

The Prussian concentration near Sombreffe.

The 1st corps.

On the evening of the 15th of June, general Von Zieten knew that in the positions his troops were having at that time, they would be unable to fight against an action against a French attack. At that time, his corps was more in a position to take in other units, as in a defensive one. His fear was that the 1st corps alone would have to face the enemy and that the army would be beaten in detail. For this reason he sent his chief of staff, colonel Von Reiche, to ask Gneisenau to put the 1st corps in rear of the Ligne, on the heights of Sombreffe, near Point du Jour. Gneisenau initially didn't want him to do so. His idea was that the 1st corps would have to face a battle even in case it would have been left on its own, in order to enable the remainder of the army to concentrate in the position of Sombreffe. Sometime after Von Reiche had returned to Zieten however at 3 a.m. [1] the following order came in:

Ew.Excellenz benachrichtige Ich dass die Befehle dahin gegeben sind, dass das zweite Armeekorps morgen früh in Sombreffe, das dritte in Mazy eintrifft; das vierte Korps marschirt nach Gembloux.

Das zweite Armeekorps ist heute erst spät concentrirt gewesen, es ist also noch nicht gewiss, ob es der Absicht gemäss morgen mit Tagesanbruch wirklich hier eintrifft. Damit also die Concentrirung hinter dem Lignebach mit grösster Sicherheit und Gewissheit erfolgen könne, ist es wichtig, dass Ew.Excellenz die Aufstellung behalten, die dieselben diesen Abend occupirt haben. Dem General-Major von Pirch I ist wiederholt aufgegeben worden, zwei Regimenter Cavallerie über Onoz nach es Fays auf Ew.Excellenz linker Flügel rücken zu lassen.

Ew.Excellenz ersuche Ich zugleich, dem General Major von Steinmetz aufzugeben, dass er Alles anwende, um seinen rechten Flügel aufzuklären, dass er die Römerstrasse beobachten lässt und Communication mit der niederländischen Armee aufzusuchen bemüht ist.

*Gneisenau*²

Yet, despite this order, a few hours later the 1st corps moved further to the right. The exact initiative and motive are not fully clear, as the evidence – in this case of colonel Von Reiche, chief of the staff of the 1st corps – is contradictory.

On the one hand, Von Reiche claims he would have pointed out to Zieten that a position between Ligny, Brye and Saint Amand would have several advantages. It would afford him to hold off the enemy for about several hours and, additionally, the troops could be given positions without having a low ground in their rear. The position afforded full communication with the Rhine, as well as with Wellington.

Disadvantages were that it could easily be turned and that the villages were often in depressions. Zieten, convinced of the use of the manoeuvre, sent Von Reiche out again to Gneisenau and Von Grolmann at Sombreffe to report what Zieten and he had agreed upon.

Now, Gneisenau and Von Grolmann told Von Reiche that they would leave the decision up to Zieten as long as the Roman road was held. As a result, the movement started at 5 a.m.³

The other version is that the 1st corps was simply ordered to its right - without any specific role of Von Reiche – as to cover the right flank of the army for fear of the safety of this flank. ⁴

Accordingly, the positions to be taken by the respective brigades were described by Zieten in the following disposition:

Die 1. Brigade besetzt das Dorf Saint Amand, die 3. Brigade das Dorf Brye, die 4. Brigade Ligny und die 2. Brigade stellt sich als Reserve im Centrum hinter den eben genannten Windmühlenberg auf.

Die Reserve-Kavallerie postirt sich rückwärts des Dorfes Ligny, dasselbe links lassend, wogegen die Reserve-Artillerie in die Position rückt.

Zur Deckung dieser Bewegung bleiben die auf dem Tombe de Ligny aufgestellten Zwölfpunder bis nach Beendigung derselben stehen und machen den Beschluss.

Was von den Brigaden zur Besetzung der Dörfer an Truppen nicht erforderlich ist, stellt sich zur Unterstützung derselben dahinter auf. Die Dörfer werden unverzüglich in möglichsten Vertheidigungszustand gesetzt und mit den nöthigen Absperrungen versehen. Wegen nicht zureichender Kenntnis der Ortlichkeit ist es gestattet, dass die Brigaden bei Besetzung der Dörfer und des Terrains sich gegenseitig aushelfen.

Zieten ⁵

For some reason, Steinmetz didn't occupy Saint Amand itself, but took up a position in rear of it. Pirch II was south of Ligny and now took a position near Brye, towards the mill of Bussy. The 1st battalion of the 6th regiment (West-Prussian nr.1) was given the task of occupying and reinforcing the adjoining farm. ⁶

Jagow, coming from his position north-east of Fleurus and to the left of road, now put his brigade between Bussy and Ligny. ⁷ Probably the brigade crossed the chaussée, marched in between Saint Amand and Ligny and there split up in two.

The brigade of Von Henckel was in rear of the farm of Le Fajjt, north of Wanfersée, and marched that morning to a position between Ligny and Saint Amand. From there it was later sent to occupy Ligny. ⁸ The artillery-reserve took up its positions west of Ligny. By 8 a.m. these movements were completed, except those of the cavalry. ⁹

The cavalry-reserve, under major general Von Röder, was during the night of the 15th of June in rear of the interval between the 3rd and 4th brigade. It had to take up positions between Ligny and Sombreffe. ¹⁰ By 5 a.m. Von Röder was ordered to fall back to a position in rear of the Tombe de Ligny, in front of Ligny. While Von Röder moved his units there, he posted the horse battery nr.2 in front of the Tombe de Ligny near the road which leads from Fleurus to Point du Jour (thereby covering the road which leads into Fleurus) and covered it to its left front with the regiment of Brandenburg dragoons. On the left, on the other side of the road, was the 3rd regiment of Brandenburg uhlans, as a possible support for the dragoons. The two 12p.-guns of 12p. battery nr.2 of the artillery-reserve were on the hillock of the Tombe de Ligny itself. ¹¹

The three remaining regiments (2nd regiment dragoons West-Prussian nr.1, the 1st and 2nd regiment Kurmark Landwehrcavalry) had Von Röder under the command of general Von Treskow as a reserve in a hollow in rear of the tombe de Ligny.

As the two infantry battalions pulled out of Fleurus, the 6th regiment uhlans (brigade Von Lützow) was still near Fleurus to receive the outposts.

These posts were pushed back by the French cavalry, as it came out from Fleurus by 10.30 a.m.¹² They went back towards the 6th regiment of uhlans, which, the moment the French entered Fleurus more and more, fell back - skirmishing - to the left flank of the Brandenburger dragoons. The cavalry here had the instruction to fall back over the Ligne-brook as the enemy advanced, as soon as the 1st corps had taken up its positions.¹³

By now, the French moved up more and more, despite the fire of the guns on the Tombe de Ligny and of the horse battery nr.2. A French regiment of cavalry advanced to the 6th regiment of uhlans, of which two squadrons succeeded in driving them back.

As the enemy developed, Von Röder pulled back the main body of his cavalry in rear of Ligny, covered by the 6th regiment uhlans, the 5th regiment Brandenburg Dragoons and two guns of the horse battery nr.2. This rear-guard was kept in a position near the Tombe de Ligny till 1 p.m., when they too were pulled back to the remainder of the division in the main position in rear of Ligny.¹⁴

The 2nd corps.

The order Gneisenau wrote on the evening of the 15th of June at 10.30 p.m. instructed Pirch I to have his corps arrive at 4 a.m. at Sombreffe. It was for this reason that Pirch I sent out the following marching order at 1 a.m.:

Um 2 Uhr setzt sich das Corps in Marsch auf der grossen Strasse nach Sombreffe mit der Tête diesseits Mazy. Die Marschordnung des Armee-Korps ist folgende:

- 1. die Reserve-Cavallerie*
- 2. Die Brigaden und ihren Nummern, wobei die Medizinwagen und Packpferde bei ihren Bataillons bleiben*
- 3. Die Reserve-Artillerie mit den Munitions-Wagen*

Die zur Bagage commandirten Offiziere melden sich in Hannut bei dem General-Wagenmeister major Von Tuchsens. Die mit der heutigen Fassung beladenen Wagen, die zum Transport der Blessirten zugeich dienen sollen, werden über Mazy hinaus rechts der Strasse im Park aufgefahen und erwarten dort die ihnen zukommenden Direction. Bivouac bei Mazy am 16. Juni morgens 1 Uhr.

*(gez.) Von Pirch*¹⁵

The fact was, however, that the corps only left its bivouacs between Onoz and Mazy at around 8 a.m. The distance between Mazy and Sombreffe is six kilometres. From around 10 a.m. the main body of the corps started to arrive at Sombreffe.¹⁶

The corps probably marched in the following order: two infantry-brigades (the 5th brigade leading) and then the main body of the artillery- and the cavalry-reserve. After a gap in the column, the two remaining infantry-brigades followed.¹⁷ The 5th brigade (Tippelskirch) marched that morning through Sombreffe to a position near Trois Burettes, the crossroads of the

old Roman road and the road leading from Namur to Nivelles. The order of march of the brigade read:

Die 5. Brigade marschirt heute in folgender Ordnung:

1. *das Füselier Bataillon 1.Pomm.Regts.*
2. *das Füselier Bataillon 25. Inf. Regts.*
3. *die beiden Musketier-Bataillone 25 Inf.Regts*
4. *die beide ersten Bataillone 5. Westph.Landwehr Regts.*
5. *das 1 und 2. Bataillon 1.Pomm.Regts*
6. *die Brigade-Batterie Nr.10*
7. *das 3. Bataillon 5.Westph. Landwehr Regts.*

(gez.) Von Tippelskirch ¹⁸

It was at Sombrefte that the 2nd and the fuselier battalion of the 2nd regiment (1st Pommeranian) joined the 1st battalion, which had had the task to protect the headquarters since the evening of the 15th . Both battalions had left their position near Mazy around 1 a.m. ¹⁹

The 6th brigade (Krafft) took up a position east of Tippelskirch, in rear of Brye. Of the 7th brigade (Von Brause) only the 14th regiment was initially present; the remaining regiments arrived around 1 p.m. ²⁰

As long as the 3rd corps had not arrived, the 8th brigade (Von Böse) had to keep a position near Point du Jour ²¹ The cavalry-reserve came in position in rear of the road Nivelles – Namur, west of Sombrefte. ²² The artillery-reserve took up a position in the vicinity of Sombrefte.

The 3rd corps.

The 3rd corps was following the 2nd corps over the road leading from Namur to Nivelles; it had left Namur at 4 a.m. ²³ Taking into account that Gneisenau's order had prescribed Thielmann to take up positions near Mazy at daybreak, it becomes clear that these orders were not being executed at all.

In fact, the order was quite impossible: how could the 3rd corps, being assembled at 11 p.m. in Namur, be at Mazy at 4.00 a.m ? The distance between this town and Mazy is 13 kilometres; even having a speed of 4 kilometres per hour it would have taken the corps more than 3 hours. After the concentration at Namur this speed was impossible, with 2 to 3 hours of rest.

In this connection there is a note written out by Thielmann, probably for Gneisenau, and in which Thiemann expresses his concerns about his arrival in Mazy:

Namur, den 16ten Juny punkt 2 Uhr

Nach soeben erhaltenen Befehle werde Ich eher [...] sehr zweifelhaft, werde aber schwerlich vor 5 Uhr bey Mazy eingetroffen seyn.

General [or Frhr.] Von Thielmann ²⁴

Maybe the 3rd corps had to wait until the whole of the 2nd corps had marched out. In any case, the vanguard of the 3rd corps closely followed the rear-guard of the 2nd corps. ²⁵ Eventually, it reached the vicinity of Sombreffe around noon. ²⁶ Initially, the whole corps was posted in columns on the road leading from Namur to Nivelles between Sombreffe and Bothey, as long as the direction of the French offensive had not developed. It was only about 2 p.m. (when the French developed their front-line) that the troops got their positions. ²⁷ Having collected his 1st, 2nd and 3rd corps, Blücher now had 94.707 men and 216 guns available. ²⁸

The 4th corps.

It was at 5 a.m. that Bülow received the order written by Gneisenau to leave from Hannut (by daybreak) and to proceed towards Gembloux. ²⁹ Six hours later, by 1 p.m., Bülow received the order which directed him towards the plateau of Ardenelle. ³⁰ The moment Bülow received the order the corps was not moving. This can be derived from the disposition he wrote at approximately 1.30 p.m. and which reads:

Das 4te Armee-Korps setzt seinen Marsch auf der Römerstrasse fort, Gembloux und das Thal Orneau links lassend, bis auf die Höhe von Artelle.

Die Brigaden brechen auf, sobald sie abgekocht haben, die 14te Brigade die schon in Marsch ist, bleibt vorne zur Avantgarde. Die 15te Brigade, die bei le Soleil abgekocht, folgt, indem sie ihren Marsch auf dem Wege fortsetzt.

Die Reserve-Artillerie, die bei Brancon abgekocht, schliesst sich an die 15te Brigade an.

Die 16te Brigade folgt von Tombe d'Empereur aus auf die Reserve-Artillerie.

Die Reserve-Kavallerie dirigirt sich auf Brancon in die Römerstrasse und die 13te Brigade von Hannut ebenfalls dahin.

Die Brigaden geben Lebensmittel aus, wenigstens so viel, dass sie morgen kochen können, und schaffen mit Wagen nach, was sie etwa nicht fortgebracht haben sollten, geben dieses aus, und schicken die Wagen zurück.

Sammtliche Bagage fährt bei Hannut auf, und es übernimmt der Major Von Stark das Kommando über dieselbe.

Wo der Bedarf an Lebensmitteln aus den Dörfern ergänzt werden kann, da muss es geschehen, und es müssen die Truppen wenigstens mit Brod und Branntwein versehen sein.

Der General-Major Ryssel der 1ste, wird, da er zuerst in der Stellung ankommt, seine Precautions nehmen.

Ich werde um 3 Uhr von Hannut aufbrechen, und mich auf die Römerstrasse zur 14ten Brigade begeben.

Die Lazareth Ambulants, die zum Korps gehören, gehen nach Hannut. Die Train-Kolonnen werden mit Lebensmitteln geladen, und nach Brancon geschickt, und hat der Ober-Krieges-Commisar de Rege den Auftrag erhalten, dies zu besorgen.

Hannut, am 16. Juni 1815

Gezeichnet Von Bülow von Dennewitz

Für die Richtigkeit der Abschrift der Chef des Generalstabes Von Valentini ³¹

In fact, the corps made a halt somewhere between 11 a.m. and 1 p.m. near Hannut. By then, at least the 14th brigade left its positions, the other units followed later on. ³² The halt can be explained by an order which had gone out from Waremme at 10.35 a.m. “zum halten und abkochen an bestimmte Punkten in der Nähe von Hannut, und zur weitem Marschbereithaltung.” ³³

The moment the first troops left their bivouacs (at 2 p.m) [³⁴] Bülow wrote to Gneisenau that he would be able to arrive at the plateau mentioned at 8 p.m. with his 14th and 15th brigade as well as with the artillery-reserve. The remainder of the corps would only be able to arrive there during the night. Apparently, the other units were somewhat behind. This letter reads:

Ew.Durchlaucht beehre ich mich gehorsamst zu melden, dass die 14. und 15. Brigaden, sowie die Reserve-Artillerie gegen 8 Uhr Abends auf dem Plateau bei Ardenelle eintreffen werden, die anderen beiden Brigaden und die Reserve-Kavallerie aber erst in der Nacht daselbst ankommen können. Ich selbst werde mit der 14. Brigade zugleich daselbst eintreffen.

Zugleich zeige ich Ew.Durchlaucht gehorsamstain, dass der in Lüttich stehende Belagerungspark unter dem Hauptmann Ludewig heute früh noch keinen Befehl hat. Ich habe deshalb diesen Park unter Deckung von 100 Man auf Kähne gepackt zurückgelassen, mit der Weisung, bei eintretender Gefahr auf der Maas nach Maastricht zu schissen.

Bülow von Dennewitz ³⁵

For some unknown reason, however, Bülow halted his corps for about two hours somewhere between 4 and 6 p.m. By that time his vanguard, the 14th brigade, was at a place called Le Soleil (west of Branchon). ³⁶ Due to the heat and the fatigue, the corps suffered from a high number of stragglers. ³⁷

At that time, the 16th brigade, coming from the north, and then halting near the Tombe d' Hottomont, joined the column on the Roman road. ³⁸ From there, all units moved on further west over the Roman road.

While approaching Gembloux captain Von Reyher (chief of staff of the 14th brigade) was sent out with a squadron of cavalry in order to reconnoitre the plateau.

Around 7.30 p.m.Von Reyher encountered the first wounded near Gembloux. He was also informed that things were going wrong at Ligny. ³⁹ At that moment the 4th corps was still three hours behind and in realizing that it was too late to help, Bülow decided to halt his troops. By then it was by 10 p.m. ⁴⁰ Bülow established his headquarters in a farm at Baudeset and wrote to Blücher at 10 p.m. the following report (⁴¹):

Basse-Bodecé [sic] bei Sauvenière

Ew. Durchlaucht melde ich gehorsamst dass ich soeben, Abends 10 Uhr, mit der Tete der 14.

Brigade hier eingetroffen bin. Da der Weg von hier nach Ardenelle mit zurückkehrender Bagage und Verwundeten verstopft ist, erachte ich es am zweckmässigsten, die anderen Brigaden, sowie sie ankommen, hier an der Römerstrasse anzuhalten und so Ew.Durchlaucht weitere Befehle und den Anbruch des Tages zu einer ordentlichen Aufstellung abzuwarten. Ich schicke jedoch die Spitze der Avantgarde gegen Ardenelle vor. Ich habe mich um so mehr hierzu veranlasst gesehen, weil nach der Anzeige des Generals Von Ryssel, der mit Kavallerie vorgeritten war, zahlreiche Mannschaften aus dem Gefecht zurückkehren, die ich hier anhalten lasse.

Bülow von Dennewitz ⁴²

The bivouac Bülow established during the night of the 16th of June was on and along the old Roman road, having the vanguard (the 14th brigade) in and around Baudecet. ⁴³ The rear-guard, formed by the 13th brigade (Von Hacke), was in and around Hottomont. ⁴⁴ In between these brigades were the 15th brigade, the reserve artillery, the 16th brigade [⁴⁵] and the reserve cavalry. Between the brigades were large intervals. ⁴⁶ The overall length of the column of the corps along the Roman road was about 12 kilometres long. Bülow himself was at Baudecet. ⁴⁷

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¹ Cf. Von Zieten in his report of 8th of July 1815. In: Reiche, Von - Memoiren etc. p.417

2. Diary of the 1st corps. KA, II.M.207 In: GSA,VPH-HA,VI nr.VII.3.p.26
Reiche, L.von - Memoiren etc. p.172

3. Reiche, L.von - Memoiren etc. p.171-174

Diary of the 1st corps. KA, II.M.207 In: GSA,VPH-HA,VI nr.VII.3a.p.29

State of the movements of the 2nd brigade. In: GSA, VI HA, NL Gneisenau, Kt.19 p.11

According to the regimental history of the Prussian 28th regiment it was 8 a.m. Cf. Die Geschichte des 28. Regiments. In: Special ABN, nr.65 p.18-19

⁴ Colonel Von Reiche. In: Über die Kriegsbegebenheiten des I.Armeekorps In: VI.E.7.I.p.1
In: GSA. VPH-HA. VI, nr.5.p.55-56

5. Ollech, Von - Geschichte des Feldzugs etc. p.120
Reiche, L.von - Memoiren etc. p.174

⁶ Cf.Conrady, E.von - Geschichte des Königlich etc.p.244

⁷ Manuscript of a history of the 29th regiment of 1848. In: Wellmann, R. - Geschichte etc.
p.629

⁸ Henckel von Donnersmarck - Erinnerungen p. 353

Both companies of the 19th regiment which had stood at Auvélais joined the regiment that morning. Cf. Leszczynski, R.von – 50 Jahr Geschichte des Königlich Preussischen 2.Posenschen Infanterie-Regiments nr.19 p.153

9. Reiche, L.von - Memoiren etc. p.181

Lehmann, commander of the artillery of the 1st corps, says it was 10 a.m. Cf. Report of lieutenant colonel Lehmann. In: KA, VI.E.7.I.197 in GSA,VPH-HA,VI nr.VII,3 E.p.21

¹⁰ According to Von Zieten the cavalry was to the left of Ligny, with its left flank resting upon the road leading to Point du Jour. Cf. Zieten's report of 8th July 1815 In: Reiche, L.von Memoiren etc. p.417

¹¹ Kraatz-Koschlau, M.T. - Geschichte des 1.Brandenburgischen Dragoner-Regiments nr.2
p.102

12. Surgeon d'Héralde, attached to the 12th regiment of light infantry (division Girard) witnessed the French advance and the Prussian retreat from his position immediately to the north of Wangenies. In: Delloye, S. - Les mémoires du chirurgien Dominique d'Héralde. In:

Bulletin SBEN (1991), nr.14 p.25

¹³ Diary of the 1st corps. KA, II.M.207 In: GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.VII.3a.p.30

14. Report of Von Röder. In: KA, nr.VI.E.7.I.156 in GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.VII.3 E.p.73-74

Report of major Von Treskow. In: KA, nr.VI.E.7.II.162 in GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.VII.3

Report of the 5th regiment of Brandenburger dragoons. In: KA, VI.E.7.I.166 in GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.VII.3 E.p.61

Report of captain Von Petersdorff (6th regiment of uhlands). In: KA, VI.E.7.II.177 in GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.VII.3 E.p.26-27

Report major Von Kameke (2nd regiment of Kurmark Landwehr cavalry). In: KA, VI.E.7.II.185 in GSA, VPH-HA, VI, nr.VII.3 E.p.35

Report of Von Reiche. In: KA, VI.E.7.I.7 in GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.VII.5.p.46

Die Geschichte des 28.Regiments. In: Special ABN, nr.65 p.20

Kraatz-Koschlau, M.T. - Geschichte des 1.Brandenburgischen Dragoner-Regiments nr.2 p.102

¹⁵ Stawitzky, E.H.L. - Geschichte des Königlich etc. p.46-47

16. Reiche, L.von - Memoiren etc. p.181

The regimental history of the 23rd regiment of infantry claims the regiment got at Sombreffe by 9 a.m. Cf. Busse, Von - Geschichte des königlich Preussischen 23.Infanterie Regiments p.163

The regimental history of the 28th regiment says the whole corps had been assembled at Sombreffe at 10 a.m. Cf. Die Geschichte des 28.Regiments. In: ABN, special nr.65 p.18

Von Müffling erroneously suggests as if the corps reached Sombreffe during the night of the 15th and the morning of the 16th of June. In: Geschichte des Feldzugs etc. p.9

Siborne believes it was 11 a.m. In: History of the war in France etc. Vol.I p.175

Noon is given by Houssaye. In: 1815.Waterloo p.160

17. Reiche, L.von - Memoiren etc. p.181

¹⁸ Stawitzky, E.H.L. - Geschichte etc. p.47

¹⁹ Mach, A.von - Geschichte des königlich preussischen Zweiten Infanterie, genannt Königs-Regiment p.326

20. Wagner - Plane etc. p.28

Pirch I himself says the brigade arrived by 10 a.m. and the 22nd regiment much later, but before 2 p.m. In: Report of Pirch I. In: KA, VI.E.15.2 in GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.VII.5.p.5

²¹ Report of Pirch I. In: KA, VI.E.15.2 in GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.VII.5.p.5

Busse, Von - Geschichte des königlich Preussischen 23.Infanterie Regiments p.164

22. The two regiments of the brigade Thümen were in the position of Ligny on the 15th of June already and must, on the morning of the 16th of June have stood in rear of the 1st corps. According to count Von Wedel, his regiment, the 1st regiment of Pommerian hussars nr.5 (brigade Von Sohr) left its position near Mazy before daybreak and arrived west of Sombreffe in the early afternoon. This statement seems to be overdone taking account the distance to be covered: it left later and arrived earlier. In: Geschichte eines Offiziers etc. p.249

23. Report of Von Thielmann. In: KA, VI.E.22.1 in: GSA,VPH-HA, nr.VII.5.p.35
According to captain Von Röder, chief of staff of the brigade of Von Luck, it was 3 a.m.In: Erinnerungen etc. p.321
Another source also claims it was by daybreak. Cf. Gottschalck, M. - Geschichte etc. p.74

²⁴ In: KA, VI.E.3.II.93 in GSA, VPH-HA, Vi nr.VII.4.p.9
The handwriting of the original was hard to read (note of Von Pflugk Harttung)
Also in: Register of staff. In: KA, VI.D.9.nr.254 in: GSA,VPH-HA, VI nr.VII.6.p.5

25. Other historians describe the time of arrival of the 3rd corps as:
Before noon: Damitz, Von - Geschichte des Feldzugs etc. p.108
10 a.m.: Clausewitz, C. von – Hinterlassene Werke etc. p.36
Between 11.30 and 12.30: Lettow Vorbeck, O.von - Napoleons Untergang Vol.III p.307

26. Report of Pirch I. In: KA, VI.E.15.2 in GSA, VPH-HA,VI nr.VII.5.p.5
Reiche, L.von - Memoiren etc. p.181
Pflugk Harttung, J.von In: GSA, HA VI, nr.III.3.p.61
Die Geschichte des 28.Regiments says it was 11 a.m. Cf. ABN, nr.65 special p.18
According to Gottschalk it was between 11 a.m. and noon. Cf. Gottschalck, M. - Geschichte etc. p.74
Major Von Holleben mentions 11 a.m. as the moment the corps got to Point du Jour, which is about the same as noon at Sombreffe. Cf. Von Holleben (3rd battalion of the 8th Leib-regiment, brigade Von Borcke). In: Aus den hinterlassenen Papieren etc p.138
Also here it is Von Müffling who erroneously suggests as if the corps reached Sombreffe during the night of the 15th and the morning of the 16th of June. In: Geschichte des Feldzugs etc. p.9

27. Report of Von Thielmann. In: KA, VI.E.22.1 in: GSA,VPH-HA, nr.VII.5.p.35
He states his brigades were initially in columns on the Namur road, between Sombreffe and Balâtre, but he probable means here Bothey. He also claims the French actions started around noon, but at the same time he states his change of positions took place by 2 p.m.
Damitz, Von - Geschichte des Feldzugs etc. p.128 (after 2.30 p.m.).
Captain Von Röder, chief of staff of the brigade Von Luck, mentions the temporary position

near Point du Jour, where the musket were being put up and rested. At 2 p.m. the troops marched out to their final position at the left wing. In: *Erinnerungen etc.* p.321

According to the regimental history of the 28th regiment the regiment took up its position at noon. Cf. *Die Geschichte des 28.Regiments.* In: *Special ABN, nr.65* p.19

28. Cf. Bowden. This total is taking into account:

-units not being present: the 2nd battalion 3rd regiment Kurmark Landwehrinfantry (775 men, brigade Luck), two squadrons of the 6th regiment Kurmark Landwehrcavalry (275 men, brigade Von Stülpnagel) and two squadrons of the 9th regiment of hussars (356 men, brigade Von Lottum).

-the losses sustained on the 15th of June: 1200 men. On the 15th the foot battery nr.3 would have lost 5 guns, but this is not entirely sure. This would bring us then to 211 guns.

The total of 94.707 men was composed of 96.5 battalions, 82 squadrons and 27 batteries.

²⁹ There is a note of Bülow on the order stating: “Erst den 16.Morgens 5 Uhr erhalten”. Cf. *GSA. VPH-HA.VI., nr.II.13.p.6*

30. KA, VI.D.9.22 In: *GSA. VPH-HA.VI., nr.II.13.p.6* There is a note on the order stating “Praes. [praesentatum] den 16.Juny N.M. 1 Uhr”.

Von Ollech says it was between 1 and 2 p.m. In: *Geschichte des Feldzugs etc.* p.121

31. Plotho, C.von - *Der Krieg des Verbundeten etc.* p.45-46

Ollech, Von - *Geschichte des Feldzugs etc.* p.158

Von Gneisenau erroneously claims the report was written at Liège. In his letter to Boyen, dated 25th of June 1815. In: *Delbrück, H. Das Leben etc.* p.540

³² Dörk confirms the 15th regiment (15th brigade) left even before daybreak and had a halt between 11 a.m. and 1 p.m.. Cf. *Dörk, G.M. - Das Königlich Preussische etc.* p.126

An actual member of the same regiment (2nd battalion), lieutenant Van Rahden, claims the battalion arrived at Hannut around 1 p.m. and, that after a halt to rest and eat, it left again for Gembloux. In: *Wanderungen eines alten Soldaten* p.350, 361-362

³³ In: *History of the war etc.* In: *MWB, 1845* p.24

Von Lettow Vorbeck states the order dated 9.25 a.m. As the original copy is unavailable, the exact time it was written cannot be established. In: *Napoleon’s Untergang Vol.III* p.345

³⁴ In: *KA,VI.E.3.II.121* in: *GSA,VPH-HA,VI nr.VII.7.p.6*

35. In: *KA,VI.E.3.II.121* in: *GSA,VPH-HA, VI nr.VII.7.p.6*

Ollech, Von - *Geschichte des Feldzugs etc.* p.121-122

³⁶ Cf. Captain Von Conrady (commander of the 3rd battalion of the 4th regiment of Silesian Landwehr infantry, brigade Von Losthin). In: Aus stürmischer Zeit p.410-411. He claims it was between 3 and 6 p.m.

According to Von Wedell, the 15th brigade halted at Le Soleil between 3 and 6 p.m. In: Geschichte des Königlich Preussischen 18.Infanterie Regiments p.161

³⁷ Wedell, Von - Geschichte des Königlich Preussischen 18.Infanterie Regiments p.162

³⁸ Von Hiller states he had sent forward an officer to enquire and then the corps was permitted to make a halt, which it did near a tumulus called Tombe d'Empereur (which was in fact the tombe d'Hottomont) between 5 and 6.30 p.m. Due to the heat and the speed of the march a lot of stragglers had to be brought back to the column by mounted officers.

During their halt the troops took shelter in the shadow of some houses, made fires and cooked. Then, at 6.30 p.m. the march was resumed. In: Denkwürdigkeiten etc. p.237-239

39. Bülow in his report. In: Bas, F.de - La campagne de 1815 Vol.III p.518

Lettow Vorbeck, O.von - Napoleons Untergang Vol.III p.345

It was around 7 p.m. that lieutenant Von Gerlach, of the general Prussian headquarters, was sent out by Von Grolmann to Bülow, but there is no information about the mission itself. By that time, the battle still hung. Von Gerlach, however, didn't head for the Roman road where he expected to find Bülow, but kept too far to his right, towards the Namur-road and ended up somewhere there without meeting Bülow at all. The next morning he headed back for Gembloux, found out about the retreat and followed later (by 10 a.m.) to Wavre, after he had his horse rest. Cf. his diary. In: Aus den Jahren Preussischer Not etc. p.149-150

40. Lieutenant Von Rahden of the 2nd battalion of the 2nd regiment of Silesian regiment of infantry (brigade Von Ryssel) states the battalion arrived near Gembloux at 11 p.m. In: Wanderungen eines alten Soldaten p.362

Captain Von Conrady (commander of the 3rd battalion of the 4th regiment of Silesian Landwehr infantry, brigade Von Losthin) states his battalion arrived near Baudeset around midnight. In: Aus stürmischer Zeit p.411

According to the 1st lieutenant Elsner (4th company, 18th regiment) however the brigade of Von Losthin (at least his regiment) marched through until dawn. Cf. his report. In: MWB, 1907 nr.129 p.2933

41. From this letter it becomes clear that Clausewitz is wrong in stating that the 4th corps arrived here at Baudeset on the 17th of June at 3 a.m. Cf. Clausewitz, C.von – Hinterlassene Werke etc. p.36

42. In: KA,VI.E.3.II.123 In: GSA,VPH-HA,VI nr.VII.7.p.6

Ollech, Von - Geschichte des Feldzugs etc. p.159

⁴³ The fact that the 14th brigade was also some distance west of Baudeset along the Roman road, can be derived from the fact that on the 17th of June, at least a part of it had to head back some distance over this road, before turning left towards Dion le Mont. Cf. Rahden, W.von In: Wanderungen eines alten Soldaten p.350, 361-362 Von Rahden was a lieutenant in the 2nd battalion of the 2nd regiment of Silesian infantry.

44. Eberts, G.W.von - Hundertjährige Geschichte etc. p.195
Damitz, K.von - Geschichte des Feldzugs etc. p.217
Bülow in his report. In: Bas, F.de - La campagne de 1815 Vol.III p.518

⁴⁵ Cf. Von Hiller - Denkwürdigkeiten etc. p.237-239
Hiller says it was at Sauvenière that his corps halted but this is incorrect: it was on the Roman road north of this village, towards Perwez.

46. Damitz, K.von - Geschichte des Feldzugs etc. p.217
Report of Bülow. In: Bas, F.de - La campagne de 1815 aux Pays Bas. Vol.III p.518

⁴⁷ Cf. GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.IV nr.1 p.34
The hamlet of Baudecet was called in 1815 Bassebodecé and the farm there (now the "ferme de Baudecet ") was then called the "Cense de Haute Bodecé".