

General observations on the battle of Waterloo.

The Prussian intervention.

The 4th and 2nd corps.

In the grand design of the intervention of the Prussian at Waterloo, the 4th corps was supposed to fall upon the French flank and rear in coming from the sector between La Haye and Aywiers; the 1st corps, coming from Ohain, would support Wellington's frontline where it was needed the most. In this role, the point designated to Bülow to aim at in his attack was the inn of La Belle Alliance in the very heart of the enemy position.

Enclosed between the low grounds of the Lasne and Ohain-streams, the Bois de Paris on the high ground allowed Bülow an unnoticed approach and assembling of his forces. ¹ Initially, Bülow was supposed to wait here for his whole corps to be complete before actually intervening, but it was decided by high command to overrule Bülow and to intervene as soon as his two first brigades, with some cavalry, would become available. ² What exactly prompted it to do so remains unclear, but it might have been the eagerness to attack the French, as well as the apparent vulnerability on their right flank. ³

The development of these two brigades (the 15th and the 16th) was initiated by strong swarms of skirmishers which enabled the artillery to come up and take action as well. As they slowly advanced from one point to another, the Prussian infantry and cavalry supports followed, even though they were vulnerable for the French gunfire. As the 15th brigade gained space, the 16th came out behind its left. Though the French offered some resistance, they did not push it through and as the enemy developed, they slowly fell back to positions north of Plancenoit. ⁴

Initially, the Prussian advance was directed towards La Belle Alliance, but it was this French manoeuvre plus the French occupation of Plancenoit by the Young Guard which now triggered the 16th brigade to move further to its left, while at the same time the 15th brigade kept its position opposite the strong masses of Lobau's infantry and cavalry. ⁵ Who ordered this is unclear, but in all probability the manoeuvre of the Guard must have been regarded as a serious threat upon the Prussian left flank. Thus, the 16th brigade broke up the total Prussian front-line in its centre, which accordingly had to be strengthened by artillery and cavalry.

In the course of the subsequent actions, this led to a situation in which the left wing got involved into a series of actions against Plancenoit (see below). Those in the centre and to their immediate right developed a frontline in which skirmishers from both sides were actively engaged and were continuously exchanged from their supporting battalions further to the rear. In numerous cases, cavalry from both sides threatened its opponent by advancing, but not actually charging. If needed, it forced units in these cases to switch into squares. For the Prussians, in this seesaw kind of actions, the artillery basically formed the spine of the front-line, covered by skirmishers and their supports further to the rear. ⁶ It was an action at close range, but which hung in a balance in which the Prussians were unable to make a breakthrough.

It was in this elongated front-line, stretching from the Lasne to the left to Fichermont and Smohain to the right, that two brigades in particular didn't get their value out for the full hundred percent. First of all, the 13th brigade. What happened was that it was gradually engaged; some parts merely acted passively to fill up the gaps in a thin front-line, thereby suffering from French gunfire. More, importantly, it was engaged in a scattered way, as units were mixed with those of the 15th brigade, thereby preventing Von Hacke to act in a unified command. ⁷

The 14th brigade was assigned a double purpose (i.e. to cover the left flank of the 4th corps and to reinforce its centre), and as a result it was unable to perform either of them in a proper way. This was also the reason that it wasn't engaged in the attacks upon Plancenoit right from the beginning. ⁸

On the flanks of the 4th corps the situation was stationary most of the time. On the extreme left it was major Von Keller who had a defensive mission, but it had become clear before that there was no threat from this direction.⁹ There is no doubt that part of his platoon of the 3rd regiment of Silesian Landwehr cavalry was used as scouts to explore the area as well. Von Keller advanced slowly, but kept stationary in the Bois de Hubermont until Plancenot had fallen into Prussian hands late that evening.

To the extreme right, in all, five battalions of the 15th and 13th brigade consolidated the situation in and around Fichermont and Smohain and after that had a stationary role which was enhanced as by 6 p.m. the French front-line was diminished by the removal of part of Durutte's division.

Right from the moment it arrived, the units of the reserve cavalry were assigned different positions and therefore got scattered. Accordingly, it was used that way, instead of as a large force. In this capacity, as at Ligny, the cavalry did not have an offensive role, but served basically as a cover for the other weapons. And if it had this role, it advanced against French infantry as a defence only. In this role, it was highly exposed to enemy gun- and skirmisher-fire and suffered accordingly. In the centre of the line for instance it served at least for some time in keeping the infantry in position, lead it on or repair any misfortunes.¹⁰

As in the other armies, the artillery was faced with the difficulty of the terrain, not only in its sodden state, but also in its configuration. The heights simply did not allow the weapon for instance to form a regular line of fire. Yet, it was in the first period of the intervention that it played a major role in the deployment of the army. In this deployment it was merely covered by skirmishers, and this was possible because of the low French resistance in artillery and cavalry.

As this resistance grew stronger, north of Plancenot, the artillery fell back into the line of skirmishers, which got in front of it. In the process, more and more infantry battalions were able to post themselves in the first line for the offensive against the French position.

As the Prussian front got more and more extended, however, the same happened to the artillery: units got scattered over a wide range and therefore an overall supervision was impossible.¹¹ In this way, like with the other weapons, the weapon wasn't used systematically in one sector as a mass, in its full strength. This was aggravated by the limitations of the terrain and the changing circumstances of the action, which resulted in an irregular front-line. Though there was an emphasis in its use at the left wing, there the artillery basically was more focused upon the French guns which stood west of Plancenot instead of upon the village itself, as a result of which the infantry in its attacks upon Plancenot bled to death.¹²

The 1st corps.

Having passed the village of Ohain, it was Zieten's task "um nach Umständen einen sehr bedrohten Ort der englischen Stellung zu unterstützen."

Zieten hadn't even started this, or he was diverted from it by high command in sending captain Scharnhorst with the order to support Bülow in his actions instead. The reasons for Gneisenau to issue this particularly important order remain unclear. In the knowledge of the situation of Wellington's army and of the design of the grand intervention, it meant that the corps was now to be used for assaulting the French flank. By the time it was sent - between 6 and 6.15 p.m. - Bülow had just started storming Plancenot and while Von Losthin's brigade was confronting Lobau north of Plancenot, Von Ryssel's brigade had just arrived at the field of battle. Additionally, Gneisenau had just learned about the French attack on Thielman at Wavre.

In the discussion about the order which ensued within the vanguard of the 1st corps, it was Zieten himself who was clear on what he had to do and that was to support Wellington. Even though his decision clashed with orders from above, it seems that it never led to any allegations against him.

It is highly probable that Von Müffling's influence here must have been the determining factor for him to do so and that its result silenced any possible criticism after the campaign. Though potentially important as it had been, the importance of the order somehow dissolved as swift as it had grown, and it is unknown how Scharnhorst's return to headquarters was apprehended by Gneisenau.¹³

Zieten's irruption at the battlefield started with strong artillery-fire, which he soon extended with infantry and cavalry. While the first two weapons acted on a half-round front-line between Fichermont and the Ohain-road, the cavalry gradually extended along Wellington's left wing, eventually as far as his center. The moment Zieten intervened, his opponent – the 95th regiment of Durutte's division – was in the extreme south part of Smohain but this didn't take long. Colonel Garnier pulled his men back on the height immediately south of the village and the farm of Papelotte and here screened this strong position with numerous skirmishers where he was able to hold Zieten back for some time. All in all, the main Prussian actions in the area around Smohain took place between 7.30 and 8 p.m. It was a sudden, short and concise action which had a profound influence on the fate of the French army, not only as a surprise against the French, but also as a boost for Wellington's forces (see below).¹⁴

General observations.

At Mont saint Jean, Prussian high command had a clear focus for the orientation of the intervention, in conjunction with Wellington, and that was La Belle Alliance, in the very heart of the French position.

Yet, in reality, what the 4th corps did in the process of intervening was gradually extending its front too much relative to its strength, as a result of which the attacks lacked real power. Within this development, all three weapons were used in smaller bits all along the line. In this way, at least a numerical superiority wasn't established in any sector. Additionally, units were mixed and in this way tactical cohesion broken up, which added up to the impossibility of supervising the actions. Other than that, there was this constant fear of being turned on their left flank during the arrival and development of the forces, resulting in the detachment of several units to the left flank, while it could have been easily ascertained that there was nothing to worry about by sending out appropriate patrols and establishing posts.¹⁵

The way the Prussian involvement developed, it gives the impression as if the Prussians attacked wherever the enemy was, instead of developing a systematic, concentrated offensive at one specific point. This point could effectively have been the sector in front of La Belle Alliance, as it were these heights which dominated the access to both Plancenoit and Smohain. Though it would have been a hard-fought effort and might carry a risk of an extra burden to Wellington, the option could have been to wait for another hour for more forces to build up. The offensive could then be preceded by a heavy artillery bombardment, and then consist of a frontal assault by both the 15th and 16th brigade, supported by a numerous cavalry, while the 13th and 14th brigade could turn Plancenoit to its left.¹⁶

This tactical deviation of the original plan finds its larger framework in the grander picture of the intervention in general. This comprised the convergence upon a frontline stretching from Wellington's front (1st corps), to the sector between Smohain and Aywiers (4th corps), while having a strong protection to the south here (2nd corps), plus a reserve at Couture (3rd corps).

As it happened, by a combination of circumstances, the 1st and 2nd corps were delayed, while the 3rd was prevented from taking part in the decisive battle.

For a major part of the intervention, the 4th corps was therefore left on its own and in combination with its tactical approach in the intervention, it wasn't able to carry out a decisive strike and thus gain an independent local success, even with the aid of part of the 2nd

corps.¹⁷ This would change with the arrival of the 1st corps, but even then it was no matter of smashing through the French front-line.¹⁸

Napoleon's counter-measures.

As has been shown above, Napoleon was aware in the morning of the fact that some Prussian force further east could become a threat to his main army. As a precaution, Ney established a cavalry screen at the extreme right flank of the army. As this presence and threat was confirmed by the early afternoon, Lobau reconnoitred the field at the same flank to select a possible position where he could resist the enemy if this would prove necessary. It became the one between the woods of Ranson and Fichermont. Later, the situation prompted Lobau to do so.

Through time, Lobau has been criticized for taking up this position, as this would not allow him to resist the Prussians as much as one immediately *east of* the Bois de Paris. In this, however, Lobau's command is treated too much as a separate entity, destined to deal with the Prussians. It cannot be stressed enough that the corps was an integral part of the grand attack designed to defeat Wellington and therefore – in the knowledge that some Prussian threat could be imminent - had to be available for this purpose as long as possible. Other than that, Lobau himself states he had another far more practical reason for choosing the position as he did instead, that it *west of* the Bois de Paris: *“je sentais le besoin d’occuper les défilés par où l’ennemi devait déboucher, mais pour cela il eut fallu éteindre la ligne et j’étais déjà beaucoup trop mince.”* (p.175)

The criticism is also connected to the feasibility for Lobau of being able to reach the remote position in terms of time and space, but here the starting point is that it would have stood near the Brussels road, which is incorrect.¹⁹ By the time the Prussians emerged from the wood, Lobau stood on the intermediate ridge opposite Wellington's left wing.

All this is enhanced by what Napoleon says about Lobau's role in relation to the Prussians. His mission was to *“de traverser la chaussée de Charleroi, par un changement de direction à droite par division, et de se porter pour soutenir la cavalerie légère du côté de Saint Lambert; de choisir une bonne position intermédiaire, où il put, avec dix mille hommes, en arrêter trente mille, si cela devenait nécessaire, d’attaquer vivement les Prussiens, aussitôt qu’il entendrait les premiers coups de canon des troupes que le maréchal Grouchy avait détachées derrière eux.”*²⁰

By the time Lobau posted his forces in his pre-reconnoitred position between the woods at the extreme right flank of the army, he was aware of the approximate strength of Bülow's corps, as it was known that it was this corps which was approaching and it had not been at Ligny. Skilful and experienced as he was, Lobau must have realized he would not be able to stem the tide there though. All he could do there was to delay the Prussian advance to gain time for the emperor to defeat Wellington. In that sense, it was for Lobau just a temporary position. It was upon the heights between Fichermont and Plancenoit that Lobau had fixed his eye to actually resist the Prussians even though it might have carried the risk for him to stretch his front-line out too far. Though it was a position which was much more near to the life-line of the army, Lobau must have had very good reasons to choose it and it worked. After all, he was able to keep it for about three hours.

There is no direct evidence about Lobau's formation during this period of time, but in relation to the way the Prussians acted against him, the 6th corps was most probably formed in regimental or battalion columns, supported by artillery and cavalry and these covered by numerous skirmishers. Where Lobau's extreme left flank rested upon is unclear, but the opposite one did upon the outskirts of the village of Plancenoit. It was here that general

Tromelin was in command with his battle-group consisting of the 10th regiment of the line and one battalion of the 107th regiment of the line. To their left were the remaining units of the 20th division, and further beyond the regiments of the 19th division.²¹

It did not take long before Lobau's right flank was very considerably reinforced by the arrival of the Young Guard at Plancenoit, and this one to be strengthened later by another two battalions of the Old Guard. All in all, the French strength opposing Blücher was about 13.000 men, with 50 guns.²²

In the overall French position against the Prussian army, the command of the units north of Plancenoit was unambiguous: they all fell under the count of Lobau. Within Plancenoit, three main units were mixed: the full Young Guards, two battalions of the Old Guard and some small units of the 6th corps, but it is unclear whether they all fell under one local commander.²³

For the French, as it came to be after the Prussian intervention, Plancenoit eventually formed part of a position to protect the communication line of the army. To its right it was covered by the low grounds of the Lasne, while the 6th corps occupied the grounds to its left. These grounds, a knoll to the immediate north of the village in particular, dominated access to the village from the east, the more as the small road coming from the Bois de Paris ran over a narrow height protruding from this wood. In addition, access to the village further south was hard due to the low and marshy ground of the Lasne. For the French, the village could easily be accessed from the west by small roads coming from La Belle Alliance and Maison du Roi. Additionally, the heights west of the village dominated it, and thus afforded favourable positions for artillery.²⁴

On the other hand, by the time the Prussians assaulted the village for the first time (by 6.30 p.m.) the men of the Young Guard barely had had any time to properly entrench the village. Entrenched, the church and its surrounding churchyard, could be turned into a redoubt and thus serve as a major anchor for the defence of the village. In the little time available, the garrison also concentrated its presence to the very village itself: any scattered houses around it remained unoccupied. Further advantages for the attackers were the slopes going down to the village, affording them more impetus, while those streets at right angles to the French front also offered them potentially an easier access. On the other hand, from the east, due to its position in the low ground, the only thing visible for the Prussians was the church-spire.

In the little time they had, there is no doubt that the French clung to the basic set-up of a defence of a village like Plancenoit: a strong line of skirmishers in the outer perimeter, with platoons as *soutiens* in their immediate rear. In the streets further to the rear were the special reserves in columns of battalions or companies, and finally a general reserve on the heights behind the village.²⁵ The whole was most probably divided into small sectors, led by local commanders. Long distance artillery support was supplied from guns placed on the heights west of the village, while at least one battery was favourably placed on the high knoll some 500 metres north of the church.²⁶

In their first assault upon Plancenoit, the Prussians neither took the trouble to reconnoitre the village, nor to bombard it for some time. In the action, the French flanks were able to hold them back, but in the centre their line of defence was overrun by the sheer speed and rush of the assault. As the French flanks maintained their positions, an enemy pocket was created in the centre. The Prussian success was that powerful that a battalion of the Old Guard had to be sent there to stabilize the situation.²⁷ From this, it can be concluded that apparently there were no general reserves of the Young Guard available anymore in rear of the village. Though the intervention of the guards-men was swift and was carried out under strict orders of keeping in close order, it degenerated into skirmishing. Luckily for the French, the Prussians had not had the time either to reinforce the churchyard as a *point d'appui* to fall back upon, nor had they occupied the village perimeter on their side and this combination allowed the French to drive them all out of the village, without exposing themselves by emerging from it.

While the French were supported with fresh forces, the initial success of the Prussian forces failed due to the absence of reserves. As these were still too far away, the Prussians were simply unable to maintain their success and the village had to be given up as a result.²⁸

In their second attempt to take Plancenoit, the Prussians complied with the golden rule of attacking a village after a first futile attempt and that was to repeat it without delay and with emphasis and with the bayonet only.²⁹ The difference was that they focused upon the French left, probably because of the terrain to the French right. Other than that, more forces were involved and the Prussian success was swift and upon the centre of the village. But even though the interval was short, somehow the French had been able to strengthen the churchyard to such an extent that the enemy offensive stranded here again. Yet, as this apparently proved threatening enough, the extra support of another battalion of the Old Guard was necessary again to repel the enemy.

Aided by the strength of the stronghold around the church and local fires which had broken out, French resistance flickered during the third Prussian attempt to take the village. Yet as the Prussians had by now divided their forces over a wide front and were able to break the French resistance on both flanks, that in the centre ran the risk of being turned. Combined with the tremendous Prussian pressure on one side and the turmoil of the French collapse of the army on the other, the evacuation of the village took place from its very centre.

First version: 1st September 2014 - Last revised: 6th September 2014 - Copyright © Pierre de Wit

¹ Cf. Pflugk Harttung, Von – Das Kampfgebiet der Preussen bei Belle Alliance p.36

² Bülow's report. In: Bas, F.de & T'Serclaes de Wommersom – La campagne de 1815 Vol.III p.524, 528

Colonel Von Hiller confirms the general direction towards La Belle Alliance, and says that this was the only disposition he received that day. Additionally, he had to orientate himself upon the movements of the right wing and avoid advancing too swiftly, but slowly and prepared by artillery. In: Denkwürdigkeiten p.244-245

³ At that moment, the 1st French corps was in front as skirmishers, right along Wellington's frontline, while the cavalry of Milhaud and Lefebvre Desnouettes had just crossed to the other side of the Brussels-road. The corps of Lobau still stood on the intermediate ridge further away to the right of La Belle Alliance.

⁴ Bülow's report. In: Bas, F.de & T'Serclaes de Wommersom – La campagne de 1815 Vol.III p.530

Von Pflugk Harttung. In: Letzte Ausarbeitung linker Flügel Plancenoit. In: GSA, HA VI, nr.3-5

Prince Von Thurn und Taxis claims the artillery accelerated its fire for a moment as a signal for Wellington about the arrival of the Prussian 4th corps. This is highly improbable however. First of all, there was a regular communication between Bülow and Von Müffling during the battle about Bülow's situation. Second, it would not be more than logical that the Prussians did not want to draw too much attention. Other than that, they did not know in detail about the French situation. This signalling more seems to be something of a later date.

Cf. Von Thurn und Taxis. Aus drei Feldzüge p.333

Von Damitz.

Von Pflugk Harttung. Ausarbeit. Fichermont. In: GSA, HA VI, nr.V.4E.2. p. 35-36

⁵ Houssaye, in this context, is incorrect by stating that Lobau was forced to fall back upon Plancenoit because of Bülow's movements, as well as in the fact that the Young Guard would have occupied the village of Plancenoit *after* the first Prussian attack. In: 1815.Waterloo p.381

⁶ Cf. Von Pflugk Harttung. In: Plancenoit. IV Korps. Ausarbeitung. In: GSA, HA VI nr.V.4F.1 p.75

Artillerie. In: GSA, HA VI, nr.V.4D p.37

⁷ Cf. Von Pflugk Harttung. In:

Plancenoit. IV Korps.Ausarbeitung. In: GSA, HA, VI, nr.V.4F.1 p.65-68

Letzte Ausarbeitung. Linker Flügel Plancenoit. In: GSA, HA VI, nr.V.4F.2 p.4-5, 19, 25

Ausarbeit. Fichermont. In: GSA, HA VI, nr.V.4E.2 p.25

⁸ Cf. Von Pflugk Harttung. In: Letzte Ausarbeitung. Linker Flügel. Plancenoit. In: GSA, HA VI nr.V.4F.2 p.8, 27

The role here of the 2nd regiment Silesian infantry no.1 and the 1st Pommeranian Landwehr is unknown.

⁹ Cf. the scouts sent from the valley of the Lasne towards Maransart, and the detaching of the fusiliers of the 4th regiment Silesian Landwehr, as well as of those of the 2nd regiment Silesian infantry no.11 and the 1st Pommeranian Landwehr.

¹⁰ Cf. Von Pflugk Harttung. In:
Ausarbeit. Fichermont. In: GSA, HA VI, nr.V.4E.2 p.13
Kavallerie. In: GSA, HA VI.nr.V.4C p.7-32

¹¹ The commander of the artillery of the 4th corps, major Von Braun, had been ordered to headquarters for some reason, while Von Bardeleben, commander ad interim, only seems to have played a role at the very end of the battle. In all, the overall command of the artillery fell upon the commander of the reserve artillery, major Von Ziegler. Cf. GSA, VPH-HA VI ..

¹² Cf. Von Pflugk Harttung. In: Artillerie. In: GSA, HA VI, nr.V.4D p.2-6, 34-41

¹³ Though Von Pflugk Harttung mentions the importance of the order as well, he doesn't enter upon its continuation either. In: GSA- HA, VI nr.V.4F.1 p.19

¹⁴ It is unclear why Zieten detached forces towards Cheval de Bois, as this was way back to the right rear of Bülow's frontline.

¹⁵ Cf. Von Pflugk Harttung. In: Raisonement. Fehler etc. In: GSA, HA VI nr.V.7.p.2-3

¹⁶ Cf. Von Pflugk Harttung. In:
Raisonement. Fehler etc. In: GSA, HA VI nr.V.7 p.4-7
Notizen zum Kampf bei Plancenoit. In: GSA, HA, VI nr.4F.1. p.3
Ausarbeit. Fichermont. In; GSA, HA VI, nr.V.4E.2 p.29

¹⁷ Cf. Von Pflugk Harttung. In: Besondere Bemerkungen.In: GSA, HA VI nr.V.4F.3 p.9
In: Das Kampfgebiet der Preussen bei Belle Alliance p.34

¹⁸ Cf. The general observations on the battle.

¹⁹ Cf. Houssaye, H. – 1815.Waterloo p.556-557
Navez, L. - La campagne de 1815 Vol.II p.126
Adkin, M – The Waterloo companion p.411

²⁰ Mémoires pour servir etc. p.140-141

²¹ Lachouque, H. – Sous la République etc. p.228

²² 6th corps: about 8700 men
Young Guard: about 3500 men
Two battalions of the Old Guard: about 1000 men

In artillery, Lobau had 34 guns(two foot batteries and one horse battery of his corps, plus the two horse batteries of the cavalry), while the Young Guard had two foot batteries (16 guns).

²³ In the fragments available from his letter to Craan of 1817, Lobau states about the units of

the imperial guard: “La Jeune Garde s’est bien battue, l’artillerie de la garde a aussi été secourable” but this is insufficient evidence to assert that Lobau had the actual command over them. After all, they both fell under the immediate command of Drouot. In: Waresquiel, E.de – Lettres d’un lion p.175

²⁴ Pflug Hartung, Von – Das Kampfgebiet der Preussen bei Belle Alliance p.37-39

²⁵ Riese, A. – Der Kampf in und um Dörfer und Wälder p.5-87

²⁶ For this last battery: Craan – Plan du champ de bataille de Waterloo dit de La Belle Alliance etc.

Major Von Pfeil (commander of the horse battery nr.12) refers to this battery on the height [knoll] north of Plancenoit and which was about to fire upon Von Pfeil’s left flank. He then took back this wing, and maintained his position despite the French skirmishing and gunfire. In: diary of Von Pfeil. In: Militärarchiv der DDR, PR.19/109 (Bl.20-22R)

This is the knoll immediately above the Prussian monument.

Two batteries of the artillery (16 guns) of the guard were attached to the Young Guard, but their positions are unknown.

According to colonel Von Hiller two guns and one howitzer stood in front of the centre of Plancenoit. Cf. Hiller’s report. In: Ollech, Von - Geschichte etc. p.248

Cf. Von Pflug Hartung, who mentions the fact that at Plancenoit the Prussians were received with grenades and canister. In: Raisonement, Fehler etc. In: GSA, HA VI, nr.V.7 p.20

H.de Mauduit mentions the support of a battery of 12-pounders of the reserve of the artillery of the imperial guard in his vicinity as his battalion stood near the Decoster house. He also adds that his unit had lent a battery to the 6th corps, this corps having sent one of its batteries to d’Erlon. In: Les derniers jours etc. Vol.II p.390

Major Pelet mentions artillery of the guard which was placed west of Plancenoit and which silenced some Prussian guns until it was disabled itself. In: d’Avout, vicomte. L’infanterie de la garde etc. p.39

Lieutenant Ingilby (battery Gardiner) saw guns being transferred from the right hand part of the French grand battery to a position opposite the Prussians. In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.266-271 (plan included).

General Durutte, from the very beginning of the battle, had artillery of the guard in the rear of his division, and these guns were later transferred to the frontline which was opposed to the Prussian army. In: Mouvements [sic] de la 4^e division du 1er corps d’armée, le 15 Juin jusqu’au 18 au soir. In: La sentinelle de l’armée 4 (1838), nr.134 p.78

²⁷ Houssaye describes how both battalions of the Old Guard were detached to the village simultaneously, but this is incorrect. In: 1815.Waterloo p.394

²⁸ Cf. Von Pflug Hartung. In:

Letzte Ausarbeitung linker Flügel Plancenoit. In: GSA, HA,VI nr.4F.2 p.14

16^e Brigade. Darstellung. In: GSA, HA VI nr.4A.2. p.14, 24

Plancenoit. IV Korps. Ausarbeitung. In: GSA, HA VI nr.4F.1.p.20

Raisonement. Fehler etc. In: GSA, HA VI, nr.V.7 p.10, 23

²⁹ Riese, A. – Der Kampf in und um Dörfer und Wälder p.5-87