

The Prussian intervention. The 1st corps.

The moment the advance guard of the 1st corps got north of Ohain at 6 p.m. (¹), sir H. Vivian got the order through captain Seymour (aide de camp of Lord Uxbridge) to reinforce the centre of the line. After that, he sent this captain with a patrol towards Ohain to verify whether they were Prussians. Having spoken with them, captain Seymour confirmed this to Lord Uxbridge, who was accompanied by Wellington. The duke then instructed Seymour to ask the Prussian commander for immediate support. Seymour left, but soon lost his horse, after which colonel Freemantle (aide de camp of Wellington) left for the Prussian advance-guard. ² Here he spoke briefly probably with generals Von Reiche and Von Steinmetz; he was told that the corps wasn't supposed to detach any units; with this information Freemantle returned to Wellington. ³

As Zieten himself was further to the rear in the column, it was his chief of staff, colonel Von Reiche, who preceded the column to find out about Wellington's situation. Von Reiche entered the battlefield on the road which leads from there to Ohain and here he bumped into the units of the Nassau troops of Saksen Weimar at the extreme left flank of Wellington's frontline. ⁴

General Von Müffling had also been there for some time by then in observation of the Prussian whereabouts in order to coordinate their movements. ⁵ Von Müffling made it clear to Von Reiche that the Anglo-Netherlands-German army needed immediate assistance and that there was no time to lose. Von Müffling then indicated that direct support was urgently needed at the extreme left flank of the army as Wellington had already moved troops from there to support his centre.

This support, he suggested, was best to be implemented by speeding up the march of the 1st corps, by reinforcing the vanguard with a battery of 12-pounders to be directed to the height in rear of Papelotte and the reserve-battery to be sent to join the British extreme left wing. ⁶

Von Reiche now rejoined the advance-guard of the corps when it was just west of the Chapelle Notre Dame de Bon Secours (⁷) and east of the road Haut-Ransbeek - Cheval de Bois that captain Von Scharnhorst, an aide de camp of Blücher, joined him. It was about 6.30 p.m. ⁸

Von Scharnhorst gave Von Reiche Gneisenau's order for general Zieten to wheel the corps to the left in order to join the 4th corps. Von Reiche referred to the serious situation at Wellington's extreme left flank, but Scharnhorst did not accept this and referred Von Reiche to his responsibility in case he would not accept and follow orders of general headquarters. ⁹

As the advance guard arrived and Zieten was not there, Von Reiche now got into a painful situation. He had the troops halt, but soon after general Von Steinmetz, commander of the 1st brigade, joined him. Without showing any understanding whatsoever for the situation he insisted that the troops continued their march. As Von Reiche refused to do this, Von Steinmetz restarted the march of his troops on his own. By doing so the units of the advance guard now took the road which leads through Cheval de Bois to the units of the 4th corps. Von Reiche, in his turn, now took the decision to have the troops return to the crossing, but just at that moment general Zieten arrived at the scene. Reiche explained him the situation and Zieten decided to follow the road towards Wellington's left flank. ¹⁰ By now, it was running towards 7 p.m. ¹¹

Around the same time, Zieten received a note from colonel Von Valentini, chief of staff of Bülow, stating the need for Zieten's forces in order to relieve the French resistance against the 4th Prussian corps. The message was carried by Jäger Diederichs; Zieten sent him back the message stating he would do his utmost to speed up his troops, as he still didn't have enough troops in front to engage. ¹²

The Prussian battalions now continued their advance towards the Chapelle Jacques (¹³) which they reached around 7 p.m. ¹⁴ From there, the Prussians entered the battle.

The brigade of Von Steinmetz formed the advance-guard and the brigade had in its front the 1st

regiment Silesian hussars [¹⁵], the Brandenburg dragoons, and the horse and foot batteries nr.7; then followed both companies of Silesian sharpshooters and the 3rd battalion of the 12th and the 3rd battalion of the 24th regiment. ¹⁶ The main body of the brigade was formed by the remaining battalions, plus the 1st regiment of Westphalian Landwehr.

As the advance-guard was too far ahead from the main body, an intermediate advance-guard was formed near the wood of Ohain with the 1st and 2nd battalion of the 24th regiment. ¹⁷ In the rear of the advance-guard marched the reserve cavalry of Von Röder. Here, the Brandenburg uhlans (in rear of the 1st squadron) was accompanied by horse battery nr.2 ¹⁸ Zieten engaged his troops first by opening fire of both batteries he had available, the horse and foot batteries nr.7.

Initially, both these batteries had taken up positions in front of Smohain, the foot battery to the left and the horse battery to the right. ¹⁹ They now fired upon the village and the adjoining valley. Soon after however, four guns of the foot battery no.7 moved to a position above the farms of La Haye and Papelotte as they were no longer needed to the left. It was also here that some time later the horse battery no.2 was placed, just next to the artillery of Winssinger, who had run out of ammunition. ²⁰ It was not long afterwards that horse battery no.2 had to detach two of its guns, under lieutenant Knobloch further to the left to support the four guns of the foot battery no.7 above the farm of La Haye. After having fired a few rounds, the view became very much obstructed by the smoke and the commander of horse battery nr.2, captain Von Borowsky, now moved his six guns further to the right towards the position of Best's brigade. Shortly after that, Von Borowsky also detached three of his guns led by lieutenant Patzig to the right flank of Best's brigade. ²¹ So all in all, the Prussian artillery formed a half-round line reaching from the front of Smohain onto the left flank of Wellington's front. Soon after the Prussian bombardment, which appeared to be successful, Zieten engaged some of his troops right at the same time without waiting for reinforcements. His main purpose was to take Smohain and to attack the French forces immediately behind it.

These were the two companies of Schützen led by major Von Neumann, as well as the 3rd battalion of the regiment nr.12 under major Von Goetz. These units, moving forward from the second line to the left of the artillery and from the height to the left of the road – having their skirmishers and Schützen in their front - took the village of Smohain without encountering any serious resistance whatsoever. ²² During this advance the 3rd battalion of the regiment no.12 was on the right flank, covering also the area between Smohain and the farm of La Haye. ²³

The moment the Prussian artillery and infantry units started their offensive towards Smohain, it was in its northern part and to the west of the village, in the farms, that the Nassau troops of Saksen Weimar were still holding. Having got hold of the southern part of Smohain, Durutte now tried to force a wedge between the Prussian and the Anglo-Netherlands-German army by pressing further to the north and to the west, by pushing forward strong masses of skirmishers towards the farms of La Haye and Papelotte.

Taken by surprise by the sudden Prussian advance, the Nassau troops now recoiled and were even fired at by the Prussian units as these took them for French troops because of their uniforms. ²⁴ The mutual musketry fire took about 10 minutes until the misunderstanding had been solved. Now, the Nassau troops joined the Prussians during their advance. ^{25_26}

In the third line, colonel Von Hofmann advanced with his 24th regiment of which he sent his 3rd battalion to the extreme left, to occupy the hamlet of Cheval de Bois. Both remaining battalions followed, in masses of battalions, the movement to Smohain through the valley, while the 1st and 2nd battalion of the regiment nr.12, still a bit further behind, now headed through the low ground for the farms of Papelotte and La Haye, though their advance was kept slower due to the fact that the Prussian leaders didn't want to spread out the brigade too

much. Meanwhile the troops of the 24th regiment found Smohain unoccupied, crossed through it and took up a position on the other side of it. ²⁷ Having taken up a position at Cheval de Bois, the 3rd battalion of the 24th regiment sent its two companies of skirmishers into the low ground towards Smohain. From here they supported the troops of Bülow which were in action near Fichermont. ²⁸



The slopes to the south of the low ground at Smohain.

Further behind, as a reserve, the 1st regiment Westphalian Landwehr infantry, as well as the reserve cavalry, advanced over the road which leads to the extreme left flank of Wellington's frontline. While the battalions of the 12th regiment advanced on the right side and the battalions of the 24th regiment on the left side towards Smohain, the 1st regiment of Westphalian Landwehr also faced towards the south, in a regimental column. In this way, the 1st battalion was to the right of the small road which led from the Ohain-road to the left towards Smohain while the 3rd and the 2nd (at the extreme flank) were to the left of this road. While moving towards the area between Smohain and the farm of La Haye, the 1st battalion approached the artillery which it had to cover for some time. However, as the 1st brigade was generally moving towards the southwest, a gap was about to arise between the Prussian units and those of Wellington. For this reason Von Steinmetz ordered the 1st battalion to send its skirmishers under captain Bennert, as well as the 1st Jäger-detachment, towards Wellington's front. Additionally, the skirmishers of the 3rd battalion plus the 2nd Jäger-detachment were sent in the same direction. During this march they would have been fired at by members of Wellington's army. At the same time, the 2nd battalion had to pass through a low ground, which caused it to be delayed and too far to the left from the other two battalions. In trying to keep up with them, it got the order of major Von Gillhausen to remain in the same line and follow the front battalions as a reserve. These were the musketeer battalions of the 24th regiment which were advancing to attack Smohain. During this action, major Von Rappard halted his battalion in front of the village but soon after he turned it on its western side while having his skirmishers covering him in his left flank in the village. Not much later, the battalion served as a reinforcement for the defensive position taken by major Von Hoffman on the other side of Smohain (see below). ²⁹ In this way, the Prussians assembled in front of Smohain so that they would be able to support Bülow, while at the same time the interval between these troops and Wellington was filled up by the artillery and the reserve-cavalry.

Initially Von Hoffmann was able to advance for some distance on the other side of Smohain, but by now Durutte had taken up a strong position on the heights leaning with his right on Lobau's corps and with his left on Marcognet's division. Durutte succeeded in driving Von Hoffmann back into Smohain. But soon after, Durutte yielded again as the Prussian gunfire was intensified and the British left wing still resisted the last French attempts to break it.

Now Von Hoffmann took up a defensive position on the height by including the troops which were led by Von Neumann. Hoffmann placed the Brandenburger fusiliers to the right, the Schützen in the centre and both the 1st and 2nd battalion of the 24th regiment under colonel Von Laurens to the left. All these troops now advanced, covered by strong masses of skirmishers, but soon their front appeared too small and for this reason Hoffmann extended his front while marching. While doing so, the Prussian units were faced again by the remnants of Durutte's division. An intense skirmishers fight ensued in which the Prussians were thrown back a few times. Both the 1st and 2nd battalion of the 24th regiment had a hard time, being partly thrown back and partly engaged as skirmishers. Hoffman tried to support them to the left by the 3rd battalion of the same regiment (of which battalion its skirmishers had attached themselves to the units of the 4th corps to their left) and to the right by the 2nd battalion of the 1st Westphalian Landwehr regiment. This particular battalion immediately sent forward its two platoons of skirmishers to fill the gap here. In doing this, both these battalions received quite some skirmishers of both musketeer battalions, which were for about half of their numbers engaged as skirmishers and which were led by captains Von Maltitz and Von Arnould.³⁰ Finally the fighting here was decided not so much by the Prussian success, but by the fact that the French were lacking any success in front of Wellington's army.³¹

At that moment, the situation was that Von Steinmetz had pushed his 1st and 2nd battalion of the regiment no.12 further to the south towards the right of Von Hoffmann's units. Both these battalions probably met less resistance.³² Further to the right, he pulled the skirmishers of the 1st and 3rd battalion of the Westphalian Regiment to the front in the vicinity of La Haye, and which the battalions themselves followed further to the rear.

Towards the right of the position of Von Steinmetz the 1st Silesian hussars had moved up to cover the guns of the foot battery no.7 while the 5th regiment of Brandenburger dragoons covered the horse battery no.7. In covering the artillery, the hussars had extended their right flank as far as the flank of Wellington's army. Due to the broken ground here, however, the regiment wasn't able to mean a lot except than to cover the artillery.

Meanwhile, the Prussian reserve-cavalry had advanced to a position north of the Ohain-road, thereby prolonging Wellington's left wing.³³ Sometime later the 5th regiment of Brandenburger dragoons was used to advance towards the area in the vicinity of the farms of La Haye and Papelotte, immediately followed by the 3rd regiment of Brandenburger uhlans.

In this regiment of uhlans, horse battery no.2 had marched but the moment it was engaged, it was soon covered by the 1st squadron of the regiment which was led by captain count Von Röder. As soon as the Prussian infantry had taken Smohain and passed the farms of La Haye and Papelotte, the three other squadrons of the regiment advanced.³⁴

Both regiments were led by general Von Röder himself. He led them through the low grounds between Smohain and the farm of La Haye and towards the French troops of Durutte which were on the other side, but which didn't await the charge. There only was some action of the dragoons against the French rearguard formed by skirmishers, while there also was a confrontation between the Prussian squadrons and those of Jacquinet.³⁵

Soon after their arrival the remaining regiments of Von Röder marched up as a support in the second line of the left wing of Wellington's army. These were the 1st and 2nd regiment of Kurmark Landwehr cavalry, the 1st regiment of West-Prussian dragoons, as well as two

squadrons of the 6th regiment of uhlans. ³⁶ In this position the 2nd regiment of Kurmark Landwehr cavalry was to the right, covering the battery of Von Rettberg. The 1st regiment of West-Prussian dragoons was led much further to the west in order to support the centre of Wellington's army. ³⁷

The 4th corps.

The left wing. The second attack on Plancenoit.

It was barely after his first attack on Plancenoit that colonel Von Hiller re-launched his troops towards the village for a second attempt. ³⁸ By then it was around 7 p.m. To the right, Von Hiller launched the 1st and 2nd battalion of the 15th regiment again, and now they had the support of the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 2nd regiment Silesian infantry nr.11 and the 1st and 2nd battalion of the 1st regiment Pommeranian Landwehr-infantry, both of the brigade of Von Ryssel. This force was led by major Von Wittich.

Towards the centre of Plancenoit, Von Hiller led the entire 2nd regiment of Silesian Landwehr infantry. Here, the 1st regiment Silesian Landwehr infantry was kept in reserve.

While diverting the enemy's attention to its left by an assault on the northern part of the village, led by major Von Wittich, colonel Von Hiller expected to penetrate into the centre of the village. In rushing his forces against the village, this is what he did, though none of the battalions was able to take the church and its surrounding churchyard.

Of the 2nd regiment of Silesian infantry nr.11, the 2nd battalion, led by captain Von Dresky, supported the 1st battalion, of which the skirmishers were led by captain Von Künsberg. Both battalions penetrated from their side of the village towards the centre and the churchyard, where they however were forced to leave again due to the fierce French resistance. ³⁹

By now, the French here had turned the churchyard into a kind of redoubt, being on a higher ground and surrounded by a stone wall. This redoubt was also well covered on its flanks: on its right side there was an open ground which was highly inaccessible for the enemy, as it was completely under French fire from all sides. On its left side, the houses on the other side of the passageway gave the French the possibility to give the Prussians effective volleys from both sides.

During the attack in the village, the 3rd and 2nd companies (led by 1st lieutenant Von Schätzelk and lieutenant Von Rahden) had got isolated in another lane from the other two companies, and even emerged on the other side of the village, from where they unsuccessfully tried to take the churchyard. In this action, the colour of the 2nd battalion was almost taken by the French. ⁴⁰

Due to the Prussian success, general Barrois and Pelet received reinforcements, and these were the 500 men of the 2nd battalion of the 2nd regiment grenadiers which was led by colonel Golzio. By now, it was between 7.30 and 7.45 p.m. The battalion was ordered by Napoleon: "de ne pas tirer un coup de fusil, mais d'arriver sur l'ennemi à la baionette ". ⁴¹

The French were able to drive the Prussians out again by a determined counterattack and by manoeuvring on their left flank. As they were afraid to be turned, all Prussians were eventually forced to evacuate the village, except for a few houses at the north east border of the village, where the 2nd battalion of the 1st Pommeranian Landwehr held out. Outside the village, the Prussian infantry was received by the 1st regiment Silesian Landwehr. ⁴² The musketeers of the 15th regiment were collected by Gneisenau himself. ⁴³ The second attack on Plancenoit was supported by foot battery nr.13 and immediately after, it silenced some French guns to the north of the village; in this it was supported by horse battery nr.12. ⁴⁴

The Prussian centre.

Just after or during the second attack on Plancenoit by the brigades of Von Hiller and Von Ryssel and the actions of the brigades of Von Hacke and Von Losthin against Smohain and the units of Lobau, a gap had developed in the centre of the Prussian front line.

Initially, this part of the line was occupied by artillery and skirmishers of infantry, but now a part of the reserve cavalry of the 4th corps moved here to support this thin line.⁴⁵

The units which did so were in all probability the 8th regiment of hussars (brigade of Von Watzdorff), the 1st regiment of Neumark Landwehr cavalry and the 1st regiment of Pommeranian Landwehr cavalry (both from the brigade of Von Sydow). Here they held out, despite the strong gunfire of the French; colonel Von Watzdorff was mortally wounded. In this sector of the front, a French regiment of lancers charged the Prussian skirmishers covering the front between the brigades of Losthin and Hiller.

However, it was the 8th regiment of hussars, led by major Von Colomb, having passed from the left to the centre, which advanced and drove them back up to the ranks of the 6th corps. It was here that the hussars were driven off by the fire of a square and by the threat in their flank of the 7th hussars. The Prussian regiment had also been split in two by the presence of the square and, to make things even worse, during its course towards this square the rear squadrons had ridden into the front ones, thereby causing disorder, which, however, soon was restored by captain Von Eisenhardt. Now the regiment fell back and reformed in rear of the Prussian battalions near the 2nd regiment of Silesian hussars.⁴⁶

The exact position of the 1st regiment of Neumark Landwehr cavalry is not known; it would have had a position in rear of a battery but which one is unknown. As soon as it moved forward the cavalry did the same.⁴⁷

The 1st regiment of Pommeranian Landwehr cavalry had got its position near the 3rd regiment of Silesian Landwehr cavalry, and both in rear of the infantry.⁴⁸

One of units of the 15th brigade, the fuselier battalion of the 4th regiment of Silesian Landwehr led by captain Von Conradi also moved out to its left to a position to the right of Plancenoit to protect the centre of the Prussian line. The battalion was reinforced here by half of the foot battery nr.10 led by captain Von Magenhöfer, of the 2nd corps.⁴⁹

To the immediate right of the road leading from Lasne to Plancenoit, horse battery nr.11 (reserve-artillery) had advanced and was in a favourable position until the battery was threatened on its right wing by two French columns, but these were driven back by a strong canister fire. Again, the battery was annoyed by French gunfire on its right but soon this fire was diverted by another Prussian battery further to the right, probably foot battery nr.11 or foot battery nr.14. In this way, the battery was able to wheel to the right and bombard the French columns.⁵⁰

The 12p. battery nr.5 (reserve-artillery) marched with the 13th brigade and the moment it left the Bois de Paris it was instructed by major Ziegler to take a position left of the road which leads to Plancenoit. Here, it opened fire on a distance of about 500 metres from the enemy. However, the battery had to leave its howitzers behind due a lack of ammunition for these guns. Somehow, it changed its position as a bit later foot battery nr.13 took its former position.⁵¹

Foot battery nr.14 (15th brigade) was initially kept to its former position, but as the infantry advanced to the front line, the battery got further in front as well through three positions, in rear of the infantry, over whose heads it fired on the French cavalry. It didn't suffer as the French artillery fired too high.⁵²

Further to the left, horse battery nr.11 (reserve-artillery) was able to maintain itself in three different positions, though it suffered. First of all it lost in its second position a howitzer (which had got damaged) as well as a gun (of which all the horses had been killed). In the third position another four guns had to be taken to the rear because of a lack of ammunition; this left the crew

with just two guns (loaded with canister only).⁵³ Yet one of the guns soon returned and these three guns kept firing their rounds till they had run out too. By that time, the battery joined horse battery nr.6 (reserve artillery of the 2nd corps) which supplied them with a bit of ammunition to make sure it was able to keep up its position till the end of the battle.⁵⁴

Twelve pounder battery nr.3 (reserve-artillery) had been in action for some time in the centre of the 15th brigade, until it advanced for about 300 paces to fire on some French cavalry and infantry. In this position it came to the right of foot battery nr.14. Here it lost some of its crew and horses by French skirmishing fire. As the Prussian infantry stormed to the front and the units got too near to the French the battery was unable to fire. It pulled back for some distance until it was ordered to the front again on the right, where it successfully drove back French units with canister fire on an average distance of 700 paces.⁵⁵

By now, the artillery of the 13th brigade, foot battery nr.21 entered the front line. It was split in two half batteries which got a position in the front line, to the left and right of the foot battery nr.14 and 12p.battery nr.3. As both half batteries were turned inwards, they got the opposite French artillery under a cross-fire.⁵⁶

The arrival of units of the 2nd Prussian corps.

The first units of Pirch I's corps which arrived on the battlefield were the four regiments of the reserve-cavalry, three of Von Thümen and one of Von der Schulenburg. On the battlefield itself they were joined by those of Von Sohr.⁵⁷ It was towards 7.30 p.m. (⁵⁸) The horsemen advanced in three lines under French grenade-fire, the last line on a larger distance.⁵⁹ After the request of general Bülow, the cavalry advanced to reinforce the left wing of the army. Right at that moment units of the 14th brigade streamed back from the (second) attack on Plancenoit; they were now halted by this new mass of cavalry.

In rear of the cavalry came the 5th brigade of Von Tippelskirch. As soon as it appeared on the battlefield, the cavalry wheeled further left to make space for this infantry which took up positions in close columns along the road which leads from Lasne to Plancenoit.

Further to the rear, the brigade of Von Krafft followed, doing the same in close columns in order to be able to turn right or left, according to the circumstances. Then, the reserve cavalry took up a position at some distance in rear of this infantry.⁶⁰

Soon it became clear that the left wing was in most need of help and therefore general Pirch I ordered major general Von Tippelskirch to bring his right shoulder forward and to advance to the left of the road Plancenoit-Lasne. As Von Tippelskirch's forces assembled on the battlefield, they were formed in brigade order in column to the centre, having the fusilier battalions of the 1st Pommeranian infantry nr.2 and those of the 5th regiment of Westphalian Landwehr in front. In his first line Von Tippelskirch formed the musketeer-battalions of the 1st Pommeranian regiment nr.2 and the 3rd battalion of the 25th regiment (to the left). In rear of the 1st battalion of the 1st Pommeranian regiment nr.2 was the Jäger-company led by 1st lieutenant Müller. The second line was formed by the musketeer battalions of the 25th regiment and the 5th regiment of Westphalian Landwehr. All battalions were in columns and these were densely packed on a small front.

Von Tippelskirch moved his units to the left, towards Plancenoit, but was by mistake instructed to follow the 14th brigade, a bit further to the right; the manoeuvre was soon countermanded but all this caused a delay of about 15 to 30 minutes. Then, Pirch led the brigade towards Plancenoit.⁶¹ The only batteries of the 2nd corps present, horse battery nr.6 (reserve cavalry) and foot battery nr.10 (brigade Von Tippelskirch) got into positions in the same line as those of the 4th corps.⁶² Colonel Von Hiller, who was in charge of the actions against Plancenoit, now decided to commit the brigade of Von Tippelskirch right away for a third attack upon

Plancenot, incited by Blücher himself (through lieutenant colonel Von Thiele).⁶³

The Prussian right wing.

During the second attack against Plancenot, the actions of the brigades of Von Losthin and Von Hacke with the French infantry of Lobau and Durutte and the cavalry of the divisions of Domon and Subervie between Plancenot and Fichermont continued. In this stage of the battle, large parts of the right wing of Von Losthin's brigade (led by major Von Massow) acted in large masses of skirmishers.⁶⁴

In the centre of the frontline of the 15th brigade, the 1st battalion of the 4th regiment of Silesian Landwehr infantry gradually came into the frontline. Having sent out its skirmishers, the battalion advanced and in this position it was moved in closed column to the left and right by its commander, major Von Knorr, to avoid the French gunfire.⁶⁵

The 2nd battalion of the same regiment, also somewhere in the centre, did the same; at some point of time, its skirmishers advanced towards the firing line, but within a short time they lost about half their numbers and the remainder was taken back. The battalion column was kept further back.⁶⁶

As the action increased, the skirmishers of the 1st and 2nd battalion of the 3rd regiment of Silesian Landwehr infantry (to the right and left) were pulled to the firing line which was formed here by those of the 3rd battalion of the same regiment. All in all, the Prussian skirmishing line was able to make a slow advance, followed by both the 1st and 2nd battalion.⁶⁷

It was in this situation that a part of the skirmishing line of the 2nd battalion (including 4 officers) got too far left and got involved in the actions of the 16th brigade (cf. actions at Plancenot).⁶⁸

As the 1st West-Prussian regiment of uhlans (brigade Von Schwerin) arrived from the left wing at the right wing (see above), it took up a position in rear of the infantry. As these advanced, the regiment followed and prevented the French cavalry from charging by advancing to their right and left. Now, the French cavalry confronted the Prussian skirmishers but as soon as the uhlans offered them a charge, they fled back in rear of their infantry and artillery. As the French infantry now formed squares, the uhlans went back and the French infantry sent out swarms of skirmishers. As a result, some platoons of uhlans advanced in extended order followed by the closed squadrons, after which the French yielded again.⁶⁹

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1. Report of Von Steinmetz (Kriegsarchiv, Berlin – nr.VI.E.7.II), as referred to by F.de Bas. & T'Serclaes de Wommersom In: La campagne de 1815 Vol.III p.227

Lieutenant Ingilby (battery Gardiner) says the Prussians approached before the brigade of Vivian left its position at the extreme left flank, at 6.15 / 6.30 p.m. In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.266-271

Major general Best confirms the Prussians approached by 6 p.m. In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.278-282

2. Captain H.Seymour. In: BL, Add.ms.34.707 p.471-480

In another version Seymour says that not his horse was wounded but that he was taken prisoner but was rescued by a few dragoons. In: The Croker papers, Vol.I 1884 p.124

Von Müffling, however, claims all contacts with the Prussian army went through him. In: Passages from my life, p.247

3. Lieutenant colonel Freemantle. In: BL, Add.ms.34.707 p.462-464

According to Houssaye, Freemantle met general Zieten. Freemantle himself talks about a meeting with Zieten and Bülow, but from the account of Von Reiche it becomes clear that Zieten himself wasn't in front in the column. The men involved probably were lieutenant colonel Von Reiche and colonel Von Steinmetz. In: 1815. Waterloo p.399

4. Reiche, L.von Memoiren etc. p.210-211

Houssaye puts it as if Zieten himself halted his corps and that he sent a officer to the front to find out about the situation, but this is incorrect, as it can be read from Von Reiche's account. In: Houssaye, H. 1815.Waterloo p.399

5. Müffling, Von - Passages from my life, p.247

Von Müffling in a letter written to general Von Hofmann. In: Hofmann, G.W.von - Zur Geschichte etc. p.138

Von Müffling had had already been at the extreme left wing around 2.30 / 2.45 p.m., the moment of the first grand offensive. Here, he spoke briefly with Vivian, Constant Rebecque and Van Saksen Weimar about the way he expected the Prussian forces to arrive.

Cf. Journal of Constant Rebecque. In: NA, 2.21.008.01 nr.25

Letter of Saksen Weimar to captain Van Löben Sels dated 29th August 1841. In: NL-ZuRAZ, Van Löben Sels, 0302 inv.nr.265

Sir H.Vivian. In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.99-107a

Lieutenant In gilby (battery Gardiner). Cf. his diary. In: RAI, nr.MD 797

Ingilby mentions De Lancey but this is highly improbable.

⁶ Von Müffling in a letter written to general Von Hofmann. In: Hofmann, G.W.von - Zur Geschichte etc. p.138

It was around this moment that Von Müffling and Von Reiche were joined by a mission consisting of major Von Pfuel, captain Blücher and lieutenant Von Gerlach, sent out by the general headquarters, that Zieten should come up between the 4th corps and Wellington's flank. Cf. Von Gerlach in his diary. In: Aus den Jahren preussicher Not etc. p.152

By then, yet, the Prussian staff held to a more northern direction for the 1st corps (see below).

7. This chapel, at the Ohain-road, about one kilometre of Ohain, dates from 1673. Count De Meeus had it reconstructed in 1859. Cf. Uffindell, A. On the fields of glory p.231

8. It was at the same time as the advance guard arrived at Chapelle Notre Dame de Bon Secours. According to Von Pflug Harttung it was then 18.15 p.m. In: GSA, VPH-HA VI, nr.V.4F.1 p.61

9. Reiche, L.von - Memoiren etc. p.212

10. Reiche, L.von Memoiren etc. p.212-213.

Houssaye makes a mistake here by having Zieten move to the left from fear not to be taken along in the flight of the Anglo-Netherlands-German army, and not according to the order of Prussian headquarters. On top of that, the column didn't move to the left, but the units which were in front returned to the junction of the roads without using it; before any units moved south, Zieten himself intervened. Then it was also not Von Müffling who convinced Zieten to support Wellington, but Von Reiche. In: Houssaye, H. 1815. Waterloo p.399

Also see: Von Müffling – The memoirs of baron Von Müffling etc. p.248-249

Von Müffling in a letter written to general Von Hofmann. In: Hofmann, G.W.von - Zur Geschichte etc. p.139

In this version, Von Müffling says Von Reiche was not there at all and that it was he himself who convinced Zieten to continue his march towards Wellington's flank.

According to major Von Gröben, present at the advance guard of the corps, Von Reiche was startled by the order to turn left and accordingly gave orders for the first units to turn and wheel back. Von Gröben states then that Von Müffling came and said: "Die Bataille ist verloren wenn das Korps nicht in Marsch bleibt und die Englische Armee sofort unterstützt !" Von Gröben now tried to ease down both down, when Zieten came and settled the matter. Cf. His account in: Pflug Harttung, J.von - Belle Alliance. Die Schilderung der Ereignisse vom 16.-18.Juni 1815 durch einen mitbeteiligten Generalstabsoffizier p.12

Pflug Harttung, J.von - Das 1^e preussische Korps bei Belle Alliance p.153

The brigade of Pirch II, which followed the vanguard at a distance, would also have received the order to wheel towards the 4th corps but a short time later it followed Jagow's brigade towards Wellington's army. Cf. Von Lettow Vorbeck who refers to the report of the 2nd brigade (former KA, nr.VI.E.7.II). In: Napoleon's Untergang Vol.III p.434

Cf. Die Geschichte des 28.Regiments. In: Special ABN, nr.65 p.25

It would have been now that count Von Nostitz, sent out by Blücher to speed up Zieten's march, reached general Zieten, who was about to intervene in the battle. Cf. Nostitz, Von - Das Tagebuch p.43

11. It was lieutenant Basil Jackson, member of the Royal Staff Corps and assistant of Sir W.Delancey, who rode after 7 p.m. on his own initiative towards the first units of Zieten to speed them up in supporting Wellington. He returned to the battlefield after the battle had been decided in favor of the allies. In: Notes and reminiscences of s staff officer p.54

¹² Account of Diederichs. In former KA (VI.E.35.113) cited by Von Pflug Harttung. In: GSA-VPH NA VI nr.V.4 E.1.p.62-63

13. The fact that this chapel is not indicated on contemporary maps may have to do with the fact that it was very small at that time. Cf. Navez, L. - La campagne de 1815 Vol.II p.215-216

Navez, L. - Waterloo en images p.65

This chapel would have been relocated to the farm of La Haye. Cf. Anon. A propos du champ de bataille de Waterloo p.43

The tablet on the current chapel reads: "Cette Chapelle est batie à la plus grande gloire de Dieu et de la Vièrge du Saint Rosaire afin quel prie avec nous et pour nous. Fait par Jean Jacques Vandeveld anno 1770." It is located at the Ohain-road, 1500 metres west of the Chapelle Notre Dame de Bon Secours. Sometimes the (incorrect) name of "St.Jacques" is used.

14. According to Von Müffling, Zieten reached the farm of La Haye at 7 p.m. Cf. Von Müffling in a report annexed to a letter of count Rechberg to fieldmarshal Wrede, in: Bayerisches Kriegsarchiv München. Published by: Pflugk Harttung, J.von - Archivalische Beiträge etc. Jahrbücher für die Deutsche Armee und Marine 1906 p.518

According to lieutenant Hope (92nd regiment) the Prussians were at La Haye at 7 p.m. In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.18-21

And in: Letters from Portugal etc. p.260

For the same conclusion see Von Knesebeck in his report dated 21st June 1815. In: Pflugk Harttung, J.von – Belle Alliance. Berichte etc. p.292

Officers of the 2nd regiment Nassau take it was about 6 p.m. In a letter July 1815. In: Bas, F.de & T'Serclaes de Wommersom - La campagne de 1815 Vol.III p.571

For 7 p.m. also see: Pflugk Harttung, J.von - Das 1^e Preussische Korps bei Belle Alliance p.154
Gneisenau believes it was by 7.30 p.m. that Zieten reached the battlefield. Cf. his report. In: Bas, F.de & T'Serclaes de Wommersom - La campagne de 1815 Vol.III p.486

¹⁵ Wechmar, H.von Braune Husaren etc. p.62 On the 17th of June, lieutenant Sellin had rejoined the regiment, now with 49 men (he lost one at Quatre Bras).

¹⁶ Otto, F.von Geschichte des 2.Schlesischen Jäger Bataillons nr.6 p.82
Zychlinski, Von – Geschichte etc. p.281

¹⁷ Cf. Zychlinski, F.von – Geschichte des 24ten Infanterie-Regiments. p.282
Both battalions were pulled in front of the 12th regiment which was in front of the 24th.

18. Report of Von Röder (Kriegsarchiv, Berlin nr.VI.E.7.I), as referred to by F. de Bas & T'Serclaes de Wommersom. In: La campagne de 1815 Vol.III p.227
Pflugk Harttung, J.von - Das 1^e preussische Korps bei Belle Alliance, p.145

¹⁹ In placing these batteries, both Von Reiche and Von Müffling claim to have had their share. Cf. Pflugk Harttung, J.von - Das 1^e preussische Korps bei Belle Alliance p.221-222
Müffling, Von – The memoirs of baron Von Müffling etc. p.249

According to Siborne, the horse battery no.7 took over the position from Von Rettberg, but this battery was much further to the west, on the crest of the position of Wellington's army. Cf. Siborne, W. History of the war etc. Vol.II p.191

Lehmann confirms both batteries got into action and that, despite the sodden ground, their position was a favourable one. Cf.Lieutenant colonel Lehmann. In: Former KA, VI.E.7.II.199 in GSA,VPH-HA, VI nr.VII.5.p.3

²⁰ Cf. Account of Winssinger. In: Cf. Eenens, A. - Dissertation sur la participation etc. p. 52

Winssinger states that the Prussian artillery took up a position to his right and initially fired on Anglo-Netherlands-German troops, but that thanks to his intervention to stopped doing so. The fact that Winssinger had run out of ammunition contradicts the fact as given by the diary of the 1st corps that the Nassau artillery joined the fray again. Cf. Das Tagebuch etc. In: Hafner, D. p.324 and in Pflugk Harttung, J.von - Das 1. Korps bei Belle Alliance p.215

²¹ Cf. Diary of the 1st corps. Report of the foot-battery no. 7 (VI.E.7.I.58), report of captain Von Borowsky (horse battery no.2 dated 22nd June 1815, in: Kriegstagebuch, artillery of the 1st corps p.36-38), report of Zieten (VI.E.7.I), colonel Von Lehmann (VI.E.7.I.198) In: Pflugk Harttung, J.von - Das 1^e Preussische Korps bei Belle Alliance p.215-222

²² Cf. Report of major Von Neumann. VI.E.7 I.24 Cited by Von Pflugk Harttung. In: Das 1^e preussische Korps bei Belle Alliance. P.158
Otto, F.von - Geschichte des 2.Schlesischen Jäger Bataillons nr.6 p.82

²³ Cf. report of the battalion. In: VI.E.7.I.92. Cited by Von Pflugk Harttung. In: Das 1^e preussische Korps bei Belle Alliance p.158
Diary of the 1st corps. In: Pflugk Harttung, J.von - Das 1^e Korps Zieten bei La Belle Alliance und Wavre p.200
Corporal J.K.Hechel (3rd battalion 2nd regiment of Brandenburg infantry nr.12). In: Coppens, B. & P.Courcelle. La Papelotte p.65

²⁴ Cf. Captain L.Wirths (2nd Nassau battalion). In: Aus der Schlacht bei Waterloo. In: Nassovia 1905 p.144

²⁵ Most of the Prussian sources mention the incident, except for Von Reiche. Cf. Pflugk Harttung, J.von - Das 1.Preussische Korps bei Belle Alliance.

See for the incident:

Major Von Rettberg (3rd battalion 2nd regiment Nassau). In: Pflugk Harttung, J.von – Belle Alliance. Berichte etc. p.212

Captain Von Reichenau (2nd battalion 2nd regiment Nassau). In: Pflugk Harttung, J.von – Belle Alliance. Berichte etc. p.210

Colonel Bernard Van Saxon Weimar. In letter dated 19th June 1815. In: Bas, F.de & T'Serclaes de Wommersom – La campagne de 1815 Vol.III p.568

Captain L.Wirths. In: Aus der Schlacht bei Waterloo. In: Nassovia 1905 p.144

General Von Kruse. In: Pflugk Harttung, J.von – Belle Alliance. Berichte etc. p.205

Officers of the 2nd regiment Nassau. In: Bas, F.de & T'Serclaes de Wommersom - La campagne de 1815 Vol.III p.571-572

Report of general Zieten. In: Bas, F.de & T'Serclaes de Wommersom - La campagne de 1815 Vol. III p.501

He mentions the taking of a village called "Franchemont", but must mean Smohain.

In the diary of the 1st corps the misunderstanding is not mentioned with so many words, but it states that the “enemy” evacuated the village even before the attack had been launched. This enemy were in fact the Nassau troops. In: Pflugk Harttung, J.von - Das I.Korps Zieten bei La Belle Alliance und Wavre p.200

There are indications that the Nassau units would have identified the Prussians earlier as vice versa. Cf. Notes of the officers of the 2nd regiment Nassau. In: Officers of the 2nd regiment

Nassau. In: Bas, F.de & T'Serclaes de Wommersom - La campagne de 1815 Vol. III p.571-572
Captain Von Reichenau (2nd battalion 2nd regiment Nassau). In: Pflugk Harttung, J.von – Belle Alliance. Berichte etc. p.209-210

According to Von Reiche prince Bernard van Saksen Weimar approached general Zieten, while protesting in the strongest manners. Initially, however, Zieten would not have recognized the prince as being a Nassau colonel. In: Memoiren etc. p.213-214

The fact corresponds to the statement of Van Saksen Weimar himself, that he intervened in person to general Von Zieten. In: NL-ZuRAZ, Van Löben Sels, 0302 inv.nr.265

The incident with the Prussian units has given rise to a controversy between prince Bernard van Saksen Weimar and officers of the 2nd regiment Nassau.

Saksen Weimar wrote in a letter dated 19th June 1815 that his units got in confusion due to the Prussian fire, got as far back as 15 minutes from the battlefield and that they had to be recollected there.

Van Saksen Weimar, in his diary, makes a slight variation in this, i.e. that the brigade was fired at by the Prussians and then was led from the field by him; he doesn't mention any disorder, but makes clear that by then the battle had not yet started. Cf. Diary of Van Saksen Weimar. In: ThHStAW, Grossherzogliches Hausarchiv A, XXIV 30, p.195

To these statements, major Sattler, captain Frensdorf and lieutenant Wittich reacted in a note dated 5th July 1815 and which was published in the Frankfurter Ober Postamts Zeitung. Here, they explained that an actual fire-fight had taken place, until the moment that the Nassau troops found out that they had to do with Prussians after which they corrected their mistake under the guidance of captain Von Rettberg. After that, the Nassau troops would have fought along side by side with the Prussian troops until in the evening. In: Bas, F.de & T'Serclaes de Wommersom – La campagne de 1815 Vol.III p.570-571

More as by this note, Saksen Weimar's words are refuted by the separate statements of captain Von Reichenau (2nd battalion 2nd regiment Nassau) and major Von Rettberg (3rd battalion 2nd regiment Nassau).

In: Pflugk Harttung, J.von – Belle Alliance. Berichte etc. p.209-212

Uffindell erroneously situate the firing between the Nassau and the Prussian troops of Bülow. Uffindell bases himself here upon the account of Van Zuylen van Nijvelt but he is mistaken. In: Bas, F.de & T'Serclaes de Wommersom – La campagne de 1815 Vol.III p.342

Uffindell also refers to the account written by major Von Rettberg, who mentions the Prussian 18th regiment (4th corps). Yet, he is not sure of this number. Cf. Uffindell, A. On the fields of glory p.240

Starklof also describes the incident, but too far south, from Cheval de Bois. Starklof, R. Das Leben etc. p.205

²⁶ In this situation, captain Von Rettberg (flanker company of the 3rd battalion 2nd Battalion Nassau) evacuated the farm of Papelotte which was now set on fire. He joined the Prussian advance, but he was only able to collect a small portion of his men due to the loss of three buglers. Additionally, colonel Van Saksen Weimar had ordered the men to return to the two companies which had stayed in their original position during the battle. The small detachment fought with the Prussians for a while, but then returned to the remains of the brigade at Mont Saint Jean that evening. Cf. Captain Von Rettberg. In: VPH, nr.77

²⁷ Cf. Report of both battalions. VI.E.7.I.37 Cited by Von Pflugk Harttung. In: Das 1^e preussische Korps bei Belle Alliance p.160

Zychlinski, Von – Geschichte etc. p.282-283

²⁸ Cf. Report of major Von Blücher (3rd battalion 24th regiment). Cited by Von Pflugk Hartung In: Das 1^e preussische Korps bei Belle Alliance p.159
Zychlinski, Von – Geschichte etc. p.282-283

²⁹ Cf. Reports of major Von Gillhausen (1st battalion), major Von Rappard (2nd battalion)(VI.E.7.I.54). Cited by Von Pflugk Hartung. In: Das 1^e preussische Korps bei Belle Alliance p.163-168
Harkort, F. Die Zeiten des ersten Westphalischen etc. p.60

³⁰ Also see: Zychlinski, F.von - Geschichte des 24.Infanterie-Regiments p.283

³¹ In these actions, near a hollow road, on the French side of the village, corporal Hechel (3rd battalion 2nd regiment of Brandenburg infantry nr.12) was wounded and led to the rear. During the action his men were erroneously fired at from behind by their fellow Landwehr men, but the mistake was soon corrected. Cf. Corporal J.K.Hechel (3rd battalion 2nd regiment of Brandenburg infantry nr.12). In: Coppens, B. & P.Courcelle. La Papelotte p.65

³² Cf. Report major Von Götz. VI.E.7.I.32 In: Cited by Von Pflugk Hartung. In: Das 1^e preussische Korps bei Belle Alliance p.162

³³ Cf. Letter of major general Best. WL, nr.704 p.278-282
Account of major Von Gröben. In: Pflugk Hartung, J.von - Belle Alliance. Die Schilderung der Ereignisse vom 16.-18.Juni 1815 durch einen mitbeteiligten Generalstabsoffizier p.13
According to the diary of the 1st corps, the regiments of the reserve-cavalry were the first units to reach the battle-field, as well as both batteries of artillery mentioned above; as they needed support of infantry, the regiments initially covered the guns. In: Hafner, D. - Hans Carl Ernst Graf von Zieten, Königlich Preussischer Generalfeldmarschall p.323-324

³⁴ Report of captain Von Wildowski (3rd regiment of Brandenburg uhlands). In: Former KA, VI.E.7.II.172 in GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.VII.3 E.p.54

³⁵ Cf.Report of Von Zieten. In: Former KA, VI.E.3.15 in GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.VII.3 E.p.2
Report of major general Von Röder. In: Former KA, VI.E.7.I.156 in GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.VII.3 E.p.80
This is being confirmed by the accounts of captain Chapuis (85th regiment) who states that his regiment was charged by Prussian cavalry.
Colonel Bro mentions the conversation he had had with colonel Marbot telling him about the charge Marbot carried out that evening against Prussian troops.
Cf. Chapuis - Notice sur le 85^e de ligne pendant la campagne de 1815 p.49-50
Colonel Bro - Mémoires p.153

³⁶ Cf.Plan of captain Von Brandis. Captain Leach, of the 1st battalion 95th regiment, in position in the centre of Wellington's army mentions the arrival of Prussian lancers towards 7 p.m. These men must either have been those of the 3rd regiment of uhlands or of the Kurmark Landwehr cavalry. They announced the arrival of Zieten's corps at the extreme left flank. Cf.

Leach, J. Rough sketches etc. p.392

³⁷ Cf. reports of Von Röder (VI.E.7.I.159), Von Treskow (VI.E.7.I.113), report of the 1st Silesian hussars (VI.E.7.I.159), report of the Brandenburger uhlands and the Geschichte des 1.Brandenburger Ulanenregiment no.8 (Guretzky-Cornitz), reports of the 1st and 2nd regiment of Kurmark Landwehrcavalry (VI.E.7.I.180 and 185), report of the 6th uhlands (VI.E.7.I.172) In: Cf. Pflugk Harttung, J.von - Das 1^e preussische Korps bei Belle Alliance p.209-214

Captain Von Rettberg confirms the passage of Prussian cavalry near his battery. In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.229-234

Both captain Mercer and lieutenant colonel Van Heerdt of the brigade of De Ghigny confirm the arrival of Prussian cavalry in the right centre of the line.

Cf.Mercer, C. The Waterloo campaign Vol.I p.328

Account of lieutenant colonel Van Heerdt. In: NL-ZuRAZ, Van Löben Sels, 0302 inv.nr.263
Erroneously, Van Heerdt believes they were the vanguard of Bülow.

³⁸ For the description of this attack from the Prussian side of view, cf.

Cf.Ebertz, G.W.von - Hundertjährige Geschichte etc. p.200-202

Julius von Pflugk Harttung in:

GSA, VPH-HA,VI nr.V.4B.p.24,27-28

GSA, VPH-HA,VI nr.4A.2.p.8

GSA, VPH-HA,VI nr.V.4F.2.p.17-24

Report of Bülow. In: Bas, F.de & T'Serclaes de Wommersom.La campagne de 1815 aux Pays Bas.Vol.III p.532

Report of colonel Von Hiller. In: Ollech, Von Geschichte des Feldzugs etc. p.248-249

Hiller, Von - Denkwürdigkeiten etc.p.249-250

Dörk, E.M. - Das Königlich Preussische 15.Infanterie-Regiment etc. p.130-131

Damitz, K.von - Geschichte des Feldzugs etc. p.298

³⁹ Cf. Eberts, G.W. von - Hundertjährige Geschichte etc. p.201-203 In this attack the 2nd battalion lost: captain Von Morgenstern, captain Rosenthal, lieutenant Von Aulock, lieutenant Walter, lieutenant Von Bodewils, Von Eglosstein (wounded) and lieutenant Dewette (killed).

⁴⁰ Cf. 1st lieutenant Von Rahden, member of the 2nd battalion of the 2nd regiment of Silesian infantry nr.11 Von Rahden got wounded, and was about to fall in French hands, when he was dragged away by a comrade. Cf. Rahden, W.von -Wanderungen eines alten Soldaten p.366-369

41. Mauduit, H.de - Les derniers jours de la grande armée Vol.II p.400-401

He erroneously mentions the 1st battalion, as other historians do. Some even mention the presence of a third battalion. Cf. Charras - Histoire de la campagne de 1815 Vol.I p.317

42. Hiller, Von - Denkwürdigkeiten etc. p.250

⁴³ GSA, VPH-HA,VI nr.V.4A.2.p.8

⁴⁴ GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.V.4D.p.24

⁴⁵ GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.V.4 E.2.p.12, 4A.1.p.4 and 14, 4F.1.p.32 and 4C.p.6-7

46. Geschichte des 1.Westfalischen Husaren-Regiments p.4-5

Report of Bülow. In: Bas, F.de & T'Serclaes de Wommersom - La campagne de 1815 Vol.III p.530

GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.4 E.2.p.17, 4C,p.7 and 4C.p.23

⁴⁷ GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.V.4C.p.16

⁴⁸ GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.V.4C.p.25

⁴⁹ GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.V.4 E.1.p.57, 4A.1.p.33,37

⁵⁰ GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.V.4D.p.13-14

⁵¹ GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.4D.p.22

⁵² GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.V.4A.p.12,36 and 4 E.2.p.26,77, 4D.p.10

⁵³ GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.V.4 E.1.p.62

⁵⁴ GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.V.4 E.1.p.77 and 4D.p.14

⁵⁵ GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.V.4 E.1.p.77 and 4D.p.16

⁵⁶ GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.V.4 E.1.p.66, 4F.1.p.41, 4D.p.17-19

57.GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.V.5B.p.22-

Wedel, C.von - Geschichte eines Offiziers etc. p.250

58. Report of Von Gneisenau. In: Bas, F.de & T'Serclaes de Wommersom. La campagne de 1815 aux Pays Bas. Vol.III p.486

Pirch I claims his vanguard reached the wood after 6 p.m. Cf. report as referred to in: Bas, F.de & T'Serclaes de Wommersom. La campagne de 1815 aux Pays Bas. Vol.II p.506

For 7.30 p.m. also see: Charras. Histoire de la campagne de 1815 Vol.I p.330

Von Stawitzky believes it was about 7.10 p.m. In: Geschichte des Königlich Preussischen 25ten etc. p.92

⁵⁹ Siborne specifies them, being in the first line the 5th regiment of Pommeranian hussars nr.1, the Brandenburger hussars (both of the brigade of Von Sohr); in second line the 2nd regiment of Silesian uhlands, two squadrons of the 6th regiment of Neumark dragoons, the Königin dragoons (all of Von Thümen's brigade) and in the third line the 5th regiment of Kurmark Landwehr cavalry (brigade Von der Schulenburg) and the egiment Elbe Landwehrcavalry (brigade-cavalry of Von Brause and Von Böse). In: History of the war in France etc. Vol.II p.188.

⁶⁰ GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.V.5B.p.22-23,31

GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.V.7 p.16

According to Von Hagen, the regiment of Neumark Dragoons nr.6 covered a battery up the end of the battle and suffered here just a few casualties. Cf. Hagen, E.von - Geschichte des Neumärkischen Dragoner-Regiments nr.3 p.280

Von Ardenne confirms that the brigade of Von Sohr halted the infantry which emerged from Placenoit. Cf. Ardenne, A.von - Geschichte des Zieten'schen Husaren-Regiments p.492

Franz Lieber, a member of the 9th regiment (Von Krafft) claims his regiment stood near the 8th regiment of hussars (4th corps) for some time, unengaged. In: The miscellaneous writings of Francis Lieber Vol.I p.159

⁶¹ GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.V.5B.p.35-36

Stawitzky, Von – Geschichte des 25ten Königlich Preussischen etc. p.92

62. Report of Pirch I, as referred to in: Bas, F.de & T'Serclaes de Wommersom. La campagne de 1815 aux Pays Bas. Vol.II p.508

Report of Bülow. In: Bas, F.de & T'Serclaes de Wommersom. La campagne de 1815 aux Pays Bas. Vol.III p.534-536

GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.V.5B.p.26

⁶³ Von Hiller. Denkwürdigkeiten etc. p.251

⁶⁴ Cf. Wedell, Von - Geschichte des Königlich Preussischen 18.Infanterie Regiments p.168

⁶⁵ GSA,VPH-HA,VI nr.V.4 D.1.p.53, 4A.1.p.30, 4F.1.p.33

⁶⁶ GSA,VPH-HA,VI nr.V.4 D.1.p.54 and 4A.1.p.31

⁶⁷ GSA,VPH-HA,VI nr.V.4 D.1.p.54-55

⁶⁸ GSA,VPH-HA,VI nr.V.4 D.1.p.56 and 4A.1.p.29

⁶⁹ GSA,VPH-HA,VI nr.V.4C.p.17-18