

The attack of the Imperial Guard.

Having stabilized the situation at Plancenoit by the intervention of part of the Old Guard and having a major part of his army in an offensive position against Wellington, Napoleon decided to renew the attack against Wellington by sending in his ultimate reserve: the infantry of the Imperial Guard.¹ By now it was about 7 p.m.² He therefore summoned his remaining 13 battalions of the imperial guard up to the front.³ From their positions east of the Brussels road and between Rossomme and La Belle Alliance they were supposed to be placed immediately to the north-west of this inn and to start their attack upon Wellington's centre from there. Though the battalions were supposed to move as one, they didn't do so. Due to an apparent delay, there was a gap in the advance which resulted in the 3rd and 4th regiments of chasseurs to take up their new position to the left front of La Belle Alliance first.⁴

While the chasseurs had reached their temporary positions at the left side of the Brussels road, the other battalions of the Imperial Guard also started crossing to the same side of the Brussels road. They did so in two groups.⁵ The first, which came in front, was composed of the one battalion of the 4th regiment of grenadiers and the two battalions of the 3rd regiment of grenadiers. Yet, as just at this period of time the enemy seemed to be emerging from the wood of Gomont after its loss by the French at 7 p.m., the 2nd battalion / 3rd grenadiers, led by colonel Belcourt, was detached to a position not far from the eastern boundary of Gomont to contain the situation there.⁶

After the first advance of the 3rd and 4th regiments grenadiers, a third group of four battalions got further north, to a position a little in rear of La Belle Alliance. They were the 2nd battalion of the 2nd regiment chasseurs (led by colonel Mompez), the 2nd battalion of the 1st regiment chasseurs (normally led by colonel Lamouret, but now by his superior general Cambronne) and the 1st and 2nd battalion of the 2nd regiment of grenadiers (led by colonel Martenot).⁷

As the four battalions of chasseurs of the 3rd and 4th regiment advanced, these battalions crossed the Brussels road. At the same time, Napoleon assigned both battalions of the 1st regiment of grenadiers new positions, both in square. The 1st battalion came in a position immediately to the left of the *chaussée* near the Decoster house; the 2nd battalion came in a position immediately east of the sand-track which connects this road with Plancenoit, a little north of this house.⁸ Of this battalion, each company sent 25 grenadiers (100 men in total) as skirmishers to the fields to the south of Plancenoit.⁹ In front of each square stood a battery of the artillery of the guard (¹⁰) and near the square of the 1st battalion stood the one of the sappers and miners of the guard.¹¹

While these manoeuvres were taking place, a significant shift in the French front against Wellington's centre took place. Cavalry units on and just in front of the ridge started hesitating in their positions, while others already started to fall back. This, in turn, incited gun crews to pull back as well, as they now no longer enjoyed any cover. To Napoleon, this serious development did not pass unnoticed. To prevent any further disintegration and to stabilize the urgent situation in this sector, he swiftly decided to launch only the four battalions of the chasseurs which were in front, without waiting for the 3rd and 4th grenadiers to come up.¹²

These were the four battalions of the 3rd and 4th chasseurs.¹³ To boost morale of his forces, he had the message spread along the line that Grouchy had arrived at the same time.¹⁴

The chasseurs were formed in two columns, having the 4th chasseurs to the left and the 3rd chasseurs to the right (with both battalions of each regiment in rear of each other). All battalions were in quarter-distance columns of grand divisions.¹⁵ In their advance so far, the interval between the columns was small. In the interval they were supported by some gun-units, but in what way remains unclear.¹⁶ It is unclear whether they were covered in their front by skirmishers.¹⁷ In total, the battalions comprised about 2000 men.¹⁸ It was now running towards

7.30 p.m.¹⁹

Meanwhile, as the Prussians had taken Plancenot for the second time, despite the reinforcements for Duhesme and Lobau of Pelet, Napoleon sent the 2nd battalion of the 2nd grenadiers in support to retake the village.

Initially, the four battalions of chasseurs moved up against the ridge beyond La Haye Sainte, having their right resting upon the Brussels-road, but soon they moved to their left so as to avoid the farm of La Haye Sainte and the sharp slopes in its rear.²⁰ It had been up to the point where they wheeled to their left that Napoleon had accompanied them, by advancing along the Brussels road. It was at about 400 metres south of the farm-building of La Haye Sainte, on the intermediate ridge, that he handed over the battalions to Ney. As he halted to the left of the road, he dismounted, while the men in their advance shouted "Vive l'empereur"; the drums beat the "pas de charge."²¹

As the battalions were heading through the low ground towards the protruding plateau of the enemy's ridge, their comrade cavalry, infantry and artillery units were evacuating the ridge and streaming back from this sector to these low grounds and those further west.²²

Once the battalions had climbed the slopes of the plateau they came under some long-distance allied gunfire, but this did not disrupt their ranks.²³ General Friant, though, was wounded in his hand, while Ney lost his horse, got stuck under it and had to continue his course on foot.²⁴

The result of the allied fire was that the two columns now started diverge from the centre, thereby enlarging their interval. As the column on the right took ground to its right, the one on the left did so to its left, but at the same time it fell behind to some extent. It was in this process that the columns were nearing the Foot Guards on the plateau.²⁵ At the same time, a column of Pégot's brigade advanced from the low ground near La Haye Sainte further away to the right of the 3rd regiment of chasseurs in support.²⁶

As the Imperial guard was moving up and forming columns immediately south-west of La Belle Alliance, a French cavalry officer who had witnessed this, rode up all the way through to the skirmishers of the 52nd British regiment.²⁷ Shouting "*Vive le roi!*" he rode straight for the 52nd, after which he was eventually led to brigade major Hunter Blair, sir Augustus Frazer and sir John Colborne. He told them: "*Ce - Napoléon est là avec les Gardes. Voilà l'attaque qui se fait.*"²⁸ The deserter lingered for a while with the regiment until brigade major Hunter Blair sent him - escorted by a sergeant - to the rear. Accordingly, Wellington was informed by Adam.²⁹

This news confirmed Wellington in his idea that a new attack was coming up and as a result he ordered all of his battalions in the sector of the line involved to take up lines of four ranks deep.³⁰

It was not long after that Pégot's column was heading towards the combined battalions of the 73rd / 30th regiment. Its advance through the smoke, which lay thick on the ground, was noisy and reluctant, the officers being in advance some metres cheering their men on. They, however, kept up a confused and running fire. After it had been fired upon by the batteries of Lloyd and Cleves [³¹], both British battalions awaited the moment the column was within range and then unleashed a volley of musketry. As a result, the column came to a standstill and hesitated. This was the moment for the British to charge but before they could even start it, the column suddenly started to fall back without getting into a further confrontation.³²

This all had to do with the fate of the neighbouring column to its far left (the one of the 3rd regiment of chasseurs) which very shortly after approached the centre of Maitland's brigade.³³ Of this brigade, both the 3rd and 2nd battalion stood - or better - lay down since, in four ranks immediately in rear of the bank of the Ohain-road at the brow of the ridge.³⁴ The Foot Guards, at that moment about 900 men strong, extended over a front of about 150 metres.³⁵ Wellington had taken up a position near the 3rd battalion.³⁶

In the short range, the column had been the target for allied batteries such as those of Bean,

Rogers, Sympher and Bolton. This last battery stood in an angle of about 140 degrees to the Foot Guards and it unleashed grapeshot at close range the moment the head of the column reached the crest of the ridge at about 180 metres distance. Since about 3 p.m., the moment captain Bolton had got wounded, the battery was led by captain Napier.³⁷

Despite its losses, the column had continued its advance until it was taken by surprise by the sudden rise - as ordered by Wellington himself [³⁸] - of the British two battalions from the trampled corn at the other side of the crest of the ridge. Because of the short range, the French accompanying guns were able to inflict serious casualties to the British with their grape-shot.³⁹ By now, the British had taken back their skirmishers.⁴⁰ At that moment the distance between both parties was not more as several dozens of paces.⁴¹

Despite the enormous pressure, the Foot Guard battalions had been able to keep their formation and to hold their fire. It was now that they gave a volley which had a devastating effect upon the French.⁴² The column halted, hesitated and started to deploy to open up in line, but even before it could complete this manoeuvre, it was cut short by the confusion and the continued British gunfire.⁴³ Upon lord Saltoun's words "Now's the time, my boys!" (⁴⁴) the brigade advanced in four ranks and drove the broken column back into the low ground in front. A further confrontation was out of the question.⁴⁵

The Foot Guards had hardly advanced, or the column of the 4th chasseurs coming up from further to the French rear. It was heading for the extreme right flank of Maitland's brigade and the extreme left flank of Adam's brigade, the 2nd battalion of the 95th regiment.⁴⁶ In its course, it had been also exposed to the fire of the batteries of Bean, Bolton and Rogers in particular.⁴⁷

As the head of the French column was advancing across the line of extension on the right of the British, major general Maitland decided to bring his brigade back to a point where it would uncover the front of the 52nd which he saw coming up. He fronted his forces and brought his left flank forward so as to meet the French, but he had barely initiated this action, or the French column was shattered further by the opportune action of the brigade of major general Adam.⁴⁸

As lieutenant colonel Sir J.Colborne, commander of the 52nd Foot (brigade Adam) had witnessed the advance of the French columns he decided on his own responsibility to bring his battalion forward.⁴⁹ As the French were closing in upon the summit of the ridge, Colborne cleared the ascent by bringing his battalion forward for a short distance over the Ohain-road.⁵⁰ Then, awaiting the moment the head of the French column was almost in line with the left flank of the battalion, he wheeled the company on the left wing to the left.⁵¹

Marking time, while using this company as a pivot, he now also wheeled the remainder of his battalion in a double quick movement forward in an angle of about 45 degrees relative to its former position. In this way, the front-line of the battalion came almost parallel to the flank of the French column.⁵² At that moment, the French, as they were slowly surging forward, were then about 180 metres away from the battalion and about 90 metres in front of the Ohain-road.⁵³

Between them, the ground was slightly rising towards the French.⁵⁴ As he had thus taken his position with the battalion, Colborne now extended 100 men of company no.5, led by lieutenant Anderson, as skirmishers to his front.⁵⁵ Colborne had formed the remainder of the battalion, about 750 men, in a line consisting of two lines of half companies with ten paces interval, so in four ranks deep. In this way, the front of the battalion counted about 175 men (about 100 metre).⁵⁶ Its extreme right flank was about 300 metres away from the nearest French formations.

To the immediate left rear of the 52nd was the 2nd / 95th and further to its far right rear was the 71st slowly approaching its right flank. At the conclusion of the right-shoulder movement of the battalion, major general Adam joined Colborne to enquire what he was going to do. Colborne replied "to make that column feel our fire". After he had then given his full approbation, he left for the 71st (see below).⁵⁷ Around the same time, major Percy, on behalf of Wellington, would have met Colborne briefly, also stating he was permitted to continue his initiative.⁵⁸

Now, Colborne had his skirmishers advance as swiftly as possible with the instruction to fire upon the French at any distance.⁵⁹ With the volleys of the English skirmishers, the majority of the French column came to a standstill.⁶⁰ The companies in its left flank marked time, thereby lengthening out the column, and wheeled to their left, thus forming a line which slightly extended the one of the British battalion and which was then ordered to fire as well.⁶¹

The French fire was such that it inflicted very serious casualties upon the skirmishers and main body of the 52nd: within a period of just a few minutes some 130 to 150 men fell.⁶² Now, the skirmishers fell back upon the battalion.⁶³ As the battalion charged, it fired while advancing: the men fired, then partly halted to load, whilst those in the rear slipped round them in a sort of skirmishing order, though they maintained a compact line, occupying nearly double the extent of ground from front to rear, which a four-deep line usually requires. For a minute or two the battalion in this way fired six or seven or more rounds.⁶⁴

During the charge, lieutenant colonel Colborne was in front of the left centre, lieutenant colonel Chalmers on front of the right centre and major general Adam in rear of the centre.⁶⁵

After the battalion had advanced for almost 100 metres, and as a result of this bold advance and fire, at a distance of about 70 metres, the French broke and fled to the rear.⁶⁶

It was not only from the actions taken by Colborne that the French columns halted; their halt and subsequent retreat was precipitated by the advance of other units of Adam's brigade and the 2nd British division.⁶⁷ At the moment of the advance of the 52nd, Wellington ordered the 2nd battalion of the 95th regiment (now led by captain Logan, after the fall of colonel Norcott and major Wilkins) to go forward.⁶⁸ It accordingly complied with the order and in doing so it passed through the guns of Bean's battery.⁶⁹ Then, the battalion wheeled to the east to follow the 52nd in its track. In this, it kept for some distance to the rear so that it did not actually get in touch with the imperial guard.⁷⁰

After Colborne had launched his battalion and had discussed with major general Adam his intentions, Adam instructed him to continue his movement; he then rode to the 71st to instruct it to move in as well.⁷¹ Shortly after it did so in a four deep line (⁷²), but too far in rear of the 52nd to play any active role against the defeat of the Imperial Guard in the immediate front of the allied line.⁷³ Just before the imperial guard attacked, the 3rd battalion 95th regiment stood in column to the immediate right rear of the 71st regiment. Initially, it followed the 71st but not long after, it got between this battalion and the 52nd in their advance towards La Belle Alliance. It probably did so in a four deep line.⁷⁴

Having launched his battalions, Adam sent his brigade major Hunter Blair to general Clinton with the request to support him on his right flank which was in the air.⁷⁵ Adam's support came in the battalion of Osnabrück of Hew Halkett's brigade. This battalion, which stood in square between Gomont and the Nivelles-road, now advanced in column and was led by Hew Halkett himself to the right rear of the 71st, leaving Gomont to its right.⁷⁶ Further to the rear, forces of Duplat's brigade were about to advance as well, but these eventually did not have any share in the defeat of the French imperial guard.⁷⁷

As the French columns in front of Maitland's and Adam's brigade were pushed back, the defeat of the column in front of Colin Halkett's brigade was completed by the intervention of forces of the 3rd division of the army of the Netherlands. Having noticed that the fire in front of his division (which stood along the Nivelles road) had slackened, its commander, general Chassé, rode to the front-line to find out. Here he saw that batteries were suffering from a lack of ammunition, while at the same time he saw French infantry forces approaching. By now it was 7.30 p.m.⁷⁸

Chassé immediately ordered his two gun teams, led by major Van der Smissen, to the front line

to bring in their fire.⁷⁹ Eventually, however, only one of them – the horse battery led by captain Krahmer de Bichin - saw action. It had advanced to the front-line along the sand-track which connects Merbraine with the Ohain-road and which led it right between the Brunswickers and the 73rd and 30th regiment. It immediately took up a position in their immediate vicinity (in front or in rear of the Ohain-road and in front or to the flank of these battalions. Here, it opened a strong fire right away and cut up the French column as it fell back.⁸⁰⁻⁸¹

The horse battery of captain Krahmer de Bichin was followed by the foot battery of captain Lux. The first half of the battery led by 1st lieutenant Schuller had barely moved off or it lost an caisson which blocked the hollow part of the road.

It was the second half battery, led by lieutenant Bentink (and accompanied by captain Lux himself), which was now prevented from advancing any further, while the first one continued its march. Bentinck wanted to overthrow the box, but Lux preferred to take it along to the front. The overall result was that both half batteries lost each other in the confusion of the battle and that the whole did not see any action whatsoever. Initially, the first half of the battery strayed off towards Mont Saint Jean. Sometime later, however, both half batteries joined there; by that time dusk was approaching. Captain Lux then decided to join the brigade of d'Aubremé (see below).⁸²

It was while Chassé was still on the ridge or while he was heading back to his division that the commander of his 1st brigade, colonel Detmers, received from a British aide de camp the order "zich met drie bataljons in eerste linie op te stellen. "⁸³ Accordingly, Detmers formed the 35th battalion of chasseurs, the 2nd battalion of the line and the 4th battalion of national militia into columns and led them along the inner slope of the ridge to a point where he deemed it proper to enter into the first line. He saw this opportunity to the immediate left of the 73rd / 30th regiments of C.Halkett's brigade.⁸⁴

Meanwhile, Chassé had returned to his division to bring up the remaining three battalions of his first brigade. After having given a short speech, he some time later joined them to the other battalions in the first line.⁸⁵ He left his second brigade, the one of d'Aubremé, in reserve, in two columns in echelons along the Nivelles-road.⁸⁶

Having merged the two parts of his brigade, Chassé now moved it against the enemy column. With fixed bayonets, in pas de charge [⁸⁷] and in one or more closed columns under beating drums and shouts of " Oranje boven, lang leve onze koning ! " the men marched up against the French.⁸⁸ It did not come to an actual confrontation though, as by that time the French were already moving back.⁸⁹

As Detmers advanced, a unit of French cuirassiers was on their left flank.⁹⁰ As they were in some confusion, however, they were easily driven off by a the fire and the subsequent bayonet attack of a group of 50 men led by captain De Haan of the 19th battalion of national militia.⁹¹

Not long after Detmers' brigade had left its position along the Nivelles road, it was the one of d'Aubremé which was ordered by lord Hill to support the advance of the 2nd British division.

⁹² It moved up under French gunfire and took up a position between the Foot Guards and Vandeleur's brigade in two squares *en echelon*.⁹³ Here, the young men suffered under French gunfire and got into some confusion, but the officers, as well as those of Vandeleur's units, were able to keep them under control.⁹⁴ The ordeal there did not take long however. It was shortly after that the brigade was moved up to the right to fill the vacancy left by Adam's brigade.

As has been stated, French forces of all arms had pulled back from the plateau where the imperial guard battalions were about to attack.⁹⁵ They were not only diminished in strength but also in cohesion and energy.⁹⁶ Yet, as they saw the imperial guard advancing upon Wellington's position, several units of cavalry – both from the line and the guard – advanced for a distant support.⁹⁷

At the same time, Wellington's sector in rear of the hollow Ohain-road continued to suffer from the unabated French skirmishing and gunfire. Cavalry, mostly cuirassiers, were still hovering around as cover. By now, havoc had reached such a stage that all the units of Kielmansegge's brigade were no longer able to maintain their positions and they now all fell back beyond the windmill of Mont Saint Jean. Here, the remains were assembled, formed and replenished with ammunition as much as was possible.⁹⁸

At the same time, the remains of the 1st battalion of KGL light infantry and those of the 5th battalion of KGL line infantry had collapsed as well and retreated upon the hamlet of Mont Saint Jean.⁹⁹

Though it had moved to another position to be more protected, Ross' battery was also in its new position in front of Von Kruse brigade exposed to the repeated charges of French cavalry. To cover it for further French interventions, a squadron of the 23rd regiment of light dragoons led by captain Cox was posted some distance in rear of the battery and in front of the infantry. It was here that Cox got wounded by the fall of his horse and was succeeded by lieutenant Banner. At the same time, the remainder of the 23rd regiment of light dragoons was posted to the immediate left of the remains of the Household brigade. Its regimental commander, major Cutcliffe, had been wounded in the late afternoon and had been succeeded by major Lautour.

By the time the column of the imperial guard to its immediate right fell back, Cox decided to exploit the situation by engaging the French cuirassiers in his front. He was able to push them back towards a French square which stood further to the rear. It brought the British light dragoons as far to the front as the low ground of La Haye Sainte where they were driven back by the fire of the square. Meanwhile, the 52nd regiment approached the area from the west in a four deep line and it was in their direction that the British light dragoons fell back. The two left companies of the 52nd, in the presumption that the cavalry was French, halted and fired upon their fellow horsemen. Sir John Colborne, however, saw the mistake and was about to interfere, when his horse got wounded. His adjutant was able to hold any further fire. The incident disturbed the advance of the battalion, but it was right at that moment that the duke of Wellington joined both companies. After Colborne told him: "It is our own cavalry which has caused this firing", upon which Wellington replied: "Never mind, go on, go on", and this is what Colborne did.¹⁰⁰ The horsemen of the squadron of the 23rd regiment of light dragoons continued their retreat towards the ridge, where – at the foot of the slope – Vivian's brigade had arrived and made a brief halt. It was along its front that the majority of lieutenant Banner's men passed. After having cleared the brigade this way, Banner reformed his men under cover of Vivian's brigade and then proceeded to join it (see below).¹⁰¹

At Gomont, part of the garrison had just lost the wood, but other parts kept their positions in the buildings, the garden and the orchard. It was from this last site that the 2nd battalion of KGL line infantry re-entered the wood. By then it was 7 p.m. It was supported on its right by the Salzgitter battalion of the brigade of Hew Halkett. This battalion, posted north of Gomont, had received the order to advance west of Gomont and to take the wood. Initially the battalion advanced with two companies only, but the situation wasn't without risk as the French were in good positions and dusk was approaching. Both companies were then supported by the other two and after that the battalion opened a bayonet action. This proved successful: the French gave up their positions and soon after the battalion got into the wood. Within a short time it was

in the hands of the 2nd battalion KLG line-infantry, the light companies of the brigade of Du Plat and the Salzgitter battalion.¹⁰²

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¹ Gourgaud – Campagne de dix-huit cent quinze p.84-86
The official French bulletin. In: Bas, F.de & T'Serclaes de Wommersom. La campagne de 1815 Vol.III p.553-554

2. General Durutte. In: Sentinelle de l'armée, March 1836 p.78
Captain Prax (3rd regiment of chasseurs) speaks about 5 p.m. In: d'Avout, A. L'infanterie de la garde à Waterloo. In: Le Carnet de la Sabretache, 1905 p.33-54 and 107-128
According to general Petit (1st regiment of grenadiers) it was 6 p.m. In: The English Historical Review. Vol.XVIII p.1903

³ These were:

The 2nd battalion 1st chasseurs

The 2nd battalion / 2nd chasseurs

The 1st and 2nd battalion / 3rd chasseurs

The 1st and 2nd battalion / 4th chasseurs (counted as two, though in strength totalling some 800 men)

The 1st and 2nd battalion / 1st grenadiers

The 1st and 2nd battalion / 2nd grenadiers

The 1st and 2nd battalion / 3rd grenadiers

The 1st battalion / 4th grenadiers

4. For the fact that the guard was formed here, cf.

Lieutenant Gawler (52nd regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.708 p.196-200

Ensign Leeke (52nd regiment). In: History of lord Seaton's regiment Vol.I p.42

Lieutenant Sandilands (battery Ramsay). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.42-43

⁵ Cf. Gourgaud. In: La campagne de 1815 p.86-87

Mémoires pour servir etc. p.161

Griffith, P. – French Napoleonic infantry tactics p.20-21

⁶ General Petit. In: The English Historical Review. Vol.XVIII 1903

Mauduit, H.de - Les derniers jours Vol. II p.418, 438

Both claim Napoleon accompanied the battalion there for some time.

7. Major Pelet. In: d'Avout, A. L'infanterie de la garde à Waterloo. In: Le Carnet de la Sabretache, 1905 p.33-54 and 107-128

General Christiani. In: d'Avout, A. L'infanterie de la garde à Waterloo. In: Le Carnet de la Sabretache, 1905 p.33-54 and 107-128

Cambronne to Mr.Dalidet. In: Brunschvicg, L. – Cambronne p.113

8. General Petit. In: The English Historical Review. Vol.XVIII p.1903

Ensign Batty (1st Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.339-340

Erroneously, De Mauduit speaks of positions near Rossomme [=Decoster house] and near the road Plancenot -Maison du Roi [=Rossomme] respectively. In: Les derniers jours de la grande armée Vol.II p.395-396

9. Mauduit, H.de - Les derniers jours de la grande armée Vol.II p.394

General Petit. In: The English Historical Review. Vol.XVIII 1903

10. De Mauduit. In: Les derniers jours de la grande armée Vol.II p.395-396

11. General Petit. In: The English Historical Review. Vol.XVIII 1903

¹² Gourgaud – Campagne de dix-huit cent quinze p.84-86

Mémoires pour servir etc. p.160

The official French bulletin. In: Bas, F.de & T'Serclaes de Wommersom - La campagne de 1815 Vol.III p.553-554

¹³ Cf. Drouot in his speech for the Chambre des pairs, 24th June 1815. In: Additional particulars etc. Vol.II p.113

Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de France etc. p.160

Gourgaud, C. - Campagne de dix huit cent quinze etc. p.86

Heymès, colonel. In: Duc d'Elchingen. Documents inédits etc. p.19

Captain De Stuers (2nd regiment of chasseurs). In: Pawly, R. & Courcelle, P. - Mémoires de Lambert de Stuers (1784-1866) p.34

Fleury de Chaboulon, M. – Mémoires pour service à l'histoire etc. Vol.II p.126

The official French bulletin of the battle. In: Bas, F.de & T'Serclaes de Wommersom. La campagne de 1815 Vol.III p.554

Major Pelet. In: L'infanterie de la garde à Waterloo p.44-46

In his description, he implicitly comes to four battalions of the 3rd and 4th chasseurs (those of the 3rd to the right and those of the 4th to the left), while he explicitly denies the participation of the grenadiers in the attack as they were still several hundred paces further to the rear.

Ney, an important though, speaks of four regiments as having been led forward by the emperor to attack Wellington's front, and at head of which he lead the attack but that they all actually took part does not really become clear. Cf. his letter to Fouché, dated 26th June 1815. In: LMB, As.1301

14. Martin, luitenant J.F. Souvenirs d'un ex-officier 1812-1815 p.296

Kellermann. Observations sur la bataille de Waterloo etc. In: SHAT, Mémoires et reconnaissances, no.719

Colonel Baudus. In: Etudes sur Napoleon Vol.I p.227

Ney in his letter to Fouché dated 26th June 1815. According to Ney it was Labédoyère who told him so. In: LMB, As.1301

According to Octave Levassieur, aide de camp of Ney, it was Dejean as the one who informed Ney and that he had to transmit it further. In: Souvenirs militaires etc. p.303-304

Captain Vaillant, aide de camp of Haxo (commander of the engineers in the guard) claims he was one of the officers sent out to report about the victory of the battle and the arrival of Grouchy with 40.000 men. In: Deux notes autobiographiques sur le maréchal Vaillant p.246

According to ensign Larreguy de Civrieux (93rd regiment, division Foy) it was Labédoyère who gave Reille the order to support the attack of the imperial guard. In: Souvenirs d'un cadet p.170

¹⁵ Captain Prax (3rd chasseurs) speaks of battalions “disposés en colonne déployés en masse

par bataillon.” In: d'Avout, A. - L'infanterie de la garde à Waterloo. In: Le Carnet de la Sabretache. 1905. p.120

Cambronne confirms his battalions, as well as those of the 3rd regiment of grenadiers, were about to form their units “en colonne serrée par divisions.” In: Brunschvicg, L. – Cambronne p.113

For the grand divisions:

Captain Cotter (69th regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.389-390

Lieutenant colonel Reeve (3rd battalion 1st Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.114-117

Ensign Tighe (2nd battalion 1st Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.83-86

Captain Ellis (Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.155-157

Lieutenant Sharpin (battery Bolton). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.15-19

For the fact that they were either closed or in quarter distance:

Ensign Batty (3rd battalion 1st Foot Guards). Cf. his letter dated 23rd June 1815. In collection Harrington.

Lieutenant Powell (2nd battalion 1st Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.181-187

Lieutenant Lascelles (2nd battalion 1st Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.79-80

Corporal Aldridge (2nd battalion 95th regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.98-100

Colonel May (RHA). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.100-101

Captain Pringle (Bolton's battery). In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.339-340

16. Major general Maitland (Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.331-334 He speaks of numerous guns on the flanks of the centre column.

Captain Harty (33rd regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.248

Lieutenant colonel Elphinstone (33rd regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.278-281

Lieutenant Pratt (30th regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.88-94

Captain Cotter (69th regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.389-390

Captain Knight (33rd regiment). Cf. his letter to lieutenant colonel Elphinstone, dated 16th November [?] 1834. In: BL, Mss.Eur. F.89.42

H.de Mauduit speaks of two guns in each interval. In: Les derniers jours de la grande armée Vol.II p.419

¹⁷ According to captain Prax there were no skirmishers, but according to ensign Leeke (52nd regiment) at least the column which the 52nd charged upon did have them.

In: d'Avout, A. - L'infanterie de la garde à Waterloo. In: Le Carnet de la Sabretache. 1905. p.120

In: History of lord Seaton's regiment etc. Vol.I p.42-43

Captain Nixon (2nd battalion 1st Foot Guards) speaks of a very strong line of sharpshooters in front of the attacking columns. In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.111-113

¹⁸ 3rd chasseurs: 1000

4th chasseurs: 1000

Cf. SHAT, nr.C15.34

They had virtually not suffered at Ligny.

On the 18th of June, De Mauduit speaks for the 3rd chasseurs of 1028 men and for the 4th chasseurs of 841 men, so about 1900 in all. In: Les derniers jours Vol.II p.397-398

19. Gore, A. - An historical account of the battle of Waterloo p.22
Mauduit, H.de - Les derniers jours de la grande armée Vol.II p.419
Major De Lacy Evans, in his report to Sir G.Murray. In: NLS Add.Ms. 46.9.19 p.115
According to ensign Batty (3rd battalion 1st Foot Guards) the French guard attacked around 7 p.m. Cf. his letter dated 23rd June 1815 p.24 In Harrington collection.
For the same claim, see lieutenant colonel Stanhope (Foot Guards) in his report dated 19th of June 1815. In: Callataj, Ph.de – Mentioned in dispatches p.7
Captain Bowles (Coldstream Regiment of Foot Guards) speaks of 6.30 p.m. in his letter to lord Fitzharris, dated 19th June 1815. In: A series of letters of the first earl of Malmesbury, p.444
Ensign Leeke (52nd regiment) believes the imperial guard approached his position towards 8 p.m. In: History of lord Seaton's regiment etc. Vol.I p.41
Cf. Captain Nixon (2nd battalion, 1st Foot Guards) in a letter to his father, dated 19th of June 1815. In: former www.1815.ltd.uk Original in: University of Nottingham, Drury Lowe Collection Dr.C 30/6
The official French bulletin mentions 8.30 p.m. In: Bas, F.de & T'Serclaes de Wommersom. La campagne de 1815 Vol.III p.554
20. Gourgaud, C. Campagne de dix huit cent quinze etc. p.86
Captain Prax (3rd regiment chasseurs) describes it as a movement " un à gauche " In: d'Avout, A. - L'infanterie de la garde à Waterloo. In: Le Carnet de la Sabretache. 1905. p.120
21. Gourgaud, C. - Campagne de dix huit cent quinze etc. p.86
Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de France etc. p.160
Ney in his letter to Fouché dated 26th June 1815. In: LMB, As.1301
Saint Denis, L.E. - Souvenirs du mameluck Ali p.112
Mauduit, H.de - Les derniers jours de la grande armée Vol.II Plan (position nr.3)
Statement of general Christiani. In: d'Avout, A. - L'infanterie de la garde à Waterloo. In: Le Carnet de la Sabretache. 1905. p.112
Gawler, G. - The crisis etc. p.11
Craan, W.B. An historical account of the battle of Waterloo p.14 / plan
- ²² Cf. Colonel Ordener (1st regiment of cuirassiers) In: H.Lot - Les deux généraux Ordener p.95
Report of baron Bellina Kupieski to Davout, dated 23rd June 1815. In: SHAT, nr. C15/6
23. The batteries involved were those of Ramsay, Webber Smith, Bean, Rogers, Sympher, Bolton, Lloyd and Cleaves.
Lieutenant Sandilands (battery Ramsay). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.42-43
Captain Walcott (battery Webber Smith). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.184-185
Lieutenant Maunsell (battery Bean). In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.272-273
Captain Rogers (battery Rogers). In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.227-234
Lieutenant Maule (battery Rogers). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.120-122
Captain Sympher. In: NHA, Hann.41.D.XXI, nr.151 p.132-133
Lieutenant colonel Hartmann. In: VPH, nr.29
Lieutenant Pringle (battery Bolton). In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.339-340
Lieutenant Sharpin (battery Bolton). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.15-19

Ensign Dirom (3rd battalion 1st Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.274-277
Captain Rudyard (battery Lloyd). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.167-170 Lloyd's battery had the course of its fire to its right.

Captain Cleeves. In: NHA, Hann.41.XXI, nr.151 p.139-146

Lieutenant Wels (battery Lloyd). In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.259-261

24. Ney in his letter to Fouché, dated 26th June 1815. In: LMB, As.1301

Mauduit, H.de - Les derniers jours de la grande armée Vol.II p.421

General Petit. In: The English Historical Review. Vol.XVIII p.1903

Gourgaud, C. Campagne de dix huit cent quinze etc. p.87

Saint Denis, L.E. Souvenirs du mameluck Ali p.112

²⁵ Major Pelet (2nd regiment of chasseurs). In: d'Avout, A. - L'infanterie de la garde à Waterloo. In: Le Carnet de la Sabretache. 1905. p.45

Major general Maitland. In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.331-334

²⁶ General Durutte. In: Sentinelle de l'armée, March 1836 p.78

Cf. observations.

27. Sir J.Colborne claims this took place as the brigade fell back to the ridge, but from the accounts of major Hunter Blair and major general Adam it becomes clear that the brigade then already stood in rear of the Ohain-road.

In: BL, Add.ms.34.708 p.40-49 and Colborne in his letter to colonel Bentham, dated 15th October 1853. In: Moore-Smith, G.C. - The life of John Colborne, field marshal Lord Seaton p.418

Yet, in another account, Colborne's follows the version of both other officers. Cf. his answers to lieutenant Yonge. In: Moore-Smith, G.C. - The life of John Colborne, field marshal Lord Seaton p.412

BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.354-357, 34.706 p.406-413

Captain Cross (52nd regiment) adds that the warning came a few minutes previous to the attack. In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.163-164

²⁸ Sir J.Colborne. In: BL, Add.ms.34.708 p.40-49

Houssaye himself varies upon the expression as: Vice le roi ! Préparez-vous ! Ce b... de Napoleon sera sur vous avec la garde avant une demi-heure." In: 1815. Waterloo p.403

According to Frazer, the officer spoke about a time-frame of within 15 minutes; Hunter Blair does so for half an hour.

In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.354-357

Sir A.Frazer in a letter dated 20th June 1815. In: Letters of colonel Sir Augustus Frazer p.552

29. Major general Adam. In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.406-413

Major Hunter Blair. In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.354-357

Lieutenant colonel Colborne. In: BL, Add.ms.34.708 p.40-49 and 319-323

Sir A.Frazer in a letter dated 20th June 1815. In: Letters of colonel Sir Augustus Frazer p.552

Cf. Sir H.Clinton in a letter dated 23rd June 1815. In: NLS, MS 3615 f.41

Cotton, E. – Une voix de Waterloo p.126

Ensign Leeke (52nd regiment). In: History of the lord Seaton's regiment Vol.I p.41

Luitenant G.Gawler. In: The crisis etc. p.13-14

They all share the fact that it was a cavalry officer, but his identity remains a mystery as the key witnesses give different descriptions.

Both Colborne and Gawler speak of a colonel of cuirassiers, while major Hunter Blair does so of an officer of the hussars and Leeke of a chef d'escadron of the cuirassiers.

Cotton states that he met an French former army officer of the carabineers or cuirassiers in 1844. In the meeting, the Frenchman told him he was the deserter in question.

It has been claimed that the officer in question was captain De Barail of the 2nd carabineers, but in case Cotton's statement is correct this is impossible as De Barail died before July 1842.

If there is some truth in his statement, there could be a link here in what De Mauduit writes.

He describes – towards 4 p.m. - the desertion of a captain of the carabineers, starting from his position in the immediate vicinity of the 1st chasseurs à cheval of Piré's division towards an enemy's post in rear of the enemy's skirmishers. In his desertion he would in vain have attempted to convince captain Début and lieutenant Bachelet of this regiment to do the same.

Apart from the fact that the hour does not correspond to the desertion alluded to here, it is also incorrect that the carabineers stood near the division of Piré, the 1st regiment of chasseurs à cheval belonged to.

In: Mauduit, H. de – Les derniers jours etc. Vol.II p.343

Cf. Houssaye, H. – 1815. Waterloo p.403 (Houssaye only gives his initials)

Damiens, M. – Le traître de Waterloo. In: <http://micheldamiens.wordpress.com/article/le-traitre-de-waterloo-3cgja7u7z8vuo-40/>

As two of the four eye-witnesses describe the actual deserter as a cuirassier-officer, this might be the most probable option.

30. Sergeant Morris (73rd regiment). In: Recollections p.80

Lieutenant colonel Elphinstone (33rd regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34703 p.278-281

Captain Garland (73rd regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.1-2

Ensign Macready (30th regiment). In: On a part etc. In: USM, 1845 I p.395

Captain Harty (33rd regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.248

Lieutenant Hope Pattison (33rd regiment). In: Personal recollections etc. p.31

Captain Knight in a letter to lieutenant colonel Elphinstone (both 33rd regiment), dated 16th November [?] 1834. In: BL, Mss.Eur. F.89.42

Lieutenant Anderson (69th regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.352-353

31. Captain Rudyard (battery Lloyd). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.167-170

Captain Cleaves. In: NHA, Hann.41.XXI, nr.151 p.139-146

Lieutenant Wels (battery Lloyd). In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.259-261

32. Ensign Macready (30th regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.708 p.253-255 and in a letter dated 7th July 1815. In: NAM, nr.8203/10

In another account, Macready speaks of the French halt and incomplete volley, a British volley and a charge through the smoke. In: On a part etc. In: USM, 1845 I p.396

Captain Knight (33rd) confirms the columns halted and soon gave way without mentioning any confrontation. Cf. his letter to lieutenant colonel Elphinstone, dated 16th November [?] 1834. In: BL, Mss.Eur. F.89.42

Captain Howard (30th regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.317-319

Lieutenant colonel Elphinstone (33rd regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.278-281
Lieutenant Pratt (30th regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.88-94
Major Dawson Kelly (73rd regiment). He mentions French fire, upon which the British replied. In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.345-347, 34.706 p.112-1115 and 34.705 p.336-337
Sergeant Morris, however, says the brigade went back for some distance for the French musketry fire. Cf. Morris, sergeant (2nd battalion 73rd regiment of foot) - Recollections p.80

33. Major general Maitland. In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.331-334
Lieutenant Powell (2nd battalion 1st Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.143-148 and 34.705 p.181-187
Ensign Dirom (3rd battalion 1st Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.274-277
Lieutenant Lascelles (2nd battalion 1st Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.79-80
Captain Ellis (1st Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.155-157
Captain Nixon (2nd battalion 1st Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.111-113
Lieutenant colonel Reeve (3rd battalion 1st Foot Guards) mentions the presence of a strong line of French skirmishers, maintaining a destructive fire. In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.114-117

34. Major general Maitland. In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.331-334 and in his report to George Regent [?], dated 19th of June 1815. In: Mentioned in despatches p.11
Lieutenant Powell (2nd battalion 1st Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.181-187
Captain Davis (3rd battalion 1st Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.75-76
Ensign Dirom (3rd battalion 1st Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.274-277
Lord Saltoun. In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.227-229
Letter of an officer of the Foot Guards, dated Binch 20th June 1815. In: Leeds Mercury, 5th August 1815.
Lieutenant Lascelles (2nd battalion 1st Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.79-80
Lieutenant colonel Reeve (3rd battalion 1st Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.114-117
Ensign Batty (3rd battalion 1st Foot Guards) states that the men laid down for about one hour before the attack took place. Wellington would had moved them there about 6 p.m. Cf. his letter dated 23rd June 1815. In: collection Harrington
Captain Knight in a letter to lieutenant colonel Elphinstone (both 33rd regiment), dated 16th November [?] 1834. In: BL, Mss.Eur. F.89.42
Captain Rooke (2nd battalion 3rd Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.358-360
Ensign Swinburne (3rd battalion 1st Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.708 p.346-347
Ensign Gronow (3rd battalion 1st Foot Guards). In: The reminiscences and recollections of captain Gronow p.73

35. Originally, both battalions counted about 1000 men each. As they had suffered by this time some 1100 men, 900 were left, covering a total front length of about 150 metre (the interval included).

36. Major general Maitland. In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.331-334
Ensign Dirom (3rd battalion 1st Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.274-277
Ensign Gronow (3rd battalion 1st Foot Guards). In: The reminiscences and recollections of captain Gronow p.73

³⁷ Lieutenant Maunsell (battery Bean). In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.272-273, 34.704 p.155-158

Captain Rogers (battery Rogers). In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.227-234
Lieutenant Maule (battery Rogers). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.120-122
Captain Sympher. In: NHA, Hann.41.D.XXI, nr.151 p.132-133
Lieutenant colonel Hartmann. In: VPH, nr.29
Lieutenant Pringle (battery Bolton). In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.339-340
Lieutenant Sharpin (battery Bolton). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.15-19
According to Sharpin, his unit had at that time just 5 guns in operation as the howitzer had exploded earlier that day.
Cf. State of the 2nd division, drafted by captain G.Marlay and dated 13th July 1815. In: WSD, Vol.X p.751

By 7.45 p.m. the sequence of the different gun-units between the high-roads was:
Ross: in front of Von Kruse (from about 6.30 onwards)
Lloyd: in front of Colin Halkett
Sympher: somewhere in front of Maitland (from 5 p.m. onwards)
Bolton: to the right front of Maitland (from 5 p.m. onwards)
Bean: in front of 2nd / 95th - it is unclear at what stage the battery had got there. Frazer at some point of time situates Bean at 45 metres to the right of the Brussels road. Cf. his letter nr.XXV In: Letters etc. p.560
Rogers: idem, but probably a bit further right (from 6.30 onwards)
Mercer: somewhere in front of Adam's brigade
Webber Smith: to the right front of Adam's brigade
Ramsay: to the direct east of the bifurcation of the Ohain-road and the track which leads to la Belle Alliance
Bull: to the west of the same bifurcation
Petter / Gey had just pulled back from its position in between these two last batteries.

The plan of the batteries as published by H.T.Siborne lacks all non-British batteries and mixes up situations of different moments, so this plan is highly incorrect. Cf. Siborne, H.T. Waterloo letters p.186

38. Wellington himself, upon the request of J.W.Croker, wrote to him: "What I must have said, and possibly did say, was, "Stand up, Guards !" and then gave the commanding officers the orders to attack." Cf. his (undated) letter to Croker (probably 1838). In: HL, WP, nr.7.2.21 p.762
Also in: The Croker papers. Vol.III 1885 (2nd edition) p.282

Lord Saltoun cites the words "Up guards, and at them", but doesn't remember whether they were actually uttered.
Gronow cites Wellington as "Guards, get up and charge!" In: The reminiscences and recollections of captain Gronow p.73
According to ensign Batty, Wellington said: "Up Guards and at them again !" Cf. his letter dated 23rd June 1815. In: collection Harrington

39. Major general Maitland. In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.331-334
There is no other witness mentioning the losses suffered from the French gunfire.

⁴⁰ Ensign Swinburne (3rd battalion 1st Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.708 p.346-347

41. Major general Maitland speaks about a distance of 20 paces. In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.331-334

Lieutenant Powell states it were 50 or 60 paces, while lieutenant colonel Reeve describes it as 30 paces. The fact that the French column halted at a short distance is confirmed by ensign Batty. In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.114-117, 181-187 and 227-234

42. Major general Maitland. In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.331-334

Ensign Dirom (3rd battalion 1st Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.274-277

Ensign Batty (3rd battalion 1st Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.227-234

Ensign Swinburne (3rd battalion 1st Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.708 p.346-347

Ensign St.John (2nd battalion, 1st Foot Guards). In: former www.1815.ltd.uk Original in: Regimental Headquarters Grenadier Guards, nr.H07/005

According to ensign Gronow the Foot Guards advanced against the enemy first before commencing fire and charging. In: The reminiscences and recollections of captain Gronow p.73-74

Also see the letter dated 29th July 1815 of a sergeant of the 3rd battalion. In: Some particulars of the battle of Waterloo in a letter from a serjeant [sic] of the Guards p.6

The same advance is being confirmed by ensign Batty. In a letter dated 23rd June 1815 p. 25 In Harrington collection.

Captain Ellis (1st Foot Guards) states there were 10 volleys. In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.155-157

43. Parts of the column would have tended to advance, while others fell back and yet others halted and fired. Cf. ensign Dirom (3rd battalion 1st Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.274-277

Lieutenant Powell (3rd battalion 1st Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.181-187 He states: "They now wavered, and several of the rear divisions began to draw out as if to deploy, whilst some of the men in their rear beginning to fire over the heads of those in front [..]"

Lieutenant Pringle (battery Bolton). In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.339-340

Lieutenant Sharpin (battery Bolton). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.15-19

Lieutenant Lascelles (2nd battalion 1st Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.79-80

As major general Maitland witnessed the French fire slackening he ordered his men to charge. Lieutenant colonel H.W. Rooke, attached to the 1st British division, mentions the French fire and deployment. Cf. his letter dated 19th June 1815 to his father. In: Gloucestershire Record Office, nr. D1833/Z5

According to lieutenant colonel Reeve (3rd battalion 1st Foot Guards), no attempt was made to deploy, but men started to fire from several files deep. In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.114-117

According to captain Ellis, the rearmost part of the column started to fire and was it attempted by the officers to form a line. In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.155-157

Ensign Batty (3rd battalion 1st Foot Guards) describes the mutual musketry fire which was kept up for a few minutes. In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.227-234

In another account, however, he claims the French halted after the first volley, and that the Foot Guards fired again and then charged with the bayonet. In a letter dated 23rd June 1815 In: collection Harrington

It was in the confrontation with the Foot Guards or Adam's brigade that lieutenant general Michel, second in command of the chasseurs, was mortally wounded in the left chest by a musketball. Cf. letter written by his aide de camp, captain Berthelot, in 1862. In: Houssaye, H. – La garde meurt etc. p.21

44. Lieutenant Powell (2nd battalion 1st Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.181-187

45. Lieutenant Davis (1st Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.75-76

Ensign Dirom (3rd battalion 1st Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.274-277

Captain Ellis (1st Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.140-141

Major general Maitland. In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.331-334

Major general Byng. Cf. his report to the duke of York, dated 19th of June 1815. In: former www.1815.ltd.uk Original in: Regimental Headquarters Scots Guards

Ensign Batty (3rd battalion 1st Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.227-234 and in a letter dated 23rd June 1815. In: Collection Harrington.

Letter of an officer of the Foot Guards, dated Binch 20th June 1815. In: Leeds Mercury, 5th August 1815.

Captain Bowles (1st regiment Foot Guards) erroneously mentions an advance against the French column first and then the volley. Cf. his letter dated 19th June 1815 to lord Fitzharris. In: A series of letters of the first earl of Malmesbury etc. Vol.II p.444

Also ensign Tighe (2nd battalion 1st Foot Guards) does so. In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.83-86

Cf. Captain Nixon (2nd battalion, 1st Foot Guards) in a letter to his father, dated 22nd of June 1815. In: former www.1815.ltd.uk Original in: University of Nottingham, Drury Lowe Collection Dr.C 30/5

Nixon states that the very strong French column approached undeployed and without firing until within 150 yards, the moment that the wings of the 2nd battalion 1st Foot Guards threw themselves forward, while keeping up a strong fire, as a result of which the French fell back.

46. Major general Maitland. In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.331-334

Lieutenant Powell (2nd battalion 1st Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.181-187

Captain Ellis (1st Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.140-141

Lieutenant Gawler (52nd regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.88-97, 190-198

Lieutenant Pringle (battery Bolton). In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.339-340

Lieutenant Maule (battery Rogers). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.44-47, 120-122

Captain Cross (52nd regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.163-164

Corporal Aldridge (2nd battalion 95th regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.98-100

Captain Miller (2nd battalion 95th regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.241-245

Ensign Leeke (52nd regiment). In: History of lord Seatons's regiment Vol.I p.42

Ensign Batty (3rd battalion 1st Foot Guards) Cf. his letter dated 23rd June 1815 p.24 In Harrington collection.

47. Lieutenant Pringle (battery Bolton). In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.339-340

Captain Rogers (battery Rogers). In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.227-234

Lieutenant Maule (battery Rogers). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.120-122

Lieutenant Maunsell (battery Bean). In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.272-273

48. Major general Maitland. In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.331-334
 Lord Saltoun. In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.431-434
 Lieutenant Powell (2nd battalion 1st Foot Guards) speaks about a considerable confusion after the action against the first column of the imperial guard, because of the sudden retreat, the French gunfire and the loss of different officers. In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.181-187
 Ensign Batty (1st Foot Guards) confirms the sudden retreat, which was halted by Maitland himself. In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.227-234
 Letter of an officer of the Foot Guards, dated Binch 20th June 1815. In: Leeds Mercury, 5th August 1815.
 Lieutenant colonel Colborne cites lieutenant general Byng, stating that at the moment the 52nd regiment advanced, the Foot Guards had run out of ammunition. In: BL, Add.ms.34.708 p.84-88
49. Lieutenant Colborne. In: BL, Add.ms.34.708 p.40-49
 Lieutenant Gawler (52nd regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 134-147, 389-399 and 34.708 p.113-119
 Major general Adam. In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.404-413
 Ensign Leeke (52nd regiment) speaks of an advance in “double quick.” In: BL, Add.ms.34.708 p.98-100
- ⁵⁰ Lieutenant Gawler (52nd regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.88-97, 190-198
 Lieutenant Winterbottom (52nd regiment) confirms the French were closing in upon the summit of the ridge. In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.32-34
51. Lieutenant colonel Colborne. In: BL, Add.ms.34.708 p.40-49, 319-323
 Captain Cross (52nd regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.166-168
 Cross led the left company of the 52nd.
 Lieutenant Gawler (52nd regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.88-97, 190-198
 Lieutenant Maule (battery Rogers). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.120-122
 Lieutenant Yonge (52nd) in his letter to colonel Bentham (1853). In: Leeke. The history of lord Seaton’s regiment Vol.I p.102-103
 Lieutenant Winterbottom (52nd regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.32-34
 Cf. Major Hunter Blair. In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.225-227 He recollected that sir John Colborne told him after the attack that he had formed his left company *en potence*, refusing his flank in the apprehension of its being turned as the French had partially gained the summit of the position.
 Cf. Lieutenant Gawler (52nd). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.88-97
 Captain Miller (2nd battalion 95th regiment) speaks of the retreat of the left wing of his battalion. In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.241-245
52. Lieutenant colonel Colborne. In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.192-195, 708 p.40-49, 319-323
 He adds that if the front-line of the 52nd in this way, had it been produced to its left, would then have formed an obtuse angle with the Foot Guards.
 Cf. Lieutenant colonel Colborne in his account for lieutenant Yonge. In: Moore-Smith, G.C. - The life of John Colborne, field marshal Lord Seaton p.411
 Lieutenant Gawler (52nd regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.708 p.57-59, 98-100 and 34.704 p.88-97

In his "Crisis and close etc.", Gawler states that his battalion wheeled for 70 degrees relative to its original position, but this would not have resulted in an obtuse angle with the Foot Guards and an almost parallel position to the French. In: The crisis and close etc. p.303
Captain Cross (52nd). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.166-168
Ensign Leeke (52nd). In: The history of Lord Seaton's regiment Vol.I p.43

⁵³ Lieutenant Gawler (52nd). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.88-97

In: The crisis and close etc. p.303

Leeke and Colborne erroneously claim the 52nd was then about 270 / 450 metres in front of the main line respectively; this could never have been the case in case got that close to the summit of the position.

In: History of lord Seaton's regiment Vol.I p.84

In: BL, Add.ms.34.708 p.40-49

⁵⁴ Cf. ensign Leeke. In: The history of Lord Seaton's regiment Vol.I p.43

55. Lieutenant colonel Colborne . In: BL, Add.ms.34.708 p.40-49 and 34.708 p.319-323

According to ensign Leeke and lieutenant Gawler this company was sent out as skirmishers *before* the 52nd left its position at the Ohain-road, with the aim to fire into the French columns; it fell back upon the battalion after its right shoulder movement. In: BL, Add.ms.34.708 p.98-100

And In: History of lord Seaton's regiment Vol.I p.42,45

56. Lieutenant colonel Colborne (52nd regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.708 p.40-40, 319-323

Lieutenant Gawler (52nd regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.708 p.100-104 and 34.704 p.88-97

Colborne states that the battalion basically advanced as a support for the skirmishers. In: BL, Add.ms.34.708 p.319-323

Initially, the 52nd counted about 880 men. Cf. Lieutenant Gawler (52nd). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.83-87

⁵⁷ Lieutenant colonel Colborne. In: BL, Add.ms.34.708 p.40-49

58. Lieutenant colonel Colborne himself does not write anything about it, but it was according to lieutenant Gawler that he had told him that Percy came to him the moment the flanking movement had been completed and that he instructed him to proceed. Cf. BL, Add.ms.34.708 p.84-88

BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.134-147, 389-399, 34.708 p.113-119

59. Lieutenant colonel Colborne. In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.192-195, 34.708 p.40-49 and 319-323

60. Lieutenant colonel Colborne. In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.192-195, 34.708 p.40-49 and 319-323

61. Lieutenant colonel Colborne. In: BL, Add.ms.34.708 p.40-49, 319-323, 34.705 p.192-195
Lieutenant Gawler (52nd regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.708 p.57-59 and 100-104, 34.706

p.389-399

Ensign Leeke (52nd regiment). In: The history of lord Seaton's etc. Vol.I p.45

Gawler speaks about the fire of two ranks. In: The crisis etc. p.39

62. Lieutenant colonel Colborne. In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.192-195, 708 p.40-49, 319-323 and 706 p.389-399

Ensign Leeke. In: The history of lord Seaton's etc. Vol.I p.47 and in BL, Add.ms.34.708 p.98-100

Lieutenant Gawler (52nd regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.174-178, 34.704 p.83-97, 34.708 p.98-104

Lieutenant Winterbottom was wounded in the head, captain Diggle on the left temple, lieutenant Dawson was shot through the lungs, lieutenant Anderson lost a leg, captain Love had a severe wounds on the head, foot and other places, lieutenant Campbell was wounded in the groin, major general Adam in the leg, while Colborne himself was grazed in the hand and on the foot. Cf. Ensign Leeke. In: The history of lord Seaton's etc. Vol.I p.46-47

63. Lieutenant colonel Colborne. In: BL, Add.ms.34.708 p.40-49

Lieutenant Gawler (52nd regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.88-97

Ensign Leeke (52nd regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.708 p.98-100

And in: History of lord Seaton's regiment Vol.I p.45

Lieutenant Hart (52nd regiment). Cf. his letter dated 20th June 1815. In: NAM, nr.8111/84

64. Cf. Lieutenant Gawler and ensign Leeke. In: BL, Add.ms.34.708 p.98-100, 104-106

The history of lord Seaton's regiment Vol.I p.45-46

Captain Cross, commander of the left company, speaks of the fire of 2 or 3 companies to the left. In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.163-164, 166-168

Lieutenant colonel Colborne remains silent about any fire given by his battalion; he only speaks of a volley given off by his skirmishers. In: BL, Add.ms.34.708 p.40-49

⁶⁵ Lieutenant Gawler (52nd). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.88-97

⁶⁶ Lieutenant Gawler (52nd). In: BL, Add.ms.34.708 p.98-100

In his reply to Vivian, Gawler states the 52nd had advanced 100 of the 800 yards of the charge, when the Imperial Guard broke. In: Gawler's answer etc. p.11

67. Lieutenant colonel Colborne. In: BL, Add.ms.34.708 p.40-49 and 84-88

During the action, lord Hill would have come under his horse as it fell; both got wounded. Cf. Letter of his aide de camp Mackworth, dated 18th June 1815, 11 p.m. In: Sidney - The life of lord Hill p.308-309

Though this detail could well have happened, the date of this testimony is most doubtful. It already mentions the so-called words spoken by Cambronne "La garde meurt et ne se rend pas" and is written in a prosaic and distant style which is not to be expected right after such a bloody event; there is no doubt that Mackworth had other things on his mind at that time. The "letter" involved forms part of a larger (still unavailable) manuscript of his manuscript journal extending from 1809 to 1815. Cf. Fletcher, I. – A desperate business p.156, 190

On the other hand, captain Churchill, an aide de camp of Hill, confirms Hill's horse got killed during the attack of the imperial guard and that Hill himself was ridden over in the act. Cf. his

letter to his father, dated 24th June 1815. In: Bruce, H.A. – Life of general Sir William Napier Vol.I p.179

68. Corporal Aldridge (2nd battalion 95th regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34. 704 p.98-100
Lieutenant Gawler (52nd regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.134-147
Captain Budgen (2nd battalion 95th regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.56-62
Captain Logan. Cf. his letter to W.Sylvester dated 18th July 1815. In: Miscellany.1934.p.86-87. BL, Department of manuscripts.Nr.Add.mss.43.830
According to lieutenant Gawler, the battalion then counted 419 men. In: BL, Add.ms.34. 704 p.83-87

69. Corporal Aldridge (2nd battalion 95th regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.98-100
Lieutenant Maunsell (battery Bean). In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.272-273
Bean's battery stood between the one of Bolton (to its left) and Rogers (to its right).

70. Lieutenant Gawler (52nd regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.134-147, 389-399
Corporal Aldridge (2nd battalion 95th regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.98-100
Lieutenant colonel Colborne. In: BL, Add.ms.34.708 p.40-49
Lieutenant Smith (2nd battalion 95th regiment) speaks of a volley at a distance of less than 20 paces of the front of the French column. In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.334-335
Captain Logan writes " .. after some desperate fighting the French began to retire .." Cf. his letter dated 18th July 1815 to W. Sylvester. In: Miscellany,1934.p.86-87. BL, Add.ms.43.830
Lieutenant Eyre of the battalion is very unclear about the exact role of the battalion against the French guards, except for the fact that he states that the battalion advanced in a four-files line. See his letter to his mother dated 28th June 1815.

71. Lieutenant colonel Colborne. In: BL, Add.ms.34.708 p.40-49
Lieutenant Gawler (52nd regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.134-147, 389-399
After Adam had asked Colborne what he was up to, he would he said: "to make that column feel our fire." In: Yonge, W.C. Memoir of Lord Seaton's services p.225
Major Egerton (aide de camp of lord Hill) eventually brought the order to Sir Th.Reynell. Initially, Reynell would have wheeled the 71st to the right, but soon Egerton could correct him. The reason for Reynell to do this was unknown to Egerton. Cf. BL, Add.ms.34.708 p.214-217

72. Captain Reed (71st regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.250-253
Cf. Sir Th.Reynell in a letter dated 18th July 1833. In Sir Th.Reynell on the movements of the 71st during the crisis at Waterloo. In: USJ,II p.543

73. Lieutenant Gawler (52nd regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.88-97 and 34.706 p.389-399
Major general Adam. In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.406-413
Major Hunter Blair. In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.354-357
According to Gawler, the 71st then counted 558 men. In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.83-87
According to lieutenant colonel Reynell (71st regiment), his battalion passed so close along the hedges of Gomont that it suffered from French fire coming from here. In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.234-249

74. Captain Eeles (3rd battalion 95th regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.77-82
Major general Adam. In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.406-413
The battalion then counted 139 men according to Gawler. Cf. BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.83-87

75. Major Hunter Blair. In: BL, Add.ms.34.708 p.1201-22
Adam would have submitted the request several times. In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.404-413
Shortly after, Adam was wounded and removed from the field. He was not succeeded: the commanding officer of each regiment acted according to his discretion. Cf. Lieutenant colonel Colborne in his account for lieutenant Yonge. In: Moore-Smith, G.C. - The life of John Colborne, field marshal Lord Seaton p.411

76. VPH, nrs.19 and 42
Major general Adam. In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.406-413
Lieutenant Gawler (52nd regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.299-203
Major Hunter Blair. In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.354-357
Sir H.Halkett. In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.402-403
Captain Von Dreves (battalion Osnabrück). In: NHA, Hann.41.XXI, nr.151 p.70-72
Lieutenant general Clinton. Cf. his reported dated 19th June 1815 to lord Hill. In: WSD, Vol.X, p.545-546

77. This brigade advanced in support. Cf. Lieutenant general Clinton. Cf. his reported dated 19th June 1815 to lord Hill. In: WSD, Vol.X, p.545-546

The square of the 1st and 3rd battalion of the line moved gradually to the east, from its position in between Gomont and the Ohainroad; it went into a four files deep line, to follow the other troops. Cf. Captain Von Goeben (1st battalion of the line KGL). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.42-45

78. According to captain Rochell (19th battalion of national militia) it was 7 p.m. Cf. his account in Harrington collection.
Lieutenant Breuer (36th battalion of chasseurs) mentions a period of 2 to 3 hours. Cf. his letter to Renard, dated 18th February 1855. In: Eenens, A. – Dissertation etc. p.55-56,89
Chassé states his forces were kept at the Nivelles road for several hours, until he moved part of them up to the front line . Cf. his letter to the prince of Orange dated 4th July 1815. In: Bas, F.de & T'Serclaes de Wommersom. La campagne de 1815 aux Pays Bas. Vol.III p.354-357
Lieutenant colonel Van Delen states this period was one of about one hour. Cf. his report dated 11th November 1815. In: Bas, F.de & T'Serclaes de Wommersom. La campagne de 1815 aux Pays Bas. Vol.III p.366
Private Munter (4th battalion of national militia) claims the period extended from 3 to 6 p.m. Cf. his letter dated 22nd July 1815. In: NIMH no reference

79. Cf. Chassé himself. In: his letter to the prince of Orange dated 4th July 1815. In: Bas, F.de & T'Serclaes de Wommersom. La campagne de 1815 aux Pays Bas. Vol.III p.354-357
Chassé to colonel Nepveu. In: NL-ZURAZ-Van Löben Sels 0302 nr.259
Van Dam van Isselt believes that captain Lux got the order to advance either directly from Chassé himself or through major Van der Smissen. Cf. Dam van Isselt, W.E. van De Noord-

Nederlandse batterij etc. p.57

Chassé, the moment he rode back to his troops, would have cried to general Trip and major Von Cramm (commander of the Brunswick hussars): " C'est le moment de faire tout ce nous pouvons; sans cela tout est sans doute perdue ! " Cf. Letter of captain Camp to Van Löben Sels, dated 23 october 1841 . In: NL-ZURAZ-Van Löben Sels 0302 nr.263

80. Cf. letters of Chassé and lieutenant colonel Van Delen. In: Bas, F.de en T'Serclaes de Wommersom. La campagne de 1815 aux Pays Bas. Vol.III p.354-357, 366-368

Captain Heise points to the fact that lieutenant colonel Hartmann (commander of the KGL artillery) had not seen Kraemer de Bichin's unit. This is correct as Von Hartmann was then further to the right, near the guns of captain Sympher. In: NHA, Hann.41.XXI, nr.151 p.129-131

Van Dam van Isselt claims a position in rear of the Ohain-raod and between the Brunswickers (to the left) and Colin Halkett (to the right). He further states the road leading there was hollow, as was the Ohain-road; however, this was not the case. For that reason he believes the battery marched up through the fields along the road; this may still have been the case, but not strictly necessary. He links the event to the one of the half battery of Lux which had got stuck in a hollow road, but this was north of the Nivelles-road (see below). Apart from that, he also states the battery took up a position in rear of the hollow Ohainroad (while arguing the statements of F.de Bas), as it would not have been possible for the battery to cross this road; however, also here, this road was not hollow. Cf. Dam van Isselt, W.E.van De Noord-Nederlandse batterij etc. p.54-55, 90-91

Van Dam van Isselt , just as Van Löben Sels, has the battery of Kraemer de Bichin advance in two half batteries, the first one led by lieutenant N.J.Dufourneau de Villers as ordered by Chassé and the second one, led by 1st lieutenant J.L.van der Smissen (probably) on its own initiative. Let alone the fact that the battery of captain Lux most probably advanced in two half batteries, this confusion is caused by mixing up commanders. Van Dam van Isselt doesn't take into account that Chassé ordered major Van der Smissen to advance with the artillery of the division.

Major Van der Smissen was commander of the artillery of the division, while lieutenant Van der Smissen was the commander of one of the half batteries of the battery led by captain Kraemer de Bichin. Erroneously, several historians let Chassé only have the battery of Kraemer de Bichin advance, while indicating it under the name of Van der Smissen. Cf. Dam van Isselt, W.E. van De Noord-Nederlandse batterij etc. p.54-55

Cf. Houssaye, H. 1815. Waterloo p.407

Renard, B.J.B.J. Les allégations anglaises etc. p.62-63

The list drawn up by major De la Sarraz of those artillery officers who distinguished themselves in the campaign also mentions lieutenant Van der Smissen and captain Kraemer de Bichin. In: KHA, nr.A37 VIIIb, nr.9

Other documents confirm the gallant behaviour of both major Van der Smissen and captain Kraemer de Bichin.

Van der Smissen is referred to as having fired with a battery of horse artillery on the Imperial Guard, inflicted high losses and that he lost two horses at that stage. That evening, he would also have received the praise of lord Hill.

The note for captain Kraemer de Bichin states that his unit " door haar wel aangebracht vuur de zege van de dag heeft helpen beslissen. " Cf. Registers of the Militaire Willemsorde. In: Kanselarij der Nederlandse Orden, Den Haag.

81. Ensign Macready (30th regiment) says about the intervention of Kraemer de Bichin:
" Some guns from the rear of our right poured in grape among them and the slaughter was dreadful. Nowhere did I see carcasses so heaped upon each other... (I believe) these guns to be Mr.van der Smissen's. Whosoever they were, they were served most gloriously and their grand metallic bang, bang, bang with the rushing showers of grape that followed, were the most welcome sounds that ever struck my ears - until I married." In: United Service Journal. 1845, I p.396

Some seven years later, he expressed himself as: " Major Van der Smissen literally cut lanes through the columns in our front. " In: United Service Journal. 1852, II, p.52

There would be a letter written by Chassé to Wellington at Roye-sur-les-Mats , dated 28th June 1815. It states: "It was he [Van der Smissen] who so well directed the light artillery of the third division, which in the battle of the 18th had the good fortune to attract the attention of your Excellency and of Lord Hill. At the moment when I attacked with the bayonet the French Guard, he seconded me in a manner above all expectation." In: Boulger, D. The Belgians at Waterloo p.34

Lord Hill also confirms the role of the artillery of Chassé in his report to the duke of Wellington, dated 20th June 1815: " The brigade of Belgian artillery also deserves my best thanks for their steady conduct and well directed fire during the last mentioned attack [meant is the attack of the imperial guard]". In: WSD, Vol. X, p.544-545

82.Cf. Letter of lieutenant Bentinck (battery Lux). In: NL-ZURAZ-Van Löben Sels 0302 nr.262

Baron Bentinck states *both* his and the horse battery left from a position near the hamlet of Mont Saint Jean, near the windmill to the left of the Brussels road. This remark is still a mystery, as both batteries were with the division by that time. Also see: Dam van Isselt, W.E. van De Noord-Nederlandse batterij etc. p.60

Chassé had instructed captain Von Omphal to bring his artillery to the front; it took him more time as expected as major Van der Smissen would have led his gun trams further to the rear as he had been instructed to do before. Cf. Account of captain Von Omphal. In: NIMH, nr.104/7

Lieutenant Kikkert of the train of the foot-battery Lux mentions the battery's advance, but gives no details on further actions. Cf. his letter to his parents, dated 26th July 1815. Cf. his diary. In: Koninklijke Militaire Academie, Breda nr..4193-2

83. Chassé himself, lieutenant colonel Van Delen and colonel Detmers. In: Bas, F.de & T'Serclaes de Wommersom. La campagne de 1815 aux Pays Bas. Vol.III p.354-357, 368 and 376

Cf. Colonel Detmers in a letter dated 1st August 1815 to Chassé. In: BG, Verzameling van alle rapporten etc. , family-archive Rochell, box 8 nr. 7

Captain Rochell (19th battalion of national militia). Cf. his account in private collection.

84. Detmers speaks of a position " links van twee in bataille staande bataljons die een zeer hevig en goed onderhouden gelederenvuur gaven " [30th / 73rd], and to the right of of a " bataljon dat in driehoek iets achterwaarts stond en verder links ervan, een korps jagers dat begon te wijken. " [a battalion of Brunswickers and further to the left the Nassau, who

Detmers refers to as chasseurs probably because of their green uniform].

In: Bas, F.de & T'Serclaes de Wommersom. La campagne de 1815 aux Pays Bas. Vol.III p. 376

Cf. Colonel Detmers in letters dated 20th June and 1st August 1815 to Chassé. In: CBG, Verzameling van alle rapporten etc. , family-archive Rochell, box 8 nr. 7

Colonel Von Wachholtz confirms that Detmers advanced to the left of Colin Halkett and to the right of the Brunswickers. In: Geschichte des Herzoglich Braunschweigischen Armeekorps etc. p.44

Also see: Captain Rochell (19th battalion of national militia). Cf. his account in private collection.

Ensign Macready (30th regiment) however states that a Dutch column advanced to his right as: "A heavy column of Dutch infantry (the first we had seen) passed, drumming and shouting like mad, with their shakos on the top of their bayonets, near enough to our right for us to see and laugh with them. " In: On a part of captain Siborne's history of the Waterloo campaign. In: United Service Magazine, 1845 I p.401

In their new position, the fire was such that - for a moment - the battalion in front, the 35th chasseurs, for a moment fell back upon the battalion in its immediate rear, the 2nd battalion of line infantry, upon which a brief confusion ensued. The situation was quickly restored, however, and the whole body advanced shortly after. Cf. letter of captain Veere (2nd battalion of the line) dated 20th June 1815 to his wife. In: NA, 2.21.2.39 nr.15

According to lieutenant colonel Arnould his battalion, the 35th battalion chasseurs, was in front of the column. Cf. his letter to colonel Detmers, dated 20th September 1815. In: Family archive Rochell, CBG

As they were marching up towards the front-line, lieutenant colonel Van Thielen (6th battalion of national militia) was killed. Cf. Captain Buhlman to Detmers. In: family archive Rochell CBG.

85. Captain Rochell (19th battalion of national militia). Cf. his account in private collection.

According to lieutenant Koch (17th battalion of national militia) his battalion advanced in column. Cf. his diary. In: Infanterie Museum Harskamp

2nd lieutenant Holle of the 6th battalion National Militia claims the battalion was in front of the column and that it advanced through a French artillery-fire which, however, mostly passed over its heads. Cf. 2nd lieutenant Holle in his letter to his parents dated 10th July 1815. In: Stadsarchief Dordrecht. Family-archive Blussé. 68-28 nr.21

According to sergeant Wiegmans (6th battalion of national militia) the brigade was formed per battalion in a closed column of six divisions (each division forming one company). In: Quatre Bras en Waterloo p.69

Major Baring (2nd battalion of light infantry KGL) explicitly denies the presence of the Netherlands artillery and infantry to the left of the brigade of Colin Halkett, neither in the attack of imperial guard nor in the general advance.

It should be remarked however that at that stage Baring was far away from the British brigade near the crossroads of the Brussels road and the Ohain-road. Moreover, he had been knocked down and had got under his horse and bruised. As he fell back, the Netherlanders were probably already further in front.

86. Chassé himself, lieutenant colonel Van Delen and colonel Detmers. In: Bas, F.de & T'Serclaes de Wommersom. La campagne de 1815 aux Pays Bas. Vol.III p.354-357, 368

Chassé also mentions a position in two squares, in echelons. Cf. his letter to lord Hill dated 5th July 1815

Also in his letter to colonel Nepveu. In: NL-ZURAZ-Van Löben Sels 0302 nr.259

⁸⁷ Chassé in his letter to colonel Nepveu In: NL-ZURAZ-Van Löben Sels 0302 nr.259

Lieutenant Koch (17th battalion of national militia). Cf. his diary. In: Infanterie Museum Harskamp

Cf. Constant Rebecque in his journal. In: NA, 2.21.008.01 nr.25

88. Chassé and lieutenant colonel Van Delen both speak of closed columns. Cf. their accounts in: Bas, F.de & T'Serclaes de Wommersom. La campagne de 1815 aux Pays Bas. Vol.III p.354-357, 368

Chassé's letter dated 5th July 1815

Lieutenant Koch (17th battalion of national militia) states his battalion deployed as it had advanced to the position in column. Cf. his diary. In: Infanterie Museum Harskamp.

2nd luitenant Roorda van Eysinga (19M) speaks of an advance with fixed bayonets. Cf. Roorda van Eysinga, P.P. Iets betreffende den slag bij Waterloo. In: Recensent der recensenten, 1831 nr.6-7

Chassé is not consistent whether the whole brigade advanced or not. On the one hand, he speaks of the entire brigade, but he also mentions that "kolonel Speelman (commander of the 2nd battalion of line infantry) de garde aanviel met een deel van de brigade ", with specifying details. Cf. his letter dated 4th of July 1815 respectively.

Muilwijk describes the attack in an attack column of two battalions wide and three deep, led on the right by the 35th Jägers and left by the 2nd line, and subsequently followed by the similar order of the militia battalions. In: Standing firm at Waterloo p.199

89. Chassé in his letter dated 4th of July 1815. In: Bas, F.de & T'Serclaes de Wommersom. La campagne de 1815 aux Pays Bas. Vol.III p.354-357

Chassé in his letter to colonel Nepveu In: NL-ZURAZ-Van Löben Sels 0302 nr.259

Lieutenant colonel Van Delen. In: Bas, F.de & T'Serclaes de Wommersom. La campagne de 1815 aux Pays Bas. Vol.III p.368

Colonel Detmers in a letter dated 20th June 1815 to Chassé. In: CBG, Verzameling van alle rapporten etc., family-archive Rochell Box 8 nr. 1

Private Munter (4th battalion of national militia). Cf. his letter dated 22nd July 1815. In: NIMH no reference

Sergeant Wiegmans (6th battalion of national militia). In: Quatre Bras en Waterloo p.69

Lieutenant colonel Van Delen speaks about French fire, but not from the imperial guard. It was most probably fire coming from skirmishers.

Captain Rochell (19th battalion of national militia). His testimony mentions the brief confusion within the brigade during its advance to the front line because of the noise, the wavering British and Brunswick infantry, the lack of space and the French fire. Soon, the men recovered themselves and continued their advance. He makes no mention of an action against or even the presence of French guard. Cf. his account in private collection.

Lieutenant Koch (17th battalion of national militia) claims his battalion gave a two-rank volley and then advanced with fixed bayonets. He doesn't mention any confrontation, but the mere retreat of the French. Cf. his diary. In: Infanterie Museum Harskamp.

Lieutenant Warin (3rd regiment of carabineers) claims the 6th battalion of national militia

would have run over the imperial guard. Cf. his letter. In: Rijksarchief van de Provincie Utrecht, familie-archief Van Ortt, 74 inv.nr.157

A member of this battalion, 2nd lieutenant Holle, is very unclear about the action, as he only mentions the presence of a near British square charged by French lancers of the guard and the advance of the battalion towards the (unspecified) enemy up to 30 paces and its fire. Cf. Holle in his letter to his parents dated 10th July 1815. In: Stadsarchief Dordrecht, family-archive Blussé. 68-28 nr.21

In an account from 1856, however, Holle doesn't mention this fire and only states the battalion advanced with the bayonet, driving the enemy in front of it. Cf. 2nd lieutenant Holle in an account dated 1856. In: Stadsarchief Dordrecht, family-archive Blussé. 68-28 nr.26

Sergeant Van Wetering (4th battalion of national militia) mentions that he took part in the action but does not go into detail at this stage. Cf. his diary in private collection

90. Chassé. In: Bas, F.de & T'Serclaes de Wommersom. La campagne de 1815 aux Pays Bas. Vol.III p.354-357 He speaks of 300 cuirassiers.

Lieutenant colonel Van Delen. In: Bas, F.de & T'Serclaes de Wommersom. La campagne de 1815 aux Pays Bas. Vol.III p.368

Colonel Detmers in a letter to Chassé dated 20th June 1815. In: CBG, Verzameling van alle rapporten etc. family-archive Rochell box 8 nr. 1

The presence of cuirassiers is corroborated by:

Lieutenant colonel Murray (18th regiment of hussars). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.106-116

Lieutenant Wyndham (Scots Greys). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.171-174

Captain Clayton (Royal Horse Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.201-203

Lieutenant colonel Mills (Scots Greys). In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.223-226

Lieutenant Biddulph (Inniskillings). In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.325-328

Private Munter (4th battalion of national militia). Diary. In: NIMH, no reference

Captain Bertram (8th battalion of the line KGL). In: BL.Add.ms.34.705 p.2502-253

Also see the circumstances under which the prince of Orange got wounded. These horsemen were hovering around in front of the Brunswick and Nassau units.

91. Cf. Chassé in his account dated 4th July 1815. In: Bas, F.de & T'Serclaes de Wommersom. La campagne de 1815 aux Pays Bas. Vol.III p.354-357

2nd lieutenant Roorda van Eysinga (19th battalion of national militia) has a slightly different version of the events. First, he mentions the advance towards and the capture of the orchard of La Haye Sainte. As the men emerged from the orchard, they were charged by cuirassiers who were driven away by the Netherlanders led by captain De Haan. In: Iets betreffende de slag van Waterloo In: Recensent der recensenten, 1831 nr.6-7

Sergeant Wiegmans (6th battalion of national militia) mentions the presence (and retreat) of the cuirassiers. In: Quatre Bras en Waterloo p.69

Lieutenant Leicher (19th battalion of national militia) also mentions the action of De Haan with some 60 men, plus the flankers of the 6th company of the same battalion, but against the imperial guard, after having noticed the cuirassiers in some confusion. In: Het leven etc. p.190

92. Lieutenant colonel Van Delen. In: Bas, F.de & T'Serclaes de Wommersom. La campagne de 1815 aux Pays Bas. Vol.III p.368

The brigade was supposed to take part in the general offensive action of the 2nd British division, but this was not to be.

93. Several witnesses of Vandeleur's brigade speak of one or more squares.

From lieutenant colonel Van Delen's account it does not become clear that both columns would have formed in squares. In: Bas, F.de & T'Serclaes de Wommersom. La campagne de 1815 Vol.III noten r.22B

In the Dutch plan from Siborne's files, the brigade is depicted in the wrong way, i.e. in two lines of three battalions each, in rear of the *chaussée* and to the right of the road which leads to Braine l'Alleud. In: BL, Add.ms.34.706,p.158-160,nr.3

94. Cf. the British testimonies of this brigade.

According to captain Tomkinson (16th regiment of light dragoons) some men fired their muskets into the air, while others started to go to the rear for about 10 metre.

He and major Childers (11th regiment of light dragoons) would have incited the men to go back to their posts. Wellington himself would also have intervened, to leave again after Childers had placed his squadron immediately in rear of the brigade d'Aubremé. In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.131-132

According to cornet Bullock (11th regiment of light dragoons) Wellington would have said to colonel Sleight, the commander of this regiment of dragoons: "That's right, tell them the French are retiring." In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.171-174

⁹⁵ Lieutenant general Reille. In: Documents inédits p.62

⁹⁶ According to sir J.Colborne a large quantity of French cavalry stood to the right of the 52nd after it had moved out. In: BL, Add.ms.34.708 p.84-88

Lieutenant Gawler (52nd regiment) saw the nearest enemy forces at about 300 metres from the right flank of the 52nd (which is immediately east of Gomont). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.88-97

Captain Enoch (23rd regiment) speaks in general terms of cuirassiers near the columns of the guard. In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.22-25

⁹⁷ Cf. Drouot in his speech for the Chambre des pairs, 24th June 1815. In: Additional particulars etc. Vol.II p.113

General Delort. In: Notice p.380 Here he basically asserts that the infantry of the line and the guard supported the cavalry.

⁹⁸. Report of the brigade Kielmansegge. In: NHA, Hann.41.XXI, nr.151 p.42-51

Lieutenant colonel Müller (battalion Bremen). In: NHA, Hann.41.XXI, nr.151 p.37-40

Lieutenant colonel Von Scriba (battalion Bremen). In: NHA, Hann.41.XXI, nr.151 p.21-28

Lieutenant general Alten to Wellington, 19th and 22nd June 1815. In: WSD, Vol.X, p.534-535 and 559-560

⁹⁹. Baring, G. Erzählung der Theilnahme etc. In: Hannoversches Militärisches Journal. 1831

Report of major Baring. In: Hann.41.XXI, nr.152 p.41-47

Report of lieutenant colonel Von Linsingen (5th battalion line KGL). In: Hann.41.XXI, nr.152 p.59-62

Lieutenant general Alten also speaks of a part of Colin Halkett's brigade, but there are no

further indications for this claim. Cf. his report dated 19th June 1815 to Wellington. In: WSD, Vol.X, p.534-535

¹⁰⁰. Lieutenant colonel Colborne. In: BL, Add.ms.34.708 p.40-49, 84-88 and 319-323
In the first letter Colborne speaks of two or three squadrons. Cf. plan of lieutenant Gawler (52nd regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34. 706 p.134-137 and in: The crisis etc. p.18
In his second letter Colborne describes the fire given by the left company and the wheeling of three companies to form square. Shortly after, the battalion halted to retake the line; at that moment it was still under French fire.
According to both Leeke and Colborne, the British light dragoons were pursued by cuirassiers. Cf. Colborne's letter to lieutenant Yonge. In: Moore Smith – The life of John Colborne p.413
Ensign Leeke (52nd regiment). In: History of lord Seaton's regiment Vol.I p.48-50
Leeke also adds that the uniform of the light dragoons was very similar to that of French *chasseurs à cheval*.

Three other witnesses state that the British horsemen were also accompanied by some German light dragoons, but neither this, nor the French pursuit, is not corroborated by members of the squadron.

Cf. Sir H.Vivian. In: USJ, 1833, II p. 316

Lieutenant colonel Murray (18th regiment of hussars). In: BL, Add.Ms. 34.704 p.106-116

Captain Taylor (10th regiment of hussars). In a letter dated 16th of July 1815 to mr.Brownrigg. In collection of A.Lagden.

¹⁰¹ Cf. Lieutenant Banner (23rd light dragoons). In: BL, Add.Ms.34.706 p.5 and 34.705 p.332-333 and in the USJ, 1836, II p.532

Captain Grove (23rd light dragoons). In: BL. Add.Ms.34.708 p.230-231

Major Lautour (23rd light dragoons). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.286-289

Lord Greenock. In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.187-189

Sir H.Vivian. In: Reply to major Gawler. In: USJ, 1833 Vol.II p.315

Lieutenant Gawler (52nd regiment), presuming the squadron came from the west (from a position north-east of Gomont) assigns it a completely route, and then making a large detour south around the column of the imperial guard. In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.134-147

102. Lieutenant colonel Von Muller (2nd battalion KLG of the line). In: VPH, nr.33

Major Hammerstein (battalion Salzgitter). In: VPH, nr.45

The report of Hew Halkett to Sir H.Clinton. In: Dehnel, H. Erinnerungen deutscher Officiere etc. p.378

Colonel H.Halkett to lieutenant general Alten, 24th June 1815. In: VPH, nr.46 and in a report to the same, dated 14th July 1815. In: Hann.41D, XXI.nr.151,p.57

He adds that it took quite an effort to take the wood, in which it spent nearly all its ammunition.

In and around Gomont were also still the light companies of the brigade of Duplat. In one of them (of the 3rd battalion) lieutenant Dehnel was instructed to rally the remnants of this (temporary) light battalion. However, most of the men had joined the 2nd battalion of the line KGL and just a few could be found. These assisted the other units to drive out the French. Cf.

Dehnel, H. Rückblicke etc. p.275-276