

The second French attack upon Wellington's centre.

The second attack on the farm of La Haye Sainte and the second advance of the 1st corps.

As a first preparation of the second grand French offensive, it was around 3.30 p.m. that Ney launched a second assault upon the farm of La Haye Sainte in the same way as he had done in the first attempt: the brigade of Quiot advanced in two columns of which one approached the farm over the *chaussée* while the other did so through the adjoining fields.¹ Both columns advanced swiftly and almost completely surrounded the farm.² As a consequence, the detachment at the abatis was pulled back into the farm and the main gate was closed.³ The French furiously assaulted the large gate here, but this was all in vain. On the west-side, they concentrated their efforts again on the gate of the large barn, and even though the gate here itself was actually absent, the Hanoverians succeeded in repelling the French. The fire at the outer walls was also well kept up by changing positions. Despite all this, the French also fired through the loopholes and tried to take the rifles from the occupants. At the same time, they would have suffered from rockets, as fired by Whinyates unit, which stood at the Ohain-road.⁴ At some point of time, it may have been by 4.15 p.m., as their fellow horsemen came back from the main position, the French infantry gave up their attempt to take the farm.⁵ Despite the intensity of the action, casualties amongst the garrison were lower as in the first French struggle for the farm.⁶

During the attack, the garrison was getting short of ammunition. It was therefore that major Baring sent an officer to the rear to ask for it.⁷ It was not long after this second attack, however, that Baring was sent the light company of the 5th battalion of KGL infantry of the line (brigade of Von Ompteda) as a reinforcement in stead of the required ammunition. During its advance towards the farm it had lost its commander, captain Von Wurmb (he was hit by a bullet in his head) as well as 14 men.⁸ Baring posted the company on the courtyard of the farm.⁹

Milhaud's and Lefebvres Desnouettes' charges.

As the French infantry encircled the farm of La Haye Sainte and as skirmishers of the 1st corps were vigorously pushing back their counterparts in Wellington's centre from their positions, Ney decided to engage a brigade of Milhaud's 4th corps to the immediate west of the farm, just like as he had done about one hour earlier. He did this in the supposition that this action was a prelude to the grand attack to be carried out by the 6th corps, the reserve cavalry and the imperial guard. By that time, it was about 3.45 p.m. Ney addressed himself to general Farine (division Delort, corps Milhaud) directly with the request to advance, which he did. Delort, however, saw what happened and halted the movement pointing out to Farine that he could only accept orders from his immediate superior, Milhaud.

In the meantime, around 4 p.m., Ney had been informed that strong Prussian forces were massing in the Bois de Paris. As Lobau had received similar information jus before, it led him to prepare his departure for another position on the French right flank, according to the scheme set out for this scenario. By the time Ney learned about the Prussian threat which was now

imminent, he was also informed that Wellington was making a backward movement with forces which had until then been visible between the highroads on or just in rear of the crest of the ridge.¹⁰

Being deprived on the one hand of the 6th corps for the second offensive as it had been planned, Ney now on the other hand saw a chance to stay in the offensive and even to break Wellington's line by engaging more cavalry at the point where he already had started doing so.

Having grown impatient why Farine's cuirassiers hadn't moved off, Ney now joined Farine and Delort and now not only repeated his orders for Farine, but at the same time ordered the rest of the entire corps (six regiments) to advance, plus those of Lefebvre Desnouettes. Delort yet tried to point out to Ney the danger of attacking an unmolested position, but Ney rejected this objection and put the whole in motion, saying "*En avant. Il s'agit du salut de la France !*"¹¹

Both the corps of Milhaud and Lefebvre Desnouettes – from their positions immediately in rear of Lobau and the intermediate ridge - crossed the Brussels road. Having done so, they formed themselves in the low ground of the farm La Haye Sainte and beyond, the cuirassiers in front and the light cavalry of the imperial guard in their left rear.¹² As they had formed for their charge, Ney ordered the cavalry to the front. By that time it was about 4 p.m.¹³

Whether Milhaud charged with more than one brigade right away is unclear, but at any case he charged per brigade *en echelon* and in these with the regiments in column, per squadron at quarter distance, with the regiments in a line or echelon of columns.¹⁴ The lancers and *chasseurs à cheval* most probably charged in the same formation as the cuirassiers of Milhaud, the *chasseurs à cheval* to the right and the blue and red lancers to their left.¹⁵



The slopes and the crest of the allied ridge west of the Brussels road.

The area where the French cavalry advanced, between both *chaussées*, was covered with crops such as wheat, oats and rye.¹⁶ It was no exception of course that also here the state of the ground was boggy, in the lower grounds in particular. Furthermore, the horsemen were to ascend a ridge on which they could only distinguish the enemy skirmishers and guns. All in all, the state of the ground did not allow the horsemen to develop a canter, let alone a “*galop de charge*” but merely a trot.¹⁷ As the cavalry advanced it kept to its left, thereby crossing the ground diagonally, avoiding the hollow road north of the farm of La Haye Sainte. In this way, it aimed at Wellington’s front-sector between Gomont and the point where the hollow road emerges on the ridge, covering an extent of some 800 metres.

As the French horsemen climbed the slopes of the ridge, they received some fire from the farm of La Haye Sainte and then touched upon Wellington’s first line which was composed of light infantry.¹⁸ This type of infantry had been ordered to advance as far as possible and take up positions at large intervals so as to be able to avoid the French fire as much as possible. It was instructed at the approach of the French cavalry not to attempt to take up a formation or to resist, but to fall back on the nearest squares of infantry, regardless their identity. As soon as the enemy cavalry was chased away, the men of the light infantry were supposed to take up their former position.¹⁹ As the French had driven back the enemys light infantry, they now approached the enemy’s guns while crying *Vive l'Empereur!*²⁰

The confrontation of the French cavalry with the allied artillery.

While the infantry and cavalry of Wellington’s army was posted on the nothern slope and in rear of the ridge of Mont Saint Jean, its artillery was placed upon the crest of the same ridge.²¹

These batteries, like those which had some time before been confronted with a major French attack, had got the explicit instruction not to fire on the French batteries, but solely on the infantry and cavalry when they were within range. They also had to be prudent with their ammunition.²²

As long the French cavalry was still distant from the line of guns, they unleashed a fire which consisted of round shot. Yet, as the range decreased the gun-crews switched to the more lethal type of ammunition such as canister and grape.²³

However, artillery-units could not normally defend themselves without support as the gunners lacked the cohesion of troops who fought in close order. Gunners were also no supposed to engage in hand-to-hand fighting except in extraordinary circumstances. A few minutes of fighting could do great damage to a battery and the leave the survivors shaken and nervous for the remainder of the battle.²⁴ Therefore, as the French cavalry were at very close range to the guns and charged home, the gun-teams were supposed to leave their guns and seek for safety either under the bayonets of the first ranks of the nearest square, amongst its ranks or within the square.²⁵ And this is what they did.²⁶ In case the crews were too late to fall back in time or they simply did not do so, they were to shelter under their guns and hope for the best, fending off the enemy with their knapsacks and / or pistols in case they would slash down on them.²⁷

In this way, the French horsemen swarmed around the guns and these were therefore in their possession as long as the charge would last.²⁸ During that time, the horsemen would have been able to disable the guns by ramming down headless nails into the vent of the barrel, but not a

single gun appears to have been spiked.

The confrontation of the French cavalry with the allied infantry.

As the commanders of the allied infantry battalions between the high roads had seen the French cavalry forming for the charge, they formed their units in the most efficient formation to drive these horsemen back again: squares.

As most brigades had placed their battalions in two lines, these formed squares in this way, thereby creating a chequered formation which allowed them mutual cover.²⁹ In this way, the first line of squares stood about 40 metres in rear of the artillery, on the reverse slope just below the crest of the ridge.³⁰ The second line stood about 80 metres in its rear.

Of Von Ompteda's brigade the 1st battalion of light infantry stood in the hollow road; the 5th and (severely mauled) 8th battalion of the line KGL were in rear of the Ohain-road to the right and to the left respectively, sometimes in square and in line, depending on the circumstances.³¹

The battalions of the brigade Kielmansegge were in the positions as they had before; those of Verden and Bremen here formed one square, while the other square –further to the rear - was formed by the battalions of Grubenhagen and York.³²

Of the brigade of Von Kruse, the 1st battalion Nassau stood in square in a position to the right of the one of Kielmansegge and the 2nd and 3rd battalion in squares in second line.³³

The positions of the battalions of the brigade Colin Halkett had not changed: those of the 73rd and 30th regiment were in one square; those of the 33rd and 69th regiment were in one square as well, in second line.³⁴

To the right of the squares of the brigade of Colin Halkett stood those of the brigade of Maitland, in two lines, the 3rd battalion of the 1st regiment Foot Guards to the left in the first line, the 2nd battalion of the 1st regiment of Foot Guards in the second line to the right.³⁵

All companies of Byng's brigade had by now been involved at Gomont except for those guarding the colours of the Coldstream Guards (the 7th and 8th company). These now stood isolated immediately to the left of the bifurcation of the Ohain-road and the roads which leads from there towards La Belle Alliance. As the French cavalry was seen preparing, they were now moved to safety. In their march they reached after two or three halts a position in a low ground in rear of a height about 350 metres south of Merbraine and about the same distance west of the Nivelles-road.³⁶ Further to the right of the first line of the Foot Guards stood five Brunswick battalions, having the 23rd British regiment in their rear.³⁷ After the departure of the majority of Byng's brigade towards Gomont, these five Brunswick battalions had been drawn into the first line and initially placed there in closed columns. By then it was about 2 p.m. They were the 2nd and 3rd battalions of light infantry and the 1st, 2nd and 3rd battalions of line infantry.³⁸

The short distance the cavalry had to cross between the allied guns and the allied squares didn't allow it to develop a proper speed, like a gallop or a *carrière*.³⁹ Therefore, a serious shock-action, a dash, on any square was virtually impossible.⁴⁰

The power of the square against cavalry lay in two elements: its solidity and its capacity to hold its fire until the very last moment. In the second element, it was also by far more efficient to fire upon the horses as upon their riders as these obviously formed easier targets and bringing them

down would easily disrupt the progress of the second line of cavalry.

While in square the infantry was always to fire by rank or by file. Fire by file commenced from the right with the target at a maximum of 150 paces. Each file fired with increasing rapidity as the cavalry closed. Fire by ranks was only executed at 100 paces or less. Ranks fired sequentially, as one rank fired the other two held their fire. The fire would then be rotated from rank to rank, so that as one rank fired, one loaded and the other held its loaded weapon ready. This form of fire was the most effective against cavalry.⁴¹

The British squares in particular kept their coolness until the very last moment, thereby being able to hold their fire until the French horsemen were at about 20 to 40 metres from the square.

⁴² Right at that moment the frontside of the square was ordered to fire a volley on the approaching cavalry, after which the leading French ranks wheeled to their left and right, thereby having the men to their rear follow in their wake.⁴³ In this way, the French horsemen passed the sides of the squares of which they then also received the fire.

In the situation of the combined square of the battalions of Bremen and Verden (brigade Kielmanssegge) in particular it becomes apparent how important it was for the squares to hold their fire up to the last moment. The officers in this particular square also did everything they could as to prevent an earlier, incomplete and irregular fire. The commander of the square, lieutenant colonel Von Langrehr, even threatened possible transgressors to be shot. It was also here that the French cavalry advanced in a trot, halted at about 70 to 80 paces from the square, probably to provoke a volley. This also took place in front of the other square of the brigade.

In stead of a very fast charge on the square, the French cavalry charged in a trot on the left hand corner of the square and then to ride round its rear. In this situation the cavalry got the fire from three sides of the square, often from a very close range (sometimes six paces). Many soldiers, however, fired too high and hit the men in stead of the horses.⁴⁴

At some point of time, this was different with the 3rd battalion of the 1st Foot Guards: this unit was able to break the impact of a charge by firing low on the horses.⁴⁵

In this way, it meant that the French cavalry didn't actually attempt to penetrate right into the very heart of the squares, the more as the horses simply could not be tempted to jump into the bayonets of the outer ranks of the squares.⁴⁶

The confrontation of the French cavalry with the allied cavalry.

About 120 to 150 metres in rear of the second line of squares stood formations of allied cavalry.

⁴⁷ They were not only meant to give physical and mental support by their mere presence to their fellow infantry in front of them, but also to intervene at the opportune moment. This was normally right after the French cavalry units had undergone the fire of the squares and had got mixed up by the confusion. In most cases, they therefore met no strong resistance and were able to drive the French back from between the squares and further back over the plateau into the low ground by merely an orderly advance up the slopes of the ridge. This scenario occurred with various allied cavalry regiments over and over again.⁴⁸

That afternoon, the 1st regiment of light dragoons for instance advanced against the French cavalry nine times; in these confrontations it came six times to an actual action, while in three occasions the enemy simply moved off without getting into an engagement.⁴⁹

For its first charge there was a lack of space to deploy and therefore the regiment charged in a column of wheeled squadrons. The French cuirassiers were thrown back, but during the pursuit a part of the light dragoons tried to reach the second line of the enemy. However, colonel Von Dörnberg, who led the charge, succeeded in recollecting the regiment. A French reserve which came up was beaten as well, and then Von Dörnberg led the regiment back to its former position.

Shortly after however, the French cuirassiers came again and the charge was repeated: initially the cuirassiers kept their ground but were forced to retire as soon as the light dragoons tried to turn them. While the cuirassiers were pursued, colonel Von Dörnberg and lieutenant colonel Von Bülow fell wounded. Major Von Reitzenstein now took the command and he led the regiment into another successful charge.

During the pursuit however, major Von Reitzenstein had seen that a squadron of French *chasseurs à cheval* threatened the regiment in its flank and back.

Major Von Reitzenstein had seen the danger, but there was no more time to collect the regiment and now he turned part of the regiment which was led by captain Von Hattorf to the left, advanced and drove them back. The remainder of the 1st regiment of light dragoons and the other French cavalry clashed with such force that both sides – at least for some part – rode through each other. In this, several German officers got wounded. All in all, the German light dragoons were forced to fall back.⁵⁰ The remaining light dragoons were formed in two squadrons by major Reitzenstein.⁵¹ These two squadrons still charged twice.⁵²

Not all allied cavalry units were successful for the full hundred percent in their counteractions.

Around 5 p.m. it was against three squadrons of cuirassiers that Trip advanced with his 1st regiment in a trot, but as this speed was too high in relation to the distance of the French horsemen, Trip had his men slow down and the French come towards him. Awaiting the right moment Trip then launched a charge and in this Trip succeeded in throwing back the French right wing, but as the 1st regiment did not outflank the French horsemen, the French left only fell back some time later.

Yet, not long after, the French made a counter-attack, which was supported by five to six squadrons *chasseurs à cheval*. As he collected his 1st regiment, Trip succeeded to drive the French back again with his 2nd and 3rd regiment, though at least a part of the brigade (probably part of the 1st regiment) came back in confusion and had to be collected further to the rear. After this confrontation, Trip took his former position and from then on he kept his brigade more or less in a stationary position in support of the first line.⁵³

The 3rd regiment of hussars (the sole regiment of the brigade of Von Arentschildt) had not for too long been in its position in rear of the squares –while having its three squadrons in a line – as that it was faced with the confused retreat of Trip's brigade which had been in front of it, and which now came back from its charge on the French cavalry. The carabineers approached the middle and right squadron of the hussars and they, in their turn, were almost run over. It was right at that moment that captain Von Kerksenbruch interfered: he successfully charged the pursuing cavalry with his left squadron (consisting of three companies), drove them back and pursued them.⁵⁴

Yet, even before the left squadron had returned to its former position, Lord Uxbridge had already committed the other two against a regiment of cuirassiers, one of dragoons and some

lancers further to the right.

The charge wasn't pushed through right away, however. This may have been caused by the absence of captain Von Kerksenbruch, or due to the French superiority.

Yet, after Lord Uxbridge had addressed himself briefly to both squadrons, both charged the French. The result was that the right squadron of the regiment clashed upon the right squadron of the French dragoons and the left one upon a body of cuirassiers. On both these points, the French was broken, but at the same time the French wings encircled the German hussars, sabred and pursued them. Soon after, however, the squares of the brigade of Kielmansegge were able to drive them off with a strong volley of musketry fire. By now, the remains – 60 files - of the 3rd regiment of hussars were assembled in rear of the squares.⁵⁵

It was between 4 and 5 p.m. and near the position of the brigade of Grant that, somehow, 100 cuirassiers had gone through to the Nivelles road and who now attempted to get away over this road.⁵⁶ Under which circumstances these cuirassiers could have come that far is unclear as accounts are contradictory. Some say the men had been taken prisoner by British cavalry but managed to escape (⁵⁷), while others believe the men tried to fall back over the Nivelles-road after their action upon the allied squares.⁵⁸

Eventually, the cuirassiers got back over the main road back towards the French position, pursued by some allied horsemen.⁵⁹ In this, they passed the bushes on the higher ground to the right of the Nivelles-road, where they received a volley of the men of the 51st regiment led by lieutenant Kennedy.⁶⁰

It was near the lane of Gomont that the French horsemen dashed into the abatis on the road and where a detachment of the 51st regiment, led by captain Ross, was posted. It was their fire which now completely dispersed the French.⁶¹ It was also this fire which prevented the squadron of the 15th of hussars (which had its position here as well) to charge.⁶²

The allied cavalry brigade commanders were instructed by Lord Uxbridge not to engage into a pursuit beyond the allied position. Yet, at some point of time, the 13th regiment of light dragoons and the 15th regiment of hussars - in line - drove a mixed body of French cavalry back as far as beyond the north-east corner of Gomont. This French cavalry, in its turn, went back towards its reserves, which resulted in the withdrawal of the Allied cavalry here.⁶³ In this action, lieutenant colonel Dalrymple lost a leg.⁶⁴

The temptation of a headlong pursuit was also given in by units of Von Dörnberg's cavalry.

Between 4 and 5 p.m. the brigade (23rd regiment and 1st regiment of light dragoons) was confronted with a regiment of cuirassiers which advanced in between the squares in a trot.

Lieutenant general Von Dörnberg kept both his regiment in columns and awaited the right moment to charge. In this charge the 23rd regiment of light dragoons would throw itself upon the French left wing, while the 1st regiment of light dragoons would do so on their right. The three rearward squadrons would, after having beaten the French, halt and deploy, while the first squadrons would pursue the French.

The charge succeeded, but – incited by their success and despite the explicit orders of Lord Uxbridge and lieutenant general Von Dörnberg – the rearward squadrons joined in with the pursuit as far as the French artillery which stood on the other side of the low ground (about 500

metres south of the Ohain-road) and which they brought in a state of confusion; here French cavalry units which were in reserve pushed them back.

These reserves, in their turn, pursued the light dragoons in a trot so that enough time was left to recollect and drive them back again. Major Lautour of the 23rd regiment of light dragoons – he had succeeded lieutenant colonel Cutcliffe as commander of the regiment as Cutcliffe had got severely wounded during the last charge – formed the regiment again and had it advance to a position in rear of the square of the 33rd-69th regiment.

The brigade had just restored its order, or a new regiment of cuirassiers was approaching. Both regiments of light dragoons, led by Lord Uxbridge, again advanced in line and in a gallop upon the ridge where the cuirassiers waited for them, their swords lifted straight up. Against this wall of iron, the light dragoons had very few chance of succes and now lieutenant general Von Dörnberg tried to lead his men along their right, but this didn't have the required result. Finally, the cuirassiers went back. In this action, Von Dörnberg himself got severely wounded by a stab in the lung. From then on , both regiments were kept near the squares upon the plateau. ⁶⁵

After each charge, the allied cavalry retook its former positions in rear of the squares. ⁶⁶ In some cases, in returning towards its own positions, the French cavalry underwent again fire of the squares and as gun-crews had taken up their positions again at their guns, they re-opened their fire upon the retreating French. ⁶⁷ Soon after, the French artillery resumed its fire as well. ⁶⁸

By 4.15 p.m., Milhaud and Lefebvre Desnouettes' corps renewed their charges. Despite this renewal, it was to little avail. Basically, the scenario of the charges was reiterated the same way as they had taken place in the previous ones and did not yield the success it was supposed to have. Of both cavalry corps, as various sub-units charged in one sector, others re-formed at the same time further to the rear in the other to recover from their previous attacks. ⁶⁹ There was a significant difference, however. Numerous French units no longer fell back as far as the low ground of La Haye Sainte and Gomont or beyond, but were mustered *en bataille* upon the very crest of the ridge of Mont Saint Jean or just slightly below it. In this way, the French horsemen were for the most part within eye-contact but out of firing-range of the allied squares. ⁷⁰

Wellington's countermeasures.

During the second French offensive, very large swarms of enemy skirmishers started creeping up the slopes of the ridge along the eastern perimetre of Gomont. ⁷¹ It led Wellington to consolidate his sector between Gomont and the Ohain-road. It was now running to 5 p.m.

Of the 2nd British division, the brigades of Adam and Duplat were now brought forward in succession in two lines for mutal cover and to close the gap between the north-east corner of Gomont and the Ohain-road. ⁷²

Immediately after his advance to the ridge, major general Adam was ordered by Wellington himself to form his brigade in a line, four files deep, to drive away the French skirmishers who

advanced from Gomont and who hindered the gun-crews.

Adam complied with this order and led his men forward through the smoke which was very thick; the 52nd regiment advanced to the right-rear as there was not enough space for the whole brigade to advance.⁷³ The brigade succeeded in driving away the French and took up a position in an oblique line between the extreme north-east corner of Gomont and the squares of Maitland, in front of the Ohain-road.⁷⁴

The 2nd battalion 95th regiment took up a position at the extreme left flank of the four-deep line, then in in battalion column of companies at quarter distance [⁷⁵] and then in square near the ridge on a height. In doing so, however, it was bothered by French skirmishers and as the battalion itself was too weak to miss any of its members, a detachment of the left square of the 52nd regiment came to its assistance, and drove them away.

The 71st regiment, having the 3rd battalion of the 95th regiment to its right [⁷⁶], advanced to the right in a four-deep line to take up a position near the extreme north-east corner of the complex of Gomont. Right at that moment in its front was a line of French infantry and both British battalions formed a line under a heavy French musketry fire and drove the French back. In doing so, a company led by captain Eeles got forward too far out in front and was threatened by a mass of French cavalry. The company then fell back in rear of the 71st regiment which had, meanwhile, formed square.⁷⁷

It was at this moment that the 52nd regiment took up a position between the 2nd battalion / 95th regiment on one side and the 71st regiment and the 3rd battalion / 95th regiment on the other, as the interval between these units was considerable. It did so from two columns in two squares, east of the sand-track which leads to La Belle Alliance, a bit more towards the 2nd battalion of the 95th regiment as towards the 71st regiment.⁷⁸ The right square was led by Sir J.Colborne, the left by captain Chalmers. It was in this position that the 52nd and the 71st regiment suffered considerably under the French gunfire, the first one as it stood higher and the other one as it stood a bit more to the front.⁷⁹

By 4 p.m. Duplat's brigade still stood in its position near the Nivelles-road, with the battalions from east to west, as follows: 2nd, 4th, 3rd and 1st battalion of the line KGL.

The moment Duplat was ordered to advance he had his brigade leave from the left to the south, towards Gomont. Whether the battalions first formed squares and then left or whether they did so during their advance is not clear, but it is a fact that they eventually were formed in squares.⁸⁰ In this march the 2nd battalion led, followed by the 4th, the 3rd and the 1st battalion.

At 5 p.m. Duplat's brigade also advanced towards the ridge; in this it approached some French cavalry which threatened to charge her, but refrained from doing so because of the steadiness in which the units marched up. The 2nd KGL battalion of the line then advanced towards French skirmishers which were holding some guns on the ridge; its crew sought refuge to the KGL battalion.⁸¹ The whole brigade then wheeled in such a way that the 2nd battalion formed the right wing near the three trees on the ridge [⁸²] - that is, it wheeled its front to the left and then halted. After a fire-fight and a bayonet-action, the Hanoverians succeeded in driving the French away and to occupy the ridge again.

As the 2nd battalion advanced towards Gomont, the other battalions of the brigade initially kept their positions on the ridge. It was here that the 1st battalion was faced with a French infantry attack at close range and which was supported by some cavalry. The battalion, however,

managed to repel the French into the orchard and the sunken road of the complex of Gomont.⁸³ The French cavalry (lancers and dragoons) then charged the battalion -which had formed square- twice, but in vain. The battalion now came under a continuous and strong French skirmishing fire which was unleashed from the enclosures of Gomont and suffered both in men and officers and caused it to join the 3rd battalion; both battalions now formed one oblong.⁸⁴

Meanwhile, the 2nd battalion had taken up a position immediately north of the sunken road and the orchard of Gomont, having the 4th battalion to the left, at the bottom of the slope. The 1st and the 3rd battalion were further left, towards the track which leads to La Belle Alliance. In this way the battalions formed a line of three squares north of Gomont and which, with the units of Adam's brigade, closed off the gap between Gomont and the Ohain-road.⁸⁵

The 2nd battalion now got seriously mauled by the French rattling skirmishing fire from the orchard of Gomont. General Clinton then ordered its commander, major Reb, to penetrate into this orchard and to drive the French away.⁸⁶ The other squares of both other battalions were now charged by French cuirassiers, lancers and dragoons.⁸⁷

Initially, the brigade of Hew Halkett stood in four closed columns directly south of Merbraine, but it must not have been long after 4 p.m. (⁸⁸) that it advanced to a position behind the continuation of the Ohain-road west of the Nivelles-road, so north of this road, which is hollow here. The brigade formed here a closed brigade-square but wasn't attacked by the French cavalry. One hour later, however, the square fell apart in two parts. At that moment the battalions Salzgitter (to the right) and Osnabrück (to the left) advanced; they crossed the hollow road and the Nivelles-road plus the ridge in square and chose a position under strong French fire on the slope, north of Gomont, in rear of the squares of Duplat. Here both battalions kept their positions during the grand cavalry-charges. Brigade general Halkett himself was near the Osnabrück battalion.⁸⁹

Both other battalions of the brigade, those of Bremervörde (to the right) and Quackenbrück (to the left) initially also advanced some distance, both then were recalled to their former positions at the Nivelles-road, where they probably came in column. Both battalions were here under the command of lieutenant colonel Von der Schulenburg. It was only in the evening that these battalions advanced.⁹⁰

All units of Mitchell's brigade were by 4 p.m. still in their positions which they had the moment the battle started. The only exception was the main body of the 23rd regiment, which, probably not long before 4 p.m., advanced in square to a position in front of the Ohain-road, near the Brunswick squares.⁹¹

Meanwhile, the large square of Chassé's division east of Braine l'Alleud (consisting of the 35th battalion of chasseurs, the 2nd battalion of the line and the 4th and 19th battalion of national militia) had suffered quite considerably from French gunfire.⁹² Some time later (it was running towards 5 p.m.) general Chassé was ordered by Lord Hill to post the division at the Nivelles-road. General Chassé now had both brigades advance towards the Nivelles-road.⁹³

Here the one of Detmers came to the north of this road *en bataille* and north of the road which connects the Ohain-road with Merbraine. The sequence of the battalions from right to left would have been the 35th battalion of chasseurs, 2nd battalion of the line, 4th battalion of the line, 6th

battalion of national militia, 17th battalion of national militia and the 19th battalion of national militia.⁹⁴

The one of d'Aubremé, while shouting loudly, advanced in columns from Merbraine and took up a position to the right of the one of Detmers, and to the right of the same road, in two columns each of three battalions, in divisions.⁹⁵ By the time the division reached the road it was 5 p.m.⁹⁶

It was during this march to this position and in this position itself that the division suffered under French gunfire.

One of the losses was lieutenant colonel l'Honneux of the 3rd battalion of the line: he got wounded. For a proper idea of the positions of the artillery, real evidence is lacking.⁹⁷

Half a battery of horse artillery would have been with both brigades from the moment that these were collected out of Braine l'Alleud , after 12 a.m.⁹⁸

The proximity of the French cavalry in front of the brigades of Maitland, Colin Halkett and Kielmansegge led the commanders of these allied squares to move them forward to drive the French back into the low ground.⁹⁹ For instance, after it had been repelled three times, French cavalry confronted the square of the Bremen / Verden battalions (led by major Von Schkopp) from closeby. It caused the prince of Orange to order major Von Schkopp to advance through the thick smoke up to the slope of the ridge. He did so on the orders and accompanied by the prince of Orange for a distance of maximum 90 metres.

As the French cavalry had now fallen back, the battalion came under a heavy canister-fire; it caused it to fall back in good order to its original position. Right at the same time the Nassau units wavered. Not long after, major Von Schkopp got wounded as well and then captain Von Bothmer took over the square. Captain Von Brandemer was assigned the command over the Verden fieldbattalion.¹⁰⁰

The French cavalry in front of the Foot Guards would not have gone back further as 100 to 150 metres.¹⁰¹ It must also have been here that the squares advanced to successfully repel the French cavalry.¹⁰² The squares of Colin Halkett also advanced beyond the Ohain-road.¹⁰³

At least those of the 30th and 73rd regiment did so once as to take some guns which had advanced with the French cavalry and which inflicted them heavy casualties; the attempt failed however and right after that, when the squares fell back to their original positions, French cavalry charged them.¹⁰⁴

Because of their proximity to the allied squares, it was also in this situation that French cavalry in some cases suffered from friendly fire which was unleashed from further to its rear.¹⁰⁵

It was not only in infantry that activities took place in this sector of Wellington's position.

Both batteries of Ramsay and Bull had gone back at 2 p.m. to the second line to recover as they had sustained losses and had already then spent a lot of ammunition.¹⁰⁶ The very first French cavalry charge took place right at the moment that they advanced back again to the front line. This caused them to come into action in the second line, between the Brunswick squares. It was also just around then - 4 p.m. – that captain Norman Ramsay was mortally hit in the heart by a musket-ball.¹⁰⁷ A second attempt to advance was prevented by a French charge, but the moment the French had to fall back to their reserves, both batteries pursued them; after that they

took up positions almost 200 metres in front of their former positions, south of the Ohain-road. In this situation, they were then in support of the squares of Adam and Duplat.

Here, the batteries came in action again but were hindered in their activity by the enfilading fire of the horse artillery of the cavalry of Piré, some 1000 metres away, near the Nivelles-road. Not long after, however, captain Bull had his section of two guns led by lieutenant Louis silence these guns.¹⁰⁸

The smoke coming from the artillery and Gomont (which was in flames), plus the low ground they were in, gave the French cuirassiers the chance to fall upon the batteries of Sandham and Kühlmann by surprise. As a result these were badly mauled and both batteries fell back to the Nivelles-road and from there to Mont Saint Jean. In this retreat Sandham fell back further as Kühlmann did. In this backward movement both batteries were re-arranged; Kühlmann received ammunition of Sandham as this last battery had not been firing that much as Kühlmann had in the action of Quatre Bras. By the time, however, that both batteries got back to the frontline on orders of lieutenant colonel Von Hartmann, the battle had been decided.¹⁰⁹

The batteries of Bolton and Sympher (of the 2nd division Clinton) moved to the front to fill up the gap left by those of Sandham and Kühlmann.¹¹⁰

Initially, the Brunswick foot battery came in position near the Brunswick infantry and threw back some French cavalry which was hovering around an allied battery with hits fire. After that, the foot battery advanced to the crest of the ridge where a mass of cuirassiers approached. Here, it gave off some canister fire but the crew was forced to go back and all guns, except one, were taken by the French, despite the intervention of some British cavalry. Later, as the French fell back, the guns were retaken.¹¹¹

It may have been towards 5 p.m. that another artillery unit was led to the front line in front of the Brunswick squares. Here, it relieved the artillery of the 1st British division which had gone to the rear. It was the horse-artillery unit led by captain Mercer.

The moment the grand French cavalry-charges started, Mercer's unit was west of the Nivelles-road and north-east of the wood which lies between Merbraine and Gomont, with the front in a southwestern direction, parallel to the Nivelles-road. At a short distance in its rear were the men of the 14th regiment in square, lying on the ground. After the battle had started captain Mercer had prepared his unit to the right of the orchard of the farm of Mont Saint Jean. Here, in the early afternoon, he got the order through lieutenant Bell to move his battery to the position described above. Mercer had the instruction not to fire, and to observe the French lancers of Piré who were hovering around the Nivelles-road. Mercer was only allowed to fire as soon as the French would cross the low ground in their front.¹¹² It was towards 5 p.m. that lieutenant colonel Sir Augustus Frazer, commander of the Royal Horse Artillery, came to captain Mercer in great haste with the order to go to the front line. Immediately, Mercer broke up his unit and went off to the ridge in full gallop in a columns of sub-divisions to the left. As he was underway with his unit, Frazer pointed out to Mercer that he might be charged by the French cavalry upon his arrival; if this charge would be pushed through, Mercer had to fall back with his crew upon the squares. Mercer got on the ridge and took up a position in front of two Brunswick squares in rear of a 50 centimetre high bank along the top of which ran the Ohain-road. Mercer was able to place his guns swiftly and they immediately came in action against French *grenadiers à cheval* and cuirassiers.¹¹³

The third attack on the farm of La Haye Sainte.

It was during the grand cavalry-charges (perhaps about 4.45 p.m.) that French infantry – probably Quiot’s brigade – was hurled against the farm of La Haye Sainte in a third attempt to take it. They did so the way they had done before, i.e. in two columns of attack.¹¹⁴

Even though the reinforcements Baring had received were most welcome, they couldn’t relieve the shortage of ammunition and that was the reason Baring made an urgent request for it again. But yet again, in stead, he was reinforced with new troops again. This time they were two companies flankers of the 1st regiment of Nassau (brigade Von Kruse), who were armed with French muskets.¹¹⁵ While they advanced to the farm the commander of the company of the 2nd battalion, captain Von Weitershausen, was killed.¹¹⁶ They apparently supported the garrison within the farm, so therefore entered it through the dwelling-house during the attack.

Meanwhile, large swarms of the 1st corps were still operating against Wellington’s centre near the sand-pit and here they were supported by a few squadrons of cuirassiers. These made several attempts to dislodge Lambert’s brigade by passing and returning between its squares of the 40th, 27th and 4th regiments, but these stood firm and the cuirassiers suffered serious casualties.¹¹⁷

It was in this phase of the actions around La Haye Sainte that the French put their weight of the action upon the west gate of the large barn. It was also this barn which they were now able to set fire into. How they managed to do so remains unclear. Luckily for the defenders, most of the straw had been taken from the barn the night before.¹¹⁸

By chance, the Nassau troops had large kettles which they filled with water from the farm’s pool in the courtyard. Even though they suffered serious losses, they were eventually able to extinguish the fire.¹¹⁹

Meanwhile, the musketry fire at the east wall of the farm was maintained by its defenders as well as possible, as they plundered the cartridge-pouches of their dead and wounded comrades. It was here that a private called Lindau distinguished himself, despite a wound on the back of his head.¹²⁰

Despite its shortage of ammunition, the garrison was eventually able to prevent the French from seizing the farm and - once again – they gave up the attempt again.¹²¹ By now, it may have been 5.15 p.m.

The corps of Kellerman and Guyot are committed into the battle.

In Napoleon’s original set-up of the French offensive against Wellington, a Prussian intervention was obviously not taken into account. Now, as the Prussians had actually intervened and were developing their forces on the right flank of the French army, the situation had become totally different as long as the cavalry was unsuccessful.

It now became vital for the cavalry to keep stationary close to Wellington’s line so as to prevent him from advancing in case the Prussians would press home their offensive. In this way, the cavalry was basically hijacked on the ridge.¹²² The only way to break the stalemate was to break Wellington’s line by engaging more and fresh forces. As Lobau was no longer available, it led Napoleon and – with him Ney - now to commit Kellermann’s corps into the action

instead. By now it was running towards 5 p.m.

Earlier that afternoon these corps had been pulled further to the front, not far behind the infantry formations of Bachelu and Foy which were to the immediate east of Gomont. As he had received his orders, Kellermann launched his corps – except for the carabiniers of Blancard – brigadewise in the same way and formation as Milhaud had done, with his division of l'Héritier to the right and the one of Roussel d'Hurbal to the left.¹²³

It was most probably around the same time that parts of Lefebvre Desnouettes's corps renewed their charges as far as they were able to; the lancers and *chasseurs à cheval* most probably charged in the same formation as the cuirassiers, but more probably per squadron, the *chasseurs à cheval* to the right and to their left the blue and red lancers.¹²⁴ As before, it meant that the allied forces were confronted with the charges of various units of cuirassiers, sometimes in combination with lancers and / or dragoons. As those before, they charged and reformed on smaller sectors to charge more often, so that never all forces were engaged at the same time.¹²⁵

Essentially, the involvement of another large of heavy cavalry did not make a difference though. The horsemen, numerous as they were, were unable to break any square.

Not long after he had engaged Kellermann, it now led Ney to use the last reserve of cavalry of the army at Waterloo, the heavy cavalry of the guard, led by general Guyot.¹²⁶ Guyot most probably followed to the left of Kellermann's original track with his *grenadiers à cheval* to the left and his dragoons to the right.¹²⁷ About the approach of the cuirassiers and *grenadiers à cheval* captain Mercer writes:" In spite of our fire the column of cavalry continued advancing at a trot until seperated from us by scarcely more than the breadth of the little road, but at the very moment when we expected to be overwhelmed, those of the leading squadrons suddenly turning, and endeavouring to make way to the rear, confusion took place, and the whole broke into a disorderly crowd. The scene that ensued is scarcely to be described. Several minutes elapsed ere they succeeded in quitting the plateau, during which our fire was incessant, and the consequent carnage frightful, for each gun (9 pounders) was loaded with a round and case shot; all of which, from the shortness of the distance, size of the object, and elevation of the ground on which they stood, took effect.

Many, instead of seeking safety in retreat, wisely dashed through the intervals between our guns, and made their way as we had seen others do; but the greater part, rendered desperate at finding themselves held, as it were, in front of the battery, actually fought their way through their own ranks, and in the struggle we saw blows exchanged on all sides. At last the wreck of this formidable column gained protection under the slope of the hill, leaving the plateau encumbered with their killed and wounded, and we then ceased firing, that our men, who were much fatigued with their exertions, might rest themselves and be fresh against the next attack, which we saw preparing; for they had not retired so far down the hill but that the tall caps of the grenadiers of the leading squadrons were visible above the brow. [...] I think three times (of this I am uncertain) these attacks were renewed, always with less prospect of success because our position became more and more inaccessible after every attack. "¹²⁸

Despite the scale and grandeur of the French cavalry charges which had taken place until now, these had so far been unable to create any serious gap or breach in any allied square. In time, it became increasingly difficult for the French officers to exercise control and to coordinate

attacks. Regiments quickly became split up as a squadron swung left round a square, while those that followed might have halted or gone right. Meanwhile, more squadrons came over the ridge behind and got entangled with those in front. What added to the confusion was the overpowering noise, the smoke and the casualties.¹²⁹

In their despair, some lancers even threw their lances, while other horsemen rode out from their ranks and fired their pistols and carbines, or were simply hacking away with their swords whenever they closed in – this was done at extreme peril to the rider who risked being either shot or spitted upon the bayonets of the infantry.¹³⁰

Captain Gronow (2nd battalion 1st Foot Guards) writes about the French courage: “Our men had orders not to fire unless they could do so on a near mass; the object being to economise our ammunition, and not to waste it on scattered soldiers. The result was that when the cavalry had discharged their carbines, and were still far off, we occasionally stood face to face, looking at each other inactively, not knowing what the next move might be. The lancers were particularly troublesome and approached us with the utmost daring. [...] On one occasion, two gallant French officers forced their way into a gap momentarily created by the discharge of artillery: one was killed by Staples, the other by Adair. Nothing could be more gallant than the behaviour of those veterans, many of whom had distinguished themselves on half of the battle-fields of Europe. In the midst of our terrible fire, their officers were seen as if on parade, keeping order in their ranks, an encouraging them. Unable to renew the charge, but unwilling to retreat, they brandished their swords with loud cries of *Vive l'empereur !* and allowed themselves to be mowed down by hundreds rather than yield. Our men, who shot them down, could not help admiring the gallant bearing and heroic resignation of their enemies.”¹³¹

Just as the French imperial horse guards came within 10 yards of the 2nd battalion 95th regiment, they found they could do no good with it; they fired with their carbines and came to the right about directly. The battalion kept up a constant fire as the heavy cavalry of the guard retreated, but often it came to the right about and fire. Some time later the French guards charged again, but with the same lack of success.¹³²

The slippery ground not only slowed down the advance of the horsemen uphill and towards the squares, but in some cases even made them stop out of their firing range, stand still and to go no further.¹³³

The chequered line of squares allowed them to give each other mutual support. For instance, as French cuirassiers charged once or twice the Brunwickers further to the left, these also passed the 14th regiment at about 50 metres in its rear. The moment the French horsemen returned they got the fire from two sides of the square of the 14th regiment, plus the fire of a British artillery-unit of which the crew had got into safety in the same square. After that, the cuirassiers got back in confusion to the position where they came from.¹³⁴

The Brunswick squares also were successful in throwing back the French cavalry: especially the 2nd and 3rd battalion of light infantry as well as the 3rd battalion of line infantry distinguished themselves.¹³⁵

During the second half of the cavalry-charges the square of the 3rd battalion 1st Foot Guards got under serious fire of French sharpshooters which had crept up the slopes of of the ridge. The result was that it deployed in a line of four files deep, advanced and drove them away.

The battalion then resumed a position to the left of the 2nd battalion of the 95th regiment

(brigade Adam), which stood here south of the Ohain-road. Here the battalions formed a square again and it was from this position that it repelled the last or one of the last charges from the French on this part of the front. The French cavalry here was focused upon the 52nd regiment (brigade Adam) further to the right and it rode along its front to turn it to its right.

However, by the destructive combined fire of the 3rd battalion 1st Foot Guards and the 52nd regiment the French didn't make a chance. Not long after, the Guards battalion returned to its original position, in square.¹³⁶ The French would have fired their carbines from a short distance but this would not have had any serious effect.¹³⁷ The square then didn't fire, but kept its fire until the French were very close; then as to break the impact of the charge, the square fired low, on the horses.¹³⁸

Against Adam's brigade the French cavalry often collected on the ridge in rear of its battalions and then to charge its squares from their rear.

In front, most charges came from the low ground near the farm of La Haye Sainte.¹³⁹ The square of the 71st regiment, however, was also charged by cuirassiers which advanced along the eastern edge of Gomont. The 71st yet did not yield an inch and did not suffer much.¹⁴⁰

To the rear, the square of the 71st was reinforced by one company of the two companies of the 3rd battalion of the 95th regiment (led by captain Eeles). This company here gave the battalion a tremendous fire power which was well-timed and therefore very successful. The other company of the battalion, under the command of captain Fullerton, acted at that moment with one of the squares of the 52nd regiment.¹⁴¹

The allied squares and cavalry versus French artillery.

As long as they were able to maintain their solidity in the various charges they underwent, numerous squares only gained in confidence.¹⁴² Yet, in their solidity against cavalry, squares were at the same time easy targets for enemy gunfire and none of all them seems to have been an exception to this rule. In this vulnerability, the actual cavalry-charges were a kind of relief as then the French gunfire was intermitted.¹⁴³

Had the allied front-line been bombarded by the French artillery from afar, now units of French artillery of both the cavalry and the 2nd infantry corps had been dragged to positions on the extensions of the ridge of Mont saint Jean from where they could unleash a galling fire of grape-shot and round-shot upon the squares at close range (i.e. about 100 metres).¹⁴⁴

Both squares of Kielmansegges brigade didn't escape the French gunfire and it was from this fire that the right leg of lieutenant colonel Von Langrehr was shattered. Major Von Schkopp succeeded him and captain Von Bremen succeeded Von Schkopp as commander of the Verden fieldbattalion. Major Müller succeeded Von Langrehr as commander of the battalion Bremen. Later, major Müller was wounded by gunfire as well and then it was captain Von Scriba who took over the command of the Bremen fieldbattalion.¹⁴⁵

Of Adam's brigade, the 2nd battalion of the 95th regiment had to sustain five charges of cuirassiers and lancers. It had no serious problems repelling those, but mainly the left side of the square suffered considerably from 18 French guns which had been placed at a barely 100 metres distance.¹⁴⁶ By 4 p.m., the commander of the battalion, lieutenant colonel Norcott, had got wounded and major Miller took over the command; as he got hit half an hour later, captain

Logan did so.¹⁴⁷ Around the same time the commander of the other battalion of the 95th regiment, the 3rd, lieutenant colonel Ross, got wounded. He was replaced by major Fullerton, who got wounded one hour later.¹⁴⁸ He was succeeded by by captain Eeles.

It was also no exception that the squares of the 52nd regiment were hit by French gunfire. Yet, many balls got stuck in the mud and comparing to other battalions, the 52nd got out relatively unscathed. As the squares of the 2nd battalion of the 95th regiment and the 71st regiment were in a prominent position in the front, these suffered the most from the French gunfire and the charges of French cuirassiers.¹⁴⁹

Near the 52nd, it was at least also the 3rd battalion KGL line infantry which had several French guns in its front, with heavy cavalry in their rear.¹⁵⁰

Of the three Nassau battalions of Von Kruse's brigade, the 1st, which stood in the first line, suffered in particular from the canister fire which was unleashed from a battery which had advanced with the cavalry at close range. As if this was not enough, the battalion also got faced with a sudden cavalry charge of cuirassiers which succeeded in destroying half a company and in doing so, to take 22 prisoners.¹⁵¹ However, thanks to the extreme exertions of the officers, the battalion held firm.¹⁵²

During the grand cavalry-charges, both KGL line battalions of the brigade of Von Ompteda (5th and 8th) sometimes stood in square and then in line again, depending on the circumstances.¹⁵³

Both these units had very little to do with the French cavalry and this all had to do with their position: the French cavalry avoided the road here as much as it could. The result was the both battalions suffered most when they were yet in square and when the French artillery and infantry opened its fire. Sometimes both battalions deployed into line due to the presence of French infantry in front of them and which hovered around the farm of La Haye Sainte.¹⁵⁴

Basically, virtually the complete frontline of Alten's division and of the brigades of Adam and Duplat was opposed to French guns at a short distance of about 100 metres, while Piré's horse artillery enfiladed the line in the area rear of these brigades as far as the division of Chassé, posted in rear of the Nivelles-road.¹⁵⁵

At the same time, batteries of the grand battery were still pounding Wellington's centre as they had before.¹⁵⁶ Of Mitchell's brigade, the 14th and the 51st regiment didn't act in the frontline and their combat mostly consisted of the constant skirmishing between their front companies and the cavalry of Piré. Despite the fact that both regiments also suffered from French gunfire, they both kept their positions along the hollow road which connects Gomont to Braine l'Alleud, following the eb and flows of the battle.¹⁵⁷

At the same time, the allied cavalry was also highly exposed to French gunfire. In some cases they could not move an inch because they were supposed to be stationary in rear of the infantry so as to bolster its morale, while in some other cases they could move about more or less to avoid it. In some cases the men had laid down beside their horses. It was most trying, as the only thing could do for the men was to stand passively to be cannonaded, having nothing else to do. And the longer it took, it could frighten and disturb soldiers, wear down their courage, sap their morale and disrupt the cohesion of the units.¹⁵⁸

The remains of both brigades of British heavy cavalry were no exception to this vulnerability. Initially, they stood to the immediate right of the Brussels road, the Household brigade in front

and the Union brigade to its rear. From there, Somerset advanced once against the cuirassiers who were pressing too boldly, but before they touched, the French fell back.¹⁵⁹

It was not before long that both British brigades were pulled to their right, in support of the first line. In this new position the Union brigade stood to the left front of the Household brigade. Here it stood in rear of the interval between Von Ompteda's and Kielmansegge's brigade, the Scots Greys to the left and in front, the Inniskillings in the middle and the Royals to the right, en echelon.

The regiments of the Household brigade (the 2nd Life Guards to the left) stood in line in rear of Von Kruse, the cavalry of Trip and the 3rd hussars KGL.¹⁶⁰

It was from these positions that Somerset advanced again with the remains of his brigade against a body of French infantry, but his horsemen were too weak to break it. In fact, his already depleted ranks suffered considerably from its fire.¹⁶¹

Ponsonby's men kept stationary and made a few advances to check the enemy cavalry, who didn't push through theirs either; the result was that they did not come to any physical contact during the remainder of the day.¹⁶²

As the British heavy cavalry already had suffered extensively during the first French offensive, the Cumberland hussars were pulled to the same sector (in rear of Von Ompteda's brigade) by lord Uxbridge to fill a gap between two of these battalions.¹⁶³ From here, the regiment was supposed to charge the French cavalry after it had charged the allied squares.¹⁶⁴ In this episode, the hussars were also suffering from French gunfire. Initially, after consulting both Alten and Von Ompteda, their commander, colonel Von Hacke had pulled his men slightly to the rear, after consulting both Alten and Von Ompteda.

After a while the French fire, however, got to such a degree that Von Hacke instructed his regiment to pull back to the rear, towards the Brussels road. By then it was about 5 p.m.

From then on, despite the exertions of several members of high command, he continued his retreat as far as the gates of Brussels.¹⁶⁵

Some distance further to the right, both commanders of the 1st and 3rd regiment of carabiniers, lieutenant colonels Coenegracht and Lechleitner, got mortally wounded by French gunfire; both men died in Brussels on the 20th of June. Coenegracht was succeeded by captain Heshusius.¹⁶⁶

Major general De Ghigny's brigade, ordered by the prince of Orange, made a successful advance against some French cuirassiers: as the brigade reached the crest of the ridge, the French horsemen pulled back to induce them into a charge. In the encounter, the regimental commander, lieutenant colonel Renno was wounded and he was succeeded by major Von Staedel.¹⁶⁷

Having its light dragoons in the first and the hussars in the second line, the brigade from then on manoeuvred slightly to maintain its position under the dominant French fire in such a way to support the infantry in its front. In some cases, as the French cavalry seemed to penetrate through the squares, it made advances which made them refrain from doing so.

In the process, its casualties in officers were considerable: captain Van Pallandt tot Eerde and lieutenant Daey were killed, captain baron Kraijenhoff and lieutenant Muysers were severely wounded, while lieutenant Van Zuilekom was mortally wounded.¹⁶⁸

It had been earlier that afternoon that colonel Van Merlen had got mortally wounded by gunfire. After that, Boreel, his successor, was instructed by Collaert to stay where he was but he

informed him some time later that the fire of the French grand battery made this virtually impossible. Collaert then instructed him to join the heavy cavalry brigade of the Netherlands at the other side of the road. By the time Boreel moved off, however, this brigade had pulled away from the Brussels road further to its right and now Boreel – also because of the thick smoke – lost it. At the same time, the brigade fell apart in its two regiments, as the new commander of the 5th regiment of light dragoons, major De Looz de Corswarem, did not follow Boreel with the hussars unconditionally as he refused to serve under him. The fate of the 5th regiment of light dragoons remains unknown; probably it kept its position in rear of Lambert's and Kempt's brigades.

The hussars took some position in rear of the first line, but where is unknown as well. Here it suffered casualties from French gunfire, such as captain Van Heiden and 1st lieutenant Verhellow. From there, it would have advanced several times against French cavalry. In one of them, the rearward squadron, led by captain Umbgrove, wheeled in such a way that it fell upon the cuirassiers flank and rear, a manoeuvre Boreel was highly displeased with. It resulted in the retreat of the French horsemen though.¹⁶⁹ The single platoon of the 4th regiment of light dragoons (led by 1st lieutenant De Belelfroid) and had been temporarily attached to the hussars of Van Merlen's brigade, now returned to its own brigade, the one of De Ghigny.¹⁷⁰

Although they were successful in their counter-charges against the French cavalry, regiments like the 7th and the 15th hussars, as well as the 13th light dragoons were equally exposed to enemy gunfire and suffered accordingly.¹⁷¹

The allied squares versus French skirmishers.

The second largest nuisance to squares - apart from artillery fire - was fire from skirmishers. From their way of acting, as single individuals against the packed masses of the squares, skirmishers could take their aim at leisure while not having the direct risk of being hit themselves. In that way, they were able without too much risk to get really close to the squares. French skirmishers were predominantly engaged in very large numbers to the immediate east of Gomont until close to the crest of the ridge, in front of the squares of Adam, Duplat and the Brunswick battalions.

As has been shown before, after advancing to the ridge, major general Adam was ordered by Wellington himself to form his brigade in a line, four files deep, to drive away the French skirmishers who advanced from Gomont and who hindered the gun-crews.¹⁷²

Here, too, the 23rd regiment was east of the Nivelles-road in square and near to the Brunswickers. When at 5 p.m. Adam's brigade crossed through the fields here in order to take up a position south of the Ohain-road, the 23rd regiment advanced in square at the same time to the left rear of the 71st regiment and then pushed back the French cavalry in this more forward position.¹⁷³ However, it was in this position that the 23rd regiment suffered from French gunfire and the French skirmishing-fire from Gomont; for this reason it fell back in square to its original position in rear of the ridge.¹⁷⁴

At some point of time, colonel Von Olfermann was ordered by Wellington to move three squares of Brunswick infantry over the crest of the ridge. Von Olfermann then led the squares of the 2nd and the 3rd battalion of light infantry plus the one of the 2nd battalion of line infantry

over the crest to a position to the left rear of the squares of Duplat. But they had barely passed the crest, when they got under a heavy canister and musketry-fire and lost many men. Von Olfermann immediately decided to lead the battalions back to their original positions on the inner side of the slope from where they further succeeded in repelling the French cavalry.¹⁷⁵

After all this, other attempts were done to have the squares advance but all these failed. It was in rear of the ridge that they held their positions, despite the strong French pressure.¹⁷⁶ It was in this period of the battle that colonel Von Olfermann got severely wounded at the right hand; he was succeeded by lieutenant colonel Von Heinemann.¹⁷⁷

It was without exception that also all squares of Duplat's brigade suffered from the French skirmishing fire which came from Gomont and to its east. It was also here that colonel Duplat was mortally hit; after him lieutenant colonel Von Wissell (commander of the 3rd battalion of line KGL) took over the command. Major Luttermann succeeded in taking over the role of Von Wissell.¹⁷⁸

At about the same time major Robertson of the 1st battalion of the line KGL was killed; he was succeeded by captain F.Goeben.¹⁷⁹ Of the brigade, the four light companies were merged into one which acted in extended order near Gomont against the French infantry.¹⁸⁰ The commander of these troops, captain Heise, also got wounded and he was succeeded by captain Beyerman of the 2nd battalion of the line KGL.¹⁸¹ In connection to the 2nd battalion of line infantry of Duplat, they were also involved in clearing the orchard of Gomont of skirmishers to their right and met with determined resistance but threw the French back.¹⁸²

It was also because of the heavy French skirmisher fire that the square of the 3rd battalion KGL line infantry made numerous moves to the rear and sides.¹⁸³

During this second half of the cavalry-charges the square of the 3rd battalion 1st Foot Guards got under serious fire of French sharpshooters which had crept up the slopes of the ridge. The result was that it deployed in a line of four files deep, advanced and drove them away.¹⁸⁴

The battalion then resumed a position to the left of the 2nd battalion of the 95th regiment (brigade Adam), which stood here south of the Ohain-road. Here the battalions formed a square again and it was from this position that it repelled the last or one of the last charges from the French on this part of the front. The French cavalry here was focused upon the 52nd regiment (brigade Adam) further to the right and it rode along its front to turn it to its right.

However, by the destructive combined fire of the 3rd battalion 1st Foot Guards and the 52nd regiment the French didn't make a chance. Not long after the Guards battalion returned to its original position, in square.¹⁸⁵ The French would have fired their carbines from a short distance but this would not have had any serious effect.¹⁸⁶ The square then didn't fire, but kept its fire until the French were very close; then as to break the impact of the charge, the square fired low, on the horses.¹⁸⁷

One of the batteries which was hindered by skirmishing-fire was the one of Petter-Gey. Even though it succeeded in keeping the French cavalry at bay by its fire and that it was able to assign its crew the best cover it could, the Netherlands horse battery suffered in train-horses in particular. As a result, not long after 7 p.m., the battery fell back along the Nivelles and Brussels road to a position near the mill of Mont Saint Jean to recover.¹⁸⁸

Losses in squares were not only caused by gunfire, skirmishing fire or actions from horsemen,

but also by men accompanying the wounded to the rear. As these men carried them as far back as beyond Mont saint Jean, most of these men returned late or only after the action was over.¹⁸⁹ In time, due to their losses, squares got smaller and could eventually - in the worst case - evolve into a kind of triangular or some irregularly formed unit. At Waterloo, this was for instance the case with the square of the Bremen / Verden battalions (brigade Kielmansegge). As long as they could keep their solidity this in itself was no problem.¹⁹⁰ Obviously, this in a high degree also had to do with the way they were controlled by their commanders who led their squares from within. It was also here that the colours, if any, were secured.

Though all squares were under enormous pressure, in some cases the extreme exertions of their officers played a model role in keeping them intact.¹⁹¹

Shortly before he witnessed the French cavalry coming up in such numbers, it was obvious for Wellington that he would seek refuge in the square of one of his elite units, that of the 2nd battalion of the 1st regiment of Foot Guards.¹⁹²

In time, the inside of the squares became places which presented shocking sights. As captain Gronow describes: "Inside we were nearly suffocated by the smoke and smell from burnt cartridges. It was impossible to move a yard without treading upon a wounded comrade, or upon the bodies of the dead; and the loud groans of the wounded and dying were most appalling. At four o'clock our square was a perfect hospital, being full of dead, dying and mutilated soldiers."¹⁹³

As the charges of Kellermann's and Guyot's units had failed in their confrontations with the allied forces of all arms, their units also fell back close in front of a main part of the allied frontline, just as Milhaud and Lefebvre Desnouettes had done some time before.¹⁹⁴

Eventually, within the time frame of about one hour, Kellermann had his cuirassiers overall charge two or three times, keeping the carabineers of Blancard in reserve. Blancard was explicitly instructed by Kellermann not to take any others as his.¹⁹⁵ Yet, however, probably around 5.45 p.m., also this last reserve was launched into action by Ney, without Kellermann's consent.¹⁹⁶

Blancard probably charged along the east side of the complex of Gomont, against Adam's and Duplat's squares.¹⁹⁷ The carabiniers charged the square of the 1st and 3rd battalion line infantry KGL. The French formed at about 150 to 200 paces of the square and then rode in a trot and then in a gallop towards the Hanoverians who gave their volley at 30 to 35 paces distance. This proved to be very effective: the French fled back into a field which was out of reach from the square.¹⁹⁸ The squares also had the support of the cavalry, Von Dörnberg's in particular.¹⁹⁹

Blancard's charge was not a success: within a short space of time, it lost half of its strength.²⁰⁰

Guyot's units shared the same fate in the three charges they performed in the same period of time. In his second charge, Guyot himself lost his horse, went back on foot and then received a few sabre-blows on his head and was taken prisoner, but right after he was rescued by the intervention of some of his *grenadiers à cheval*. In his third charge Guyot got a bullet in his chest and received a strong contusion in his left elbow, upon which he handed over the command of his corps to general Jamin.²⁰¹

It was finally around 6 p.m. that the charges petered out due to the casualties suffered by the

horsemen, their fatigue and the access to the enemy position which became more and more difficult due to the state of the ground and the numerous dead and wounded horses and men.
202

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1. Baring, G. Erzählung der Theilnahme etc. In: Hannoversches Militärisches Journal.1831 p.76

According to Baring there was a 30 minutes time-lapse between the first and second attack.

General Hanoverian report. In: NHA, Hann.41.XXI, nr.156 p.27-49

Major general Kempt confirms that a new attack was carried out shortly after the arrival of Lambert's brigade (which was between 3 and 3.15 p.m.). Cf. his report dated 19th of June 1815. In: WSD, Vol. X p.536

2. Baring, G. Erzählung der Theilnahme etc. In: Hannoversches Militärisches Journal.1831 p.76

Lieutenant colonel Busche confirms that in almost all its attacks, the enemy approached the farm from both sides. Cf. his report to the duke of Cambridge dated 23rd June 1815. In: NHA, Hann.38D, nr.200

³ Lindau, F. Ein Waterloo-Kämpfer p.132

⁴ Cf. Baring. In: BL, Add.ms.34.707 p.159-160

5. Cf. Baring, G. Erzählung der Theilnahme etc. In: Hannoversches Militärisches Journal. 1831 p.76

6. Baring, G. Erzählung der Theilnahme etc. In: Hannoversches Militärisches Journal.1831 p.76

Lindau, F. Ein Waterloo-Kämpfer p.132-134

General Hanoverian report. In: NHA, Hann.41.XXI, nr.156 p.27-49

⁷ Captain Ross-Lewin (32nd regiment) claims that the commander of the garrison at La Haye Sainte came to his unit asking in vain for ammunition, upon which he went further to the rear. This may have occurred, but the person involved certainly was not Baring himself. In: Ross-Lewin, H. With the thirty second etc. p.274-275

8. Cf. Ompteda, L.Fr. von - Ein Hannoversch-englischer Offizier vor hundert Jahren etc. p.285

Cf. Anonymous. Die Königlich Deutsche Legion und das Hannoversche Corps bei Waterloo p.25

Lieutenant colonel Von Linsingen (5th battalion of the line KGL). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.237-240

VPH, nr.19

Shaw Kennedy, J. – Notes etc. p.122

Cf. Von Brandis, captain (aide de camp of Von Ompteda) Von. In: Dehnel, H. Erinnerungen deutscher Officiere etc. p.289 and in BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.235-237

Hanoverian report. In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.289-302

9. Baring, G. Erzählung der Theilnahme etc. In: Hannoversches Militärisches Journal.1831 p.78

Baring, G. In: VPH, nr.30

General Hanoverian report. In: NHA, Hann.41.XXI, nr.156 p.27-49

Journal of the 5th battalion of the line KGL. In: NHA, Hann.38D nr.236 p.168-170

Two eye-witness situate the reinforcement too early in the action. Cf. Lieutenant colonel Von Linsingen (5th battalion of the line KGL). In: NHA, Hann.41.XXI, nr.152 p.59-62

Captain Von Brandis (same battalion). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.235-237

Baring gives conflicting versions of the reinforcement when it comes down to the time he received them. In his one account (VPH, nr.30) he states it came in during or right after the second French attack, while in his other he claims it occurred during the third one.

¹⁰ Cf. Official French bulletin. In: Bas, F.de & T'Serclaes de Wommersom – La campagne de 1815 Vol.III p.553

Colonel Heymès. In: Documents inédits p.16-17

Cf. Charras. Histoire de la campagne de 1815 p.303

There is no corroboration for this circumstance from Wellington's side though.

¹¹ Cf. General Delort. In: Waterloo. Relation inédite p.261

¹² Baring, G. Erzählung der Theilnahme etc. In: Hannoversches Militärisches Journal.1831 p.78
Brack, A.F.de - La cavalerie de la garde à Waterloo. In: Carnet de la Sabretache. (1901) p.361-363-365

At this stage, De Brack, as captain in the lancers of the imperial guard, already mentions the grenadiers and dragoons to the left of the light cavalry; all in echelon, the lancers to the right front.

Within Milhaud, in conformity with the order of battle of this corps, the sequence of the brigades might have been from left to right: Dubois –Travers (Wathier), Farine -Vial (Delort).

Another indication could be the fact that the colour of the 5th battalion of the line KGL was taken by a member of the 9th regiment of cuirassiers (division of Delort).

Major Edward Kelly (1st Life Guards), on the other hand, claims he killed the commander of the 1st regiment of cuirassiers (Dubois' brigade). Cf. his letter dated 6th July 1815. In: NAM, nr.2002-01-254

This colonel, though, Ordener, got wounded in the battle. It could also have been colonel Martin or Bigarne (6th and 9th regiment of cuirassiers respectively, both brigade of Vial) who got wounded.

Due to the getting wounded of either major general Travers or Dubois (its is unclear when they both got wounded during the battle), lieutenant general Wathier reorganised his forces. Now, the 1st and 7th regiments of cuirassiers were merged into a brigade led by colonel Ordener, former

commander of the 1st regiment of cuirassiers. The reason for him to do was the fact that Ordener had led the 7th in former campaigns. The 4th and 12th were merged into a second brigade. Cf. Ordener. In *Les deux Ordener* p.93

13. Cf. ensign Macready (30th regiment) in his diary. In: *History of the 30th regiment* p.342
General Milhaud times his first charge about one hour after the defeat of the 1st corps (which is in fact about 4 p.m.). Cf. his report. In: *Stouff, L. Essai etc.* p.131-132
Colonel Michel Ordener (1st regiment cuirassiers). In: *Lot, H. Les deux généraux Ordener* p.93
Adjutant Griffiths (15th regiment of hussars). Cf. his diary. In: *Regimental Museum XVth / XIXth The King's Royal Hussars, Newcastle upon Tyne*
Report of major general Von Dörnberg. In: *VPH, nr.27*
Captain Powell (1st Foot Guards). In: *BL, Add.ms.34.705* p.181-187
Shaw Kennedy, J. – Notes etc. p.114
Lieutenant Sandilands (battery Ramsay). Notes. In: *RAI, nr.MD 638*
In his report to his father dated 22nd of June 1815, the prince of Orange mentions a time of 3.30 p.m. In: *KHA, A.40 VI A.10*
Major Von Schnehen (3rd regiment of hussars) mentions a first counter-charge of his regiment at 3 or 4 p.m. In: *VPH, nr.59*
Also lord FitzRoy Somerset speaks of 3 or 4 p.m.. In: *NAM, Book of manuscript copies of Waterloo letters. Nr.6507-1*
General Foy believes it was 3 p.m. In: *Girod de l'Ain. Vie militaire etc.* p.281

14. Cf. Lord Uxbridge. “They were always in column.” In: *BL, Add.ms.34.706* p.185-192
Lieutenant O'Grady (7th regiment of hussars). In: *BL, Add.ms.34.705* p.73-75 “The French cavalry were in the first instance cuirassiers, and in squadron, but they soon became mixed with cavalry of all arms and acted in masses of more or less size.”
Captain Thackwell (15th regiment of hussars). In: *BL, Add.ms.34.704* p.67-70
Captain Sandham (battery Sandham). In: *BL, Add.ms.34705* p.273-276
Captain Petter (Battery Petter / Gey). In: *NL,-ZuRAZ, Van Löben Sels, 0302 nr.262*
Captain Mercer (battery Mercer). In: *BL, Add.ms.34.703* p.347-354
In his journal, Mercer speaks of “leading squadrons of the advancing column coming on at a brisk trot”, “compact squadrons, one behind the other, very numerous” and “there were lancers amongst them, hussars, and dragoons – it was a complete mêlée.” In: *Journal of the Waterloo campaign Vol.I* p.308, 313, 319
Captain Cleeves (battery Cleeves). In: *VPH, nr.63*
Journal of the 1st regiment of light dragoons KGL. In: *VPH nr.48*
Captain Weiz (1st battalion, 1st regiment Nassau infantry) mentions the advance of cuirassiers in three echelons on a small distance and having a front of two squadrons. In: *Unzer, A. Darstellung etc.* In: *Nassauische Heimatblätter, 1915* p.6
Captain (7th hussars) speaks about lancers advancing in three lines and in echelon. In: *BL, Add.ms.34.705* p.127-130

According to captain Von Scriba (battalion Bremen, brigade Kielmansegge) saw eight very wide platoons (about 700 men in total), following each other at quarter distance. In: Das Leichte etc. p.91

Shaw Kennedy, J. – Notes on the battle of Waterloo, p.116 He states the French cavalry charged in line of columns, keeping a reserve at hand.

Sergeant major Cotton (7th hussars) says there were cuirassiers, chasseurs à cheval and lancers advancing in three lines, en echelon. In: Une voix de Waterloo p.88

Milhaud himself states he charged per brigade. Cf. his report to Soult In: Notice sur les etc. p.380

Colonel Ordener (1st regiment of cuirassiers) states: “je mets sur le champ mon régiment au trot, en colonne, par escadron à grandes distances.” In: Lot, H. - Les deux généraux Ordener p.91

¹⁵ The fact that cuirassiers charged over virtually the whole extent of Wellington’s line between the high roads can be taken from:

Captain Von Scriba (battalion Bremen). In: VPH nr.41 and in: In: Das Leichte etc. p.91-98]

Lieutenant O’Grady (7th regiment of hussars). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.73-75

Captain Weiz (1st battalion, 1st regiment Nassau infantry) Cf. Account in: Unzer, A. Darstellung etc. In: Nassauische Heimatblätter, 1915 p.6

Captain Mercer (battery Mercer). In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.347-354 and in: Journal of the Waterloo campaign Vol.I p.308, 313, 319

Captain Sandham (battery Sandham). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.273-276

Journal of the 1st regiment of light dragoons KGL. In: VPH nr.48

Ensign Cappel (Leib battalion) Cf. his account in the NSA, nr.276 N15 former www.1815.ltd.uk

Ensign Gronow (1st Foot Guards). In: The reminiscences and recollections of captain Gronow p.71

Sergeant Langenstrassen (4th company of Brunswick hussars), in a letter dated 2nd August 1815. In: NSA 249 AN190

Ensign Kübel (3rd Brunswick line infantry battalion), in a letter dated 22nd June 1815. In: former www.1815.ltd.uk Original in NSA, nr.249 AN 190

Ensign R.Batty (1st Foot Guards). In a letter dated 23rd June 1815 p. 20-21 Private collection.

¹⁶ Cf. Lieutenant colonel Manners (10th regiment of hussars). In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.222

Lieutenant Sharpin (battery Bolton). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.19

Lieutenant Biddulph (Inniskillings). In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.328

Sir H.Vivian. In: BL, Add.ms.34.707 p.57

¹⁷ Captain Von Scriba (battalion Bremen). He also describes the direction of the French mass of cavalry initially as one which came upon the left side of the square, and then to split in two at its corner; later they fell upon the full flank and then to make the full turn around the square. In:

VPH nr.41

Lord Uxbridge. "They never charged at speed." In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.185-192

Colonel Ordener (1st regiment of cuirassiers) states: "je mets sur le champ mon régiment au trot, en colonne, par escadron à grandes distances." In: Lot, H. - Les deux généraux Ordener p.91

Ensign Gronow (1st Foot Guards) confirms that due to the heavy ground the cavalry advanced in a trot. In: The reminiscences and recollections of captain Gronow p.71

Captain Mercer also confirms the pace as being in a steady trot. In: Journal of the waterloo campaign Vol.I p.319

Captain De Brack (lancers of the imperial guard) saw the brigade of Blancard pass along the allied guns *au petit trot*. In: La cavalerie de la garde à Waterloo p.366

Cf. Lenient, E. – La solution des énigmes de Waterloo p.410

Adkin, M. – The Waterloo companion p.360

¹⁸ Baring, G. Erzählung der Theilnahme etc. In: Hannoversches Militärisches Journal.1831 p.78

19.Lieutenant Pratt (30th regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.88-94

Ensign Macready (30th regiment). In a letter dated 7th July 1815 In: NAM, nr. 8203/10

20. Ensign Gronow (1st Foot Guards). In: The reminiscences and recollections of captain Gronow p.70

²¹ Wellington himself. In: WSD Vol.XIV p.618-620

22. Wellington himself in a letter to the earl of Mulgrave, master of the ordnance, dated 21st December 1815. In: WSD Vol.XIV p.618-620

Captain Walcott (battery Webber Smith).In: BL, add.ms.34.704 p.184-185

Major Rudyard (battery Lloyd). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.167-170

Captain Mercer. In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.347-35 and in: Journal of the Waterloo campaign, Vol. I p.311-312

Captain Cleeves (battery Cleeves). In: VPH, nr.63

Report about the battery Sympher. In: VPH, nr19

Captain Kühlmann (battery Kühlmann). In: VPH, nr.62

23.Major Rudyard (battery Lloyd). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.167-170

Report on Sympher's battery. In: VPH, nr.19

²⁴ Muir, R. - Tactics and the experience of battle in the age of Napoleon p.38, 44

Sergeant Langenstrassen (4th company of Brunswick hussars) confirms he covered some cannon for some hours, during which time his unit occasionally had to change our position. Cf. his letter dated 2nd of August 1815. In: former www.1815.ltd.uk Original in: NSA 249 AN190

25. Major Rudyard (battery Lloyd). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.167-170
Captain Walcott (battery Webber Smith). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.184-185
Lieutenant Wilson (battery Sinclair). In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.281-282
Captain Mercer. In: Journal of the Waterloo campaign Vol.I p.310

26. Sir.A Frazer in a letter dated 19th June 1815. In: Sabine, E. (ed) - Letters of colonel Sir Augustus Frazer etc. p.114
General report of the brigade of Kielmanssegge. In: VPH,nr.21
Captain Scriba (fieldbattalion Bremen). In: VPH nr.41
Scriba, C.von - Das leichte Bataillon etc. p.94
Lieutenant Kuckuck (3rd battalion of line KGL). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.35-38
Lieutenant Pratt (30th regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.88-94

This was also the case with a British battery of horse artillery which was operating in the immediate vicinity of the 3rd battalion of line KGL line infantry (probably the one of Bull or Ramsay). As the crew had gone back into the square, it some time later drove the French cavalry away from the guns with a bayonet attack on its own initiative. Cf. Captain Aberdeman. In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.3-10

The instructions for the artillery not to enter into any duels and to fall back upon the squares in case of necessity were both transmitted by lieutenant Bloomfield. In: Duncan - History of the royal regiment of artillery p.453, 456

²⁷ Captain Von Scriba (Fieldbattalion Bremen). In: Das Leichte etc. p.94

Captain Mercer was one of the few commanders who had his men do this for fear that if his men would fall back upon, the Brunswick square in his rear might break. Cf. Mercer's letter dated 24th January 1866. In: RAI, nr.MD88

28. Captain Bowles (1st regiment of Foot Guards) in a latter dated 19th June 1815 to lord Fitzharris. In: A series of letters of the first earl of Malmesbury etc. Vol.II p.443
Lieutenant Wilson (battery Sinclair). In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.281-282
Captain Mercer. In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.347-354
Major Turner (13th regiment of light dragoons). In a letter dated 3rd July 1815. In: NAM, nr.7509/62

29. Cf. order of battle.

Baron Constant Rebecque. In: NA, 2.21.008.01 nr.25

Sergeant major Cotton (7th regiment of hussars). In: Une voix de Waterloo p.89

³⁰ Wellington himself. In: WSD Vol.XIV p.618-620

31. General Hanoverian report. In: NHA, Hann.41.XXI, nr.156 p.27-49
 Major Von Linsingen. In: NHA, Hann.41.XXI, nr.152 p.59-62
 The journal of the 5th battalion of the line KGL. In: NHA, Hann.38D. nr.236 p.168-170
 The journal of the 8th battalion of the line KGL. In: NHA, Hann.38D, nr.236 p.218-219
 Cf. Biedermann, E. lieutenant (2nd battalion light infantry KGL) - Von Malta bis Waterloo p.184
32. General Hanoverian report. In: NHA, Hann.41.XXI, nr.156 p.27-49
 General Hanoverian report. In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.289-302
 Lieutenant colonel Müller (battalion Bremen). In: NHA, Hann.41.XXI, nr.151 p.37-40
 Captain Von Scriba (fieldbattalion Bremen). In: NHA, Hann.41.XXI, nr.151 p.21-28
 Lieutenant Bülow of the battalion Bremen, in a letter dated 26 August 1815. In: Kannicht, J. - Und alles wegen Napoleon p.206
33. Cf. Account of captain F.Weiz. In: Unzer, A. Darstellung etc. In: Nassauische Heimatblätter, 1915 p.5
 Diary of the 1st regiment Nassau infantry. In: VPH, nr.71
 Lieutenant colonel Müller (fieldbattalion Bremen). In: NHA, Hann.41.XXI, nr.151 p.37-40
 Captain Von Scriba (fieldbattalion Bremen). In: NHA, Hann.41.XXI, nr.151 p.21-28
 Von Scriba clearly stated the Nassau men stood in closed columns all day long. Also see: Scriba, C.von Das leichte Bataillon etc. p.89
 Major Von Schnehen (3rd regiment hussars KGL). In: NHA, Hann.41.XXI, nr.152 p.7-10
 Major Von Goeben (3rd regiment hussars KGL). In: NHA, Hann.41.XXI, nr.152 p.11-15
34. Ensign Macready (30th regiment). In a letter dated 7th July 1815. In: NAM, nr.8203/10
 Captain Barlow (69th regiment) in a letter dated 7th of July 1815. In: NAM, 6507/1
 Major general Colin Halkett. In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.344-345
 Lieutenant colonel Elphinstone (33rd regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.278-281
 Major Kelly (73rd regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.345-347
 Captain Garland (73rd regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.1-2
 Ensign Macready adds that, previous to the cavalry-charges, the light troops of the 30th and the 73rd regiment skirmished with the French, until these were reinforced with and the French artillery started to fire with canister. The light company of the 30th regiment quickly lost officers, one of whom was major Vigoureux.
 Ensign Macready, then commander of the battalion, placed the remains of the company (about one third) on the rearside of the square. In his diary. In: History of the 30th regiment p.341
 The Bremen / Verden square was four files deep. Cf. Captain Von Scriba (Fieldbattalion Bremen). In:Das Leichte etc. p.91
35. Lieutenant colonel Saltoun. In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.431-434

Ensign Batty (1st Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.227-234

Major general Maitland in his report to George Regent [?], dated 19th of June 1815. In: Mentioned in despatches p.11

According to lieutenant colonel H.W.Rooke the squares were squares formed by half battalions. In a letter dated 19th June 1815 to his father. In: former www.1815.ltd.uk Original in: Gloucestershire Record Office, nr. D1833/Z5

36. Major general Byng. In a letter to the duke of York, dated 19th June 1815. In: www.1815.ltd.uk Original in: Regimental Headquarters Scots Guards

Ensign Short (Coldstream Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.15-18

Ensign Gouch (2nd battalion Coldstream Guards) situated them north of the crossing of the lane of Gomont and the Nivelles-road; probably this was one of the halts. In: BL, Add.ms.34.708 p.299-302

Lieutenant Walton (2nd battalion 3rd Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.36-39

Cf. MacKinnon. The origin and services of the Coldstream Guards Vol.II p.217

³⁷ In all, in the first line stood 13 battalions divided over 11 squares and in the second stood 8 battalions, divided over 6 squares.

There are no indications that the Brunswick squares stood in two lines. Cf. Plan of colonel Von Herzberg. In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.55

³⁸ Wachholtz, F.von - Cf. his report dated 16th September 1841. In: former www.1815.ltd.uk Original in: NSA, VI Hs.18 nr.8

Gunner Hellemann (Brunswick foot artillery). Cf. his letter dated 20th June 1815 In: NSA, 248 AN190

Ensign Kübel (1st company 3rd Brunswick line battalion). Cf. his letter dated 22nd June 1815. In: NSA, 249 AN 190

Ensign Lindwurm (2nd line battalion). Cf. his letter dated 23rd June 1815. In: NSA, 249 AN 190 Report of colonel Von Olfermann. In: VPH, nr.67

Ensign Gronow (1st Foot Guards). In: The reminiscences and recollections of captain Gronow p.71

Ensign St.John (2nd battalion, 1st Foot Guards). Cf. letter dated 22nd June 1815. In: former www.1815.ltd.uk Original in the Regimental Headquarters Grenadier Guards nr. H07/005

39. Ensign Gronow (1st Foot Guards). In: The reminiscences and recollections of captain Gronow p.71

⁴⁰ Captain Von Scriba (Fieldbattalion Bremen). In: Das Leichte etc. p.91

⁴¹ Nafziger, G. – Imperial bayonets p.49-50

42. Adkin, M. The Waterloo companion p.250

At a higher distance [40 to 60 metres] the damage done was unlikely to be sufficient to stop the charge and those muskets that had fired could not be reloaded in time. At a shorter distance [less than 10 metres] wounded horses might career into the square creating a gap that could be exploited. Cf. Adkin, M. The Waterloo companion p.250

Lieutenant general Alten to Wellington, dated 19th of June 1815. In: WSD, Vol.X, p.534-535

Ensign Macready in his diary. In: History of the 30th regiment p.341

Lieutenant colonel H.W.Rooke, attached to the Foot Guards, mentions a distance of about 45 metres. Cf. his letter to his father dated 19th June 1815. In: former www.1815.ltd.uk Original in: Gloucestershire Record Office, nr. D1833/Z5

Captain Weiz (1st battalion, 1st regiment Nassau) states that the British right next to his square (those of C.Halkett) fired at a distance of 60-80 paces [about 36-48 m] Cf. Account of captain F.Weiz. In: Unzer, A. Darstellung etc. In: Nassauische Heimatblätter, 1915 p.6

Lieutenant colonel Von Wissell speaks about about a distance less than 30 yards. Cf. his report dated 20th June 1815 to the duke of Cambridge. In: NHA NHA, Hann.38D nr.200 p.7-9

43. Note sur la charge de la division L'Héritier etc. In: SHAT, MR719

44. Lieutenant colonel Müller (fieldbattalion Bremen). In: VPH, nr.40

Captain Von Scriba (fieldbattalion Bremen). In: VPH, nr.41 and in: Das Leichte etc. p.91

45. Ensign Gronow (1st Foot Guards). In: The reminiscenses and recollections of captain Gronow p.72

Cf.Sergeant Ch.Wood (3rd battalion 1st Foot Guards). In: Some particulars of the battle of Waterloo in a letter from a serjeant [sic] of the Guards p.5. In a letter dated 29th July 1815 to J.B. at London

46. Colonel Reynell (71st regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.234-239

Captain Howard (30th regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.317-319

Ensign Swinburne (3rd battalion 1st Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.708 p.346-347

⁴⁷ Captain Von Scriba (Fieldbattalion Bremen) mentions a distance of about 500 paces [300 metres]. In: Das Leichte etc. p.94

⁴⁸ Muir, R. - Tactics and the experience of battle in the age of Napoleon p.113

Captain Thackwell in his diary. In: Wylly, H.C. The military memoirs of etc. p.71

⁴⁹ However, Von Nettelblatt distinguishes five charges. Cf. Nettelblatt, A.von - Die Althannoverschen Uberlieferungen etc. p.38-39

50. Captain Von Sichart (1st regiment of light dragoons KGL). In: NHA, Hann.41.XXI, nr.156

p.51-52

Captain Von Sichart, on behalf of lieutenant Jacobi. In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.90-91
Journal of the 1st regiment of light dragoons KGL. In: NHA, Hann.38D nr.231 p.15-16

51. Schwertfeger, B. Geschichte der Königlich Deutschen Legion p.

⁵² Nettelblatt, A.von Die Althannoverschen Überlieferungen etc. p.39

⁵³ Cf. Major general Trip. In: Bas, F.de & T.Serclaes de Wommersom – La campagne de 1815
Vol.III p.404-412

Cf. his report dated 25th October 1815. In: Aerts, W. – Le colonel J.B.Debruyne et les carabiniers
no.2 p.57-58

Lieutenant Warin of the 3rd regiment of carabineers (brigade Trip). Cf. his account in an
undated letter in the family archive of Van Ortt,74 inv.nr.157 in the Rijksarchief of the
province of Utrecht

Lieutenant Morbotter (1st regiment carabineers). In: NL-ZuRAZ, Van Löben Sels, 0302
nr.263

He points to the fact that his regiment carried lighter sabres and no protective cuirasses.

Cadet-carabineer Anemaat (1st regiment) confirms a flight of part of his unit (either the
brigade or his regiment), even up to Brussels and far beyond. In: Dagboek van Alexander
Verheull p.41

Yet, Morbotter speaks of a retreat for about 180 metres.

Lieutenant Warin (3rd regiment carabineers) mentions three charges, but doesn't enter into
full details. For one charge he states that the 1st regiment charged some cuirassiers, that the
2nd regiment followed in its course but due to the fact that it wheeled to the right, it prevented
the right wing of his regiment from advancing. Cf. his undated letter. In: Rijksarchief van de
provincie Utrecht. Familie archief Van Ortt, 74 inv.nr.157

The register of the MWO related to 2nd lieutenant Majoie (2nd regiment of carabiniers) states
the regiment charged twice. In: Kanselarij der Nederlandse Orden

Private Wouter Schalkwijk (1st regiment) mentions sometimes charges having been carried
out, but doesn't enter into further detail at all. In: KHA, A40 XIII-35

The timing of the charge is taken from lieutenant Gawler (52nd regiment) who saw the brigade
coming back from the charge in some confusion the moment he advanced into the first line.
In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.369-382

The fact that cavalry of the Netherlands passed through the ranks of the Royal Horse Guards
in their rear is confirmed by captain Clayton. In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.201-203

Constant Rebecque and Hoyneck van Papendrecht are most uninformative by merely stating
that the brigade carried out one charge. In: NA, 2.21.008.01 nr.25

Bas, F.de & T'Serclaes de Wommersom – La campagne de 1815 Vol.III p.385

On the 22nd of June, the prince of Orange wrote to his father that the carabineers had distinguished themselves, but in what way remains unclear. In: KHA, A40 XIII 10

The same as with Wellington who wrote on the 19th of June: “General Kruse, of the Nassau service, likewise conducted himself much to my satisfaction; as did general Trip, commanding the heavy brigade of cavalry etc.” In: Bas, F.de & T'Serclaes de Wommersom – La campagne de 1815 Vol.III p.480

54. Major Von Goeben (3rd regiment of hussars KGL). In: NHA, Hann.41.XXI.152.p.11-15
Journal of the 3rd regiment of hussars KGL. In: NHA, Hann.38D.233.p.198-202

55. Major Von Goeben (3rd regiment of hussars KGL). In: NHA, Hann.41.XXI, nr.152 p.11-15
General Hanoverian report. In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.289-302

In his report to the duke of Cambridge, colonel Arentschildt sketches a somewhat different picture.

First of all, he does not mention the presence of Netherlands cavalry in his front. Instead, he saw the left wing of the 3rd hussars KGL successfully charge and pursue a large quantity of cuirassiers. The hussars would have been assembled first before charging again.

While Von Goeben mentions of French dragoons, lancers and cuirassiers in the charge of the middle- and right squadron, Von Arentschildt himself only mentions the presence of dragoons. In: NHA, Hann.38D, nr.200.

56. Captain Wodehouse (15th regiment of hussars). In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.319-323
Private Wheeler (51st regiment) mentions a hundred men, while captain Ross (same regiment) mentions 70. In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.198-200
Colonel Rice (51st regiment) indicates in his plan the direction where the French horsemen came from, i.e. between Gomont and the Ohain-road. In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.11-14

57. Captain Ross (51st regiment). He mentions the presence of a small escort of light dragoons. In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.198-200

58. Lieutenant colonel Rice (51st regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.11-14
Lieutenant Lane (15th regiment of hussars). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.95-98
Major general Thackwell (15th regiment of hussars). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.305-308
Captain Wodehouse (15th regiment of hussars). In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.319-323 – plan.
Lieutenant colonel FitzRoy (deputy assistant adjudant general). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.185-187
Private Wheeler (51st regiment). In: Letters of private Wheeler p.173

59. Cotton here mentions the hussars of his regiment in pursuit, led by captain Verner. In: Une

voix de Waterloo p.95

Captain Verner himself, however, only confirms he was present near the incident. In: Verner, W. Reminiscences of William Verner. JSAHR, 1965 nr.8

Major general Thackwell (15th regiment of hussars) claims the cuirassiers passed to his left. In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.305-308

Captain Wodehouse (same regiment), however, depicts the French as passing to his right. In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.319-323

60. Cotton, E. – Une voix de Waterloo p.96

He tells us that the hussars could barely escape from this friendly fire.

Captain Wodehouse (15th regiment of hussars). In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.319-323

Captain Ross (51st regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.198-200

Private Wheeler (51st regiment). In: Letters of private Wheeler p.173

61. Cotton, E. – Une voix de Waterloo p.96

Captain Mackworth, dated 18th of June 1815. In: Inventaris Archieffonds Franse periode. LMB. Vol. III. Box 25, nr.I,1.

Private Wheeler (51st regiment) in a letter dated 23rd June 1815. In: NAM, nr.

Lieutenant Lane (15th regiment of hussars). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.95-98

Captain Ross (51st regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.198-200

There is no clear idea about the French losses.

E.Cotton mentions almost 50 men killed, wounded and taken prisoner. In: Une voix de Waterloo p.96

According to captain Wodehouse (15th regiment of hussars) there were 30 losses. In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.319-323

According to captain Ross 12 horses and 8 men were killed; 60 cuirassiers were dispersed and taken prisoner. In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.198-200

62. Major general Thackwell (15th regiment of hussars). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.305-308

63. Major general Thackwell. In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.305-308

Captain Robbins (7th regiment of hussars). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.127-130

Lieutenant O'Grady (7th regiment of hussars). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.73-75

Lieutenant Doherty (13th regiment of light dragoons). In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.229-230

Captain Thackwell (15th regiment of hussars). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.67-70 and in his diary. In: Wylly, H.C. In: The military memoirs of lieutenant general Sir J.Thakwell p.71

Lieutenant Lane (15th regiment of hussars). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.95-98

Captain Verner (7th regiment of hussars). In: Verner, W. Reminiscences of William Verner. In: JSAHR.1965, nr.8

Major Turner (13th regiment of light dragoons). In his letter dated 3rd of July 1815 to a man called Busby. In: NAM, nr. nr.7509/62

He mentions the presence of French infantry, while Lane mentions grenadiers à cheval, Doherty saw dragoons, Thackwell cuirassiers and O'Grady mixed cavalry. Captain Wodehouse saw grenadiers and lancers of the guard. In: BL, Add.ms.34.703.97, plan nrs.10-12

Captain Wodehouse (15th regiment of hussars) also mentions the presence of French infantry in squares, and which was attacked by the 15th of hussars at 5 p.m. between Gomont and the Ohainroad. In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.319-323

64. Lieutenant Doherty (13th regiment of light dragoons). In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.229-230

As lieutenant colonel Dalrymple and major Griffith both had got wounded, the command over the brigade devolved upon captain J.Thackwell. Thackwell himself got wounded by 7.30 p.m. Cf. his diary. In: Wylly, H.C. - The military memoirs of etc. p.71

65. Von Dörnberg himself. In: NHA, Hann.41.XXI, nr.152 p.1-4

Major Lautour (23rd regiment of light dragoons). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.286-289

Lieutenant Banner (23rd regiment of light dragoons). In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.16-18

He also mentions lancers being present.

Captain Grove (23rd regiment light dragoons) states his regiment charged that afternoon three times, against both cuirassiers and dragoons. Cf. his journal. In: NAM, nr.1978-05-74-2

66. Captain Nepveu, in a letter dated July 1815. In Section historique de l'état major général à La Haye. Cf. Bas, F.de & T'Serclaes de Wommersom. La campagne de 1815 Vol.II p.191

Lieutenant Kuckuck (3rd battalion of the line KGL). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.35-38

67. Sir A.Frazer in a letter dated 19th June 1815. In: Sabine, E. (ed) - Letters of colonel Sir Augustus Frazer etc. p.114

Lieutenant Pratt (30th regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.88-94

Major Evans. In: former www.1815.ltd.uk Original in: NLS, Adv.46.9.19

⁶⁸ Cf. Account of captain F.Weiz (1st battalion Nassau, 1st regiment). In: Unzer, A. Darstellung etc. In: Nassauische Heimatblätter, 1915 p.6

⁶⁹ Uffindell, A. - On the fields of glory p.113

The fact that cavalry reserves were in the back can also be taken from the charges / pursuits as carried out by the brigades of Grant and Von Dörnberg.

Lieutenant Pratt (30th regiment) states: "advances of French cavalry, sometimes extending along the whole or that part of the position, sometimes confined to a particular part, were sudden and rapid." In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.88-94

Lieutenant general Alten states the French cavalry now "appeared in crowds on the position." Cf. his report dated 19th June 1815. In: WSD, Vol.X p.534

⁷⁰ Cf. Wellington to the earl of Mulgrave, master general of ordnance, 21st December 1815.

In: WSD, Vol.XIV p.618-620

Captain Nepveu writes : “La cavalerie anglaise les contre-chargea avec valeur, mais à la fin elle était découragée et s’était couverte des carrés; les cuirassiers ennemis poussèrent l’audace jusqu’à se former en bataille vis-à-vis des carrés et de faire le feu de rang en règle. Mais rien n’ébranla ces braves masses d’infanterie, à qui le gain de la bataille est entièrement dû.”

Cf. his letter dated July 1815. In Section historique de l’état major général à La Haye. Cf. Bas, F.de & T’Serclaes de Wommersom. La campagne de 1815 Vol.II p.191

Major Evans. In: former www.1815.ltd.uk Original in: NLS, Adv.46.9.19

Captain De Brack of the lancers of the Imperial Guard writes - after having stated that he had charged five times - “Là, à 150 pas de l’infanterie ennemie, nous sommes exposés au feu le plus meurtrier etc.” In: La cavalerie de la garde à Waterloo p.366

Captain Mackworth (adc of lord Hill) speaks of a distance of about 40 paces [25 metres]. Cf. his letter dated 18th June 1815. In: LMB, Archieffonds 1792-1815

Captain Mercer (battery Mercer) confirms the presence of grenadiers and cuirassiers just behind the crest of the ridge. In: Journal of the Waterloo campaign Vol.I p.323

Colonel Ordener (1st regiment cuirassiers). In: Lot, H. Les deux généraux Ordener p.94

General Kellerman. In: SHAT, Mémoires et reconnaissances, nr.719

Chef d’escadron Rigau (2nd regiment of dragoons, division Lhéritier). In: Souvenirs des guerres de l’Empire p.112

⁷¹ Cf. For instance major Meijer (4th battalion of line infantry KGL). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.270-273

72. Dehnel, H. Rückblicke etc. p.256

Dehnel was a lieutenant in the Schützen-company of the 3rd battalion.

Lieutenant general Clinton to lord Hill, report dated 19th June 1815. In: WSD, Vol.X, p.545-546

Captain Purgole (2nd battalion of the line KGL). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.11-13

Lieutenant Gawler (52nd regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.88-97

Major general Adam. In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.404-413

Private John Smith, in a letter to his brother dated 14 July 1815. In: NLS, MS 15385, p.68

Lieutenant Horton (71st regiment). Cf. his letter dated 23rd June 1815. In: former www.1815.ltd.uk Original in: Somerset Heritage Service Archives, Taunton, Somerset nr.DD/HY/15/6/23

Lord Seaton (52nd regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.708 p.319-323

For Duplat’s brigade earlier hours are being mentioned but from the details of the situation it can be derived that it was during the cavalry-charges.

Like there is 4 p.m. given by the journal of the 1st battalion line KGL. In: NHA, Hann.38D.236.p.27-28

For 3 p.m. cf. major Von Rettberg (1st battalion line KGL), In: NHA, Hann.38D.152.p.49-50

General Hanoverian report. In: NHA, Hann.41.XXI.156.p.27-49

Lieutenant Kuckuck (3rd battalion line KGL). In: BL, Add.34.705 p.40-41

For 2.30 p.m. cf. the journal of the 3rd battalion line KGL. In: NHA, Hann.38D.816.p.22-25

Lieutenant Von Müller (2nd battalion of the line KGL) even gives 12.30 p.m. In: NHA, Hann.41.XXI.152.p.51-53

For captain Aberdeman of the 3rd battalion KGL it was 2 p.m. In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.3-10

Captain Goeben (1st battalion of the line KGL) mentions a time between 2 and 3 p.m. In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.42-45

Lieutenant Heise confirms it was after 4 p.m.. Cf. Lieutenant Heise (2nd battalion of the line KGL). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.255-258

73. Major general Adam. In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.404-413

According to Adam the advance took place in battalions in columns of companies on quarter distance.

Cf. Lord Seaton (52nd regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.708 p.40-49

Another witness mentions an advance in wing squares. Cf. Lieutenant Gawler (52nd regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.88-97

Cf. lieutenant colonel Reynell (71st regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.234-239

Corporal Aldridge (2nd battalion 95th regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.98-100

Captain Eeles (3rd battalion 95th regiment). In: BL, Add.34.704 p.77-82

Cf. Cf.Caldwell & Cooper. Rifle green at Waterloo p.64

74. Plan of lieutenant Gawler (52nd regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.369-382

Ensign Leeke situates the brigade too far in front, having the 71st regiment halfway the east-side of Gomont. In: Leeke, W. – History of the 52nd Vol.I,p.28

Cf. Shaw Kennedy, J. Notes etc.p.124-125

⁷⁵ While in line, the sequence of the companies was from left to right: no.1, 3 and 6, then in their rear no.4, 5 and 2. Cf. Cf.Caldwell & Cooper. Rifle green at Waterloo p.64

⁷⁶ According to Caldwell and Cooper the 3rd battalion of the 95th regiment formed in rear of the squares of the 52nd. Cf. Cf.Caldwell & Cooper. Rifle green at Waterloo p.73

⁷⁷ According to Caldwell and Cooper general Adam and his staff took up a position in the square of the 71st. Cf. Cf.Caldwell & Cooper. Rifle green at Waterloo p.73

⁷⁸ According to Cusick there was about 180 metre between the right square of the 52nd regiment and the square of the 71st. Cf. Cusick, R. Waterloo, the legacy of Sir John Moore. In: The Waterloo Journal Vol.20 nr.1 p.4

79. Major general Adam. In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.404-413

Lieutenant colonel Seaton (52nd regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.708 p.40-49 and 34.708319-

323

Captain Chalmers (52nd regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.165-166

Captain Diggle (52nd regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.242-243

Lieutenant Gawler (52nd regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.369-382, 34.704 p.88-97 and 34.705 p.312-318

He speaks, as Diggle does, about a march in a square with wings. Cf. The crisis etc. p.36-37

Lieutenant colonel Reynell (71st regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.234-239

Captain Budgen (2nd battalion 95th regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.56-62

Captain Aldridge (2nd battalion 95th regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.98-100

Cf. Yonge, W.C. Memoir of Lord Seaton's Services p.221

An Anonymous officer, as cited by Moorsom. In: Historical record of the 52nd etc. p.255-256

Lieutenant colonel Reynell (71st regiment) places the square of his battalion just south of the Nivelles-road and not between Ohain-road and Gomont. In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.234-239

According to ensign Leeke (52nd regiment) the front side of the right hand square was at right angles with the orchard of Gomont. In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.312-318 as cited by lieutenant Gawler.

80. For the reconstruction of the advance and the actions of this brigade of Duplat the following eye-witness reports have been used:

General Hanoverian report. In: NHA, Hann.41.XXI, nr.156 p.27-49

The journal of the 1st battalion of the line KGL. In: NHA, Hann.38D, nr.236 p.27-28

Major Von Rettberg (1st battalion of the line KGL). In: NHA, Hann.41.XXI, nr.152 p.49-50

Lieutenant colonel Von Müller (2nd battalion of the line KGL). In: NHA, Hann.41.XXI, nr.152 p.51-53

The journal of the 3rd battalion of the line KGL. In: NHA, Hann.38D. nr.816 p.22-25

The journal of the 4th battalion of the line KGL. In: NHA, Hann.38D. nr.236 p.118-119

According to lieutenant Dehnel of the Schützen-company of the 3rd battalion infantry of the line KGL, the march took place in a column to the left of companies. Further down the march, French cavalry forced the Hanoverians to close at quarter distance to be able to form squares. Dehnel, H. Rückblicke etc. p.257

Dehnel was a lieutenant in the Schützen-company of the 3rd battalion.

According to captain Schlichthorst (4th battalion of the line KGL), his battalion move to the front in a column at half distance and formed square on the crest of the ridge; in this way it descended into the low ground where it halted. In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.268-269

The following references claim the units formed squares during their march:

General Hanoverian report. In: NHA, Hann.41.XXI, nr.156 p.27-49

Major Von Rettberg (1st battalion of the line KGL). In: NHA, Hann.41.XXI, nr.152 p.49-50

The journal of the 3rd battalion of the line KGL. In: NHA, Hann.38D. nr.816 p.22-25

These sources claim the battalions did so when they left:

The journal of the 1st battalion of the line KGL. In: NHA, Hann.38D, nr.236 p.27-28
 Lieutenant Von Müller (2nd battalion of the line KGL). In: NHA, Hann.41.XXI, nr.152 p.51-53
 Lieutenant Hamilton (2nd battalion of the line KGL) in his letter dated 21st July 1815. In: NAM, nr.7905/5
 Captain Purgole (same battalion). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.11-13

81. Reports of both the 1st and 2nd battalion of the line KGL. In: VPH, nr.32 en 33

⁸² Lieutenant Heise (2nd battalion of the line KGL). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.255-258

83. The commander of the battalion, major Robertson, then got seriously wounded. In: VPH, nr.32 He was succeeded by captain F.Goeben.
 Cf. State of the 2nd division, drafted by captain G.Marlay and dated 13th July 1815. In: WSD, Vol.X p.751

84. Captain Von Goeben (1st battalion of the line KGL). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.42-45
 Of the 3rd battalion of the line, lieutenant colonel Von Wissell got wounded by 4 p.m.; he was succeeded by major Luttermann. Cf. the state of the 2nd division, as drafted by captain Marlay on the 13th of July 1815. In: WSD, Vol.X p.751

85. Cf.Ensign Uslar-Gleichen (4th battalion of the line, brigade Duplat). In: Dehnel, H. Erinnerungen deutscher Officiere etc. p.365

86. Cf. VPH, nr.33
 General Hanoverian report. In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.289-302
 Captain Purgold (2nd battalion KGL). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.11-13
 Lieutenant Hamilton (2nd battalion of line infantry KGL) doesn't mention the action in the orchard at all. Cf. his letter dated 21st July 1815. In: NAM, 7905/5

87. Cf.Ensign Uslar-Gleichen (4th battalion of the line, brigade Duplat). In: Dehnel, H. Erinnerungen deutscher Officiere etc. p.365
 Reports about units of Du Plat's brigade. In: VPH, nrs. 31 -34
 Lieutenant Hamilton (2nd battalion of line infantry KGL) doesn't mention the action in the orchard at all. Cf. his letter dated 21st July 1815. In: NAM, 7905/5
 Lieutenant Kuckuck (3rd battalion of the line KGL). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.35-38

88. According to a general Hanoverian report it was 3 p.m. In: NHA, Hann.41.XXI, nr.156 p.27-49
 General Hanoverian report. In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.289-302
 For 2 p.m. cf.
 Major Von Dreves (battalion Osnabrück). In: NHA, Hann.41.XXI, nr.151 p.70-72

Major Hammerstein (battalion Salzgitter). In: NHA, Hann.41.XXI, nr.151 p.60-64

89. General Hanoverian report. In: NHA, Hann.41.XXI, nr.156 p.27-49

General Hanoverian report. In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.289-302

Captain Von Dreves (battalion Osnabrück). In: NHA, Hann.41.XXI, nr.151 p.70-72

Major Hammerstein (battalion Salzgitter). Cf. his account dated 24th June 1815. In: NHA, Hann.41.XXI, nr.151 p.60-64

Major general H.Halkett to major Hammerstein. In: NHA, Hann.41.XXI, nr.151 p.53

Colonel H.Halkett to lieutenant general Alten, dated 14th July 1815. In: NHA, Hann.41D XXI, nr.151 p.

Sergeant Führung. In: NHA, Hann.41 XXI nr.157

Lieutenant Winckler (battalion Osnabrück). Cf. his letter dated 9th July 1815. In: Hannoverschen Geschichtsblätter nr.1 (1898). Cf. former www.1815.ltd.uk

90. General Hanoverian report. In: NHA, Hann.41.XXI, nr.156 p.27-49

Captain Scheuch (battalion Bremervörde). In: NHA, Hann.41.XXI, nr.151 p.65-68

Major Hammerstein (battalion Salzgitter). In: NHA, Hann.41.XXI, nr.151 p.60-64

Lieutenant general Clinton to Lord Hill, report dated 19th June 1815. In: WSD, Vol.X p.545-546

91. Lieutenant Holmes (23rd regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.209-212

2nd lieutenant Ellis (23rd regiment) shows in his plan (position nr.1) that his regiment was east of the Nivelles-road until 3 p.m. , in the corner of this road and the Ohain-road. This position, however, more corresponds to the second one, the one near the Brunswick units.

His position nr.2 – south of the Ohain-road and not far from the northeast-corner of Gomont – nearly was the position of the regiment during some time during the cavalry-charges. In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.126-128

^{92.} For the reconstruction of the marches and positions of this division the following sources have been used:

Report of lieutenant colonel Van Delen. In: Bas, F.de & T'Serclaes de Wommersom. La campagne de 1815 aux Pays Bas. Vol.III p.364-366

Report of colonel Detmers. In: Bas, F.de & T'Serclaes de Wommersom. La campagne de 1815 aux Pays Bas. Vol.III p.374-376

Letter of general Chassé to the prince of Orange, dated 4th July 1815. In: Bas, F.de & T'Serclaes de Wommersom. La campagne de 1815 aux Pays Bas. Vol.III p.354-357

Account of captain Mercer (battery Mercer). In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.347-354

Letter of private A.H.Munter (4th battalion of national militia, brigade d'Aubremé), dated 22nd July 1815. In: NIMH, no reference

Captain Schäfer (adjutant of colonel Detmers). In: NA, nr.2.13.04

Account of 2nd lieutenant P.P.Roorda van Eysinga. In: Iets betreffende den slag van

Waterloo. In: Recensent der recensenten. 1831 nr.6-7

Account of captain Rochell (19th battalion of national militia). In: private archive family Rochell

Account of captain Van Omphal. In: NIMH, nr.104/7

Lieutenant Breuer (36th battalion of chasseurs). In: Eenens, A.M. , Dissertation sur la participation des troipes des Pays-Bas à la campagne de 1815 en Belgique p.55-56

Craan, W.B. - Plan du champ de bataille de Waterloo

⁹³ According to Van Omphal they did so in square. Cf. his diary. In: NIMH, nr.104/7

Siborne claims that Chassé moved in a great measure, if not entirely, concealed from the enemy's observation. From the south this is correct, but Piré's patrols were able to see it from their positions near the Nivelles road. In: History of the war Vol.II p.85

⁹⁴ Plans of:

Craan, W.B. - Plan du champ de bataille de Waterloo

The fact that, meanwhile, the 6th battalion of national militia had joined the brigade (after pulling in its detachment which stood south of the village) is confirmed by sergeant Wiegmans. In: Quatre en Waterloo p.66, 68

It got there in the position near the Nivelles road by a march in divisions in closed columns.

95.Cf. Captain Turnor (14th regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.708 p.348

Captain Mercer, whose battery was initially in position northeast of the wood halfway between Merbraine and Gomont and having his front towards the division of Piré, confirms the approach of two loudly shouting columns coming from the direction of Merbraine.

The commander of the 14th regiment rode out to find out what kind of troops they were and the initial impression was that they were French and the order to fire had been given, when colonel Gold (of the Royal Artillery) found out that they were from the Netherlands. Cf. Captain Mercer's letter dated 24th January 1866. In: RAI, nr.MD88

Cf. his letter in BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.347-354

Captain Van Omphal states the brigade was in column in a terrain which protected it somewhat against French gunfire. Cf. his diary. In: NIMH, nr.104/7

96. Cf. his letter in BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.347-354

According the 2nd lieutenant Holle of the 6th battalion National Militia (brigade Detmers) the brigade was in Braine l'Alleud until 4 p.m. In: Letter to his parents dated 20th June 1815. In: Stadsarchief Dordrecht. Family-archive Blussé. 68-28 nr.20 In his account dated 1856, however, he says it was 3 p.m. Cf. 2nd lieutenant Holle in: Stadsarchief Dordrecht. Family-archive Blussé. 68-28 nr.26

97. According to Van Dam van Isselt, Krahmer was initially divided into two half-batteries over both brigades, but the moment Lux had arrived it would have re-united and taken up a

position in rear of the infantry. Cf. Dam van Isselt, W.E. van De Noord-Nederlandse batterij etc. p.52

The battery of of Lux would have left its bivouac around 8 a.m. for a position towards Mont Saint Jean; here it halted, but soon after it was ordered to take up a position to the rear of this hamlet, to the left of the road, near the windmill. Here, both batteries would have had their positions for some time. Cf. 1st lieutenant Bentinck. Cf. NL-ZuRAZ, Van Löben Sels, 0302 nr.262

98. Account of captain Rochell. In: In: private archive family Rochell

⁹⁹ Lieutenant general Alten to the duke of Cambridge, 20th June 1815. In: VPH, nr.20
Shaw Kennedy, J. – Notes on the battle of Waterloo p.100-101
Captain Knight in a letter to lieutenant colonel Elphinstone (both 33rd regiment), dated 16th November [?] 1834. In: BL, Mss.Eur. F.89.42

100.General Hanoverian report. In: VPH, nr.19
Also see: lieutenant Bülow of the battalion Bremen, in a letter dated 26 August 1815. In: Kannicht, J. Und alles wegen Napoleon p.205
Scriba, C.von Das leichte Bataillon etc. p.94-96

101. Captain Stanhope (1st Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.22.-24
Captain Bowles (1st Foot Guards) in a letter to lord Fitzharris 19th June 1815. In: A series of letters of the first earl of Malmesbury p.449

¹⁰² Lieutenant colonel H.W.Rooke, attached to the division of Cooke. Cf. his letter dated 19th June 1815 to his father. In: former www.1815.ltd.uk Original in: Gloucestershire Record Office, nr. D1833/Z5
It is also captain Bowles (1e regiment Foot Guards) who confirms that squares advanced as to retake the guns. Cf.in a letter dated 19th June 1815 to lord Fitzharris, in: A series of letters of the first earl of Malmesbury etc. Vol.II p.444

103. Lieutenant colonel Elphinstone (33rd regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.278-281
Lieutenant Macready (30th regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.708 p.265-268 and in USJ, 1845, I, p.400-401

104. Captain Howard (30th regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.317-319

¹⁰⁵ Kellermann. Observations sur la bataille de Waterloo etc. In: SHAT, Mémoires et reconnaissances, no.718

106. Frazer, Sir Augustus. In: Sabine, E. Letters of colonel Sir Augustus Frazer. Letter XXV,

p.557

107. Ramsay would have been buried during [!] the battle at the Ohain-road, at about 360 metres east of the three trees which stand in rear of Gomont.

Cf. File of captain Ramsay. In: RAI, nr.MD 340.

Cf. Sabine, E. Letters of colonel Sir Augustus Frazer, Letter nr.XXVI, p.563

Ramsay was succeeded by captain Macdonald; when he got wounded, he was succeeded by lieutenant Breton. When he got wounded, lieutenant Sandilands became the commander of the battery. Cf. Papers relating to the battle of Waterloo In: BL, Add.ms.nr.19.590

108. Captain Bull. In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.46-49

Sergeant Mackay (battery Bolton) also mentions the detachment of gun nr.1 to silence a French gun which enfiladed the battery; this gun was also silenced. In: BL, Add.ms.706 p.124-125

109. Captain Kühlmann. In: VPH, nr.62

Lieutenant colonel Hartmann. In: VPH, nr.29

Lieutenant colonel Adye (commander of the artillery of the 1st division). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.7-10

Lieutenant Von Wissell (battery Kühlmann). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.262-263

General Hanoverian report. In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.289-302

110. Captain Sympher. In: NHA, Hann.41.D.XXI, nr.151 p.132-133

Sympher states he advanced with Bolton's battery to a position to the right of the Brussels road, without being more specific. During the battle, Sympher had one 9-pounder damaged, sent to the rear but also brought back to the front again during the action.

Cf. lieutenant colonel Hartmann. In: VPH, nr.29

Captain Cleaves In: VPH, nr.63

Lieutenant Pringle (battery Bolton). In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.339-340

Lieutenant Sharpin (battery Bolton). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.15-19

Lieutenant Kuckuck (3rd battalion line KGL) mentions a position of the artillery between the squares, which is further to the west, in rear of Gomont and just west of the track which leads here from the Ohainroad to La Belle Alliance. In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.35-38

Also see: Lieutenant Heise (2nd battalion of the line KGL). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.255-258

¹¹¹ Cf. Gunner Hellemann., letter dated 20th June 1815. In: former www.1815.ltd.uk Original In: NSA. 249 AN190

According to another source, both Brunswick batteries would have maintained their positions north of Gomont, but both were no exception in spending quite some ammunition. Apart from that, the horse battery suffered quite a lot in its material. For that reason, both batteries at some point of time during the grand French cavalry charges got to the rear to replenish their ammunition but were back to the front before the Imperial guard attacked. Cf. Cf. Internet.

Herzoglich Braunschweigisches Feldkorps.2001

112. Captain Mercer. In: Journal of the Waterloo campaign.Vol.I p.294-297 and in BL Add.ms.34.703 p.347-354

And in a letter dated 24th January 1866. In: RAI, nr.MD88

Mercer adds that he got the serious request from major Lloyd to support him, but as Mercer had moved out he was sent back to his original position by lieutenant colonel A.Macdonald, commander of the horse artillery. In: Journal of the Waterloo campaign. Vol.I.p.295-296

113.Captain Mercer. In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.347-354

In: Journal of the Waterloo campaign.Vol.I p.314

That it was towards 5 p.m.can be taken from the fact that the French grenadiers were involved from that time on. Mercer himself claims it was 3 p.m. In: Journal of the Waterloo campaign. Vol.I p.309 and in his letter dated 24th january 1866. In: RAI, nr.MD88

114. Baring, G. Erzählung der Theilnahme etc. In: Hannoversches Militärisches Journal.1831 p.78

Also in: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.48-62

115. Cf. Lieutenant H.von Gagern of the 2nd battalion in his letter to his mother dated 26th July 1815. In: Ein unbekannter Waterloo-Brief. In: Nassauische Blätter, 1956 Heft. 1 p. 23

Report of colonel Von Kruse. In: VPH, nr.73

Shaw Kennedy, J. – Notes etc. p.122

In total it would have been almost 300 men, though Baring himself mentions a strength of about 200 men. According to the diary of the 1st regiment of Nasau it would have been only one (flanker) company of the 2nd battalion. In: VPH, nr.71.

Brumm also mentions a company of the 2nd battalion 1st regiment Nassau, led by captain Von Weitershausen. In: Brumm, J. Die Nassauers in der Schlacht bei Waterloo. Nassovia, 1915 p.82
A.Uffindell claims there were 150 men of the light company of the 2nd battalion of the 1st regiment of Nassau. In: On the fields of glory p.121

116. Diary of the 1st regiment of Nassau. In: VPH, nr.71

Cf. Lieutenant H.von Gagern of the 2nd battalion in his letter to his mother dated 26 July 1815.

In: Ein unbekannter Waterloo-Brief. In: Nassauische Blätter, 1956 Heft. 1 p. 23

¹¹⁷ Captain Stretton (40th regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.224-226

Sergeant Lawrence (40th regiment). Mémoires d'un grenadier anglais p.208, 211-212

Lieutenant Mill (40th regiment). In: A regimental historical records committee. The Royal Inniskilling fuseliers 1928 p.263

118. Lieutenant Graeme (2nd battalion of light infantry KGL). In: BL, Add.ms.34.707 p.497-

119. Baring, G. Erzählung der Theilnahme etc. In: Hannoversches Militärisches Journal.1831 p.79

Lindau, F. - Ein Waterloo-Kämpfer p.135-136

Of the company of flankers of the 2nd battalion Nassau, one corporal and seven men were taken prisoner. Cf. the diary of the regiment. In: VPH, nr.71

120. Baring, G. Erzählung der Theilnahme etc. In: Hannoversches Militärisches Journal.1831 p.79

Lindau, F. - Ein Waterloo-Kämpfer p.132

¹²¹ It was also during this attack that the French immediately east of the farm suffered from British rocket-fire. Cf. Major Baring. In: BL, Add.ms.34.707 p.159-160

¹²² Cf. Colonel Ordener (1st regiment cuirassiers) In: Lot, H. Les deux généraux Ordener p.94

Kellerman zelf: p.26 (nr.718 SHAT) cavalerie kon niet terug uit vrees leger mee te slepen, kon niet snel vooruitkomen, leed onder artillerievuur van de vijand en eigen kanonvuur.

¹²³ The chef d'escadron Létang (7th dragoons) confirms his brigade (the one of Picquet) was operating in the vicinity of the farm of La Haye Sainte. In: Note sur la charge de la division l'Héritier. In: SHAT, MR nr.719

¹²⁴ Cuirassiers charged virtually along the whole of Wellington's centre, except across the hollow part of the Ohain-road.

Cf. Private Bosse (3rd Brunswick line battalion). Diary. In: former www.1815.ltd.uk Original in: NSA, 249 AN 191

Lieutenant O'Grady (7th hussars). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.73-75

Captain Weiz (1st battalion, 1st regiment Nassau). In: Unzer, A. Darstellung etc. In: Nassauische Heimatblätter, 1915 p.6

Mercer, C. – Journal of the Waterloo campaign Vol.I p.314

Ensign Cappel (Leib battalion) Cf. his account. In: NSA, nr.276 N15

Captain Sandham (battery Sandham). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.273-276

Report of the 1st regiment of light dragoons KGL. In: VPH nr.48

Captain Schlichthorst (4th battalion of the line KGL). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.268-269

Major Meijer (4th battalion of the line). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.270-273

Captain Rudyard (battery Lloyd). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.167-170

Chef d'escadron Létang (7th dragoons) In: Note sur la charge de la division l'Héritier. In: SHAT, nr. MR719

Captain Von Scriba (Fieldbattalion Bremen). In: Das Leichte etc. p.91-98 and in VPH, nr.41

Lancers at least acted upon the front between the Brunswickers and the fieldbattalion Bremen.

Cf. Kubel,

Captain Von Scriba (Fieldbattalion Bremen). In: Das Leichte etc. p.91-98 and in VPH, nr.41

Captain Schlichthorst (4th battalion of the line KGL). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.268-269

Major Meijer (4th battalion of the line). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.270-273

Mercer, C. – Journal of the Waterloo campaign Vol.I p.314

Captain Thackwell (15th hussars). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.67-70

Captain Robbins (7th hussars). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.127-130

Lieutenant O’Grady (7th hussars). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.73-75

Captain Rudyard (battery Lloyd). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.167-170

Ensign R.Batty (3rd battalion / 1st Foot Guards). Cf. his letter dated 21st June 1815. In: former www.1815.ltd.uk Original in the Harrington Collection.

The grenadiers operated on the left wing of the French front.

Cf. Mercer, C. – Journal of the Waterloo campaign Vol.I p.314

Ensign R.Batty (3rd battalion / 1st Foot Guards). Cf. his letter dated 21st June 1815. In: former www.1815.ltd.uk Original in the Harrington Collection.

Private Lewis (2ns battalion 95th regiment). Cf. his letter dated 8th July 1815. In: Dorset history centre, Dorchester D/FIL/25

Captain De Brack (lancers of the guard). In: In: La cavalerie de la garde à Waterloo p.365

Baring, G. Erzählung der Theilnahme etc. In: Hannoversches Militärisches Journal.1831 p.76

¹²⁵ Milhaud himself confirms he charged three times. Cf. his report dated 1815. In: Stoff, L. - Essai sur le général Delort p.131

Colonel Trefcon (Bachelu’s division) says he saw the cavalry charge more as ten times In: Carnet de campagne p.189

Captain De Brack of the lancers of the guard states he charged five times. In: La cavalerie de la garde à Waterloo p.366

General Guyot confirms his corps charged three times. Cf. his letter to Drout, dated 4th July 1820. In: Carnets de campagne p.386

Chef d’escadron Rigau (2nd regiment of dragoons, division Lhéritier) writes that he advances twelve times. In: Souvenirs des guerres de l’Empire p.113

According to lieutenant colonel Harris (73rd regiment) his regiment was charged thirteen times. In: Cotton, E. Une voix de Waterloo p.112

Lieutenant general Alten mentions five to six charges in his report to Wellington, dated 19th June 1815. In: Supplementary Despatches. Vol.X, p.534-535

According to ensign W.Thain (33rd regiment) his battalion was charged eight times by cuirassiers. Cf. Ensign W.Thain (33rd regiment). In his diary, in: Duke of Wellington’s regiment archive, Halifax

The square of the battalions Verden / Bremen would have been charged five times by cuirassiers, lancers and *chasseurs à cheval*. Cf. Captain Von Scriba (Fieldbattalion Bremen).

In: Das Leichte etc. p.91-98

Captain Mercer confirms his battery was charged three times [so after about 5 p.m.]. In: Journal of the Waterloo campaign. Vol.I p.317-325

The 2nd battalion of Brunswick line infantry would have been charged six times. Cf. Ensign Lindwurm. Cf. his letter dated 23rd June 1815. In NSA, 249 AN 190

The report of Kielmansegge's brigade claims there were several charges of which the first one were en echelon and the others isolated. In: VPH, nr.21

Lieutenant general Alten describes that five or six times the French cavalry charged the squares of his division. Cf. his report dated 19th June 1815. In: WSD, Vol.X p.534

French cavalry would have advanced 10 to 11 times against the 2nd battalion 1st Foot Guards. Cf. Captain Nixon in a letter dated 19th June 1815. In: University of Nottingham, Drury Lowe collection Dr.C.30/6

¹²⁶ In what way marshal Ney actually participated in the charges themselves remains unclear. Neither Ney himself, nor two of his aide de camps (Curély and Levavasseur) make any mention of this.

Colonel Heymès merely states that five horses were shot under him, which makes it probable that he participated in some way. In: Documents inédits p.19

Captain De Brack adds that Ney, on his own, passed his front and encouraged the lancers, by calling those by name he knew. In: La cavalerie de la garde à Waterloo p.366

The fact that he wasn't with the emperor is corroborated by both Napoleon and Gourgaud, in their astonishment about the involvement of the cavalry at that moment and in those numbers. Cf. Mémoires pour servir etc. p.150

Gourgaud. La campagne de dix huit cent quinze p.82

¹²⁷ Cf. Sketch of captain De Brack (lancers of the imperial guard).

The fact that Guyot was not engaged the same time as Kellermann can clearly be taken from Guyot's account. He writes in July 1820 to Drouot: "Ce dire est d'autant plus faux qu'il doit vous souvenir que dès les deux heures environ de l'après midi je fus mis à la disposition du maréchal Ney qui faisait déjà agir la cavalerie de Kellermann et d'autres troupes sur la ligne ennemie, que je ne fus pas plutôt arrive près de lui qu'il m'y employa également à plusieurs reprises etc." In: General comte Guyot p.384

De Brack in his sketch and account, though, suggest as if both corps (the light and heavy cavalry) advanced at the same time, Guyot to the left and his own corps to the right. He depicts the regiments en echelon, the right (lancers) in front. In: La cavalerie de la garde etc. p.364

128. Captain Mercer. In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.347-354

Also his letter dated 24th January 1866. In: RAI, nr.MD88

¹²⁹ Cf. Adkin, M. – The Waterloo companion p.360

¹³⁰ Fletcher, I. – A desperate business p.139

Major Evans. In: former www.1815.ltd.uk In: NLS, Adv.46.9.19

In one case, the French discharged their carbines with little effect at a distance of about 9 to 13 metres. Cf. Ensign Gronow (1st Foot Guards). In: The reminiscences and recollections of captain Gronow p.71

Ensign R.Batty (3rd battalion / 1st Foot Guards). Cf. his letter dated 23rd June 1815. In: former www.1815.ltd.uk Original in the Harrington Collection.

Major general Maitland confirms the fact that the French cavalry halted at some distance from the squares and then sent forward some of their men to fire their pistols to provoke the Foot Guards to return the fire, but this was in vain. Cf. his report to George Regent [?], dated 19th of June 1815. In: Mentioned in despatches p.11

¹³¹ Ensign Gronow (1st Foot Guards). In: The reminiscences and recollections of captain Gronow p.72, 191

¹³² Private Lewis (2nd battalion, 95th regiment). In a letter dated 8th July 1815. In: former www.1815.ltd.uk Original in: Dorset history centre, Dorchester D/FIL/Z5

¹³³ Major Meijer (4th battalion of the line KGL. In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.270-273

¹³⁴ Albemarle, G.Th. Fifty years of my life Vol.2 p.28-35

135. Colonel Von Olfermann. In: VPH, nr.67

Lord Hill praises the battalions of majors Von Proestler and Von Holstein (the Leib-battalion and the 1st battalion of light infantry) for their behaviour in this part of the battle. Cf. his report of the 20th of June 1815. In: WSD, Vol.X, p.544-545

Captain Mercer noted the very young age of the Brunswick (18 years at most) and the lack of order in the squares which the Brunswick officers attempted to restore. Cf. his letter dated 24th January 1866 to an unknown person. In: RAI, nr.MD88

Schneidawind confirms all French cavalry charges were thrown back. In: Der letzte Feldzug etc. p.107-108

136. Lieutenant colonel Saltoun (1st Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.431-434

Lieutenant Davis (1st Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.75-76

While Saltoun explicitly indicates that this took place *during* the grand cavalry-attacks, Davis does so a period *after* them.

¹³⁷ Ensign Gronow (1st Foot Guards). In: The reminiscences and recollections of captain

Gronow p.72

Ensign Macready (30th regiment) in his diary. In: History of the 30th regiment p.342

138. Ensign Gronow (1st Foot Guards). In: The reminiscences and recollections of captain Gronow p.72

Cf. Sergeant Ch. Wood (3rd battalion 1st Foot Guards). In: Some particulars of the battle of Waterloo in a letter from a serjeant [sic] of the Guards p.5. In a letter dated 29th July 1815 to J.B. at London

139. Lieutenant Hart (52nd regiment) dated 20th June 1815. In: NAM, nr.8111/84

Lieutenant Gawler (52nd regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.88-97

Lord Seaton (52nd regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.708 p.40-49

Major general Adam. In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.404-413

140. Colonel Reynell (71st regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.234-239

Lieutenant Gawler (52nd regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.88-97

Private John Smith, in a letter to his brother dated 14 July 1815. In: NLS, MS 15385, p.68

Colonel Reynell, by the way, was in the very centre of his battalion for the main part of the day and therefore didn't see much of any other actions other than his own unit. Cf. BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.234-239

141. Captain Eeles (3rd battalion 95th regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.77-82

¹⁴² Cf. Captain Von Scriba (Fieldbattalion Bremen). Das leichte etc. p.95

Muir, R. – Tactics and the experience of battle in the age of Napoleon p.132

143. Cf. Gronow. – The reminiscences and recollections of captain Gronow p. 190

Lieutenant general Alten in his report for the duke of Wellington, dated 19th June 1815. In: WSD, Vol.X, p.534-535

Captain Von Scriba (Fieldbattalion Bremen). Das leichte etc. p.94

Sergeant Morris (2nd battalion 73rd regiment). Recollections p.78

¹⁴⁴ Cf. Reille. In: Documents inédits p.62

For instance, 18 guns had been placed opposite Adam's brigade at barely 100 metres distance. Cf.

Captain J. Logan in his letter dated 18th July 1815 to W. Sylvester. In: Miscellany, 1934 p.86-87. BL, Add.ms.43.830

Captain Budgen (2nd battalion 95th regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.55-62

Corporal Aldridge (2nd battalion 95th regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.98-100

Major Norcott (2nd battalion 95th regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.121-124

Opposite Alten's division and Kruse's brigade several batteries were established:

Captain Weiz (1st battalion, 1st regiment Nassau) confirms that the enemy developed several batteries, with guns in sections of two by two at large intervals, accompanied by large masses of cavalry. In: Unzer, A. Darstellung etc. In: Nassauische Heimatblätter, 1915 p.6

Of the three Nassau battalions the 1st, which stood in the first line, suffered in particular from the canister fire which was unleashed from a battery which had advanced with the cavalry at close range. In: Diary 1st regiment of Nassau. In: VPH, nr.71

Report major general Von Kruse. In: VPH, nr.72

Lieutenant general Alten states the French artillery fired at his squares from a distance of about 150 paces [90 metre]. Cf. his report to the duke of Cambridge, dated 20th June 1815. In: VPH, nr.20

In his reports dated 19th and 22nd of June, he characterizes the distance of the French guns as within grape-shot and which was actually fired. In: WSD, Vol. X p.534, 559

Captain Von Scriba (Fieldbattalion Bremen) adds that as the French cavalry had fallen back, the battalion came under a heavy canister-fire; it caused it to fall back to its original position. In: Das leichte Bataillon p.96

At least the *30th and 73rd regiment* advanced beyond the Ohain-road to take some guns which had advanced with the French cavalry and which inflicted them heavy casualties; the attempt failed however and right after that, when the squares fell back to their original positions, French cavalry charged them. Cf. Captain Howard (30th regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.317-319

Lieutenant Pratt (30th regiment): "artillery had gained considerably in advance" In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.88-94

Captain Aberdeen (3rd battalion of the line KGL) also mentions French cavalry in front, covered in its rear by heavy cavalry. In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.3-10

Ensign Gronow (1st Foot Guards). "It was about 5 o'clock [...] that the enemy's artillery had come up *en masse* within 100 yards of us" [...] "at point blank distance." In: The reminiscences and recollections of captain p.73, 191

145. General report. In: VPH, nr.19

Also see: lieutenant Bülow of the battalion Bremen, in a letter dated 26 August 1815. In: Kannicht, J. Und alles wegen Napoleon p.205

Scriba, C.von Das leichte Bataillon etc. p.94-96

Lieutenant colonel Müller (fieldbattalion Bremen). In: VPH, nr.40

Captain Von Scriba (fieldbattalion Bremen). In: VPH, nr.41

146. Captain J.Logan in his letter dated 18th July 1815 to W.Sylvester. In: Miscellany,1934 p.86-87. BL, Add.ms.43.830

Captain Budgen (2nd battalion 95th regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.55-62

Corporal Aldridge (2nd battalion 95th regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.98-100
major Norcott (2nd battalion 95th regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.121-124
Lieutenant Gawler (52nd regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.369-382
Major Wilkins (2nd battalion 95th regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.707 p.101-102
According to private Robinson the French charged four times and they were beaten in all cases by musketry fire given at close range (30-40 yards). Cf. private Robinson (2nd battalion 95th regiment). In: His letter to his brother dated 10th September 1815. In: former www.1815.ltd.uk
Original in: Regimental Headquarters, The Duke of Wellington's Regiment, Wellesley Park, Halifax.

¹⁴⁷ Situation of the 2nd British division, dated 13th July 1815, as given by captain G.Marlay. In: WSD, Vol.X p.751

¹⁴⁸ Situation of the 2nd British division, dated 13th July 1815, as given by captain G.Marlay. In: WSD, Vol.X p.751

149. General Adam, In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.404-413
Lieutenant Gawler (52nd regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.369-382
Also see: Cusick, R. - Waterloo, the legacy of Sir John Moore. In: The Waterloo Journal Vol.20 nr.1 p.4
Yonge adds that it were mostly the right and front-side of the square of the 52nd which fired upon the cuirassiers who ran at the 71st. Cf. Yonge, W.C. Memoir of Lord Seaton's Services p.221
The 71st regiment had to sustain several cavalry charges, which took no effect. See the letter of private John Smith dated 14th July 1815. In: NLS, MS 15385, p.68

¹⁵⁰ Captain Aberdeen (3rd battalion of the line KGL). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.3-10

151. Diary 1st regiment of Nassau. In: VPH, nr.71
Report major general Von Kruse. In: VPH, nr.72 The prisoners were 20 wounded soldiers and the captains Schüler and Waitz.

152. Captain Von Scriba (fieldbattalion Bremen). In: VPH, nr.41
Constant Rebecque was able to collect the Nassau battalions several times, but it is not entirely clear from his account whether this was during the period referred to here. He would have led them to the front several times, during which one panicked by the explosion of some grenades. Yet, Constant Rebecque could restore it and bring it back to its position. Cf. his journal. In: NA, 2.21.008.01 nr.25
Captain Weiz (1st battalion, 1st regiment Nassau). In: Unser, A. Darstellung etc. In: Nassauische Heimatblätter, 1915 p.6

153. General Hanoverian report. In: NHA, Hann.41.XXI, nr.156 p.27-49
Major Von Linsingen. In: NHA, Hann.41.XXI, nr.152 p.59-62
The journal of the 5th battalion of the line KGL. In: NHA, Hann.38D. nr.236 p.168-170
The journal of the 8th battalion of the line KGL. In: NHA, Hann.38D, nr.236 p.218-219
Cf. Biedermann, E. lieutenant (2nd battalion light infantry KGL) Von Malta bis Waterloo p.184

154. General Hanoverian report. In: VPH, nr.19
Journal of the 5th battalion of the line KGL. In: VPH, nr.36
Lieutenant colonel Von Linsingen (5th battalion of the line KGL). In: VPH, nr.37
Report on the 8th battalion of the line KGL. In: VPH, nr.38
The journal of the 5th battalion of the line mentions three charges and here the same remark applies. In: VPH, nr.36

¹⁵⁵ Cf. situation of Chassé, batteries of Ramsay and Bull.

¹⁵⁶ One of the units which was under continuous gunfire from 2 to 7 p.m. was the brigade of Von Vincke. Cf. Musician Schacht (Gifhorn battalion, Von Vincke's brigade) in a letter dated 25th August 1815. In: former www.1815.ltd.uk Original in: NSA, nr.299 AN289

157. Cf. Four years of a soldier's life p.409
A group of cuirassiers, returning from a charge, would have passed through the skirmishers of the 14th regiment. Cf. Dalton, The Waterloo roll call p.263

¹⁵⁸ Cf. Muir, R. Tactics and experience etc. p.47

159. Lord E.Somerset. In his report to Wellington dated 24th June. In: WSD, Vol.X, p.577-578.
In his letter dated 23rd June 1815. In: Bodleian library MS.Eng.hist.d. ff.49-60
Lieutenant Marten (2nd Life Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.5-6
Lieutenant Waymouth (2nd regiment of Life Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.707 p.372-375
Private Nicholson (2nd regiment of Life Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.3-4
Lieutenant Pratt (30th regiment) claims the Household brigade carried out several fine charges. In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.88-94

¹⁶⁰ Lieutenant Hamilton (Scots Greys). In a dated 23rd June 1815. In: The Cavalry Journal p.74

Lieutenant Mills (Scots Greys). In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.223-226
Captain Kennedy Clark (Royals). In: BL, Add.ms.34.707 p.91-94
Lord E.Somerset. In his report to Wellington dated 24th June. In: WSD, Vol.X, p.577-578
Cornet Marten (2nd Life Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.5-6

Lieutenant Waymouth (2nd Life Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.707 p.263-265
Lieutenant colonel Clifton (Royals). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.73-76
Lieutenant Biddulph (Inniskillings). In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.325-328
Captain Mackay (Inniskillings). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.81-82
Captain Clark (Royals) erroneously claims his regiment stood at some point of time (until the general advance) about 100 metres south of the Ohain-road. In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.151-154 and 34.707 p.91-94

161. Lord E.Somerset. In his report to Wellington dated 24th June. In: WSD, Vol.X, p.577-578
In his letter dated 23rd June 1815. In: Bodleian library MS.Eng.hist.d. ff.49-60

162. Lieutenant Wyndham (Scots Greys). In: BL, Add.ms.34.707 p.21-22
Major Dorville (Royals). In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.231-232
Lieutenant Mills (Scots Greys). In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.223-226
Captain Clark Kennedy (Royals). In: BL, Add.ms.34.707 p.91-94
Lieutenant colonel Muter (Inniskilling dragoons). In: BL, Add.ms.34.707 p.83-84
At this stage, Muter got wounded. Cf. his letter dated 10th of July to his brother. In private collection. In: www.nam.ac.uk/waterloo200
According to sergeant Johnston (Scots Greys) Lord Uxbridge led the Scots Greys forward only once; after that the remains of the regiment just moved back and forth a bit. Cf. Journal of Johnston. In: Atkinson, C.T. A Waterloo journal. JSAHR.Vol.38 p.39-40
Private Boulter (Scots Greys) in a letter dated 23rd September 1815. In: NAM, 9501-118
According to lieutenant Hamilton (Scots Greys) the remains of both brigades charged a French square which was thrown into some confusion. At least the Scots Greys charged the cuirassiers in front of them , after which both parties kept stationary positions on a short distance of each other, both afraid to advance for fear of the infantry giving way. Cf. lieutenant Hamilton (Scots Greys). In a letter dated 24th June 1815. In: former www.1815.ltd.uk Original in: National Archives of Scotland. RH1/2/517
Majoor Clarke (Scots Greys) states that the charge of the remains of Scots Greys did not make any impression; at that moment Clarke got wounded. Cf. major Clarke (Scots Greys) in a letter to Sir J.Stewart, dated 11st July 1815. In: The Cavalry Journal 1926 Vol.16 p.76
The memorandum of the Inniskillings claims that the brigade charged and drove back the cuirassiers several times. In: BL, Add.ms.34.707 p.11-15
Lieutenant Wilson (battery Sinclair) states that the Royals charged through his battery in driving back the cuirassiers. In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.281-282

¹⁶³ Cf. Lord Uxbridge. In: BL,Add.ms.34.707 p.442-444
The order was carried by one of his aides, captain Wildman. Cf. extensive relative to the Cumberland hussars.
Cf. Lieutenant general Alten's letter dated 27th of July 1815. In: NHA, Hann.42-1762
Cf. Kürzel to Alten, letter dated 28th July 1815. In: NHA, Hann.42-1762

Cf. Preterick to the prince regent, letter dated 2nd November 1815. In: NHA, Hann.42-1762

¹⁶⁴ Künzel to Alten, 28th July 1815. In: NHA, Hann.42-1762

¹⁶⁵ Cf. extensive note relative to the Cumberland hussars.

¹⁶⁶ Cf. Lieutenant Morbotter (1st carabiniers). In: NL-ZuRAZ, Van Löben Sels, 0302 nr.263
Account of private Schalkwijk (1st regiment carabineers). In: KHA, A40 XIII-35
Surgeon Rodi de Loo. In: Dommelen, G.F.van - Levensberigt van wijlen met rang van kolonel
gepensioneerden 1^e officier van gezondheid der 1^e klasse bij de Landmagt M.Rodi p.4
This surgeon accompanied and cared for both commanders.
Register of the MWO. In: Kanselarij der Nederlandse orden, Den Haag

¹⁶⁷ Cf. Diary of lieutenant colonel Renno. In: Groninger Museum, Groningen. Collection
Offerhaus Foundation.
Lieutenant colonel Van Heerdt (chief of staff of the brigade). In: NL-ZuRAZ, Van Löben Sels
0302 nr.263
Squadron sergeant major Fundter (4th regiment of light dragoons). In: Geschiedenis van het
4e regiment lichte dragonders p.19-20

168. Cf. his report. In: Bas, F.de & T'Serclaes de Wommersom. La campagne de 1815 aux
Pays Bas. Vol.III, nr.26 p.416-417
Lieutenant colonel Van Heerdt (chief of staff of the brigade). In: NL-ZuRAZ, Van Löben Sels
0302 nr.263

The 4th regiment of light dragoons stood in two lines (two squadrons in front and one in rear),
of which only the first one attacked. Cf. Diary of lieutenant colonel Renno. In: Groninger
Museum, Groningen. Collection Offerhaus Foundation.

Squadron sergeant major Fundter of the 4th regiment of light dragoons mentions two charges
of his regiment (both ordered by the prince of Orange) which both were unsuccessful due to
the strong French fire and the French superiority in cavalry. In: Geschiedenis van het 4e
regiment lichte dragonders p.19-20

The registers of the Militaire Willemsordes indicate as if the 4th regiment of light dragoons
would have charged several times, but these charges were advances only. Cf. those of captains
Van Dam, Koltrop, 2nd lieutenant Tieleman. In: Kanselarij der Nederlandse Orden, The Hague.
Sergeant Bosch (4th regiment of light dragoons) claims the regiment endured two charges of
cuirassiers and chasseurs à cheval of the imperial guard and that it then retired slightly to the
rear. The regiment fell back under cover of a detachment led by Bosch and consisting of 40 to
50 horsemen. As the French drew back, Bosch would have led the detachment further to the
front again, but at some point he halted for fear of being cut off. In: Family-archive Van Heerdt,
in the Centraal Bureau voor Genealogie, The Hague.

Major Van Krayenhoff doesn't enter into any details of the regiment after the action against the

division of Durutte. Cf. his account in the the Rijksmuseum, nr. NM 10255b

¹⁶⁹ Cf. Brevet major Van Balveren (6th regiment of hussars). In: NL-ZuRAZ, Van Löben Sels 0302 nr.263

Captain Umbgrove (6th regiment of hussars). In: CBG, Collection Umbgrove, Genealogische fragmenten, 1944, p.71

1st lieutenant Deebetz (6th regiment of hussars). In: NL-ZuRAZ, Van Löben Sels 0302 nr.263
The commander of the 5th regiment of light dragoons, lieutenant colonel De Mercx, is highly uninformative in his letter dated 17th January 1855 by merely stating: “Là [the place where Van Merlen fell] et ailleurs, mon regiment s’est toujours distingué.” In: Marchot, R. – Notice biographique etc. p.77

Brigadier Jan Norden (6th regiment of hussars) is equally uninformative in his most general account. In: Norden, J. - Het leven en de lotgevallen van de gebroeders J.en A.Norden p.398

¹⁷⁰ Cf. Report of lieutenant colonel Boreel. In: Bas, F.de & T’Serclaes de Wommersom - La campagne de 1815 Vol.III p.418-420

Sergeant major Fundter. In: Geschiedenis van het 4e regiment lichte dragonders p.15

Brevet major Van Balveren (6th regiment of hussars). In: NL-ZuRAZ, Van Löben Sels 0302 nr.263

171. Major Turner in his letter dated 3rd of July 1815. In: NAM, nr. 7509/62

Captain Verner (7th regiment of hussars) states that most of the cannonballs flew over the infantry, hitting his comrades. Not long after, the regiment moved slightly to its right to avoid the gunfire, but this made matters even worse. After that, the regiment found a more covered position in a sunken lane [?]. In: Verner, W. - Reminiscences of William Verner. In: JSAHR.1965, nr.8

Lieutenant O’Grady (7th regiment hussars) claims his regiment charged 12 or 14 times. In his letter dated 31st July 1815. In: NAM, 1978-05-24

172. Major general Adam. In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.404-413

According to Adam the advance took place in battalions in columns of companies on quarter distance.

Cf.Lord Seaton (52nd regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.708 p.40-49

Another witness mentions an advance in wing squares. Cf. Lieutenant Gawler (52nd regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.88-97

Cf. lieutenant colonel Reynell (71st regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.234-239

Corporal Aldridge (2nd battalion 95th regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.98-100

Captain Eeles (3rd battalion 95th regiment). In: BL, Add.34.704 p.77-82

Cf. Cf.Caldwell & Cooper. Rifle green at Waterloo p.64

¹⁷³ The square would have parried several charges of cuirassiers. Cf.Cannon, R. Historical

record of the 23rd or Royal Welsh Fusileers p.153

According to private T.Jeremiah, the 23rd regiment first would have been charged five times by dragoons and then by cuirassiers. All charges would have been beaten off by the 23rd by a fire given at 30 to 40 paces. Cf. Account of T.Jeremiah (23rd regiment). In: NLW, MS.22102A p.60-62

According to captain Enoch (23rd regiment) the 23rd pushed back cuirassiers four to five times. In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.22-25

174. Lieutenant Holmes (23rd regiment). In: BL,Add.ms.34.705 p.209-212

175. Schneidawind, F. Der letzte Feldzug etc. p.108

Schneidawind mentions a battalion "Wolffradt"; the battalion meant is probably the 2nd battalion of the line.

Wachholtz, F.von Geschichte des herzoglich Braunschweigischen Armee-Corps etc. p.41-42
Colonel Von Herzberg, of the Brunswick staff. In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.23-55

J.Hamilton (2nd battalion line infantry KGL). Cf. his letter dated 21st July 1815. In: NAM, nr.7905/5

Major general Adam confirms the success of the Brunswickers on north-side of the ridge. In: BL, Add.sm.34.706 p.404-405 and 406-413

176. Ensign Gronow (1st Foot Guards) mentions a strong charge of chasseurs à cheval on the Brunswickers. In: The reminiscences and recollections of captain p.71

177. Wachholtz, F.von - Geschichte des herzoglich Braunschweigischen Armee-Corps etc. p.42

Colonel Von Herzberg, of the Brunswick staff. In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.23-55

Captain Von Heinemann (Brunswick horse artillery). Cf. his letter dated 4th July 1815. In: former www.1815.ltd.uk Original in: NSA, 251, neu 9

Captain Von Heinemann was the brother of lieutenant colonel Von Heinemann, who fell later that day near the 2nd Brunswick battalion of line infantry, shortly it had been ordered to deploy from square in line and to advance.

178. Report lieutenant general Clinton to Lord Hill, dated 19th June 1815. In: WSD, Vol.X,p.545-546

Cf. Ensign Uslar-Gleichen (4th battalion of the line, brigade Duplat). In: Dehnel, H. Erinnerungen deutscher Officiere etc. p.365

Major Von Wissell to lieutenant general Clinton, dated 20th June 1815. In: NHA, Hann.38D nr.200

List of battalion-commanders of the 2nd division, as listed by assistant adjudant general G.Marlay, dated 13th July 1815. In: WSD, Vol..X, p.751

Lieutenant Kuckuck (3rd battalion of the line KGL). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.40-41

Kuckuck claims each battalion lost about 100 men (out of the 400).
According to major Von Wissell, Duplat fell around 3.30 p.m.

179. Cf. state mentioned above.

Captain Von Goeben (1st battalion of the line KGL). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.42-45

180. Lieutenant Kuckuck (3rd battalion of the line KGL). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.40-41

181. Cf. State of battalion-commanders of the 2nd division mentioned above.

Cf. Ensign Uslar-Gleichen (4th battalion of the line, brigade Duplat). In: Dehnel, H. –
Erinnerungen deutscher Officiere etc. p.365

¹⁸² Major Von Wissell. In: Report to the duke of Cambridge dated 20th June 1815. In: NHA
NHA, Hann.38D. nr.200 p.7-9, 11-13

¹⁸³ Captain Aberdeman (3rd battalion of the line KGL). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.3-10

¹⁸⁴ Lieutenant colonel Saltoun (1st Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.431-434

Cf. Sergeant Ch.Wood (same battalion). In: Some particulars of the battle of Waterloo in a
letter from a serjeant [sic] of the Guards p.5. In a letter dated 29th July 1815 to J.B. at London

185. Lieutenant colonel Saltoun (1st Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.431-434

Lieutenant Davis (1st Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.75-76

While Saltoun explicitly indicates that this took place *during* the grand cavalry-attacks, Davis
does so a period *after* them.

¹⁸⁶ Ensign Gronow (1st Foot Guards). In: The reminiscences and recollections of captain p.71
Ensign Macready (30th regiment) in his diary. In: History of the 30th regiment p.342

187. Ensign Gronow (1st Foot Guards). In: The reminiscences and recollections of captain p.71

Cf. Sergeant Ch.Wood (3rd battalion 1st Foot Guards). In: Some particulars of the battle of
Waterloo in a letter from a serjeant [sic] of the Guards p.5. In a letter dated 29th July 1815 to
J.B. at London

¹⁸⁸ Lieutenant Van Wassenaar. In: NL-ZuRAZ, Van Löben Sels, 0302 nr.262

Captain Gey van Pittius. In: NL-ZuRAZ, Van Löben Sels, 0302 nr.262

Captain Petter. In: NL-ZuRAZ, Van Löben Sels, 0302 nr.262

189. General report. In: VPH, nr.19

Also see: lieutenant Bülow of the battalion Bremen, in a letter dated 26 August 1815. In:

Kannicht, J. Und alles wegen Napoleon p.205

Scriba, C.von Das leichte Bataillon etc. p.94-96

Between 6 and 7 p.m. there was no more regularity in the formation of the 3rd battalion of KGL due to the fact that because of the noise orders could hardly be heard. Further, it was unclear who was in command as all officers had either been killed or wounded or dismounted. Cf. captain Aberdeman. In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.3-10

¹⁹⁰ At the fifth and last charge of French cavalry upon the square of the battalions Bremen and Verden, it was still closed, but no more as an irregular triangle. Cf. Captain Von Scriba. In: Das leichte Bataillon etc. p.98

191. See above. Captain Von Scriba (fieldbattalion Bremen). In: VPH, nr.41

192. Ensign Gronow, R.H. (1st Foot Guards) - The reminiscences and recollections etc. p. Gronow claims Wellington then had just one aide de camp left, but this is exaggerated.

¹⁹³ Ensign Gronow, R.H. (1st Foot Guards) - The reminiscences and recollections etc. p.190

¹⁹⁴ After its first charge, the brigade of Picquet (division l'Héritier) was collected in the low ground of La Haye Sainte. From there, the brigade took up a new position with the 2nd regiment of dragoons on the ridge, and the 7th regiment to its right rear, at the foot of the declivity.

Feeling a moment of weakness in the enemy's line, the chef d'escadron of the 7th dragoons asked the commander of the 2nd, colonel Léopold, to charge but he refused as he had no further orders.

As a result, Létang charged and apparently had some success, until the 2nd regiment fell back to take the former position of the 7th. As now Létang had the impression he might be turned, he ordered the regiment to pull back as well, until the 2nd halted. Then it became clear that the whole situation was the result of a misunderstanding. Létang led his regiment to the front again, but failed in the attempt. After that, the only thing he could do was to maintain his position. Cf. Chef d'escadron Létang (7th dragoons). In: Note sur la charge de la division l'Héritier. In: SHAT, nr.MR719

¹⁹⁵. Kellermann. Observations sur la bataille de Waterloo etc. SHAT, Mémoires et reconnaissances, no.718

¹⁹⁶ Kellermann. Observations sur la bataille de Waterloo etc. SHAT, Mémoires et reconnaissances, no.718

¹⁹⁷. Kellermann. Observations sur la bataille de Waterloo etc. SHAT, Mémoires et reconnaissances, no.718

Notes of captain De Stuers (red lancers), as cited by Houssaye. In:1815.Waterloo p.386
Colonel Trefcon - Carnet de campagne du colonel Trefcon 1793-1815 p.189

A sergeant of the 71st speaks of a charge of five squadrons of French cavalry clad in armour. Cf. his letter to his parents. In: Caledonian Mercury, dated 8th July 1815
Cf. the desertion of a member of the 2nd carabiniers some later (see below).

^{198.} Report of major Von Rettberg (1st battalion of the line KGL). In: VPH, nr.32

^{199.} Report of lieutenant colonel Von Müller (2nd battalion of the line KGL). In: VPH, nr.33
Lieutenant Hamilton (2nd battalion of line infantry KGL) Cf. his letter dated 21st July 1815.
In: NAM, 7905/5

Lieutenant Kuckuck (3rd battalion of the line KGL). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.40-41

^{200.} Kellermann. Observations sur la bataille de Waterloo etc. SHAT, Mémoires et reconnaissances, no.718

Captain De Brack (lancers of the imperial guard). In: La cavalerie de la garde à Waterloo p.366
Notes of captain De Stuers (red lancers), cited by Houssaye. In: 1815.Waterloo p.386

²⁰¹ General Guyot himself. In: Carnets de campagne p.386, 394

Within the 3rd and 4th corps of cavalry several other high officers were wounded, such as lieutenant general Lhéritier, major general Picquet, major general Guiton, lieutenant general Roussel d'Hurbal, major general Blancard, colonel Lacroix (3rd regiment of cuirassiers - he died of his wounds on the 30th of June), colonel Léopold (7th regiment of dragoons), baron colonel Chassériau (chief of staff of Milhaud's corps) (he died on the 26th of June), lieutenant general Wathier, major general Dubois, major general Travers, lieutenant general Delort, major general Farine. In the light cavalry of the guard baron Lallemand and De Monthyon (his chief of staff) were wounded. Major general Donop was missing.

Later in the battle, general Jamin was killed. His aide de camp Valéry de Siriaque wrote in Paris on the 30th of June 1815: "Je déclare que le général Jamin est tombé à mes côtés entre les pièces d'artillerie Anglaise qui se trouvaient déjà abandonnées. Le coup qui l'a jeté en bas de son cheval est parti d'un carré d'infanterie Anglais qui se trouvait à notre droite et nous étions alors à 70 pas. Je suis resté près de son corps ¼ d'heure environ durant lequel il n'a pas donné signe de vie et ne l'ai quitté qu'au moment où les canons enemies reprenaient leurs pièces le régiment ayant été obligé de se replier." In: Jamin's file. In: SHD. Cf. Papers E.Stoffel.

^{202.} According to Fletcher the charges petered out around 5.30 p.m. In: A desperate business p.142

Delort, Milhaud and the official French bulletin state that the grand cavalry charges took about three hours.

Milhaud in his report to Soult. In: Notice sur les etc. p.380

Cf. French bulletin. In: Bas, F.de & T.Serclaes de Wommersom – La campagne de 1815 Vol.III p.553

