

Observations.

Napoleon's original set-up for a second offensive against Wellington's centre involved the 1st, 2nd and 6th corps, the Imperial Guard and the cavalry of the line. This design did not exist for long. First of all, Ney – who had the tactical control of the offensive – was tempted into a different twist by engaging a mass of cavalry in a different sector, initially without infantry support. As has been shown, it was a conjunction of circumstances between 3.45 and 4 p.m. which caused this twist.¹

From the way this phase of the battle started, French sources agree upon one element in particular: the fact that Ney started it prematurely for some 45 to 60 minutes in relation to the design for the second offensive.²

The French offensive which took place opposite the allied centre between roughly 4 and 7 p.m. can initially be characterized as one in which cavalry units charged without the direct support of the other two weapons. During these charges, numerous enemy guns temporarily came in French hands several times, but there are no indications that any one of them was spiked.³ Nor were any allied colours taken.⁴ At the same time, very large swarms of skirmishers were operating along the east flank of Gomont and around the farm of la Haye Sainte.

In the process, the cavalry was used in a fragmentary way as it charged as various sub-units (most probably brigades, regiments or combinations of parts of regiments) charging in one sector, while others re-formed at the same time further to the rear to recover from their previous charges.⁵

Napoleon's original set-up for the second offensive did not take into account any Prussian intervention as Napoleon expected to beat Wellington before they could intervene at all. Now, as Ney distorted the second offensive by engaging a large mass of cavalry right away, he was well aware of the fact that Lobau would be available as long as the Prussian pressure was not such that his presence on the right flank was required. He probably expected to have reached a breakthrough against Wellington, in which he could use the 6th corps after all. However, as it turned out, the 6th corps was required - and Lobau acted to it according to Ney's own instructions - by 4.15 p.m., just at the moment Ney had engaged part of the cavalry. After a while, it turned out into a double failure for Ney: not only in his own lack of success against Wellington, but also in the loss of Lobau's corps for the second offensive against Wellington of which the concept now was overtaken even more. The absence of Lobau, coupled to the lack of success in his charges so far, probably prompted Ney to engage the corps of Kellermann first, and Guyot not long after, as well.

The way these two last corps were committed is circumstantial. As far as Kellermann is concerned, Napoleon himself is unambiguous in confirming that it was his own initiative, even though he realized that the attack was premature.

Kellermann himself, however, has another version. He writes: “on lança la cavalerie du general Milhaud. La Garde impériale la suit. La droite de la cavalerie de reserve du IV [=3rd] corps fut entraînée imprudemment par l'imbécile general qui la commandait [Lhéritier] et qui n'attendit pas les ordres du comte de Valmy, son commandant en chef etc.”⁶

In this context sir Hussey Vivian met Lhéritier somewhere between 1815 and 1833, on which occasion Vivian asked him how it had been possible that his men had been engaged “trop tôt et mal employé.” His explanation was that the whole body of cuirassiers had been concentrated in a hollow immediately under the allied position, where they had suffered dreadfully from the allied fire, so much so, that at last the men became impatient and with resistless cries of “En avant !” accompanied by the expression “Ici nous sommes écrasés” demanded to be led against the enemy.⁷ Here he suggest as if his whole corps was swept into the action through the initiative of one his subordinates; as a result it reached the allied frontline in some confusion and had to

reform under enemy fire as far as it was possible.⁸ The question can be asked why he would shift the responsibility of the charge onto some subordinate, while Lhéritier had his orders from above?

In connection to the heavy cavalry of the imperial guard, its commander, Guyot, states that from about 2 p.m. onwards his corps was assigned to Ney.⁹ This conflicts however with Napoleon's claim that the corps was engaged without his explicit consent. The emperor would even have sent out count Bertrand to call him back, but this proved too late.¹⁰ Additionally, it is count Flahaut who claims that he would have carried orders on behalf of Napoleon for both corps to charge against Wellington's line.¹¹ In the context of the situation it is most logical to suppose that Ney did have powers to act with this cavalry, but with certain limitations which Guyot not necessarily knew about. Despite this instruction, Ney engaged Guyot after all which provoked the emperor's indignation.¹² It is in this connection highly improbable that Flahaut carried an order for Ney; he probably only did so in connection to Kellermann's corps.

Engaging more cavalry, however, made no material difference to the situation as it had developed.¹³ And this situation contained all ingredients to make success for the French virtually impossible: their opponents were neither caught by surprise, nor were already engaged with other troops, nor were already wavering.

Additionally, the field and the composition of the allied front-line prevented the development of a proper speed to be successful.¹⁴ It is about this balance between speed on the one hand and nerve on the other as Muir puts it: "pace was indisputably more important than order for the cavalry, though a full gallop still must not be reached too soon. The speed of the charge excited the men and gave them the impetuous courage needed to disregard the infantry's fire. It also frightened the infantry and often made them fire too soon and inaccurately. Ineffective fire would in turn encourage the cavalry, as would any sign of wavering among the infantry. As the distance between them diminished the pressure on both sides increased until finally one or the other lost their nerve. [...] "the greater the dash of the cavalry, the more likely they were to unnerve the infantry – the more determined the infantry, the more effective their fire and the better their chance of stopping the cavalry's charge."¹⁵

So, all in all, as long as the squares kept tight – and this is what occurred at Waterloo - the French broke upon the squares, having about the same impact as a wave breaking on a rocky shore.¹⁶

To impose their will upon Wellington, the French from about 5 p.m. onwards changed their tactics: they not only maintained numerous cavalry units on and near to the crest of the ridge of Mont Saint Jean, but they also dragged gun units, covered by this cavalry, up very close to the enemy's frontline front.¹⁷ At the same time, infantry units of Bachelu, Foy and Pégot attacked and harassed the allied position.¹⁸

The sector within this position the French focused upon was the one stretching from Adam's to Kielmansegge's brigade (about 700 metres). Though the ascent in the (French) right wing of this sector was not easy, access played a prominent role in this choice, as the ridge here is more like a plateau, allowing both artillery and infantry the firepower at close range, while having cavalry in their immediate vicinity.

The idea behind it was if the cavalry could establish a battery within canister range, or coordinate its attack with supporting infantry, squares would soon be reduced to a shambles, unable to make any resistance when cavalry and infantry attacked again. What now developed was a see-saw, close-encounter combat of attrition upon a limited sector of Wellington's frontline in which the French defied the allied resistance and in which they hoped to soften it up to such an extent that it would break at the next major assault.

In practice a coordination as sketched proved difficult [¹⁹], and at Waterloo at this stage this was no exception: a first, integral attack of infantry around 6.30 p.m. composed by the brigades of

Husson, Campy (Bachelu), Jamin (Foy) and Pégot (Durutte) - covered by artillery and cavalry close by - failed. Its timing was ambiguous. On the one hand it was set in too soon, on the other far too late. Too soon, in the sense that apparently the allied line had not been softened up sufficiently for a decisive strike. Too late, in a much more basic sense. Had the cavalry action which started at 4 p.m. been properly supported by a very strong mass of infantry, like the 6th corps plus the remains of the 2nd and a decent number of guns, there might have been a chance that Wellington's line could be broken. But, as the first offensive had shown, to make a chance against an intact enemy position, it all came down to a combination of weapons, not only in their relative strengths and their mutual vicinity during the attack, but also in the timing of the cooperation of their actions.²⁰

The struggle for La Haye Sainte.

Had the French infantry, covered by cuirassiers, in its first attack upon the farm of La Haye Sainte enjoyed the success of pushing back Major Baring's men into the farm itself, it was cut short by the defeat of these cuirassiers and of the other units of the 1st corps.

The second attack upon the farm was originally framed in the same kind of set-up for a second offensive, but this did not last long after as Ney decided to launch strong masses of cavalry against Wellington's centre instead.

Basically, the second attack wasn't materially different as the first. As the French gradually encircled the farm from both sides, they attempted to penetrate into it from there. It was all in vain, and ultimately the first major retreat of French cavalry to their left around 4.45 p.m. most probably triggered them to fall back to their starting positions again.

In the third attack the French approach changed however. While artillery was pounding against the walls and buildings on the east side of the farm, the French infantry focused most of their energy upon the large open west gate of the large barn. It was from here that they also succeeded in setting the barn on fire. Eventually, it did not yield the desired success, better: the French broke off the attack, but from what cause remains a mystery. It might have been fatigue and casualties suffered so far, as by the moment a fourth attack was launched, probably by 5.45 p.m., the French were reinforced by the remnants of Schmitz' brigade.

Eventually, in the fourth attack, the delicate balance which so far had prevented the French from taking the farm was broken. First of all, the French ferociously stormed with new forces the west-gate again and at the same time were able again to set fire into the barn. Additionally, as more artillery was engaged against the farm, allied resistance slackened. Ultimately, the French somehow managed to scale the walls and some of the buildings of the farm.

The moment the French actually possessed the farm, the forces which advanced beyond it were integrated into the swarms of skirmishers who were engaged on their flanks at close range from Wellington's line. The configuration of the ground with its high banks did not allow large formations of any weapon to make a vigorous push against Wellington's front here. In a way, the French were physically stuck in their success as long as there was no major support to bring about a breakthrough.

The obstinacy of the French makes it probable that the man in tactical control, brigadier general Quiot, had instructions to take the farm, no matter what. The second and third attack against the farm had become more a thing of their own as that they were part of a larger context.

The involvement though in the fourth attempt of more artillery, engineers and infantry other as Quiot's, makes it possible that Ney was the one who took this initiative. It was in an attempt to incorporate the farm into the new design of his offensive against Wellington's centre: the use of all weapons from a close range so as to soften it up for an ultimate massive

strike.²¹

Resuming, in a general sense, the possession of the farm developed for the French from an element facilitating a massive offensive against Wellington's centre, through a more isolated situation, into one which formed part of an alternative tactical approach to prevail over Wellington.

As this took place, what was the significance of the possession of the farm for the allies and how did this reflect in their performance before and during the battle ?

Being located at such a short distance from the allied front-line, the farm served as an advance post to disrupt a French approach upon Wellington's very centre. Due to the very limited possibility of firing from the farm in a lateral way, its strength in this respect lay in the opposite direction in splitting the French advance.

Because of this proximity, the farm was garrisoned right from the 17th of June onwards, but it seems that the local commander, major Baring, did not receive any information on the 18th about the specific importance of his post, nor did he receive any detailed instructions for how long he had to defend it. There are no indications however that he asked for them either. Presuming he was ordered by to hold it, he entrenched the farm as well as he could with the scarce technical means he had available.²² Some of the gates and doors were barricaded and hay was thrown out of the barns, but loopholes were virtually absent, as was the case with scaffolding. No partial un-roofing took place either.

As the battle progressed, Baring soon concentrated his defence upon the farm-building itself while he was able to keep his life-line to the main ridge open. The obstinacy of the French to take the farm made Baring encroach upon the defence of his post and its importance was clearly seen in the main position as well.²³

In the first French attack Baring suffered high casualties, as a result of which - upon his own request - he received a reinforcement. In the subsequent French attacks, however, it were not so much his casualties but his chronic lack of ammunition which came to play him a nasty trick. Shortly before the third attack he made his first request, another two during this attack and the fourth during the fourth attack. They were all in vain though; instead, he received new reinforcements.

The lack of ammunition of the garrison at La Haye Sainte after the second French attack has always been the dominating factor in the discussion around the fall of the farm. This discussion is often linked to the fact that Baring's battalion, the 2nd light KGL, was armed with rifles and that this type of ammunition was hard to procure.

First of all, of the total forces present at the farm, 50% was rifle-armed, while the remaining other half was armed with muskets.²⁴ All these forces suffered from a lack of ammunition so the problem should be sought elsewhere. Baring's requests came through to his superiors at brigade level, but as it seems he got no proper feedback on why they sent reinforcements instead of ammunition. At the same time, it becomes clear that other similar units using a mix of rifles and muskets did *not* suffer from the same problem (like the other battalions - or parts thereof - of the brigade of Von Ompteda), so the problem was most probably a logistic one.

Baring's requests started at about 4.45 p.m. and lasted until about 6 p.m. During this period, the *chaussée de Bruxelles*, the most direct connection to the farm, as well as its east-gate were dominated by swarms of French skirmishers. The only safe connection left to the farm was through the fields between the deep-banked Ohain-road and the wicket in the north-wall of the house, adjoining the garden. This connection, obviously, did not allow any regular transport with carts or casks. As the buildings did not allow the garrison to fire for the full 100% because of its closed perimetres, the situation could have been worse though. Now, the available ammunition lasted longer as could otherwise have been expected.²⁵

Even though Baring might not have had full instructions on the defence of the farm, he should

take some of the blame for not ensuring that he had a proper reserve of ammunition well before the battle started as realistically he could presume he would have to hold on his own because of the configuration of the ground would not permit a supply.²⁶

The situation convinced high command to send reinforcements instead. The fact that these were able to cross the fields immediately north and north-west of the farm means that this sector was unoccupied at those moments by the French. French presence further south, however, caused them to enter the buildings through the wicket of the house only in single-file. How the reinforcements were used in detail remains unknown, but that they were acting under the command of major Baring is certain. They were obviously sent with the consent of lieutenant general Alten.

Opposite Wellington's left wing, what had been intended to be a preliminary to the second major French assault against Wellington's centre with Ney's initiative now turned into a more or less isolated close encounter combat all along the line. Initially, this was a matter of French infantry and some cavalry only, but later at least one attempt was done to bring up three guns at a relative close distance as well. The moment this was done may be simultaneous with the forward actions of French guns opposite the allied centre. Overall on the French right wing, it was more or less the same formula as it was used later against Wellington's centre; the main difference was that no further infantry formations were available. This lack of formed infantry was increased by the removal here of Pégot's brigade. Present at what later became a vital joint of both enemy armies, the brigade was ordered to the left wing in the presumption that it could be missed at a theatre where forces were merely busy skirmishing in the broken ground.

The situation at Gomont.

It becomes clear from the way the actions around Gomont developed after 3 p.m. that they were still clearly linked to the way the general French-front-line developed in front of Wellington.

After the failure of the grand first offensive, the situation at Gomont came to a stand-still in the sense that French activities were from then on limited to skirmishing only. Right from the beginning, this had been the original general intention of the action after all, but on a different front-line: it included the possession of the orchard, which was not the case. In fact, the British further strengthened the orchard by bringing in more reinforcements around 3 p.m.

The take-off to the second grand offensive of the French initiated an intensified run against the buildings, orchard and garden of Gomont which resulted in brief irruptions in the first two, but – again – the success was brief and could not be consolidated.

By 4.30 p.m. the French were back in the wood and from then on they no longer made any offensive movements against the buildings and the garden. Instead, they increased their skirmishing actions all along their front, but particularly against the orchard and alongside the east-side of the complex. Having by now established their front-line now with cavalry at the foot of the ridge of Mont Saint Jean, for the French, the need to actually occupy the orchard of Gomont was no longer an issue as it had been before.

The increase of the numbers of skirmishers east of Gomont, however, was such that it prompted Wellington to bring part of his 2nd division forward to close the gap between his main-line and Gomont. In fact, its position was an extension of the inner defence line of Gomont. This, in turn, triggered the French around Gomont again to cover the left flank of the main French front-line further to their right. So by 5.30 p.m. another attempt was made to take the orchard. It didn't work; in fact, it caused them to evacuate the wood altogether. The allied success was not of a long duration though, as by 6.30 p.m. – possibly in a parallel advance

with the remains of the divisions of Foy and Bachelu further to their right – Tissot's and Jérôme's men gained the wood back from their opponents.

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¹ It has been suggested by colonel Heymès that Ney engaged one brigade only and that the corps of Milhaud and Lefebvre Desnouettes followed without orders. Yet, in the powers Ney had over these commanders, this is simply impossible. They would not move without his consent. In: Documents inédits p.16-17

Milhaud himself is not explicit how his corps was committed into the action. He simply states it was ordered three times to attack the plateau. In his report dated 1815. In: Stoff, L. – Essai sur le lieutenant general baron Delort p.131

Kellerman either does not elucidate who committed Milhaud into the battle. In: Observations sur la bataille de Waterloo etc. In: SHAT, Mémoires et reconnaissances, no.719

Napoleon sees a non-existent relation between the British heavy cavalry being driven back by the cavalry of Milhaud and Lefebvre Desnouettes and the prolongation of this success against Wellington's centre and right one hour later. In: Mémoires pour servir etc. p.144-150

Captain De Brack (lancers of the guard) even claims the advance of his unit caused both cavalry corps to follow. In: La cavalerie de la garde à Waterloo p.365

The same kind of claim is done by chef d'escadron Rigau (2nd regiment of dragoons, division Lhéritier). In: Souvenirs des guerres de l'Empire p.110

Napoleon also erroneously states, as there was no synchronicity in time here: "Quand le général Milhaud s'engagea sur le plateau, Napoleon était occupé à repousser Bülow don't la mitraille arrivait déjà sur la chaussée de La Belle Alliance." In: Notes sur l'art de la guerre, Correspn. Vol.XXXI p.398

Gamot states that after the closing in to his left, Reille had left a gap between his corps and that of d'Erlon, which Ney wanted to close by using cavalry, as infantry was refused by the emperor. He speaks of the possibility that the enemy might exploit this gap, which is highly unlikely. Further, it would not have to mean that the cavalry had to be used offensively right away. In: Réfutation etc. p.37, 40

² Napoleon states it was some 60 minutes. In: Mémoires pour servir, p.150,187

Elsewhere he states: "La charge de la cavalerie, à quatre heures du soir, a été faite un peu trop tôt." In: Notes sur l'art de la guerre. Corresp. Vol.XXXI p.393 Cf. Houssaye, H. -1815. Waterloo p.367

Jérôme Bonaparte says it was 45 minutes. Cf. his letter dated 15th July 1815. In: Coppens, Gourgaud merely states it was premature, without specifying for how long. In: La campagne de 1815 p.82

The fact that it was premature is confirmed by Rogniat. In: Considérations sur l'art de la guerre p.235

³ For instance, Milhaud claims his men kept 40 allied guns for some time and sabred their crews. Cf. his report dated 1815. In: Stouff, L. - Essai sur le général Delort p.131
Guyot, in his turn, mentions 20 guns “sans chevaux ni avant-trains.” Cf. his Voyages. In: Carnets de campagne p.293

It is also Baudus who states that the horsemen could not take the 60 guns which came in French hands as the allied limbers were to the rear. In: Etudes sur Napoleon p.226

According to Fletcher each horsemen carried a box of headless nails to spike guns. In: A desperate business p.142

Glover points to the fact that cavalry did not routinely carry spikes, and this is most probably the most probable explanation. In: Waterloo, myth and reality p.148

⁴ Some claim that the French took six colours, but this is not corroborated by allied accounts. Cf. Mémoires pour servir etc. p.152

Official French bulletin. In: Bas, F.de & T'Serclaes de Wommerson – La campagne de 1815 Vol.III p.553

General Milhaud in his report dated 1815. In: Stouff, L. – Essai sur le lieutenant général baron Delort p.132

Captain Klein de Kleinenberg of the *chasseurs à cheval* (1781-1856) of the imperial guard would have taken a colour from a battalion of KGL infantry. As this was not the one taken from the 5th battalion of line infantry KGL, it remains a mystery which colour this could have been. Cf. his file in SHAT, Registre des officiers du 5e hussards nr.2 Yb 2429

Another claims is done by Delort for a colour taken from a British battalion by *maréchal de logis* Aubert of the 10th regiment of cuirassiers. In: Stouff, L. – Essai sur le lieutenant général baron Delort p.154

Juzancourt states it was a *maréchal de logis* named Gauthier. In: Historique du 10e régiment de cuirassiers p.88

⁵ The picture of all four corps eventually charging all at the same time, therefore, is completely incorrect. Cf. Houssaye, H. – 1815. Waterloo p.382

Based upon the strengths of the different units, this leads to the dimensions of their various charges.

Taking into account any casualties suffered before and the absence of service squadrons, totals might have been the following:

Corps Kellerman: 3250 men / 24 squadrons

Corps Milhaud: 3000 men / 25 squadrons

Corps Lefebvre Desnouettes: 1600 men / 8 squadrons

Corps Guyot: 1200 men / 6 squadrons

Total: 9000 men / 63 squadrons

These charged on an overall front of the enemy of about 800 metres, i.e. between the road connecting the Ohain-road and the Brussels-road on the one hand, and the start of the hollow Ohain-road north of La Haye Sainte on the other.

Front-extensions of regiments in column, per squadron at quarter distance, for cuirassiers varied between 60 and 100 metres, while those of the cavalry guard varied between 100 and 125 metres. Taking one third of the front as the interval between two regiments, it would mean that the total front of a brigade of cuirassiers varied between 149 and 230 metres while that of both cavalry corps was around 250 metres each.

⁶ Cf. Observations etc. In: SHAT, Mémoires et reconnaissances, no.719

⁷ Cf. Sir H.Vivian. In: Reply to major Gawler In: USJ, II p.312

⁸ Cf. Observations etc. In: SHAT, Mémoires et reconnaissances, no.719

⁹ Cf. Guyot himself in his letter dated 4th of July 1820 to Drouot. In: Général comte Guyot. Carnets de la campagne (1792-1815) p.384

In a publication called “Victoires, conquêtes, désastres, revers et Guerres civiles des Français de 1792 à 1815, 1821) : it is stated: “Il n’est point vrai que ce général [Guyot] ait engagé sa division sans ordres ainsi qu’il est rapporté dans les Mémoires sur la campagne de 1815, attribués à Napoleon. Nous tenons du general Guyot lui-même, que, depuis trois heures après midi, il avait été mis par Napoleon à la disposition du prince de la Moskowa, chargé, comme nous l’avons dit, de la grande attaque du centre.” Citation in: Général comte Guyot. Carnets de la campagne (1792-1815) p.368

¹⁰ In: Mémoires pour servir etc. p.151

¹¹ Cf. his letters to the Moniteur and A.Thiers, dated 9th April 1857 and 27th August 1862. In: The first Napoleon p.318-320

¹² Napoleon states: “les grenadiers à cheval et les dragons de la garde, que commandait le general Guyot, s’engagèrent sans ordre. [...] L’usage constant, dans toutes les batailles, était que la division des grenadiers et dragons de la garde ne perdit pas de vue l’empereur, et ne chargeât qu’en vertu d’un ordre donné verbalement par ce prince au général qui la commandait.” In: Mémoires pour servir etc. p.187-188

And in the journal of Gourgaud, Napoleon is cited on the 13th June 1816, the 28th of December 1816 and the 20th of March 1817 that an officer had given orders to Guyot to advance on his behalf, which was *not* the case. In: Général comte Guyot. Carnets de la campagne (1792-1815) p.354, 355

The fact that Guyot was committed by Ney [upon the instigation of Napoleon] is confirmed by Guyot himself in several accounts. In: In: Général comte Guyot. Carnets de la campagne (1792-1815) p.384, 393, 396

¹³ Contrary some French claims, there are no indications that any allied square was broken. Cf. Milhaud who writes that his corps broke 5 or 6 squares. Cf. his report dated 1815. In: Stoff, L. - Essai sur le général Delort p.131

¹⁴ Cf. Fletcher, I. – A desperate business p.140

Captain Von Scriba also points to the soft soil, the low speed, the fatigue of the horsemen and the well-formed squares as making charges basically useless. In: Das Leichte etc. p.92

Wellington puts it thus: “I had the infantry for some time in squares, and we had the French cavalry walking about us for some time as if they had been our own. I never saw the British infantry behave so well.” Cf. his letter lord Beresford dated 2nd of July 1815. In: WSD< Vol.XII p.529

¹⁵ Muir, R. - Tactics and the experience of battle in the age of Napoleon p.130,134

¹⁶ Cf. Nafziger, G. – Imperial bayonets p.200

¹⁷ The presence of the French cavalry here in some cases resulted in casualties caused by friendly fire.

Cf. Kellermann. Cf. Observations etc. In: SHAT, Mémoires et reconnaissances, no.719
Captain De Brack. In: In: La cavalerie de la garde à Waterloo p.366

¹⁸ The strength of this combined mass of infantry is very hard to determine as casualties on the 16th of June and earlier on the 18th are mere guesses. It might be that Bachelu counted still some 2500, Jamin 1600 and Pégot 1500 men (5600 men in total).

Wellington himself similarly describes the summary of the action that afternoon thus: “The French cavalry were on the plateau in the centre between the two high roads for nearly three quarters of an hour, riding about among our squares of infantry, all firing having ceased on both sides. I moved our squares forward to the guns; and our cavalry, which had been detached by Lord Uxbridge to the flanks, was brought back to the centre. The French cavalry were then driven off. After that circumstance, repeated attacks were made along the whole front of the centre of the position by cavalry and infantry till seven at night. How many I cannot tell. In: The dispatches etc. Vol.XII p.610

¹⁹ Muir, R – Tactics and the experience of battle in the age of Napoleon p.131

²⁰ Guyot cautiously states: “Peut-être eût-il fallu nous faire suivre par de l’artillerie et de l’infanterie.” Cf. his “Voyages.” In: Carnets de campagne p.293

Milhaud goes a step further by stating that the support he got from a few battalions of the line and of the guard were too late and unstructured. In: Stouff, L. – Essai etc. p.132

Both Shaw Kennedy and Kellermann regard the lack of support as an error of surpassing magnitude.

General Kellerman. Cf. Observations. In: SHAT, Mémoires et reconnaissances, nr.719
J.Shaw Kennedy. In: Notes on the battle of Waterloo p.165

²¹ French artillery did not inflict insuperable damage to the buildings of the farm; walls were damaged but not breached (as has been claimed by major Evans), while roofs were not completely destroyed.

Cf. Major Evans. In: NLS, Add.ms.46.9.19

Cf. Plate K. In: Mudford, W. – An historical account etc.

²² According to Shaw Kennedy, proposals of the high command of the 3rd division to reinforce the farm were rejected by central headquarters. In: Notes on the battle of Waterloo p.175

²³ Cf. Mastnak, J. & M.A.Tänzer - Diese denckwürdige und mörderische Schlacht. Die Hannoveraner bei Waterloo p.52

²⁴ 2nd light battalion KGL: 240 men (60%)

2 companies of 1st light battalion KGL: 90 men (100%)

1 light company of the 5th line battalion KGL: 80 men (100%)

Total: some 400 men out of 800. The Nassau forces carried French muskets.

Mastnak, J. & M.A.Tänzer erroneously take the Nassau forces in as rifle-armed, thereby coming to a higher percentage of them (about 570 out of 780, i.e. 71%). In: Diese denckwürdige und mörderische Schlacht. Die Hannoveraner bei Waterloo p.51

²⁵ Adkin, M. – The Waterloo companion p.416

²⁶ Cf. Shaw Kennedy, J. – Notes on the battle of Waterloo p.123-124
Adkin, M. – The Waterloo companion p.416