

The supply situation. ¹

In having a war with France at hand, the allies were faced with the huge task of provisioning the hundreds of thousands of men of the coalition.

Given this scale, the unjustness of requisitions from the people of friendly states on one side and the insufficient financial means of the main powers of Europe involved – Prussia, England, Austria and Russia – to purchase provisions on commercial terms on the other, ways had to be sought for the solution of this problem.

It was the Prussian statesman Stein [²] who came up with the idea of establishing inter-governmental contracts for supplies, payable at fixed rates with deferred settlement dates; the individual suppliers would be paid by their own governments and not by the foreign armies.

Within this context, the contractors would be the powers mentioned, as these were the ones which had formally declared war on Napoleon.

As Britain was on a different footing in this (see above), the other powers attempted to agree upon subsistence arrangements which would be binding upon the entire Continental alliance.

Using statistical data, Austria, Prussia and Russia defined geographical zones for Germany (i.e. the territories of the German princes), called “rayons.” Each of them was to supply the armies of a great power for three months until those armies should be able to draw upon French resources as they advanced.

It meant for Prussia the assignment of supplying the Hanseatic towns, Hanover, Brunswick, Rhenish Prussia and north-west Germany. Austria was to supply Baden, Württemberg and Bavaria while Russia would be responsible for the middle German states, Saxony, Bamberg, Ansbach etc.

The proposal in this way was agreed upon and formalised in séances held by a special committee (in which Austria, Russia and Prussia were represented) at Vienna on the 21st and 30th of April. ³

Right from the start, Britain, although relying in part upon German contingents, was excluded from the German rayon scheme. Wellington’s British army (including the King’s German Legion) and the regular Hanoverian contingent would get their supplies from British sources, paying cash at a commercial rate, while the Netherlands forces drew upon their own sources.

And it was from this that complications came up.

Though Brunswick, Hanover (with a second contingent), Nassau and the Hanseatic towns were supposed to send troops to Belgium, no arrangements had been made at Vienna for their subsistence there.

First of all, their home governments were in the Prussian rayon and therefore were to deliver supplies for the Prussian army. And secondly, as the king of the Netherlands was no party in the agreements made at Vienna, this would mean that, strictly speaking, these contingents were to draw upon the Netherlands sources (for commercial rates).

At Vienna, British objections to this situation were dismissed by the statement that the rayon system was for Germany and that Britain could not have a rayon inside the country. ⁴

From the very start of the Prussian presence in the Low Countries, the supply of the Prussian army must have been a matter of great concern and strain between the two countries.

Before the corps of Von Zieten moved into Namur on the 2nd of April, Von Röder wrote on the 31st of March: “Was die Verpflegung anbetrifft, so sind die holländischen Kommissarien angewiesen worden, mit den unsrigen alles Erforderliche zu vereinbaren, damit es an nichts fehle.” ⁵

This arrangement, however vital, was a bilateral one between the Netherlands and Prussia, provoked by the emergency of the situation; apart from that, no price or payment terms seem to have been set.

And as Wellington had arrived in Brussels a few days later and asked Gneisenau to move the Prussian army further west, so as to be nearer to his army he wrote him: “Je dois avertir votre Excellence que le roi des Pays Bas a donné ses ordres que les mesures soient prises pour pouvoir vos troupes de tout ce qu’il leur faudra quand elles s’avanceront dans ce pays-ci.”⁶

Resulting, general Von Röder wrote to Wellington on the 8th of April:

“Son Excellence Monsieur le duc de Wellington est supplié de vouloir accorder son intervention pour assurer la subsistance des troupes prussiennes cantonnants sur la rive gauche de la Meuse, tant en vivres qu’en fourrages.”⁷

For the Prussians, Wellington was the guarantee of the promise of king Willem to take care of the supplies Blücher’s army needed.

In that context it was on the 27th of May that Von Müffling reported to the Prussian king: “[...] worauf der Herzog mir die ganzen Wiener Verhandlungen, im Betref der Rayons mittheilte und hierzu sagte: er habe den König der Niederlande aufgefordert die Verpflegung für uns besorgen zu lassen, und die Ausgleichungen (die ihm nicht fehlen könnten) auf diplomatischem Wege zu fordern.”⁸

Yet, the system did not work the way it was supposed to do as magazines were not supplied in time and the local governments responsible for the distribution of the supplies did not do what they were supposed to do.

It led Gneisenau to write a complaint about the situation to Von Boyen on the 18th of April:

“Sie haben, verehrter Freund, unsere Lage hier richtig beurteilt. Der Feind wird uns so bald nicht von hier vertreiben, aber wohl der Hunger. Vorderhand zwar ist noch einigermaßen gesorgt, wie lange dies aber noch in diesen Hungersmonaten bis zur Ernte dauern werde, lässt sich nicht vorher bestimmen. In diesem Augenblick schon isst unsere Kavallerie Hafer, der auf französischem Gebiet gewachsen ist. Wird die Sperre verhängt, dann treten Verlegenheiten ein.

Die Anstellung des Grafen Dohna-Wundlaken neben dem Gouverneur Sack ist ebenfalls schädlich und die Einheit störend. Um die Verpflegung der Armee zu sichern, ordnete der Graf an, dass fortan die Einwohner ihre Einquartierung zu ernähren hätten, und zwar ohne Vergütung. Nun ist die Eifel und die Ardennen ein sehr armes Land und bereits sehr hart mitgenommen. Sollte die Anordnung des Grafen Dohna in Ausführung ferner noch gebracht werden, so müssten die Einwohner auswandern. Nun ist den Gouvernementskommissärs hier in Luxemburg und Koblenz aufgetragen, für die Verpflegung der Truppen auf Wegen der Lieferung durch Kontrakte oder Ausschreibungen, wo solche ausführbar sind, zu sorgen. Ein Teil unserer Truppen ist auf belgisches Gebiet gerückt, und der König der Niederlande hat die Verbindlichkeit übernommen, sie verpflegen zu lassen, aber das geschieht nicht in der ganzen Ausdehnung, und Stockungen nebst Klagen von beiden Seiten haben sich schon ergeben, weswegen ich den o.K.Kommissär Ribbentrop nach Brüssel zur Abhilfe gestern gesandt habe. [...]”⁹

And Gneisenau wrote a second one on the 8th of May, again to Von Boyen:

“Über die Verpflegung in dem sehr ausgezehreten Lande zwischen Maas, Mosel und Rhein steigern sich meine Besorgnisse mit jedem Tage. Ich sehe den Augenblick kommen, wo wir dieses Land verlassen und ein anderes suchen müssen, wo wir zu leben finden. Das ist unter den jetzigen Verhältnissen allein Brabant. Jetzt können wir aus diesem Lande (Brabant) nur durch Unternehmer etwas ziehen, nämlich wenn wir bezahlen. Aber an Geld fehlt es in allen Kassen. Gehen wir aber auf das linke Maasufer, so leben wir von den Vorräthen der Einwohner und geben höchstens Bons. Diese Maasregel vereinigt sich auch mit einer andern. Unsere beiden ersten Armeekorps nämlich stehen das eine bei Fleurus, das andere bei Namur. Wenn der Feind aus seinen Festungen schnell vordringt, so können sie mit Übermacht angegriffen werden. Wenn wir aber das vierte Armeekorps ebenfalls auf das linke Maasufer

versetzen und es einen Marsch östlich von Gembloux aufstellen, so kann es zur Schlacht sich vereinigen. Das noch schwache dritte Armeekorps kann in diesem Falle bei dem Kreuzwege unweit Ciney aufgestellt werden, um einer etwaigen Detachierung des Feindes von Givet nach Lüttich zu begegnen. Die Gegend daselbst ist sehr schwierig.

Ich vernehme dass kaiser Alexander seine Armee zwischen die drei andern einschieben will. In diesem Fall können also wir das Kriegstheater an der Mosel nicht erhalten und wir müssen danach uns auf das an der Maas vorbereiten. Wundern Sie sich daher nicht, wenn Sie vernehmen, dass wir eine neue Aufstellung angenommen haben. Die Kriegsregel: schnell vereinigt seyn zu können und die Nothwendigkeit: dem Mangel vorzubeugen, sind für eine solche Bewegung hinlängliche Motive; selbige kann aber nicht ausgeführt werden bevor das Vierte Armeekorps nicht heran ist.”¹⁰

Apparently, the mission of commissary Von Ribbentrop as sent out by Gneisenau by the 18th of April had not been very successful.

By now, the Prussian army lived from the inhabitants by paying them with promissory notes, as it lacked the money to pay them in cash. However, the Dutch authorities either refused to accept them and return them in cash, or were very slow in doing so. This, in turn, was of course detrimental to the relationships between the Prussians and the local inhabitants.

It even touched upon units of the army of the Netherlands, as for instance commanders of cantonments of the cavalry brigade of Van Merlen complained to Van Merlen himself about requisitions being carried out there for the Prussian army as well.¹¹

By the 29th of April, it led Provost - first counsellor to the embassy in Brussels - to write to Metternich: “Quelque justice que l’on rende à la valeur que les troupes prussiennes ont déployé dans les dernières campagnes, il n’en est pas moins vrai que leur conduite dans les endroits où elles sont actuellement en cantonnements les fait détester, et surtout dans le pays de Liège qu’elles épuisent totalement et de vivres et de contributions en argent; elles traitent ce pays et la province de Luxembourg en pays ennemi. Cette conduite contraste singulièrement avec celle des troupes anglaises et hanovriennes qui payent exactement ce qu’on leur fournit; ces dernières commettent bien aussi quelques petits excès, mais au moins elles ne battent et ne maltraitent pas les habitants comme font les Prussiens.[..]”¹²

By the 1st of May, the situation was such that even the Prussians were threatening to withdraw their forces across the Rhine, while they had been obliged, since entering the Low Countries, to feed them from Jülich.¹³

Two weeks later, on the 14th of May, Wellington sent a sharp reaction about the real situation in the Low Countries, contrary to what was said about it in Vienna.

He indicated to Clancarty the fact that, first of all, neither Hanover, nor Brunswick nor Prussia were paying any money for their troops in the Low Countries, and secondly, that it was not true that the Prussians drew their magazines from Jülich.

At the same time, the duke did not see these points worth disputing. What counted for him was the great interest of the allies and as far as both previous points respecting the rayons was concerned he left it to Clancarty to make such an arrangement as he thought proper.

For Wellington the bitter discussion over rations was secondary to what the allies were supposed to do: to endeavour to lessen their expenses and for Britain to “assist them as much as possible in drawing every resource from the countries within their reach, in order to enable them to subsist the enormous bodies which they are bringing to bear upon one point.”¹⁴

Meanwhile, it was on the 21st of May that king Willem sent a letter to Gneisenau in which he stated that the presence of the Prussian troops was too much of a burden to his country and that it was desirable to alleviate it, one way or another.¹⁵

Colonel Hardinge wrote about it on the 22nd, after the letter had dropped in at Namur:

“General Gneisenau informs me a letter has just been received from the King of the Netherlands, the substance of which announces that the Prussian troops are felt to be a very

heavy charge to this part of this country, and that it is desirable to consider of means to alleviate the pressure. It is intended to answer that the Prussians did not come uninvited, or purely for Prussian objects, and that if the King is decidedly of opinion that their services are no longer required, they will move on the Moselle, where, he added, the right bank afforded abundant subsistences and where the entrance into France presented none of impediments of fortified places with which the Belgian frontier was crowded.”¹⁶

The substance of the answer, as written by colonel Von Pfuel of the general staff, on the 24th of May is unknown, but the general tone may have been in the line Hardinge wrote the day after.¹⁷

Before, Wellington wrote Hardinge on the 24th:

“In regard to the king of the Netherlands, his case is a very hard one. This subsistence of the Prussian army ought to be provided for on a trifling payment by a rayon, consisting of different countries in Germany, and on the left of the Rhine, as lately settled by the Congress. The circumstances of our general situation require they should be here; for I can never admit that all the allies have not nearly an equal interest in preventing this country from falling, even for a moment, into the hands of the enemy; and the King of the Netherlands is obliged not only to maintain them at the expense of 200,000 pound sterling a month which is saved to the rayon, which ought to maintain them; but they do not pay him what they would be obliged to pay the rayon, from which they ought to be subsisted; and he besides gives subsistence to the whole of the army under my command, to which his country belongs as a rayon.

The King does not complain of subsisting them; and I believe they have been, and will be, as well taken care of in his country as on the Moselle or elsewhere; but he complains of the expense, which ought not to fall upon him, but partly on the King of Prussia, and partly on the countries forming the rayon of the Prussian army.

I beg you will explain this point to general Gneisenau. As soon as we understand well the basis on which this question stands, I will enter farther into it.”¹⁸

Hardinge wrote as a reply on the 25th of May:

“I spoke with general Gneisenau this forenoon on the subject of the subsistence of the Prussian troops by the King of the Netherlands. I introduced the conversation by asking if the general had received the Vienna arrangements for the subsisting of the allied armies by rayons of countries. He said he had not; and that he knew nothing more on the subject than the references made to such a system in the letters he had lately received, and by the information he had obtained from general Grollmann, who happened to be at Vienna at the time the Commission was sitting. I then explained the points, according to your Lordship’s instructions, which render the case of the King of the Netherlands a hard one. The general admitted the expense to be very heavy: his reasoning on the questions was, that when circumstances rendered it expedient that the Prussian troops should enter Belgium, it was stipulated that their subsistence should be provided at the expense of the King of the Netherlands, and that your Lordship was a party, or the guarantee to this stipulation, and the principal cause of the readiness with which the movement was made without magazines or means to supply their troops; that the King of the Netherlands can only complain of the heaviness of the expense, and require an indemnity, since the period of the Vienna arrangement taking effect; and that he has no doubt the redress which those arrangements point out for the case of a rayon furnishing more than its own army will be fairly fulfilled on the part of the King of Prussia; and that he knows corn and other supplies are sending by Prussia to Rotterdam; but that the agitating of this subject by the King in writing in the style of a complaint to this head-quarters on a matter requiring representation between the two Courts is calculated to have any but a good effect; and that on several occasions of unpleasant communications from the Netherlands government, he has abstained from any mention of them in his despatches to the King of Prussia for the purpose of avoiding any sharp

correspondence. However, if the King's ministers continue to seize with eagerness every opportunity of collecting grievances of the ruin of the country by the Prussians, that the latter may be compelled to make a printed statement of the causes to which these misfortunes are attributable, which, he acknowledged, were severe, but maintained were owing to the bad measures of the government in their arrangements of magazines, and to the ignorance of their commissaries, and that in most instances the irregularity in the supplies had produced the irregularities of discipline. The general then remarked, that if a country like Prussia, poor in money, makes an extraordinary effort in men, and raises 25.000 upon each million of its population, whilst its wealthy ally has not raised 8000 on a million, the more energetic proceeding ought to be assisted.

During this conversation strong expressions were used towards the Belgian government, showing the acrimony and bad understanding which exist between the two Courts.”¹⁹

Parallel to these words as uttered by Gneisenau towards Hardinge, he made similar complaints about the total lack of money of the army and the lack of cooperation of the King of the Netherlands towards Hardenberg and Von Dörnberg.²⁰ At the same time, Gneisenau expressed his discontent about the supply situation to the representative of the Netherlands in the Prussian general staff, baron Van Panhuys. In this connection, if it would be down to the supply situation only, he also mentioned to him the consideration to move the mobile army from the Netherlands towards the rivers Saar and Moselle.²¹

Blücher seems to have discussed the issue with the King when he was in Brussels on the 29th of May. It was on the same day that Von Brockhausen, the Prussian ambassador to the Netherlands, reported that the King promised to take care of the subsistence, while repeating at the same time, however, that the Prussians had to pay for it; he denied having declared that he would take over these costs.²²

It was also on the 28th of May that king Willem had talked to Wellington on the supply problems for the Prussian army. As a result, the duke wanted to assist him as much as he could and it was for that reason that he made means of transport of his army available for the Belgian authorities. This was accepted and on the 30th of May Wellington put the matter in hand with the Netherlands military authorities.²³

Meanwhile, during their visit to Brussels, the Prussian high command was received by king Willem to talk about the issue. The meeting was also attended by Prussia's ambassador, Von Brockhausen though doesn't seem to have been present. Willem repeated that he would undertake to supply provisions to the Prussian army but he denied that he had ever said that he promised to bear the costs involved. As the Prussians claimed he had done so, the meeting broke up without agreement.²⁴

In this situation, it was on the 4th of June that Blücher took his share in the complaints, towards the Prussian king, as apparently the situation hadn't improved:

[...] “Die lange Verzögerung des Anfangs der Feindseligkeiten halte ich für höchst nachtheilig. Der Feind verstärkt sich von jetzt an verhältnismässig weit mehr als wir, und Bonaparte gewinnt wieder Zeit, seine Macht im Innern Frankreichs fest zu gründen. Da ferner hier durch die nicht guten Anstalten der niederländischen Behörden die Verpflegung mit jedem Tage schlechter und die Last für das Land drückender wird, so muss ich Ew. Majestät allerunterthänigst bitten, den Anfang der Feindseligkeiten möglichst zu beschleunigen.”²⁵

Also, on the 6th of June, Blücher also issued a proclamation stating that his troops were entitled to seize provisions when local suppliers failed in their duty.²⁶

Meanwhile, early June, Wellington must have received Clancarty's letter dated 26th of May, which was a reaction of his letter of the 14th. Clancarty had forwarded this letter to Hardenberg and to the Hanoverian minister at Vienna, count Münster.

The Prussian delegates gave no reaction, while count Münster “remarked that the binding arrangements imposed by the three autocracies on the smaller states in western Germany were not matched by anything similarly binding on Austria or Russia or most of Prussia; that Prussia was claiming, from the rayon allocated to her, subsidised provisions for “280.000 men and 70.000 horses” and additionally for units which should not form part of the agreement, although in reality the three army corps under Blücher “are at present actually maintained by the Low Countries”. It would seem, therefore, the the Prussian claims about reliance upon Jülich (Rhenish Prussia) were suspect, if not bogus.²⁷

Apparently there have been contacts between the Prussian commissaries and the authorities of the Low Countries in which the duke of Wellington may have played a role as on the 6th of June he wrote in a memorandum that a conference with the Prussian Commissaries had already produced “an arrangement satisfactory to them for the formation of their magazines”²⁸

It suggests as if some kind of solution, at least for the formation of magazines, had been found but it was on the very same day that Blücher issued a decree which allowed his troops, due to the inconsistency of the supplies, to live at the cost of the local inhabitants.

It was also still on the 9th of June that sir Charles Stuart wrote to Castlereagh that the Netherlands “are unable to support the Prussian army for a longer period than a month to come. The Prussians are aware of this and anxious to move.”²⁹

As the process dragged on till the very moment of the French invasion of Belgium, relations between the Prussian general headquarters and the King of the Netherlands continued and reached its lowest point as Gneisenau wrote to Hardenberg on the 12th of June:

“Ew.Durchlaucht wollen geruhen, das was die folgende Zeilen enthalten, als eine blosse Privatmittheilung und nicht als einen offiziellen Bericht anzusehen, da der Gegenstand derselben von einer zu zarten Natur ist, als dass ich mir erlauben könnte, ein Aktenstück damit zu füllen, und selbiger dennoch zur Kenntniss von Ew.Durchlaucht gebracht werden muss.

Der König der Niederlande ist als ein heftiger Feind Preussens zu betrachten. Seinen Hass gegen den König, unsern Herrn, trägt er auch auf uns, seine Diener über, und trotz allen gezwungenen Höflichkeitsformen bricht dieser bei der mindesten Veranlassung aus.

Die Verpflegung unserer Armee hier bietet hiezu häufige Gelegenheiten dar. Oft sind, wie ich vermuthet durch absichtliche Stockungen, die Truppen ohne Lebensmittel und diese dann genöthigt, ihre Verpflegung von den Bequartirten zu fordern, wodurch Bedrückungen des armen Unterthanen entstehen.

Als ich den interimischen Befehl über die Truppen hier übernahm und der König der Niederlande sowohl als der Herzog von Wellington unsere Hülfe verlangten, willigte ich nicht eher darein, bis nicht der König sowohl als der Herzog unsere Verpflegung uns zugesagt hatten. Es war meine Pflicht dem König unserm Herrn diese Ersparniss zu machen, und ich benutzte gern die günstige Gelegenheit.

Jetzt, wo die Gefahr eines feindlichen Angriffs fast verschwunden ist, fällt es dem kargen König, der durch unterlassene Rüstungen ansehnliche Schätze gespart hat, empfindlich, unsere Truppen zu ernähren, und er hat schon Versuche gemacht, davon sich zu entbinden; ja er ging hierin so weit, dass er sich nicht entblödete, zu leugnen, er habe jemals es übernommen, unsere Truppen zu verpflegen. Hiegegen spricht aber das Zeugniss des Generals von Röder, das des Gesandten von Brockhausen und endlich das des Herzogs von Wellington, gegen den er, zur Zeit unserer Verhandlungen über Hülfeleistung und Verpflegung, geäußert hatte: es falle ihm zwar hart, uns zu ernähren, indessen sei es doch besser, Preussen zu ernähren als Franzosen. Auch habe ich nicht eher die Hülfeleistung zugesagt, bevor nicht der Herzog von Wellington die Bürgschaft über die Verpflegung

übernommen hatte. Denn aus einem früheren Vorgang noch aus der Zeit der Untersuchungs-Kommission her ist mir bewusst, wie wenig der König der Niederlande Anstand nimmt etwas abzuleugnen.

Wenn daher dieser Herr auf diplomatischen Wege und auf die Rayonsbestimmungen zu Wien sich gründend eine Vergütung der uns geleisteten Verpflegung unterhandeln wollte, so kann aus den hiesigen Verhandlungen dargethan werden, dass ihm solche nicht gebühre, und ich habe stets alle derlei Anträge abgewiesen, so wie einen, der mir vor wenigen Tagen wurde: nämlich unsere Armee aus den Magazinen von Maestricht und Venloo zu verpflegen und das Entnommene wieder aus den dem preussischen Rayon ankommenden Vorräthen zu erstatten. Ein schlimmer Umstand ist, dass uns noch aus den abgetretenen Ländern am rechten Maasufer etwa 1 ½ Millionen Franken rückständiger Einkünfte zukommen, die er sicherlich uns vorzuenthalten trachten wird, so wie die Vergütung des durch den General von Bülow in den Festungen eroberten Geschützes [...]

Als der Baron Reinhardt in Aachen war angehalten worden und er erfuhr, dass dies auf einen Wink von Brüssel aus, geschehen sei, so brach er ganz entrüstet aus: "So ! also der König der Niederlande ! Wenn nur der Preussische Hof wüsste, welche Anträge er Frankreich zu einer Verbindung gegen Preussen gemacht."

Diese Aesserung vermochte mich um so mehr, auf Sendung der Papiere des Baron Reinhardt an Ew.Durchlaucht zu bestehen. Der Major Dumoulin leitete einst die Unterredung mit dem König auf diesen Gegenstand, und da gestand dieser seine Anträge an Frankreich und setzte hinzu, was ich bereits früher Ew.Durchlaucht zu melden die Ehre hatte, nämlich: da er unter den andern Mächten Freunde nicht habe finden können, so habe er wol dahin sich wenden müssen, wo er hätte hoffen dürfen Freundschaft zu finden.

Es ist in diesem Lande jedem Unterrichteten ausser allem Zweifel, dass der König der Niederlande bei einem den verbündeten Waffen zustossenden Unfall sogleich trachten werde, Friede und Bündniss mit Frankreich zu schliessen, sofern dieses nur will. Zu einem entgegengesetzten rühmlichen Entschluss mangelt ihm Seelengrösse und Einsicht." ³⁰

Supply problems for the Anglo-Netherlands-German were virtually non-existent, at least there are no records of such problems.

Most of the supplies were either sent directly from England or taken from the local inhabitants and paid for in cash right away.

Apparently, the only instance of complaint about the subsistence seems to have come from the duke of Brunswick late May, after his units had reached their cantonments in and near Brussels.

Wellington's reaction of the 1st of June explains on the system used for the allied armies in the Netherlands in general:

"That to which Your Highness is entitled in this country, as one of the Powers adhering to the treaty of the 25th of March, is a certain ration for each man and horse in your service, of which Your Highness has a statement as fixed by the Powers of Europe and their Ministers assembled in congress at Vienna; and this ration is regularly delivered to Your Highness'troops, as I am informed. It is delivered from the British magazines under a particular arrangement with the King of the Netherlands, who will have to pay for what is delivered, and Your Highness will have to pay to his said Majesty the price for each ration fixed by common consent in Congress.

I have no authority to consent to alter the quantity or the quality of this ration, either from the King of the Netherlands or my own sovereign; and, if Your Highness chooses that your troops should receive more than it has been fixed by common consent that they should receive from this country, it will be necessary that you should pay for it, not the price fixed by common

consent, because that price is applicable only to the fixed ration, but its real value in the markets of the country.

I believe Your Highness labours under a mistake regarding the supplies taken by the Allies from your Highness's dominions. The ration taken from Your Highness's country by the Prussian army is the same as that delivered to your Highness's troops here from the British magazines, for which ration your Highness's treasury will be entitled to receive the same sum as that which your Highness will have to pay to the King of the Netherlands." ³¹

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¹ This chapter is largely based upon:

Hofschröder, P. 1815. The Waterloo campaign. Wellington etc. p.118-121

Lettow Vorbeck, O.von - Napoleon's Untergang Vol.III p.179-184

Hussey, J. "Provisioning the allied armies in 1815." In: First Empire (2007), nr.94 p.23-27

² Stein, Karl, Freiherr vom und zum , 1757-1831, Prussian statesman and reformer. Rising through the Prussian bureaucracy, he became minister of commerce (1804-7) but was dismissed by King Frederick William III for his attempts to increase the power of the heads of the ministries. He was recalled (1807) as chief minister after Prussia's defeat by the French only to be dismissed again (1808) on pressure by Napoleon I . An exile in Russia, Stein helped to bring about the Russo-Prussian alliance of 1813 and returned to prominence as chief administrator of the reconquered and newly conquered Prussian provinces, following the Wars of Liberation against Napoleon. His hopes for a united Germany were disappointed at the Congress of Vienna, and his role after 1815, when Prussia turned to reaction, was not prominent. Few men have achieved as many radical and successful reforms in so peaceful a manner and in such difficult circumstances as did Baron Stein. His chief reforms were carried out in 1807-8, when Prussia was a defeated nation and a virtual dependency of France. They were continued by K. A. von Hardenberg after Stein's exile, and they were forwarded by such men as Gerhard von Scharnhorst in the military field and Wilhelm von Humboldt in the educational system. Before Stein's reforms Prussia was still a semifeudal state. Stein caused the king to abolish serfdom and the estate system by the Edict of 1807. The law ended the restrictions against the sale to burghers of land owned by nobles; those restrictions had had disastrous effects on Prussian economy, for the nobles lacked the capital to till their land properly. The edict also opened all trades and professions to all classes. Stein instituted local self-government in towns, cities, and provinces. His administration transformed Prussia into a modern state and enabled it to play its leading role in the eventual unification of Germany. Stein was also responsible for the publication, beginning in 1826, of the *Monumenta Germaniae Historica*, which became the model for editions of national historical documents. In: <http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1E1-Stein-Ka.html>

³ In: WSD, Vol.X p.207-212

⁴ Lord Stewart to Wellington, 1st of May 1815. In: WSD, Vol.X p.205-207

⁵ Ollech, Von Geschichte etc. p.9

⁶ WD, Vol.XII p.288-289

⁷ WSD, Vol.X p.47-48

⁸ In: Lettow Vorbeck, O.von – Napoleons Untergang Vol.III p.510

⁹ In: Lettow Vorbeck, O.von – Napoleon's Untergang Vol.III p.510

¹⁰ Delbrück, H. Das Leben etc. Vol.IV p.503

Lettow Vorbeck. O.von – Napoleon's Untergang p.179-180

¹¹ Cf. Van Merlen (at Binche) to Constant Rebecque, dated 19th April 1815. In: NA, 2.13.14.01 nr.7-8

¹² In: Gedenkstukken etc. Vol.VII p.344

¹³ Lord Stewart to Wellington, 1st of May 1815. In: WSD, Vol.X p.206

¹⁴ WD, Vol.XII p.386

¹⁵ Cf. Prussian register of staff. In: GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.VII nr.6 p.13. The letter reached Gneisenau on the 22nd of May.

¹⁶ In: WSD, Vol.X p.337

¹⁷ The heading of the letter written by Von Pful reads: “Obrist v.Pful an S.Maj.Kg.der Niederlande. Betrifft die Verpflegung der Truppen und der darüber getroffenen Verordnungen.” In: GSA, VPH-HA, VI, nr.VII nr.6 p.13
Colonel Ernst Heinrich Adolf von Pful (1779-1866) was later an infantry general, a reformer of the military sports and prime minister and minister of war.

¹⁸ WD, Vol.XII p.422

¹⁹ WSD, Vol.X p.368-369

²⁰ In: Delbrück, H. Das Leben etc. Vol.IV p.511-512

²¹ Baron Van Panhuys to baron Van der capellen, 24th May 1815. In: NA, 2.05.01 nr.771
Von Nostitz claims that, thanks to him, it was Van Panhuys who joined Prussian headquarters specifically to deal with the problems related to the supply of the army, and what he would have done very well (according to Von Nostitz). In: Das Tagebuch etc. p.14

²² At some point of time, colonel Von Nostitz, aide de camp of Blücher, would have been sent to Von Brockhausen to discuss the supply problem with the King. As Von Brockhausen would not have done so, Von Nostitz would have managed to talk with the minister of the interior . The result was that the king sent major Van Panhuys to Namur to settle this matter. According to Von Nostitz he did, but from my data it becomes clear that it was a problem also in June. In: Das Tagebuch etc. p.14

²³ Cf. Wellington to general baron Tindal, the Netherlands liaison officer at his headquarters – 30th of May 1815. In: WD, Vol.XII p.429

²⁴ In: Hussey, J. – Preparing to invade France etc. p.17

²⁵ Ollech, Von – Geschichte etc. p.51

²⁶ In: Hussey, J. – Preparing to invade France etc. p.17

²⁷ Hussey, J. – Provisioning the allied armies in 1815 p.25
Cf. Count Münster to Clancarty, 26th May 1815. In: WSD, Vol.X p.380-381

²⁸ WD, Vol.XII p.444

²⁹ TNA, FO 37/79

³⁰ Delbrück, H. Das Leben etc. Vol.IV p.518
Also in: Lehmann, M. Zur Geschichte etc. p.276-278

³¹ WD, Vol.XII p.433-434