

The Saxon rebellion.¹

It was since 1814 that the Saxon army (about 14.000 men) had been assigned to the army corps which was led by general Von Kleist.

Yet, the Saxons had fought for most of the Napoleonic wars alongside with the French, especially after 1806 when the Saxons were included by Napoleon into the Confederation of the Rhine. This situation had not changed till during the war of liberation of 1813, when general Von Zeschau, commander of the Saxon infantry, asked his king, Friedrich August to turn to the allies. While the king hesitated to do this, they actually did and Friedrich Wilhelm was taken prisoner.

In this situation the king had remained loyal to the french while parts of his army had joined the allies. In this context, from the allied perspective, the Saxon army had broken its oath to its king.

Typical for this situation was the position of the commander of the Saxon army, general Von Thielmann. A Saxon by birth, his preference clearly was with the German nation.

It was in Saxon service that he commanded the fortress of Torgau in 1813, while having hopes that the king would join the allies. As this did not happen, Thielmann left the Saxon service and having been in Russian service for a while, he was eventually taken into Prussian service. In here, he led the Saxon corps which served with the allies in 1814.

It was during the congress of Vienna that Prussia displayed its territorial ambitions towards Saxony and the result was that in March the congress decided that the Kingdom of Saxony was to be divided. Originally, the prussians had attempted to gain the whole of Saxony, but Anglo-Austrian efforts prevented this from happening. In this division, the northern part would befall Prussia, while king Friedrich August could hold the remaining parts of his realm. Yet, this would only be enforced as soon as the king would speak out in favour of the allies and that is what he didn't; at least he did his utmost to prevent the decision to be ratified and to release his men from their oath.

Parallel to this political instability, the army suffered from this as well as frictions arose between Saxon and Prussian soldiers. Accordingly, the dilemma arose whether the Saxon army should be kept together or that it should also be divided into a "new-Prussian" and an "old-Saxon" part.

The first possibility was no real option for the Prussians as it would have the kingdom of Saxony come out much stronger in case of victory in the coming war. Though the second option carried all sorts of risks, the king favoured the first option and instructed Gneisenau in the beginning of April, when he took over the command from Von Kleist, to divide the Saxon accordingly.

This meant that those Saxons from territories annexed by Prussia were to join the Prussian army, while those from territories still under Saxon rule were to be assigned to the North German Federal Army under Von Kleist.

Until now, Von Kleist himself has attempted to deal with the situation sensibly, gained time and thereby clearly favoured the Saxon cause as he feared that by the division of the army their morale would collapse.

Meanwhile, the Saxon army had been attached as a whole to the corps of Von Borstell.

On the 15th of April, Gneisenau wrote to Hardenberg:

“Vergebens haben wir seither auf die Erklärung des Königs von Sachsen geharrt. Bevore solche nicht anlangt können wir die Theilung und Sonderung der Truppen nicht vornehmen, wenn wir nicht der Gefahr uns Preis geben wollen Tumult zu erregen.”²

And the same day, he wrote to lieutenant colonel Von Thile:

“Von den Sachsen kann ich nicht viel Guts versprechen, wenn die jetzige Unentschiedenheit ihres Zustandes fortdauert, denn sie hat die Unzufriedenheit derselben noch gesteigert.

Murren darüber lässt sich täglich vernehmen, und man darf schliessen, dass durch Emissäre aus Frankreich das Feuer noch mehr geschürt wird. Wenn wir eine Schlacht zu liefern hätten, so würde ich Bedenken tragen, sie in dieselbe zu führen. Leben Sie wohl.”³

Evidently, when Blücher reached Liège on the 19th of April, he tried in his way to keep the loyalty of the Saxons by using two of their regiments, one of which was the élite Guard Grenadiers, to guard his headquarters.⁴ General Von Müffling, a Saxon himself, was convinced of their loyalty.

About the dualism within the Saxon corps, he writes: “Many of the superior and subaltern officers of the Saxon army announced to me their intention to enter the Prussian service, requesting me at the same time to keep this secret, that they might not come into any unpleasant collision with the *exaltés* of the Saxon party; others, still more anxious and cautious, begged to be excused declaring any intention until the King had released them, and the division had actually taken place. These wishes seemed to me and my commanding general quite fair, and they were stated to be so in the reports. We then quietly waited for the king of Saxony to perform his part.”⁵

Yet, gradually, the Prussians got more and more influence in the Saxon forces. When Von Thielmann was succeeded by general Von Ryssel, himself a Saxon, he wore a Prussian uniform. Saxon officers were forced to decide whether they wanted to enter Prussian service. The result was that numerous Saxon officers joined into a pro-Saxon fraction, which was initially led by general Lecoq and later by the Saxon chief-of-staff, colonel Von Zezschwitz. Politics in Vienna, meanwhile, contined and it was here decided to allocate the “old-Saxon” force to Wellington’s army instead.

On the 18th of April it was determined at Vienna which contingents would befall to the armies of Wellington and Blücher. Those for the Prussian army were those of Hessen, Mecklemburg, Schwarzburg, Reuss, Waldeck, Lippe and Anhalt, plus those of Saxony, while of these last Wellington was to receive the Saxon contingent “telle qu’il reste après les cessions faites à Sa Majesté le roi de Prusse” – to his army were also allocated the contingents of Hannover, Brunswick, Nassau, Oldenburg and the Hanzean cities.⁶

Some days after Blücher’s arrival, major Von Weitershausen, commander at Liège, warned members of the Prussian staff about tensions amongst the Saxon units, but Von Müffling, having a high esteem of these troops, rejected this.⁷

While the situation grew more and more delicate, it was on the 30th of April that general Von Grolman came from Vienna at Liège bringing the order-in-cabinet dated 22nd of April informing Blücher that it would take a few more days before the final details of the division of Saxony were settled.⁸

The King ordered Blücher to divide the Saxon army without any delay into two brigades. One was to be composed of units coming for their most part from provinces which were to be Prussian territory, while the other brigade was to be composed of those from provinces which were to form the remaining “old-Saxon” kingdom.

A draft proposition for this division of the corps was made by colonel Von Zezschwitz, in which about 6800 men – the 1st brigade under general major Von Steinmetz - would come to the Prussian army and about 7900 men – the 2nd brigade under by colonel Von Leyser- to that of Wellington.⁹

The reorganisation was to be implemented without regard to the fact that the King of Saxony had not yet released his soldiers from their oath of loyalty.

Apart from this procedure, the reorganisation as such was most complicated as all regiments, even to the company-level, were composed of men of both territories.

While the reorganisation was taken lightly in Vienna, in Liège it wasn’t, but all in all, the Prussian leadership must have felt it was possible to carry into execution without too much trouble.

Accordingly, it was on the 1st and 2nd of May that Blücher announced the coming division which was to be finalised on the 5th. That date, there would have to be a Prussian and Saxon brigade, both in their own quarters, the first to be formed near Liège and the second near Verviers.

For that reason, on the early evening of the 2nd of May, the commanding officers of the Saxon corps were sent for by Gneisenau to explain and prepare the arrangement.¹⁰ The officers wished this arrangement not to take place, but instead it was announced to be commenced the next day.

This announcement proved to be too much for the Saxon élite units at Liège, the Guard Grenadiers. After the officers came back from the meeting, soldiers of the 1st battalion gathered together in front of Blücher's headquarters and shouted "Wir wollen nicht geteilt sein, es lebe unser König Friedrich August !" The result was that all six battalions of the regiment were called to their assembly point where they were calmed down by their leadership.

Yet, between 8 and 9 p.m., a group of soldiers of 400 or 500 men of both grenadier-battalions again walked out towards the premises where Blücher had his headquarters. Now, Prussian officers and the Saxon sentries, accompanied by Von Müffling, tried to stop them. When their pleas were ignored, they drew their swords; the Saxons drew their weapons and a fight ensued in which Von Müffling himself was hit on an epaulet with a side-arm.

Meanwhile, the Saxon in the back of the crowd threw stones through the windows of the building.

When they finally were able to storm the building, Von Müffling drew the guard back into the house, locked the door and Blücher fled to safety through a door in the rear of the building to the village of Oreye.¹¹

When the crowd found out that Blücher had gone, they broke up.

It was from Orey that Blücher ordered that night for all Saxon units at Liège to quit this town and to march to cantonments near Verviers and Limbourg. The grenadier-battalion of the guard, however, had to march out from Liège on the road which leads to Namur. Being the most culpable, this battalion was supposed to have its conduct inquired into.

After some protestations, this is what it did; by 2.30 a.m. they had left Liège.

As he was expected at Tirlemont the next day, Blücher issued orders for the reorganisation of the Saxon forces. First of all, this had to be carried through right away, and the result would have to be that the two brigades were to leave Liège by 10 a.m. and to march off in two different directions. After that, a Prussian brigade would take over the town. By then, 20 Prussian battalions were on their way to occupy Liège and its environment so as to prevent the main body of the Saxons to join the rioting battalions, and vice versa.¹²

In this context, it were the regiment of Pommerian infantry and two squadrons of Königin dragoons which came from Huy to Liège to protect Prussian general headquarters; additionally the 6th brigade reached Liège on the 5th of May while the 7th brigade was taken to Huy.¹³

So, on the 3rd of May, after general Von Steinmetz had delivered him the order, Von Zezschwitz decided to divide the army on a regimental level, thereby taking into account the majority of each part in each regiment. Zezschwitz tried to assemble the units in such a way as to avoid any mutual influence, but for this it was already too late. The result was that the final attempt to divide the corps failed completely.

While the 2nd line regiment marched off from Liège at noon, the two battalions of grenadiers refused to do so as they insisted to join the Guard battalion which was now at Huy.¹⁴

Zezschwitz conceded, but only on the condition that they would leave Liège after 3 p.m. This led to a tense situation: discipline and order broke down; anti-Prussian and pro-French exclamations were heard. It was only when the battalions were permitted by general Von

Grolman to march off towards the guard and the promise was given that they could join the guard the next day, that the grenadiers moved out from Liège.

The Saxon cavalry, meanwhile, being at Visé, consented in the arrangements and were ordered into cantonments near Sittard.¹⁵

To make things worse it was on the 3rd of May as well that Blücher, while returning from Tirlémont, met the 2nd regiment of Saxon light infantry which refused to salute him.¹⁶

Having returned to Liège, Blücher, immediately issued orders for the departure of the Saxon units, also those which had not protested.

General Von Borstell, commander of the 2nd corps, to which the Saxons belonged, was instructed to take measures to prevent them from going to France. At the same time, Blücher pulled the 3rd corps further towards Liège.

On the 4th of May he wrote to the king:

“Soviel Ich die ganze Revolte bis jetzt übersehen kann, hat sie folgende Ursache.

Von den Offizieren ist früher eine Verbindung ausgegangen, welche sich später dem gemeinen Mann mitgeteilt hat: sich nicht trennen zu lassen. Die Rebellen haben sich gestern vielfach geäußert, dass sie sich alles gefallen lassen wollten und müssten, wenn sie die Unterschrift ihres Königs sähen.

Die Offiziere haben an der Revolt selbst keinen Teil genommen, aber es scheint dass die ersten Schritte von einigen Offizieren herbeigeführt sind, welche hofften, dadurch zu schrecken. Dass es zu einem solchen Frevel kommen würde, hatte keiner geglaubt, und als die Offiziere späterhin sich Mühe gaben, den Gehorsam herzustellen, war es zu spät und ihre Autorität verloren.

Die Sächsische Kavallerie hat bis jetzt gar keinen Teil genommen, eine Chaine gezogen und alle Kommunikation mit der sächsischen Infanterie aufgehoben, allein es scheint mir, als ob dieselbe Vereinigung bei ihr stattfindet, sich nicht trennen zu lassen.

Der Kommandierende der Kavallerie, Oberst Von Leyser, hat mir gestern abend durch einen Offizier sagen lassen, wenn ich der Kavallerie einen preussischen General vorsetzte und sie ungetrennt liesse, würde sie zeigen, was sie tun könnte.

Ich habe mich in keine Unterhandlungen eingelassen, sondern die Kavallerie und Artillerie in rückwärtige Kantonnements verlegt, die Infanterie mit Ausnahme in rückwärtige

Kantonnements verlegt, die Infanterie mit Ausnahme der Grenadiere biwakieren lassen. [...]

Ich sehe dies als den letzten Versuch an, die Ehre der sächsischen Armee zu retten, um allgemeines Blutvergiessen zu ersparen. Ich habe den Obersten v.Leyser und v.Zezschwitz anbefohlen, die Disziplin herzustellen, die Offiziere anzuhalten, dass sie mit den Leuten reden und die falschen Vorstellungen auszurotten suchen. Dann sollen sie die Teilung dergestalt bewirken, dass sie fürs erste in den Regimentern geschieht, nämlich eine gewisse Anzahl Kompagnien aus Leuten südlich, und andere aus Leuten nördlich der Scheidungslinie zusammengesetzt werden, wo dann bei der Infanterie eigene Bataillons, bei der Kavallerie eigene Eskadrons entstehen und bei jedem Regiment unter den jetzigen Kommandeurs verbleiben. Dass die Teilung der Leute in 2 Brigaden nicht anders, als mit gewaffneter hand durchzusetzen ist, davon habe ich mich überzeugt; auch könnte es leicht möglich sein, da jetzt alle Leidenschaften aufgeregert sind, dass alle Offiziers [sic] welche der ersten Brigade zugeteilt waren, gestützt auf Ew.Majestät Befehl zur zweiten übertreten, wo dann rein gar keine oder sehr wenig Offiziere bei jener sich befänden, keine Ordnung erhalten werden könnte, und, wenn sie durch preussische Pffiziere kommandiert werden sollten, Revolten mit Sicherheit vorauszusehen wären.

Was das Grenadier-Regiment betrifft, so hat das Garde-Bataillon den Anfang gemacht, Unordnungen zu begehen, und schon früher einen sehr unruhigen Geist gezeigt, jedoch keine Handlungen begangen, welche Todestrafen erfordern.

Ich werde dieses Bataillon umringen, desarmieren lassen und es als unwürdig, gegen den gemeinschaftlichen Feind zu fechten, von der Armee abschicken. Die beiden Grenadier-Bataillone nr.2 und 3 hingegen haben durch die Revolte am 2.Mai, durch tätliche Vergehungen an ihren Offizieren am 3. und durch den noch jetzt fortdauernden Ungehorsam sich zu Verbrechern herabgewürdigt, welche mit dem Tode nach den Kriegsgesetzen bestraft werden.

Ich werde sie daher, sobald die dazu bestimmten Truppen des II.Armee-Korps angekommen sein werden, umringen, desarmieren, und dann an sie die Forderung machen lassen, dass sie ihre Anführer der Rebellion ausliefern; geschieht dies, so werde ich diese totschiessen lassen; geschieht dies nicht, so werde ich die dezimieren und daraus eine Anzahl totschiessen lassen. Dann werde ich auch diese Bataillons als untwürdig, mit uns zu fechten, von der Armee zurücksenden.”¹⁷

And on the same day he expressed to the Prussian king his ideas about the causes of the rebellion and the resulting lack of use of the Saxon troops for the Prussian army:

“Ew.Königliche Majestät werden aus meinem Bericht nr.1 den unangenehmen Vorfall bei den sächsischen Truppen zu erheben geruht haben. Ich habe darin nur das Grenadier-Regiment erwähnt, weil es nur bei diesem zum offiziellen Ausbruch gekommen ist, allein ich kann Ew.Majestät nicht bergen, dass sich im ganzen Armee-Korps derselbe Geist zeigt und dass, wenn bis jetzt noch keine Schritte von den anderen Truppen geschehen sind, es nur noch an einem unternehmenden Anführer fehlt; wenn dieser aber sich finden sollte, durchaus nicht zu übersehen ist, wohin diese Zustand führen kann.

Auf jedes Bivak, das sie dem König von Sachsen bringen, folgt gewöhnlich ein Bivak Napoleon, und die Obersten, selbst Oberst v. Zezschwitz hat alle Gewal über die Truppen verloren. Es scheint, dass die Revolution von Wien aus organisiert worden ist, denn 1.sind Anzeichen vorhanden, dass an mehrere Tage vor der Ankunft Grolmans davon gewusst hat, dass eine Teilung vor sei.

2. ist so viel ausgemittelt, dass von Offizieren der sächsischen Armee Leuten, welche bei der Revolte waren, Geld zugesteckt ist, und dass die Soldaten zum Theil betrunken waren. Wenn es nun vielleicht in der Politik des Königs des Königs von Sachsen liegt, die Trennung der Armee so lange als möglich zu hindern, und hierzu geheime Befehle gegeben worden sind, so hat er das Blut, das jetzt vergossen werden muss und vielleicht noch als Folge dieses Aufruhrs vergossen werden wird, auf seinem Gewissen. Ich glaube, dass ihm dies mit den allerlebhaftesten Farben zu schildern ist.

Ehe nicht die Ratifikation des Traktates St.Majestät von Sachsen hier ankommt, sind selbst wenn es jetzt durchgesetzt wird, dass die Formation regimenterweis geschieht, die sächsischen Truppen ganz unbrauchbar zu jedem Dienst, ja selbst, wenn die Ratifikation aufs schleunigste erfolgt, wie ich dies Ew.Majestät beschwöre, durch alle Mittel zu veranlassen, glaube ich, ist es ratsam, sämmtliche Ew.Majestät zufallende Mannschaften von hier zurückmarschieren zu lassen und alle Neuformationen aus Saachsen bei dem V. und VI. Armee-Korps vorzunehmen, da die Nachricht von der Rebellion Ew. Majestät hier stehende Truppen dergestalt mit Hass und Abscheu erfüllt hat, dass ich es kaum für möglich halte, dass die hier stehenden 4 Armee-Korps in diesem Kriege mit den Sachsen zusammen dienen können.”¹⁸

Blücher couldn't be clear enough on what he thought about the Saxons. Yet, though Blücher wrote about retributions on the 4th of May, these were not carried into effect until the 6th. The 5th of May was used for the officers of the Saxon corps to endeavour “to bring round the minds of the soldiery to the arrangement, which, by the Prussians, is now considered a point of honour and of discipline from which they cannot recede. But in any event the three battalions which are separated are to be disarmed and punished”, Hardinge wrote to Wellington that day.¹⁹

It was on the morning of the 5th of May that colonel Hardinge had a private conversation with generals Von Müffling and Von Grolman about the situation. In this meeting, Hardinge made an attempt to prevent the situation from escalating by restating his reasons which might palliate, without however justifying, the conduct of the Saxon soldiery.

Hardinge's letter also sheds interesting light upon the way the Prussian leadership considered the situation. He writes: "... that, under the present circumstances, it might be more politic to yield in a certain degree to the unanimous feelings of 15.000 men until their King released them formally from their allegiance, rather than push them to the extremity, with the chances, as they admitted, against the success of their arrangement; that if the battalions would not allow their own officers or the Prussian officers to approach them, they might be inclined to listen to a third and disinterested party in their quarrel, and abide by the arbitration." Yet, Hardinge only found insistence on the Prussian side in the way they intended to deal with the problem:

"I was told they had attempted only to accomplish legitimate objects, to which even the Saxon officers could not object in point of right; that the outrage committed on the commander in chief, who confided his person to their honour, required atonement, as well as discipline an example; that these battalions, after what had passed, could be of no use this campaign; and the only chance of the remainder performing service in the field was by crushing this spirit, and enforcing the arrangement, or sending them away.

In short, my Lord, the exasperation is at such a height that, in any favourable turn this affair may take, I don't conceive the troops of the two countries can serve together."²⁰

In this sense, it was Gneisenau who wrote to general Dobschütz on the 5th of May:

"Wir werden die drei ungehorsamsten Bataillone entwaffnen lassen, um zu sehen, welche Wirkung dies auf die andern tue. Auf jeden Fall sollen alle samt und sonders von der Armee entfernt und zu dem Kriege nicht zugelassen werden, wenn man auf meinen Rat hört."²¹

On the 6th of May, all battalions of the Saxon Guard-Regiment (those not far from Liège and the other one at Namur) were surrounded by Prussian units, disarmed and forced to deliver the rioters. When they refused, decimation of the battalions was envisaged. Eventually, from one battalion four and of the other two, three men were brought up and executed on the spot.²²

Blücher also had instructed to burn the regimental colour, but general Von Borstell protested to this, as well as to the disarmament of the battalions, on the 7th of May.

This was in vain and Von Borstell, as a result, was taken from his post the day after. He was succeeded by general Pirch I. The same day, the regimental colour was burnt.²³

Meanwhile, though the Saxon cavalry had consented in the Prussian arrangements, the atmosphere amongst the Saxon infantry was most unstable. By the 9th of May, near Verviers, more battalions dismissed their officers and confrontations with Prussian units were imminent.²⁴

The whole affair cut deep between the Saxons and the Prussians. All this led Blücher to order on the 10th of May that the whole Saxon contingent (except for the cavalry) was to march off to cantonment at Wesel, Venlo, Roermond and Düsseldorf and to remain there, awaiting the instructions of the Saxon king.²⁵ From there they later marched to Waldeck and Paderborn.

On the 12th of May he wrote to the Prussian king: "Meine Absicht ging dahin, am 12. die Preussischen Truppen von allen Seiten heranrücken zu lassen und die befohlene Formation in Bataillone mit Gewalt zu erzwingen. Ich hatte zum 10. Mai die Obersten nach Lüttich kommen lassen, um ihnen zu eröffnen, welche Massregeln ich nehmen würde, als am Morgen dieses Tages Nachrichten vom Herzog Wellington eingingen, nach welchen man vermuthen musste, dass Bonaparte unverzüglich einen Angriff auf uns bezweckte, der vorzüglich von Maubeuge aus erfolgen sollte. Hiernach wurde es mir wünschenswert, alle Kräfte gegen den

Feind führen zu können und der Bewachung der sächsischen Infanterie überhoben zu werden.”²⁶

Not long after, on the 22nd of May, colonel Raabe, commander of the artillery, also protested to the way things were dealt with and was sent away as well, to Jülich. That same day, the Saxon king finally relieved the troops of their oath, thereby opening the way of the definitive division of the Saxon contingent.

[Cettriz]

On the 26th of May, Gneisenau wrote to his wife: “Unsere Sächsische Infanterie fährt fort, sich schlecht zu betragen. Es musste daher darauf gedacht werden, sie noch weiter zu entfernen, und sie erhält soeben Befehl, über den Rhein zu gehen, wo sie dann in Westphalen und Hessen verlegt wird, wel sie unwürdig der Ehre ist, an dem Kriege Teil zu nehmen.”²⁷

And the day after, Blücher wrote to Hardenberg about the Saxons:

“An die Sachsen ist kein Haar gut. Um nicht in der Notwendigkeit zu kommen, barbarisch mit sie umzugehn, habe ich sie alle getrennt und die Infanterie, die gewiss bei der ersten Gelegenheit überginge, über den Rhein geschickt, die Artillerie nach Jülich verlegt und die Kavallerie, die sich gut zeigt, bei mich behalten. Wenn die Sache mit Sachsen in Wien angemacht ist, wird sich alles geben, aber so sagen sie: “Unser König hat noch nicht abgetreten und wir sind unserm Eid nicht entbunden.” Ich wollte, dass Wellington die Sachsen zu sich nähme, aber er will sie nicht. [...] Denken Sie aber einmal, wie ich unglücklich sein konnte, wenn die Sächsische Infanterie es erfuhr, dass der General Von Borstell sie vertreten wollte ! Ich wäre in den Fall gekommen, sie alle niederschieszen zu lassen; denn wenn 8000 Mann den Gehorsam versagen, so ist es eine bedenkliche Sache. Die ganze Schuld war, dass diese Menschen hier verzogen waren. Man hatte mit sie getätschelt, und da sie nun geteilt werden sollten, so glaubten sie, die Sache rühre von mich her. Aber ich wurde mit die fertig bevor sie noch erfuhren, dass Herr von Borstell ihr Sachwalter sein wollte. Aber ich war entschlossen, die Sache durchzusetzen und des Königs Befehl Gehorsam zu verschaffen und nötigenfalls den Herr von Borstell auch totschiessen zu lassen. Nun sieht der Mensch sein Unrecht ein, aber es ist zu spät. Meine Truppen sind so aufgebracht, dass ich die Sachsen mit allen meinen Ansehn in Schutz nehmen muss, sonst bringen sie sie um.”²⁸

Wellington and the Saxons.²⁹

On the 1st of April it was decided at the congress of Vienna that the Saxon troops were to be attached to Wellington’s army. This decision formed part of arrangements made for the division of the different German contingents over the armies of Wellington and Blücher. In this context, Wellington wrote to the earl of Clancarty on the 11th of April:

“As it appears by a letter of the 1st instant, received from the earl Cathcart, and one from your Lordship, that the contingent of the King of Saxony is destined to join the army under my command, I beg your Lordship to procure an order to the General commanding these troops to place himself under my command, together with an order from the King of Prussia to general Gneisenau to allow him to do so; and that your Lordship will be pleased to send duplicates of both to me.”³⁰

From Vienna, Boyen, on the other hand, reported to Gneisenau on the 15th of April:

“Unsere Sächsischen Angelegenheiten gehen den Schneckengang und werden nicht gut geführt, Humboldt meint, dass wenn der König von Sachsen sich nicht bereitwillig erklären wollte, man die ganze Armee an Wellington überlassen müsste; dawider habe ich mich sehr stark erklärt, denn einmal würde es zeigen, wie unbeschreiblich schwach wir sind und dann, wie könnte man wohl glauben nach geendetem Kriege auszuführen, was jetzt uns nicht möglich ist; ich werde hiernach morgen mit dem Staatskanzler, der heute verreist war,

sprechen und mich beeilen Ihnen sobald als möglich ein Resultat zu verschaffen. Sollte man nicht in der sächsischen Armee die Ansicht aufstellen können, dass diejenigen, die preussische Unterthanen würden, in eine nachtheilige Lage kommen könnten, wenn sie Schwierigkeiten machten: sie sind ja ausmarschirt ohne die Bewilligung des Königs; was brauchen sie sie jetzt ?

Der König hat es genehmigt dass die neu beabsichtigten Corps und Brigaden nur immer so formirt werden sollen, wie die dazu bestimmten Truppen ankommen; dadurch wird also manche Schwierigkeit, die einer neuen Formation entgegen stehen muss, denn doch etwas beseitigt werden können.”³¹

Things were not formalized, however, until the 18th of April when the congress sat together. It was during this meeting that Hardenberg “cursorily mentioned that such of the troops, hitherto coming under the description of Royal Saxon troops, as belonged to those parts of the former Saxon territories now assigned to the king of Prussia ought, as subjects of His Majesty, to continue to act with the Prussian army.”

Yet, as little notice was taken of these comments, Clancarty thought the arrangement remained as it was made on the 1st of April and signed it.

Yet, when he got his copy on the 20th, the annex, then attached, said that only those Saxon troops coming from the “royaume de Saxe tel qu’il reste après les cessions faites à S.M.le Roi de Prusse” would befall Wellington.

This was something Clancarty strongly objected to in a meeting held on the evening of the 20th where he mentioned “in strong terms the necessity either of having the tableau altered to the original arrangements, or that at least such further assignments of German contingents should be made, either of the troops of Ducal Saxony or Hesse &c. as would make up the numbers at which the Chancellor himself had estimated the Royal Saxon troops; that these last troops having been in a state of mutiny at the time, it had been solely on the proposition of the Prussian plenipotentiaries, for their particular accomodation, and in the hopes that under some other command this force might be rendered more available, that I had consented to their being annexed to your Grace’s army; but that, having thus consented, I could not now permit that the whole of them should be disorganised, and such small part thereof as the Prussians might think it convenient to spare passed over to serve with our army.”³²

A discussion arose but no new decision was taken, but meanwhile Clancarty was resolved not to leave matters as they were.

For Clancarty it was of the utmost importance that the Saxon army either came to Wellington, or – if not – that Wellington was to receive other German contingents instead with the same strength, as estimated between 12.000 and 14.000

Clancarty’s attitude and reaction must have been strengthened by the order-in-cabinet which was taken by the Prussian king about the division of the Saxon army on the 22nd and which reached him on the 23rd.

Hardenberg’s reaction to Wellington came on the 23rd of April as well. First of all, he referred to the consideration, when Wellington was still in Vienna himself, that a part of the Saxon army was to be assigned to Wellington; this was that led by the King of Saxony and that the other was to be assigned to the Prussian army.

After Wellington left from Vienna, Hardenberg spoke to Clancarty of “à peu près de 12.000 ou 14.000 hommes”. Yet, it was in this that a misunderstanding arose between them. While Clancarty thought that Wellington could have this number of Saxons, Hardenberg in his turned claimed he never had promised that number of Saxon troops to the British, but that he was referring to the totals of the contingents of the German princes. In all, after the division of the Saxon corps, Wellington might have 7000 or 8000 men at most. At the same time,

Hardenberg was fully confident that Wellington could have even more as 12.000 Saxons, as Saxony should be able to deliver this number of men from its population.³³

It was in this context that Clancarty wrote to Wellington on the 26th of April:

“I avail myself of a Dutch courier, which they tell me goes in an hour, to tell you that I have been disappointed in my hopes of having matters satisfactorily settled with respect to the service of the Royal Saxon contingent. Hardenberg told me at the last conference that the King could not permit such of the soldiers as came from his part of Saxony to serve otherwise than with his armies; so that this force is not likely, if divided, to be worth much for some time. I have entered the paper sent you in my last on the protocol, which is all that can be done by me.

I know not how far it would be prudent, but I am sure it would serve them right, if we should refuse to receive any part of these picked and culled remains of the Royal Saxon corps, whose organisation and efficiency in discipline as well as composition cannot but materially suffer by the proposed operation, into the line of our army; and if we were to replace their numbers by Portugese or Danish troops, paying the whole expense of these from the subsidies, otherwise assignable to Prussia, who would thereby little tempted to make similar experiments in future. Unfortunately, however, their cooperation is essential to us; and although the means are in our own hands, and that there would be no denying the justice of the act, it may not be very polite to put into execution.”³⁴

It was in the same way that Hardenberg replied to Clancarty in a formal meeting four days later, on the 30th of April. The day after, Clancarty referred towards Hardenberg again to the formal protocol of the 18th of April and the enclosure, in which, after the protocol had been signed, the change had been made as far as the Saxons was concerned: in that change, the division of the corps had been taken in, while this, according to Clancarty, had not been agreed upon in a formal way.

He also indicated that Hardenberg had not gone deeper into the subject of the division of the army itself and its implications.

On his turn, Hardenberg, denied having promised the full contingent to Wellington and having spoken in this of specific numbers; he indicated that this strength depended upon the division itself and the arrangements of the Saxon king.

Yet, on the 23rd of April, Von Boyen expressed to Gneisenau his fear of losing the service of the complete Saxon corps for the Prussians altogether and asked for his assistance:

“Ohne alle Rücksicht auf das preussische Kriegssystem hat man Wellington die königlich sächsische Armee zugesagt und die englische Gesandtschaft verlangt diese nun ganz; wir riskieren alle sächsischen Truppen zu verlieren und dadurch selbst den Besitz unseres kärglich uns zugemessenen Antheils dem wankenden Kriegsglück zu unterwerfen. In diesem Verhältnis, wo die Diplomatie nichts mehr helfen kann, muss das Militair wenigstens zu retten suchen, was es kann. Was militärisch geschehen kann und ohne förmlichen Ungehorsam nicht von den Truppen zu verweigern ist, bestimmt die erste, heute mitkommende Cabinetsordre; vielleicht, dass die sächsischen Regimenter so wie sie in besondere Brigaden getheilt sind, dann selbst zur weitem Auseinandersetzung die Hand bieten. Dringend bitte ich Sie um unseres armen Vaterlandes willen, hier alles Mögliche anzubieten, dass wir nicht den Übelstand erleben, dass uns die sächsische Armee ganz entzogen wird.”³⁵

It is hard to determine who was right in this matter, but due to the fact that in the documentation of the congress there are no formalities about the Saxons until the 18th of April, Hardenberg could be right and that the whole matter was only discussed without engagement.

After the Saxon rebellion had taken place on the 2nd of May, Wellington wrote to Hardenberg on the 3rd of May:

“Pour ce qui regarde les Saxons, votre Altesse recevra peut-être par cette occasion les rapports de leur conduite d’hier au soir; et, comme je n’ai pas assez de bonnes troupes pour pourvoir disposer d’un corps pour observer et tenir en ordre un autre disposé à la mutinerie, je crois que je ferais mieux de n’avoir rien à dire à ces troupes; et, si elles ne se tinrent pas de leur affaire de hier au soir d’une manière honorable, et qui soit conforme au caractère militaire, malgré mon respect pour les puissances qui en auront mis une partie sous mes ordres, je les prierai de me dispenser de les commander.”³⁶

And to Clancarty, Wellington wrote the same evening:

“The Saxons mutinied last night at Liège, and obliged poor old Blücher to quit the town; the cause of the mutiny was the order to divide the corps, and that the Prussian part, in which the guards were included, should take the oath of allegiance to the king of Prussia.”³⁷

For Wellington it was clear: he had no interest any longer in the Saxons.

There is a claim in the meeting at Tirlemont, Blücher would have asked the duke to take the Saxons troops over to his army, but the duke rejected the proposal.³⁸

On the 4th of May, as the mutineers were to be disarmed, Hardinge asked the duke on behalf of the Prussian leadership “whether the battalions which it is intended to disarm and separate from the rest of the Saxon forces can, in the event of its being judged expedient, be accommodated with transports and embarked at any of the Dutch ports for such of the Prussian maritime places as may be hereafter resolved upon.” Hardinge added that the reason for this consideration was “the little confidence at present to be placed in any of the other Saxon corps, and the risk which might result of the main body had any intercourse with the disarmed battalions; or at any rate, by referring this point to your Lordship, to have an additional alternative in the mode of sending these troops to the rear, should such be the indispensable necessity.”

Wellington’s reaction was crystal clear: he objected to this mode by writing to Hardinge on the 5th of May what to do with the situation:

“When I was at Tirlemont and spoke to the Marshal, I was not aware of what had occasioned the mutiny among the Saxon troops. I thought it had been their attachment to Napoleon, which, from them particularly, was not to be passed over. Considering the spirit and sentiments known to prevail among them, it would have been best, perhaps, to have deferred to make the division of them which had been ordered; but, as the attempt has been made, and has produced a mutiny, the mutiny must be in the first instance be got the better of, and the leaders in it punished; and then it must be seen what it is proper to do with the Saxon troops. Upon the first point I recommend that the Saxon guards, and the two battalions who have taken part with them, should be disarmed, and sent prisoners into the Prussian provinces. The disposal of them afterwards will be a question between the two Governments, with which we military men have nothing to do.

We have no transports in any of the Dutch ports, or indeed in any port. Our troops come over to Ostend in vessels hired for the purpose, which go back as soon as the troops are landed; so that we cannot assist in sending the mutineers into Prussia.

In regard to the other Saxon troops, it is very obvious that they will be of no use to any body during the war; and our object must be to prevent them from doing mischief. I know enough of the state of Saxony, and of the discussions between the King of Saxony and the allied powers, and of the King’s character, to be very certain that it will not do to send the Saxon troops back to Saxony; and that which I recommend is, that they should be out in small numbers in such posts as it may be necessary for the Allies to garrison. They would thus

relieve other troops, and they could do no mischief; and they would be cured of, or find it necessary to conceal their attachment to Napoleon. Two or three thousand might be safely disposed of in this manner in Mayence. But if the principle is adopted, the Marshal will know best how to adopt it.

I do not think 14.000 men will have much weight in deciding the fate of the war. But the most fatal of all measures will be to have 14.000 men in the field who cannot be trusted; and who will require nearly as many more good troops to observe them.”³⁹

Before he sent these thoughts to Hardinge, the duke had told them to Von Röder as well.

The next day, on the 6th, the duke reported further to Hardinge:

“I have received your letter of the 5th, 7 p.m. and you will see that I concur very much in the principle of the line of action of the Prussians since the mutiny of the Saxon troops. We shall lose the service of those troops; but I believe no line of conduct could save it to us; and we must not capitulate with mutiny in any shape. Indeed, from all I hear, I doubt that the Saxons would ever have served with the Prussian army, even if the division of them had not been attempted.”⁴⁰

The same day, Blücher sent an officer to general Röder to report him in detail about the measures taken by the Prussian leadership to repress the Saxon rebellion.⁴¹

At the same time, Blücher asked the duke of Wellington to have the three disarmed battalions to be sent to Antwerp so as to be shipped back from there to Prussia.⁴²

This last point had already been touched upon two days before by colonel Hardinge on the request of Von Müffling towards Wellington. In this way, the Prussians wanted to be sure that first there would be no intercourse between the disarmed battalions and the remaining units of the Saxon corps and second that these battalions, while on their way back into Germany, would not touch upon all sorts of places.⁴³

Wellington, from his side, proposed to Blücher on the 7th of May to have them march off through the Netherlands and Hannover to Prussia.⁴⁴ It was also for this reason that the duke declined Von Röder’s request on the evening of the 7th.

At the same time he asked Von Röder to have the Saxon units halt at Louvain until further notice and this is what Von Röder did.

And Wellington wrote to Blücher on the 7th:

“Je viens de recevoir la lettre de Votre Altesse, dans laquelle vous me faites savoir que vous avez arrangé l’affaire des troupes Saxonnnes sur quoi je vous félicite; et que vous désirez que je les fasse embarquer à Anvers pour un des ports Prussiens.

Le général Röder m’a aussi parlé sur ce projet; et il vous fera savoir que nous n’avons aucun bâtiment de transport ou à Anvers ou à Ostende. Il convient avec moi que la meilleure chose à faire sera de faire passer les prisonniers Saxons par la Hollande et le Hanovre en Prusse; et j’en demanderai permission au Roi des Pays Bas demain matin; et, s’il la donne, j’arrangerai leur marche en conséquence avec le général Röder.”⁴⁵

In this context Wellington asked permission for this passage from the king, Willem I, on the 8th of May.⁴⁶

However, the Prussian anxiety to dispose of the mutinous battalions was so great, that even though Wellington had indicated he had no transport vessels available and that he wanted to consult king Willem, the Prussians had ordered the mutineers to St.Trond and Tirlemont.⁴⁷

As Wellington heard about this, and even before king Willem could have expressed his view on the whole matter, the duke had himself ordered the mutineers to halt at Louvain so as to gain time to have the king’s opinion.

He refused. His main reason was that he didn’t want them to cross the march of the Brunswickers. Apart from that he didn’t want to render any service to the Prussians and what counted most for the king was to get of the Saxons as soon and as direct as possible.

As a result, Wellington proposed on the evening of the 10th or the 11th of May to move the Saxons out through Diest and Venlo towards Wesel. Von Röder, having no instructions of this kind from the Prussian leadership sent an express courier to Liège; to save time he asked in this letter them to send direct orders to major Dorsch, the commander of the unit which was escorting the Saxons. Yet, the letter never reached Blücher and therefore Dorsch didn't move from Louvain. It was only on the 14th of May that Dorsch inquired to Von Röder and when he learned Dorsch was still in Louvain, he immediately sent him to Hannut. Meanwhile, however, the general headquarters had moved from Liège to Namur.

It was on the 21st of May that Wellington wrote to prince Schwarzenberg: "Si les événements, et les fausses mesures prises n'eussent pas inutilisées les troupes Saxonnnes, qui sont 14.000, votre Altesse verra que j'aurais eu le nombre de troupes calculé dans ma dépêche d'Avril." ⁴⁸

At the same time, in Vienna, the Saxon king had declared his strong will to have his army commanded by Wellington and to achieve this, Wellington was approached several times. First of all, it was the king who wrote in this sense to Wellington on the 22nd of May. ⁴⁹ He had handed over the actual command over the Saxon army to the duke of Saxe Coburg, who also wrote to Wellington in the same sense. In the same document he also asked Wellington for British subsidies for his troops, plus those of Saxe Meiningen and Hilburghausen which were supposed to be attached to the Saxon contingent. ⁵⁰

From Vienna, it was also prince Metternich who informed the duke about this Saxon wish on the 23rd of May; at the same time the king had declared that if Wellington declined the offer, that he would offer his services to Austria.

Metternich himself also made a positive statement to the duke about the Saxons as: "Je vous prie de ne pas juger des Saxons sur ce que les généraux Prussiens vous en diront, car je les connais beaucoup les uns et les autres, et la troupe Saxonne est excellente, à mons que le vertige du Nord l'aît gagné." ⁵¹

And as if this was not enough, the colonel of Saxon dragoons was sent on a mission to Brussels to talk with the duke about the proposed transfer of command. He met the duke on the 23rd of May, dined with him, but didn't achieve anything. As a matter of fact, the duke had sir J.Craufurd tell him what he felt about the issue. Wellington wrote about this to Hardinge the day after and it is this letter which explains a lot about the way Wellington thought about the situation:

"The colonel of the Saxon dragoons was over here the other day and dined with me. He had some conversation with sir J.Craufurd regarding the Saxon troops, who repeated it to me; and I desired sir J.Craufurd to tell him that the Saxon troops had been destined by the Allies to be placed under my command; and that, if I had found they really went into the war as good soldiers and good Germans, I should have had no objection to them; but that since the mutiny I could have nothing to say to them unless they should come out of it quite clear. The colonel wanted to speak to me, but I did not see him. You may mention this or not as you please. You will take care, however, not to get the colonel into any scrape." ⁵²

On the 2nd of June, Gneisenau reported to Boyen:

"Dass der König die uns zufallenden sächsischen Soldaten unterstecken will, ist sehr zweckmässig. Auch die beste Behandlung würde sie uns nicht gewonnen haben. Wir sind willens, alle der Wellingtonschen Armee bestimmten Sachsen nach Osnabrück zu dirigieren, wo die hannöversche Regierung sie ernähren mag, und sie dann unsern Provinzen nicht zur Last fallen. Ich habe dem Herzog von Wellington geraten, sie womöglich nicht in die Linie aufzunehmen, sondern sie zu Garnisonen der zweiten Linie zu gebrauchen, was er auch sehr zweckmässig fand. Früher wollte er sie ganz und gar nicht. Ich hatte, was im Französischen besser als im Deutschen klingt: craché le pot." ⁵³

On the 5th of June, Wellington wrote to Hardenberg: "Je ne peux rien dire sur les troupes Saxonnnes jusqu'à ce que je sache comment elles sortiront de leurs affaires avec l'armée

Prussienne, parce que je ne veux avoir rien à faire avec des mutins, ni avec ceux attachés à Napoleon.”⁵⁴

And the next day to colonel Hardinge the duke expressed himself in these words: “I shall likewise be obliged to you to mention to him [Blücher] that I have had a letter from the king of Saxony, in which he desires me to take the command of the Saxon troops. This is in consequence of an arrangement of the Allies. But I beg you to tell the Marshal that I shall not take any command of these troops till I shall learn from him that he has directed them to place themselves under my orders.”⁵⁵

The letter of the Saxon king as referred to by Wellington was brought to him by colonel Von Leyser and colonel Ziegler; both, however, were told by the duke that he couldn't accept the Saxons just like that without having spoken to general Von Müffling (the new liaison since late May) before.⁵⁶

In his turn, at least at 11th June, Von Müffling was awaiting some more clarity on what Wellington would do.⁵⁷

At the same time, the duke of Saxe Coburg was losing his hopes of being able to serve with his troops under the duke of Wellington, as becomes clear from his letter dated 6th of June which he wrote to Wellington.⁵⁸

Eventually, the Saxon king must have realised the situation as now relieved his troops from their oath. This news reached the Saxon infantry at Osnabrück on the 13th of June; on the 18th of June it reached the Saxon cavalry, then at St.Trond.

Immediately after, the cavalry left from there and it was on the 19th of June that a detachment of about 700 Saxon hussars of the 12th regiment led by lieutenant colonel Von Czetztritz (seven squadrons) reached the corps of Von Thielmann, then at St.Achtenrode.⁵⁹

For Wellington it meant that it was now possible to have the Saxons being transferred to his army. Accordingly, it was in this sense that he wrote to general Lecoq at Arolsen on the 20th of June:

“J'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir votre lettre du 14; et le roi de Saxe m'ayant communiqué son désir que les troupes de Sa Majesté servent sous mes ordres, je consens à en prendre le commandement; et j'espère qu'ils se conduiront en bons soldats.

Je vous prie, aussitôt que les troupes seront prêtes, de marcher sur Anvers par la route de Rheina. Vous aurez la bonté de faire savoir au Ministre de Sa Majesté le Roi des Pays Bas quel jour vous entrerez sur ses états; et de me faire dire quel jour vous arriverez à Anvers, pour que je puisse vous envoyer des ordres pour votre marche ultérieure.”⁶⁰

Lecoq himself gave his reaction on the 25th of June thereby indicating that the troops available for Wellington lacked all kind of supplies and that they were not united; his intention therefore was to recruit new levies at Dresden so that a total force of 16.000 men would be available after all.⁶¹

Yet, in the meantime, the Saxon king had decided otherwise: having received Britain's objections, he turned to Austria. His explanation was that the Saxon units had been removed from Wellington's forces by the Prussians and herewith a new situation had arisen.⁶²

The result was that the contingent marched off towards the Austrian army on the 12th of July, so long after the defeat of Napoleon.

Revised: 18th April 2009

¹ This chapter is largely based upon the article of J.von Pflugk Harttung. Die Gegensätze etc. p.144-169

And therewith upon Peter Hofschröers description of the events as this description has been, in turn, largely based upon Von Pflugk Harttung's description. In: Waterloo. Wellington etc. p.48-55

For a summary, also see: Wacker, Das herzoglich-Nassauische Militär Vol.II p.87-88

² Delbrück, H. Das Leben etc. Vol.IV p.496

³ Griewank, K. – Gneisenau. Ein Leben in Briefen p.312-313

⁴ Müffling, Von – Memoirs p.209

⁵ Müffling, Von – Memoirs p.207-208

⁶ Ollech, Von – Geschichte etc. p.38

⁷ Nostitz, Von Tagebuch p.6

⁸ Nostitz, Von Tagebuch p.6

According to another publication it was on the 1st of May. Cf.Das Preussische Heer in den Jahren 1814 und 1815 p.158

⁹ Ollech, Von – Geschichte etc. p.38

¹⁰ Nostitz, Von Tagebuch p.7

¹¹ Müffling, Von – Memoirs p.210

Hardinge to Wellington, 4th of May 1815. In: WSD, Vol.XII p.220

Gneisenau to his wife, 4th May 1815. In: Gneisenau. Ein Leben in Briefen p.314

Von Nostitz. Tagebuch p.7-10

¹² One of these battalions would have been the 3rd battalion of the 1st Elbe Landwehr infantry (2nd corps), which got the sudden instruction to leave for Liège on the 5th of May. It passed the night of the 6th near Huy and reached Liège on the 7th of May from where it encircled the rebellious Saxon units on the 8th of May. Cf. Captain Von Borcke. In: Kriegerleben etc. p.303-305

¹³ Ollech, Von – Geschichte etc. p.39

¹⁴ Gneisenau to general Dobschütz, 5th of May 1815. In: Gneisenau. Ein Leben in Briefen p.315

¹⁵ Hardinge to Wellington, 4th of May 1815. In: WSD, Vol.XII p.220-221

¹⁶ Nostitz, Von Tagebuch p.11

¹⁷ Lettow Vorbeck, O. von Napoleons Untergang p.503-504

Von Müffling claims Blücher wanted to decimate the battalions, but that he himself was able to convince him to take less harsh measures, i.e. the execution of the rioters and the burning of the colour. In: Memoirs p.211

¹⁸ Lettow Vorbeck, O. von Napoleons Untergang p.504-505

¹⁹ WSD, Vol.X p.238

²⁰ WSD, Vol.X p.238-239

²¹ Gneisenau to general Dobschütz, 5th May 1815. In: Gneisenau. Ein Leben in Briefen p.315

²² Gneisenau to Gruner, 9th May 1815. In: Delbrück, H. Das Leben etc. Vol.IV p.504-505

²³ Von Borstell was sent to Berlin to be punished. Cf. Nostitz, Von Tagebuch p.12
In November 1815 he was condemned to 6 months of imprisonment in the castle at Magdeburg.
Gneisenau to Gruner, 9th May 1815. In: Delbrück, H. Das Leben etc. Vol.IV p.504-505
And in: Gneisenau. Ein Leben in Briefen p.316
Hardinge to Wellington, 9th May 1815. In: WSD, Vol.X p.266

According to another version, Pirch succeeded Borstell on the 9th of May. Cf. Geschichte des 1.Oberschlesischen etc. p.110

²⁴ Gneisenau to Gruner, 9th May 1815. In: Delbrück, H. Das Leben etc. Vol.IV p.504-505
And in: Gneisenau. Ein Leben in Briefen p.316
Hardinge to Wellington, 8th and 9th of May 1815. In: WSD, Vol.X p.262, 266

²⁵ Hardinge to Wellington, 10th May 1815. In: WSD, Vol.X p.273
It was already on the 5th of May that Hardinge wrote to Wellington about the threat, if the Saxon contingent would not accept the division, that it would then be forced to march across the Rhine by Wesel. In: WSD, Vol.X p.238
On the 8th of May, king Willem authorised Wellington to have the Saxons pass through Venlo to Wesel and beyond. Cf. his letter to the duke, of that date. In: NA, 2.02.01 nr.6211

²⁶ Lettow Vorbeck, O.von – Napoleons Untergang Vol.III p.176

²⁷ Pflugk Hartung, J.von Gegensätze etc. p.166 He cites from the original in the Gneisenau-archiv nr.A.20.II.192

²⁸ Blüchers briefe p.273-274

²⁹ This chapter has been largely based upon Von Pflugk Hartung. In: Die Gegensätze etc. p.153-169

³⁰ WD, Vol.XII p.300

³¹ Delbrück, H. Das Leben etc. Vol.IV p.499

³² Clancarty to Wellington, 21st April 1815. In: WSD, VolX p.125-126

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- ³³ Hardenberg to Wellington, 23rd April 1815. In: WSD, Vol.X p.143-144
- ³⁴ WSD, Vol.X p.165
- ³⁵ Delbrück, H. Das Leben etc. Vol.IV p.502
- ³⁶ WD, Vol.XII p.345
- ³⁷ WD, Vol.XII p.346
- ³⁸ Cf.chapter on this meeting.
- ³⁹ WD, Vol.XII p.349-350
- ⁴⁰ WD, Vol.XII p.355
- ⁴¹ Hardinge to Wellington, 6th May 1815. In: WSD, Vol.X p.245
- ⁴² WSD, Vol.X p.257
Also in: NA, 2.02.01 nr.6211
- ⁴³ Hardinge to Wellington, 4th of May 1815. In: WSD, Vol.XII p.219-220
- ⁴⁴ Wellington to Blücher, 7th May 1815. In: WD, Vol.XII p.357
- ⁴⁵ WD, Vol.XII p.357
- ⁴⁶ WD, Vol.XII p.364
- ⁴⁷ Hardinge to Wellington, 6th of May 1815. In: WSD, Vol.XII p.245
- ⁴⁸ WD, Vol.XII p.414
- ⁴⁹ WSD, Vol.X p.348
- ⁵⁰ WSD, Vol.X p.346-347
- ⁵¹ WSD, Vol.X p.346
- ⁵² WD, Vol.XII p.421
- ⁵³ As cited by Von Pflugk Harttung. In: Gegensätze etc.p.166-167 He cites from the former Kriegsarchiv. VI.D.119.II.81
- ⁵⁴ WD, Vol.XII p.442-443
- ⁵⁵ WD, Vol.XII p.449

⁵⁶ Müffling to Gneisenau, 7th June 1815. As cited by Von Pflugk Harttung. In: Gegensätze etc.p.165-166 He cites from the Gneisenau-archive, A.40.fol.79

⁵⁷ Von Müffling to Gneisenau, 11th of June 1815. In: Pflugk Harttung, J.von Vorgeschichte etc. p.328-329

⁵⁸ WSD, Vol.X p.425-426

⁵⁹ Cf. Förster, Von Geschichte des königlich preussischen Ulanen-Regiments Graf zu Dohna nr.8 p.74

According to Förster the appearance of the Saxon cavalry had aroused some confusion, the Prussians thought, because of their uniforms, they were French. In this context, Von Hobe praises colonel Czetrütz. He would have been asked by general Von Leyser not to join the Prussian army after the disaster of the 16th of June, but Von Czetrütz refused and joined it in the situation mentioned. Cf. the diary of Von Hobe, cited in: Bredow, Von Geschichte des 2.Rheinischen Husaren-Regiments Nr.9 p.13

⁶⁰ WD, Vol.XII p.491

⁶¹ WSD, Vol.X p.584-585

⁶² Count Einsiedel to Wellington, 22nd June 1815. In: WSD, Vol.X p.561