

## **Preliminary actions.**

*Napoleon's plan.*

**B**y 9 a.m. most of the 1<sup>st</sup> French corps had taken up its battle positions, and the units of the 2<sup>nd</sup> were completing theirs between 10 and 11 a.m.

Being informed by Haxo about the absence of any entrenchments [<sup>1</sup>] and after having observed how the weather was improving and how the different units of the army were taking up their positions, Napoleon now dictated his plan for the battle to Soult at 11 a.m. for Ney. <sup>2</sup> It reads:

*Once the entire army will be ranged in battle, at approximately 1 p.m., at the moment the emperor will give the order to marshal Ney, the attack will commence in order to take the village of Mont Saint Jean which is at the intersection of the roads. To this end, the 12 pounder batteries of the 2<sup>nd</sup> corps and those of the 6<sup>th</sup> will join those of the 1<sup>st</sup> corps.*

*These 24 guns will be firing on the troops of Mont Saint Jean, and count d'Erlon will start the attack, by moving his left division forward and, depending on the circumstances, to support it with the divisions of the 1<sup>st</sup> corps.*

*The 2<sup>nd</sup> corps will subsequently advance to protect count d'Erlon's line. The companies of sappers of the 1<sup>st</sup> corps will hold themselves into readiness to immediately entrench themselves at Mont Saint Jean.* <sup>3</sup>

The area around the crossroads of the Brussels road and the Ohain-road was the target of the main attack; from there Napoleon wanted to penetrate deep into Wellington's position as far as the hamlet of Mont Saint Jean so as to cut off Wellington's centre and right wing from the direct road to Brussels through the forest.

In Napoleon's mind, the way to do this was a massive frontal attack which was to be preceded by a heavy bombardment of a grand battery placed near the centre of the French line, as well as by a preliminary action of a part of Reille's corps to against the complex of Gomont.

Highly protruding from the enemy's position, Gomont was considered a potential threat upon the left flank of Reille and therefore had to be neutralized first. After doing so, Reille was not to push through his advance against Wellington's main position. The time calculated for neutralizing Gomont was about two hours.

In this main attack, the 1<sup>st</sup> corps - formed *en echelon* left in front- was then to break through Wellington's line towards the hamlet of Mont Saint Jean. As a further support to d'Erlon's left, Reille was to advance against Wellington's line shortly after the 1<sup>st</sup> corps.

After the 1<sup>st</sup> corps would have split Wellington's line in its very centre, the success was then to be exploited by the corps of Lobau and the cavalry of Milhaud and Lefebvre Desnouettes in a combined shock action. At the same time, guns of the grand battery would advance as well, to enhance the shock. Eventually, the Imperial Guard would move up to crown the success. <sup>4</sup>

### *The attack on Gomont.*

Having dictated his plan for the battle, Napoleon ordered Reille to attack Gomont with his 9<sup>th</sup> division, led by his brother. By now it was running towards 11.15 a.m. <sup>5</sup>

Jérôme decided to use his brigade led by general Bauduin. Bauduin accordingly formed his men in five battalion columns, which were arranged around the wood; they were preceded by a very large number of skirmishers, which swarmed out in front and on both flanks of the wood. <sup>6</sup> By now, it was around 11.30 a.m. or slightly later. <sup>7</sup>

All allied batteries had got the explicit order not to fire on the French batteries, but on approaching French infantry and cavalry only. <sup>8</sup> As the columns approached the wood of Gomont, they now came under fire from the batteries of Bull, Cleeves, Lloyd, Kühlmann, Sandham, Webber Smith and Petter / Gey. <sup>9</sup>

As lord Uxbridge had witnessed the preparations of an attack upon Gomont, he had ordered the horse battery of Bull, equipped with howitzers, to get into action against it. As a result he pulled it up to a position right at the junction of the roads coming from La Belle Alliance and Ohain, where it came in action with spherical case with the intention of dislodging the French infantry on the left of Gomont, at about 900 metres distance. At the same, time the French here came under fire from the batteries of Cleeves and Kühlmann. The one of Webber Smith, placed further west, was able to annoy the columns which approached Gomont from the south, until they disappeared from its view when they reached the edge of the wood. <sup>10</sup> Both the prince of Orange and lieutenant general Alten were witness of the success of the Anglo-Netherlands-German guns. <sup>11</sup>



Gomont, seen from the south-west.

The Hanoverian and Nassau units fired their muskets from the edge of the wood on the French skirmishers, but due to their numerical inferiority they were unable to hold them back. A fight ensued, in which the allied troops were forced back deeper into the wood. <sup>12</sup> At this stage,

general Bauduin – who was in charge of the attack - fell.<sup>13</sup>

As the French skirmishers progressed in the wood, supports in the form of company columns established themselves in its edge and advanced from there into it. They had stepped out from the battalion columns, which were left in the open fields around the wood as reserves.

Meanwhile, a foot battery of the 2<sup>nd</sup> French corps opened its fire. Soon, it was supported by Napoleon himself with two batteries of Kellermann's corps.<sup>14</sup> Piré's battery, having by now advanced up to the height where the road coming from Braine l'Alleud crosses the Nivelles-road, was also involved by unleashing an effective enfilading fire upon the allied main position.<sup>15</sup> The result was that, by noon, the gun-fire on this sector of the battlefield had increased significantly.<sup>16</sup> All of these French guns inflicted serious casualties on numerous allied units in the main position between both highroads which as a result laid down and / or moved either closer to the ridge or further to the rear, or in a lateral way to avoid the gunfire.<sup>17</sup>

The French infantry pushed the Hanoverian and Nassau units back towards the buildings and the enclosures around them.<sup>18</sup> Meanwhile, around noon, the garrison was reinforced with companies nos. 2 and 3 of the 2<sup>nd</sup> battalion 3<sup>rd</sup> Foot Guards; they most probably moved into a position west of Gomont.<sup>19</sup>

Backed up by this reinforcement and the gunfire which was resumed upon the French in the wood, the light companies of Maitland's brigade now fell upon the French right flank in the wood, by coming out from the orchard. As the light companies of Byng's brigade had moved from the rear of the complex to the area west of it some time before, these now attacked the French in the wood in their left.<sup>20</sup> By doing so they succeeded, aided by the Hanoverian jäger, to drive the French out of it.<sup>21</sup> By then it was about 12.30 o'clock.

By the time the French skirmishers, supported by a few platoons of Piré, swarmed out towards Gomont, a company of the 51<sup>st</sup> (led by captain Phelps) was sent out to extend as skirmishers to meet them. Owing to the undulating ground and the high standing corn, the British did not come in contact with the French light troops until at a very short distance. Here they fired, cheered and dashed forward, thereby driving back the French to their supports. Incited by their success, and supported by a small body of light cavalry, the men of the 51<sup>st</sup> were keen to continue their advance, but were called back by lord Hill. They withdrew accordingly upon four other companies of the 51<sup>st</sup> (led by major Keyt) which had taken up positions in rear of the hollow road which extends from Gomont to Braine l'Alleud. The company joined them to their left, immediately to the right of the Nivelles-road. By that time it had already lost 12 of its 70 men.<sup>22</sup> Another company, led by captain Ross, had taken up a position before on the road, near the abatis.<sup>23</sup> The remainder of the regiment kept its positions at about 180 metres in rear of the hollow road.<sup>24</sup>

It became clear to high command that progress at Gomont was not what was expected it to be in relation to the grand offensive which was about to start in about one hour. As a result, Ney sent one of his aides, colonel Levasseur, to find out and intervene if needed. In convincing himself on the spot that Bauduin's brigade apparently had been incapable to carry out the task assigned to it, he now urged Jérôme Bonaparte to engage his 2nd brigade, the one of Soye.<sup>25</sup> As Jérôme did so, the French now assailed the wood again.<sup>26</sup> Under this pressure the British guards fell back towards their original positions: for the light companies of Byng's brigade these were the grounds west of the buildings of Gomont.<sup>27</sup> The ones of Maitland went back towards the orchard.<sup>28</sup>

It was for the first time that the French emerged from the wood and stormed the buildings and

the walled garden. Yet, before being able to do so they had to breach the hedge along the outer perimeter of the wood here and as they then entered the open strip of land between this hedge and the buildings of Gomont, the French came under the well-aimed musketry-fire which was unleashed by the men of the 1st battalion of Nassau from behind and through the garden-wall, as well as from the buildings. In this killing zone, many French fell and the men – not risking a general escalade – sought safety in the wood, to find cover behind the trees and hedges.<sup>29</sup> It was from there that they kept up a well-maintained skirmishing fire on their well hidden opponents. By now the wood of Gomont was crowded with French where Bull's destructive howitzer-fire caused great losses and disorder.<sup>30</sup> At the same time, the British forces immediately west of Gomont, in the vicinity of the haystack, kept stationary. It was now around 1 p.m.<sup>31</sup>

It was also by now that the grand battery, composed of 54 guns, had been fully established and it was not long after that it started its fire. Added to the roaring of the gunfire on the French left wing, the noise of battle now became tremendous. By 1.15 p.m. the garrison at Gomont received a considerable reinforcement which advanced towards the grounds immediately north-west of Gomont. They were the grenadier and 1<sup>st</sup> company of the 2<sup>nd</sup> battalion / 3<sup>rd</sup> regiment of Guards, led by lieutenant colonel Home, as well as three companies of Coldstream Guards, led by lieutenant colonel Mackinnon.<sup>32</sup>

Right from the start of the action upon Gomont, swarms of skirmishers had also been sent forward all along the front-line of the French 2<sup>nd</sup> corps towards Wellington's (right) centre. Here, they were involved in a popping fire with their enemy's counterparts upon the slopes of the ridge of Mont Saint Jean.<sup>33</sup>

It was in this context that not long after the battle had started that the 1st and 2nd company of the 1st battalion of light infantry KGL, led captain Wynecken and Von Goeben, were sent out as skirmishers north of the farm of La Haye Sainte and to the right of its garden.<sup>34</sup>

### *Napoleon and Grouchy.*

It was somewhere between 10.30 a.m. and 12.30 p.m. that the report was delivered to Napoleon which Grouchy had written at 6 that morning from Gembloux.<sup>35</sup> In the same time-frame, more information dropped in from Subervie's horsemen who were patrolling the valley of the Lasne about the presence of Prussian patrols which were preceding some kind of force which was approaching from the east.<sup>36</sup> Now, as a result – it was then between 12.30 and 1 p.m. - Soult wrote to Grouchy:

*Marshal,*

*You have written to the emperor this morning at 6 a.m. that you would move to Sart à Walhain. Thus, it was your plan to proceed to Corbaix and Wavre. This movement is in conformity with the dispositions of His Majesty which have been communicated to you. Nevertheless, the emperor orders me to tell you that you always ought to manoeuvre in our direction and to attempt to approach the army, so that you can join us before any Prussian corps can place itself between us. I do not give you a direction, it is up to you to find out where we are, in order to arrange yourself accordingly and to link our communications and also to be able to fall upon*

*some enemy troops which may be trying to disturb our right, and to crush them.*

*The 18<sup>th</sup> at 1 p.m.*

*Marshal duke of Dalmatia*<sup>37</sup>

Immediately after writing to Grouchy, at 1.15 p.m., Soult also wrote to Davout the following letter:

*du bivouac en avant de Caillou, le 18 juin, à une heure un quart*

*Au ministre de la guerre,*

*Monsieur le maréchal, nous nous battons en ce moment; l'ennemi est en position en avant de la foret de Soignes, son centre à Waterloo.*

*Nous allons consommer beaucoup de munitions; nous en avons usé une grande quantité à la bataille de Ligny. L'Empereur ordonne que vous en fassiez diriger sur les places du Nord, sur Avesnes, par des moyens accélérés. Ces munitions seront escortées d'Avesnes au moyen des bataillons qu'on a ordonné d'y établir pour l'escorte de prisonniers; la direction que vous devez leur faire donner est celle de Beaumont sur Charleroi pour rejoindre l'armée.*

*Vous sentirez, monsieur le maréchal, combien il est important que les ordres de l'Empereur soient promptement exécutés. Je vous prie de me prévenir de ceux que vous donnerez à cet égard.*<sup>38</sup>

Just as Soult was about finishing this second letter, a Prussian officer was led to the imperial headquarters. He had been taken prisoner by a patrol of Subervie and was the bearer of a letter of general Bülow to Von Müffling. It learned the French general staff that the 4<sup>th</sup> Prussian corps was supposed to fall upon the French right flank.<sup>39</sup>

After an assessment of the situation and instigated by Napoleon, Soult decided to make some additions to his letter to Grouchy dated 1 p.m. and which was still pending to be sent out. First, he added a post scriptum which reads:

*“P.S. A letter which has just been intercepted states that general Bülow must attack our right flank. We believe that we can see this corps on the heights of St.Lambert thus do not lose an instant to approach us, and to join us and to crush Bülow whom you will take in the very act. Nap[oleon]”*<sup>40</sup>

Second, he rumbled the following words between the last line of the main part of his letter and his own signature, thereby specifying more precisely the position of the main army:

*“At this moment the battle is engaged on the line of Waterloo in front of the forest of Soignes, the centre of the enemy is at Mont Saint Jean, so manoeuvre to join our right.”*

Eventually, it was around 1.30 p.m. that the officer who was supposed to carry the letter was despatched to Grouchy. Napoleon, as he had got the intercepted Prussian letter, now decided to

send the cavalry division of Subervie to his right flank as well. <sup>41</sup> It was then around 1.30 p.m. Subervie joined with his division the one of Domon, where he was now acting under Lobau's command. <sup>42</sup>

At the same time, in the context of the instructions Lobau already had, Napoleon ordered him to reconnoitre the fields on his extreme right wing for a possible position there later, in case of necessity. <sup>43</sup>

Meanwhile, the despatch of Soult's letter to Davout had been delayed as well. In view of the significant events which had just taken place this can easily be explained. Finally, by 2.30 p.m., Soult also gave this document a post scriptum which reads:

*P.S. Il est deux heures et demie; la canonnade est engagée sur toute la ligne; les Anglais sont au centre, les Hollandais et Belges à droite des troupes Allemandes, les Prussiens sont à la gauche; la bataille est générale; quatre cent bouches à feu tonnent en ce moment.* <sup>44</sup>

From this, it can be concluded that the document was most probably sent out between 2.30 and 3 p.m. <sup>45</sup>

*Wellington's extreme right wing.*

As the action at Gomont continued for about half an hour and as the cavalry of Piré developed along the Nivelles road and to the west of it, Wellington instructed Hill to pull his extreme right flank in on the line Gomont – Merbraine. For Chassé it meant that he now received the following order:

*18 juin*

*Le général commandant de la 3e division Belgique aura la bonté de disposer des troupes dans la manière suivante: 1 bataillon dans le village de Braine la Leud, 2 bataillons pour communiquer de Braine la Leud avec la droite de la division anglaise et pour soutenir le bataillon dans le village. Les autres bataillons de la division seront placés derrière Braine la Leud à la droite de la 2me division anglaise entre cette division et le Bois de Soignes, mais touchante l'aile droite des anglais.*

*Signé,*

*Hill* <sup>46</sup>

After Chassé got this order, he pulled in all his detachments and detached battalions, except for the 6th and the 17th battalion of national militia (brigade Detmers), which he kept in their former positions. <sup>47</sup> The four remaining battalions of the brigade Detmers came in division-columns immediately to the east of the village. <sup>48</sup> By 1 p.m. the flankers company of the 6th company of the 6th battalion of national militia led by 1st lieutenant Suterland started skirmishing with the French cavalry south of Braine l'Alleud. <sup>49</sup>

The brigade of d'Aubremé left its position near the farm of Du Vieux Foriez through Braine l'Alleud to a position north-east of the village. Here it kept its position for quite some time. <sup>50</sup>

Initially. Adam's brigade had stood south-east of Merbraine, but by noon it moved in columns to a position half way between Merbraine and the Nivelles-road.<sup>51</sup>

*The arrival and development of Durutte's division.*

Around noon, the division of Durutte arrived in his assigned position of the order of battle at the extreme right flank of the French army. Not long after after, he opened gunfire upon the extreme allied left flank.<sup>52</sup>

In developing his infantry, Durutte also sent a strong line of skirmishers ahead towards the complex of Papelotte and La Haye.

As a result of this French advance, the 2<sup>nd</sup> Nassau battalion detached its flanker-company (led by lieutenant Fuchs) towards the farm of La Haye. The 3<sup>rd</sup> Nassau battalion did the same with its flanker-company (led by captain Von Rettberg) to the farm of Papelotte.<sup>53</sup>

The French managed to get to the immediate vicinity of this last farm but were driven back here by Von Rettberg into the low ground. In the process, Von Rettberg occupied a few small houses in the area with his flankers.<sup>54</sup> To his left, the detachment of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Nassau battalion was equally successful in holding the French back.

Durutte's development was on its left flank covered by an aggressive demonstration of a part of Jacquinet's division in the direction of the brigades of Best and Von Vincke and the battery of Von Rettberg. This battery, plus the section of captain Winssinger (captain Bijleveld) further to the left rear, opened fire.

The 10th regiment of hussars (brigade Vivian) had a picket, consisting of one squadron led by captain Taylor, at Smohain and as soon as he was informed that 3 or 4 French squadrons approached the village, he withdrew his squadron and formed it in the open to protect a possible retreat of the infantry present. Gardiner's horse battery also advanced but didn't get into action.

As a result of the threat, Von Vincke – after detaching skirmishers to protect Von Rettberg's battery – fell back slightly to the rear, to a position next to the one of Best. Best, in his turn, had detached skirmishers as well as a cover for Von Rettberg.

Because of the presence of the French cavalry and in order not to manoeuvre, Von Vincke and Best decided to merge their brigades into one dense square of which the battalions were intermixed and of which the front stood on the crest of the ridge. Von Vincke, as senior in command, took over the command of the whole. Eventually, the French cavalry did not push through their demonstration which either served as a strong for the development of Durutte or as a reconnaissance upon Wellington's extreme left flank.<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Gourgaud. La campagne de 1815 p.73

Mémoires pour servir etc. p.125

Baron Petiet. Souvenirs militaires p.212

Haxo himself states he was sent out to find out about the enemies strength; he estimated them to be about 80.000 strong. Cf. his notes taken by M.Maurice on the 25th June 1815. In: Mélanges et documents etc. p.375

<sup>2</sup> Both Napoleon himself and Gourgaud confirm that Napoleon dictated an *ordre de bataille*, which was in fact a plan for the battle. Cf. La campagne de 1815 p.72 and Mémoires pour servir pour servir etc. p.125

3. Cf. copy in SHAT, nr.C15, nr.5

This copy has the following note at the bottom:

*“Collationné. Certifié conforme à la pièce originale non signée, mais ordre de l’époque et d’une écriture connue communiquée en 1859 par la famille du général Rogniat, Paris le [..] Septembre 1859. Le colonel, conservateur des archives du dépôt de la guerre Brabant [?].”*

The version as published by the duc d’Elchingen comes from one as written by Ney in pencil and to which he added on the bottom of the document the following note:

*Count d’Erlon will understand that it is by the left that the attack will commence, instead of by the right. Transmit this new disposition to general in command Reille.*

Additionally, he wrote on the 21<sup>st</sup> of June on the rear of the document the following note:

*“Ordres dictés par l’Empereur, sur le champ de bataille du Mont Saint Jean, le 18, vers onze heures du matin, et écrits par le maréchal Duc de Dalmatie, major général. Paris, le 21 Juin 1815. Le maréchal Prince de la Moskowa, Pair de France, Ney.”*

In: Documents inédits nr.XIX p.53-54

Napoleon’s version is different as in this version of each corps just one battery is mentioned: “A cet effet, la batterie de 12 du 2<sup>me</sup> corps et celle du 6<sup>me</sup> se réuniront à celle du 1<sup>er</sup> corps.”

Ney’s note is left out altogether. Cf. Correspondance. Nr.22060

Colonel Levassieur, an aide de camp of Ney, had been assigned to inform the generals of the order of attack dated 11 a.m. First, Levassieur would have gone to Jérôme Bonaparte and then to d’Erlon; Reille is not mentioned. In: Souvenirs p.296-297

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Jomini – Précis etc. p.167

<sup>5</sup> Jérôme Bonaparte says he got the order to attack at 12.15 o’clock. Cf. His letter date 15<sup>th</sup> July 1815 to his wife. In: Mémoires et correspondances etc. Vol.VII p.22



6. For the fact that there several columns were involved, cf.

Ensign Standen (2<sup>nd</sup> battalion 3<sup>rd</sup> Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.708 p.324-327

Major Büsgen. In: VPH, nr.75. He speaks of “zahlreicher Tirailleurs, unterstützt von geschlossenen Truppen”

Lieutenant Ellison (1<sup>st</sup> Foot Guards). He speaks of three columns which were posted at the bottom of the hill outside the wood. In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.1-2

Captain Kühlmann (battery Kühlmann) claims there was one column, but this was most probably the one he aimed his fire to, east of Gomont. In: Hann.41.XXI, nr.151 p.134-137

Captain Cleeves speaks about dispersing a column of 3000 to 4000 men, which is grossly exaggerated. In: Hann.41.XXI, nr.151 p.139-146

A lot of skirmishers swarmed out to the south in the direction of the gardens west of Gomont. Cf. Private Clay (2nd battalion 3rd Foot Guards). In: former [www.1815.ltd.uk](http://www.1815.ltd.uk) – Original in: Regiment Headquarters Scots Guards.

There might have been one or two columns east of the wood, two to the south and one to the west.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. separate note.

8. Lieutenant colonel Hartmann. In: VPH, nr.29

Captain Kühlmann (battery Kühlmann). In: VPH, nr.62

Lieutenant Adye (battery Sandham). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.7-10

Lieutenant Von Wissell (battery Kühlmann). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.262-263

<sup>9</sup> It had been around 11 a.m. that the battery of Petter / Gey had received instructions to advance to the ridge of Mont Saint Jean. Until then, the battery (or, rather two half batteries) had stood near the division of Collaert. After that, it had moved to a position at the foot of the declivity of the ridge where it halted for a short period of time. From there, it advanced to the crest of the ridge. Here the battery took up a position immediately east of the bifurcation of the Ohain-road and the one which leads from there to La Belle Alliance, having the half battery of Petter to the left and the of Gey to the right. It was a position between the battery of Webber Smith to its left and those of Ramsay, Bull and a Brunswick battery to its right. It had only just established itself there, or three of its caissons were hit by French gunfire and exploded. It did not prevent the battery however from taking up an advantageous position, covering all in its front, Gomont included.

Cf. Report of captain Petter. In: Bas, F.de & T'Serclaes de Wommersom. La campagne de 1815 aux Pays Bas. Vol.III, nr.29, p.426-429

Cf. his letter. In: NL-ZuRAZ. Van Löben Sels 0302, nr.262

Lieutenant Wassenaar van St.Pancras (battery Gey). In: NL-ZuRAZ. Van Löben Sels 0302, nr.262

Major Turner (13th regiment of light dragoons). In a letter. In: NAM, nr. nr.7509-62

Lord Seaton (52nd regiment, brigade Adam) mentions a Belgian battery named "Gould" as one through which his unit passed later in the day. This pleads for the same position.

Yet, if Seaton meant colonel Gold, commander of the artillery of the 2nd British division, it remains unclear why he then gives the battery the Belgian nationality. In: BL, Add.ms.34.708 p.84-88 and p.40-49

Captain Petter speaks about a group of 32 guns, counting his own unit, a Brunswick and two British batteries. In fact, these were 28 guns, as the British units were composed of six guns instead of eight.

Cf. Muilwijk, E. – The forgotten Dutch battery at Waterloo In: First empire (2005), nr.83 p.4-9

10. Lieutenant Von Wissell (battery Kühlmann). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.262-263

Captain Walcott (battery Webber Smith). In: BL Add.ms.34.704 p.184-185

2nd lieutenant Ludowicz (battery Cleeves). In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.436-437, 34.705 p.28-29

Lieutenant general Alten in his report to Wellington. In: WSD, Vol.X. p.534-535

Captain Cleeves. In: Hann.41.XXI. nr.151 p.139-146

Captain Kühlmann. In: Hann.41.XXI, nr.151 p.134-137

General Hanoverian report. In: Hann.41.XXI, nr.156 p.27-49

General Hanoverian report. In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.298-302

Ensign Wedgwood (2<sup>nd</sup> battalion 3<sup>rd</sup> Foot Guards). Cf. his letter dated 19<sup>th</sup> June 1815. In: [www.1815.ltd.uk](http://www.1815.ltd.uk) Original in: Regimental Headquarters Scots Guards.

Captain Chr.Heise (1st battalion of light infantry KGL). In: BL, Add.ms.34.706.122

Captain Bull (battery Bull). In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.46-49

Subaltern Townsend (battery Bull). Cf. extract of his letter, dated ? In: Lipscombe, N. - Henry's Shrapnel's shell – a force multiplier. In: The Waterloo journal Vol.35 no.3 p.5

Sir A.Frazer in a letter dated 20th June 1815. In: Sabine, E. Letters of colonel Sir Augustus Frazer p.555-556

Lord Seaton (52nd regiment) cites colonel De Cubières (1st regiment of light infantry), who would have said that the first Anglo-Netherlands-German gunshot had killed and /or wounded three of his men. In: BL, Add.ms.34.708 p.40-49

Lieutenant colonel Home (2<sup>nd</sup> battalion 3<sup>rd</sup> Foot Guards) states that the first French column which approached the complex was forced to halt due to the allied gunfire, and as result of which it retired under a rising ground for shelter; after that the French no longer advanced to Gomont in column but in a double shield of sharpshooters. Cf. his account dated 1816. In: BL, Add.ms.19590 (Mudford papers).

11. 2<sup>nd</sup> lieutenant Ludowicz (battery Cleeves). In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.436-437, 34.705 p.28-29

Captain Cleeves. In: VPH, nr.63

Captain Kühlmann. In: VPH, nr.62

Ensign Lake (2<sup>nd</sup> battalion 3<sup>rd</sup> Foot Guards). Cf. his journal. In: [www.1815.ltd.uk](http://www.1815.ltd.uk) Original in: Regimental Headquarters Scots Guards

12. Major Büsgen. In: VPH, nr. 75

Ensign Standen (2<sup>nd</sup> battalion 3<sup>rd</sup> Foot Guards). Cf. his letter dated 27<sup>th</sup> June 1815. In: [www.1815.ltd.uk](http://www.1815.ltd.uk) Original in Regimental Headquarters Scots Guards.

There is an indication that the 1<sup>st</sup> battalion of the 1st regiment of light infantry wasn't committed right away: it would have been committed towards 1 p.m. to support its skirmishers in the wood and which had attacked the buildings of Gomont without success. Cf. Chef de bataillon Jolyet (1st regiment of light infantry, division Jérôme). In: Souvenirs et correspondance etc. p.77

13. His death is commemorated on a tablet on the southern wall of the garden, stating: "A la mémoire du général Bauduin tombé devant ces murs le 18 Juin 1815. A.C.M.N. 1987." A.C.M.N. stands for "Association pour la conservation des monuments Napoléoniens."

In military logic, he was succeeded by the senior of the colonels commanding his two regiments, so either colonel De Cubières (1<sup>st</sup> regiment of light infantry) or Vautrin (3<sup>rd</sup> regiment of line infantry).

14. Mémoires pour servir etc. p.136

15. Captain Bull (battery Bull). In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.46-49  
He speaks here of 4 guns.

Captain Powell (1st Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.181-187

Major Meijer (4<sup>th</sup> battalion of KGL line infantry). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.270-273

<sup>16</sup> Ensign Macready (30th regiment) in his diary. In: History of the 30th regiment p.339

Lieutenant Bülow of the battalion Bremen, in a letter dated 26 August 1815. In: Kannicht, J. Und alles wegen Napoleon p.206

General Kellermann. In: Observations sur la bataille de Waterloo etc. In: SHAT, Mémoires et reconnaissances, no.719

General Clinton. In a letter dated 23rd June 1815. In: NLS, MS 3615 f.40

General Von Hügel confirms the French gunfire started between noon and 12.30 p.m. Cf. his report. In: Pfister, A. Aus dem Lager etc. p.369

Lieutenant Pratt (30th regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705.28

Report captain Cleeves. In: Hann.41.XXI, nr.151 p.139-146

Von Brandis, captain (aide de camp of Von Ompteda) Von. In: Dehnel, H. Erinnerungen deutscher Officiere etc. p.286

Gore. In: An historical account etc. p.45

Lieutenant general Alten in his report to Wellington, dated 19th June 1815. In: WSD, Vol.X, p.534-535

Kühlmann mentions a heavy French battery which fired from 700 metres distance. In: Hann.41.XXI, nr.151 p.134-137

Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de France etc. p.135-136

Constant Rebecque In his journal. In: NA, 2.21.008.01 nr.25

Ensign Macready (30<sup>th</sup> regiment). Cf. his letter from Paris dated 7th of July 1815. In: NAM, nr.8203/10

Prince of Orange. Cf. his report to his father, dated 22nd of June. In: WSD, Vol.X, p.555-557  
Also see: Cf. lieutenant H.von Gagern, of the 2nd battalion 1st regiment Nassau. In: Ein unbekannter Waterloo-Brief. In: Nassauische Heimatblätter 1956 Heft 1 p.22  
According to captain Weiz of the 1st battalion of the 1st regiment Nassau infantry, the first shot fell at about noon. Cf. Account of captain F.Weiz. In: Unzer, A. Darstellung etc. In: Nassauische Heimatblätter, 1915 p.4  
Cf. Chapter about Grouchy at Walhain.

17. Captain Walcott (battery Webber Smith). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.184-185  
Captain Cleeves. In: VPH, nr.63  
Lieutenant colonel Home (2<sup>nd</sup> battalion 3<sup>rd</sup> Foot Guards). He speaks of 30 French guns. Cf. his account dated 1816. In: BL, Add.ms.19590 (Mudford papers).

Captain Bull initially speaks of 12 guns in front of him, and which were reinforced by 6 more some time later. Major Cairnes of Bull's battery was killed. In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.46-49

Colin Halkett's brigade:

Lieutenant Pattison (33rd regiment). In: Personal recollections p.26  
Lieutenant Pratt (30th regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.88-94  
According to ensign Howard, the 30th didn't suffer very much from the fire. See his letter dated 8th July 1815. In: A Waterloo shako, In the JSHAR, by B.W.Webb-Carter.

Maitland's brigade:

Ensign Tighe (1st regiment Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.83-86  
Lieutenant colonel Mercer reports that he moved his battalion (the 2nd / 3rd Foot Guards) a little further back from its position nearly on the top of the brow of the height, where it was less exposed to the fire of a battery which did it much execution. Here the companies lay down, and only got up as they were called up to Gomont. Cf. his statement dated 26<sup>th</sup> June 1834. In: [www.1815.ltd.uk](http://www.1815.ltd.uk) Original in: National archives of Scotland. GD 172/1201/1

Du Plat's brigade:

Report of the 1<sup>st</sup> battalion of line infantry KGL. In: VPH, nr.32  
Journal 3rd battalion of line infantry KGL. In: VPH, nr.34  
Report of lieutenant colonel Von Müller (2nd battalion of the line KGL). In: VPH, nr.33  
Lieutenant Kuckuck (3rd battalion of the line KGL). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.40-41 He mentions that the gunfire had very little effect because of the soft ground.  
Major Meijer (4th battalion of line infantry KGL). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.270-273

Kruse's brigade:

Shortly after 12 o'clock, the 1<sup>st</sup> battalion advanced to a position at about 300-400 paces [180-240 metres] to the right front of the 2nd battalion, which stood in the second line (as did the 3rd). By 1 or 1.30 p.m. both the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> battalion were pulled some 60 to 100 paces [36 to 60 metre] further to the slope of the ridge because of the enemy gunfire.

Account of captain F.Weiz. In: Unzer, A. Darstellung etc. In: Nassauische Heimatblätter, 1915 p.5

Diary of the 1st regiment Nassau infantry. In: VPH, nr.71

Lieutenant colonel Müller (fieldbattalion Bremen). In: Hann.41.XXI, nr.151 p.37-40

Captain Von Scriba (fieldbattalion Bremen). In: Hann.41.XXI, nr.151 p.21-28

Von Scriba clearly stated the Nassau men stood in closed columns all day long. Also see: Scriba, C.von Das leichte Bataillon etc. p.89

Major Von Schnehen (3rd regiment hussars KGL). In: Hann.41.XXI, nr.152 p.7-10

Major Von Goeben (3rd regiment hussars KGL). In: Hann.41.XXI, nr.152 p.11-15

Von Dörnberg's brigade:

Journal of the 1st regiment of Light dragoons KGL. In: VPH, nr.48

Report of colonel Friedrichs (2nd regiment of light dragoons KGL). In: VPH, nr.52

Von Arentschildt's brigade:

Journal of the 3rd regiment of hussars. In: VPH, nr.58

Report of major Von Goeben (3rd regiment of hussars). In: VPH, nr.60

Colonel Von Arentschildt to the duke of Cambridge. In: Hann.38D, nr.200 Arentschildt adds that Meyer got wounded at 2 p.m. and that he was succeeded by captain Kerssenbruch.

18. Major Büsgen. In: VPH, nr.75

MacKinnon. The origin and services of the Coldstream Guards Vol.II p.216

<sup>19</sup> Lieutenant colonel Mercer (2nd battalion 3rd Foot Guards). Cf. his statement dated 26<sup>th</sup> June 1834. In: [www.1815.ltd.uk](http://www.1815.ltd.uk) Original in: National Archives of Scotland. GD 172/1201/1

<sup>20</sup> Cf. Private Clay (2nd battalion 3rd Foot Guards). In: former [www.1815.ltd.uk](http://www.1815.ltd.uk) Original in: Regimental Headquarters Scots Guards.

Clay calls the area here the kitchen garden; it was a piece of ground west of Gomont, along the road and the corn-fields here, and which was at its western side bounded by a hedge. To the left was the wood.

21. Ensign Standen (2<sup>nd</sup> battalion 3<sup>rd</sup> Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.708 p.328-334

Ensign Standen (2<sup>nd</sup> battalion 3<sup>rd</sup> Foot Guards). Cf. his letter dated 27<sup>th</sup> June 1815. In: [www.1815.ltd.uk](http://www.1815.ltd.uk) Original in Regimental Headquarters Scots Guards.

Private Clay (2nd battalion 3rd Foot Guards). In: former [www.1815.ltd.uk](http://www.1815.ltd.uk) – Original in: Regiment Headquarters Scots Guards.

Lieutenant colonel Home (2<sup>nd</sup> battalion 3<sup>rd</sup> Foot Guards) Cf. his account dated 1816. In: BL, Add.ms.19590 (Mudford papers).

Captain Bourdon de Vatry (adc of Jérôme Bonaparte). In: Mémoires de Grouchy Vol.IV p.103

Major Büsgen. In: VPH, nr.75

According to major Büsgen the Hanoverian company, after this action, again attached itself to its brigade. In: VPH, nr.75

22. Captain Ross (51<sup>st</sup> regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.198-200  
 Lieutenant Mainwaring (51<sup>st</sup> regiment) In: Four years of a soldier's life. In: United Service Magazine 1844, III p.409  
 Private Wheeler (51<sup>st</sup> regiment). In: In: The letters of private Wheeler p.171
23. Captain Ross (51<sup>st</sup> regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 147-149  
 Private Wheeler (51<sup>st</sup> regiment). In: The letters of private Wheeler p.171 Ross would have almost been taken prisoner.
24. Lieutenant colonel Rice (51<sup>st</sup> regiment). In: BL Add.ms.34.704 p.11-12  
 Captain Ross (51<sup>st</sup> regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.147-149  
 In reading the account of private Wheeler, however, one gets the impression that the four companies of Phelps which followed initially advanced beyond the hollow road and then went back because of the heavy French artillery fire to a position in rear of this road. When they got in the same fire again there they would have advanced to a position immediately in rear of this road. In: The letters of private Wheeler p.171
25. Levavasseur, O. Souvenirs etc. p.301  
 Levavasseur mixes up his chronology in some degree by putting this episode *before* Ney ordered the attack upon La Haye Sainte [which is correct], but by stating it *after* his own share in the first grand offensive [which is incorrect].  
 Jérôme Bonaparte. Cf. his letter date 15<sup>th</sup> July 1815 to his wife. In: Mémoires et correspondances etc. Vol.VII p.22
26. Ensign Standen (3rd Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.708 p.328-334  
 He mentions the presence of a huge quantity of French skirmishers.  
 Captain Robinaux (4<sup>th</sup> company, 2<sup>nd</sup> battalion 2<sup>nd</sup> regiment of line infantry) mentions his advance with fixed bayonets. In: p.208
- 27 Cf. Private Clay (2nd battalion 3rd Foot Guards). In: former [www.1815.ltd.uk](http://www.1815.ltd.uk) – Original in: Regiment Headquarters Scots Guards  
 Clay himself was one of the last to enter the buildings by the north gate. Until that moment he had been the aim for the French skirmishers on the west side of the buildings.
28. Ensign Standen (3rd Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.708 p.328-334
29. Major Büsgen. In: VPH, nr.75  
 In these first actions against the buildings, the 1<sup>st</sup> battalion of the 1<sup>st</sup> regiment of line infantry (brigade Soye), led by major Lebeau, was involved in an impetuous advance and suffered high casualties, particularly amongst its officers. Cf. the account of major Lebeau, the commander of the regiment. In: Coppens, B. & P.Courcelle - Hougoumont p.44

30. Captain Bull. In: BL, Add.ms.34.34.703 p.46-49

31. The fact that the wood was in French hands by that time is confirmed by ensign Standen (2nd battalion 3rd regiment Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.708 p.328-334

<sup>32</sup> Lieutenant colonel Mackinnon. In a letter dated 23<sup>rd</sup> June 1815. In: Franklin, J. – “Waterloo. 3<sup>rd</sup> regiment of Foot Guards” p.433 (manuscript)

From this letter it can also be concluded that his detachment preceded the one led by Woodford (see below).

Cf. Lieutenant colonel Home. In a letter dated 9<sup>th</sup> December 1836. In: NLS, MSS 866 Count Pozzo di Borgo mentions two companies of Foot Guards which advanced around 1.30 towards Gomont; this may be a reference to Home’s detachment. Cf. his report to king Wolkonsky, dated 19th June. In: VPH, nr.123

<sup>33</sup> Ensign Macready (30th regiment). Cf. his diary. In: History of the 30th regiment p.340

<sup>34</sup> Adjudant Buhse (1st battalion of light infantry KGL). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.264-267

<sup>35</sup> Cf. Navez, L. – La campagne de 1815 Vol.I p.262

Houssaye believes it was after 10 a.m. In: 1815.Waterloo p.342

Von Lettow Vorbeck believes it was 11.30 a.m. In: Napoleons Untergang. Vol.III p.418

F.de Bas is incorrect his conclusion that Zenocwicz carried the order dated 1 p.m. Cf. Bas, F.de & T’Serclaes de Wommersom. La campagne de 1815 aux Pays Bas. Vol.II p.102

Lieutenant general Von Boguslawski says it was 5 a.m. but he makes the incorrect presumption that it was Grouchy’s report dated 2 a.m. Cf. Zur Auffassung des Feldzuges von 1815. In: Militär Wochenblatt nr.59 p.1567

<sup>36</sup> Cf. the order as given below, dated 1 p.m.

The French bulletin. In: Bas, F.de & T’Serclaes de Wommersom - La campagne de 1815 Vol.III p.551

The Prussian vanguard of Bülow reached Chapelle Saint Lambert by 10.30 .a.m.

37. This version is the one from the facsimilé of the original as published by Houssaye. Cf. Houssaye, H. 1815.Waterloo n.p.

Houssaye states he used the original as coming from Grouchy’s papers, and communicated to him by M.Francois Saint Maur, former president of the *cour de Pau* and nephew of Mademoiselle Huat, the second wife of marshal Grouchy. In: 1815. Waterloo p.344, 466

38. Copy in register of staff. In: AN, Nouv.acq.nr.4366 and in SHAT, nr.C15, nr.5

Also see:

Grouchy, E.de - Mémoires Vol.IV p.176-177.

Soult mentions the existence of this letter in his report to Davout, dated 19<sup>th</sup> June. In: SHAT,

C15 nr.15

The same applies to his letter to Napoleon, dated 21<sup>st</sup> of June. In: Grouchy, E.de – Mémoires Vol.IV p.346

In this connection, De Mauduit cites part of a letter written by Soult after 3 p.m. to lieutenant general Evrain, director of the artillery at the war office in Paris, asking him for a constant supply of ammunition, as: "Que, quelle que fut l'issue de la bataille, qui se livrait, de lui faire arriver, jour et nuit, des munitions; que l'on était dans les plus longs jours, et obligé de recommander de les ménager pour en avoir même jusqu'à la nuit." In relation to the letter cited, the existence of such a letter is highly questionable. Cf. Mauduit, H.de - Les derniers jours de la grande armée Vol.II p.317-318

<sup>39</sup> Napoleon claims that he scanned the horizon before he started his main attack and that as a result a discussion took place about what could be seen near Chapelle Saint Lambert: enemy's forces or something else. All this would have to suggest that the imperial staff wasn't surprised. In real life, however, it was by the intercepted letter and the result was the observation towards Chapelle Saint Lambert. In: Mémoires pour servir etc. p.137

Baudus, in his turn, as he is used to do, pleads for Soult by stating that it was him who saw the Prussians first. In: Etudes sur Napoleon. Vol.I p.225+

Napoleon claims that the bearer of the letter was a hussar dressed in black, who was led to him by a "colonne volante de 300 chasseurs" about 15 minutes after the above mentioned discussion took place. In: Mémoires pour servir etc. p.139

There is some confusion about the identity of the messenger who carried the letter of Bülow. It was certainly not a plain hussar, as Napoleon suggests it was, certainly not in case he was able to speak French, as Napoleon suggest he did.

Baudus assigns the Prussian messenger the rank of *maréchal de logis* of the cavalry. In: Etudes sur Napoleon Vol.I p.225

A black uniform is no clue for his identity either, as the only horsemen who wore such a uniform were those of the 8<sup>th</sup> regiment of hussars (brigade Von Watzdorf of the reserve cavalry). Houssaye claims it was a member of the 2<sup>nd</sup> regiment of Silesian hussars nr.6 (brigade Von Schwerin, reserve cavalry), as this regiment formed part of the advance guard of Bülow, but this regiment was dressed in green. In: 1815.Waterloo p.341

Colonel Von Hiller, commander of the 16<sup>th</sup> brigade, explicitly mentions the denial of the same regiment as having lost a member as being taken prisoner by the French. In: Denkwürdigkeiten etc. p.242

Whatever way the messenger was dressed, it was an officer who was a member in Bülow's general staff, and not necessarily a member of the cavalry which was in the advance guard of the corps.

Marbot, colonel of the 7<sup>th</sup> hussars of this division of cavalry, says it was a platoon of his regiment which took the prisoner, but this claim should be dismissed as Marbot's account is in many respects highly unreliable (cf. separate note). Marbot also claims the man was taken prisoner on the other side of Chapelle Saint Lambert, a place where French cavalry never came. In: Marbot, J.B.A.M. de - Mémoires du général baron de Marbot Vol.III p.378



The identity of the letter itself is also a subject of discussion. On the one hand, Soult clearly states it was about Bülow's corps about to attack Napoleon's right flank. It was about 11.30 a.m. that Bülow sent his disposition for Von Müffling, but this document was of a more general character, mentioning the destination of other corps as well. It might therefore have been another note, issued by Bülow to Von Müffling. As the document itself is lacking, a 100% certainty cannot be given. In case Bülow wrote it at noon and its carrier caught by 12.30 o'clock, he could have been delivered at French HQ by 1.15 p.m. Until now, the Prussian letter has never surfaced from the French archives.

40. After the original (fascimilé). In: Houssaye, H. - 1815.Waterloo n.p.

41. Napoleon claims both divisions were detached just before the Prussian hussar was brought in.

De Mauduit claims Napoleon detached Domon first, and then, after the receipt of the Prussian letter, the 6<sup>th</sup> corps of Lobau. After that, Subervie would have been detached and placed in columns of squadrons near the division of Jacquinot.

Cf. Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de France etc. p.137

Mauduit, H.de - Les derniers jours de la grande armée Vol.II p.287-289

42. Gourgaud, C. Campagne de dix huit cent quinze etc. p.76

Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de France etc. p.137

Napoleon to Grouchy through Bertrand, 17<sup>th</sup> June.

<sup>43</sup> Gourgaud – La campagne de 1815 p.76, 80

44. Cf. the reference above.

In a letter dated 19<sup>th</sup> of June to Davout, Soult refers to this letter of 2.30 p.m. In: SHD, nr.C15/5

45. Gneisenau, in his report dated 20<sup>th</sup> June 1815 mentions a letter which would have been sent at 3 p.m. to Paris, announcing the imminent French victory. Maybe it is this letter he refers to, but this one doesn't contain this news as such.

In: Bas, F.de & T'Serclaes de Wommersom. La campagne de 1815 aux Pays Bas. Vol.III. nr.31.3A

<sup>46</sup>. Del Campo, W.J. - Het leven en de krijgsbedrijven van David Hendricus baron Chassé, in leven generaal der infanterie enz

<sup>47</sup>. Account of captain Rochell (19<sup>th</sup> battalion of national militia). In: private archive family Rochell

According 2nd lieutenant Holle of the 6<sup>th</sup> battalion of national militia, Chassé then ordered the brigade to barricade the streets and hold the village till the last man. Cf.2nd lieutenant Holle in his letter to his parents dated 10<sup>th</sup> July 1815. In: Stadsarchief Dordrecht. Family-archive Blussé. 68-28 nr.21

<sup>48</sup> For this change of position and the ones following, cf. Colonel Detmers in a letter dated 1<sup>st</sup>

August 1815 to Chassé. In: Verzameling van alle rapporten etc. CBG, family-archive Rochell Box 8 nr. 7

<sup>49</sup> Colonel Detmers. In: Bas, F.de & T'Serclaes de Wommersom - La campagne de 1815 Vol.III p.372-378

Lieutenant colonel Van Delen. In: Bas, F.de & T'Serclaes de Wommersom – La campagne de 1815 Vol.III p.364-366

Sergeant Wiegmans of the same battalion. In: Wiegmans, C. Quatre Bras en Waterloo p.65  
Another detachment of 30 flankers led by 2nd lieutenant Holle of the same bataillon was also sent out that afternoon; it observed the enemy out from another position out of Braine la Leud. Cf. 2nd lieutenant Holle in his letter to his parents dated 10th July 1815. In: Stadsarchief Dordrecht. Family-archive Blussé. 68-28 nr.21

<sup>50</sup> For the reconstruction of the marches and positions of this division the following sources have been used:

Report of lieutenant colonel Van Delen. In: Bas, F.de en T'Serclaes de Wommersom. La campagne de 1815 aux Pays Bas. Vol.III p.364-366

Report of colonel Detmers. In: Bas, F.de en T'Serclaes de Wommersom. La campagne de 1815 aux Pays Bas. Vol.III p.374-376

Letter of general Chassé to the prince of Orange, dated 4th July 1815. In: Bas, F.de & T'Serclaes de Wommersom. La campagne de 1815 aux Pays Bas. Vol.III p.354-357

Account of captain Mercer (battery Mercer). In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.347-354

Letter of private A.H.Munter (4th battalion of national militia, brigade d'Aubremé), dated 22nd July 1815. In: NIMH, no reference number

Captain Schäfer (adjutant of colonel Detmers). In: NA, nr.2.13.04

Account of 2nd lieutenant P.P.Roorda van Eysinga. In: Iets betreffende den slag van Waterloo. In: Recensent der recensenten. 1831 nr.6-7

Account of captain Rochell (19th battalion of national militia). In: private archive family Rochell

Captain Van Omphal. Account. In: NIMH, nr.104/7

Craan, W.B. Plan du champ de bataille de Waterloo

<sup>51</sup> Leeke, ensign - The history of Lord Seaton's regiment Vol.I,p.28

Lieutenant Gawler (52nd regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 88-97 and 34.705 p.369-382

Cf. Cusick, R. - Waterloo, the legacy of Sir John Moore. In: The Waterloo Journal Vol.20 nr.1 p.4 (position F)

Private J.Smith (71st regiment) in a letter to his brother dated 14 July 1815. In: NLS, MS 15385, p.68

<sup>52</sup> Major general Von Vincke. In: VPH, nrs.25 and 26

As a result of this fire the commander of the 3rd battalion Nassau, major Hegmann, lost his foot. He was succeeded by captain Frensdorff. Hegmann died a few days later. Cf. Bernard van Saksen Weimar. In: NL – ZuRAZ, Van Löben Sels, 0302 nr.265

Captain Frensdorf (private collection).

Captain Rettberg (3<sup>rd</sup> battalion 2<sup>nd</sup> regiment Nassau). In: VPH, nr.77 Original in: HHA abt.202 nr.1372

Hegmann was taken care of by surgeons Lauprecht and Behrens of Von Vincke's brigade. Cf. their reports. In: VPH, nr.97, 100

<sup>53</sup> Captain Rettberg (3<sup>rd</sup> battalion 2<sup>nd</sup> regiment Nassau). In: VPH, nr.77 Original in: HHA abt.202 nr.1372

1st lieutenant Wirths (2<sup>nd</sup> Nassau battalion). In: Aus der Schlacht bei Waterloo p.144

<sup>54</sup> Captain Rettberg (3<sup>rd</sup> battalion 2<sup>nd</sup> regiment Nassau). In: VPH, nr.77 Original in: HHA abt.202 nr.1372

Major Sattler (2<sup>nd</sup> regiment Nassau). In: VPH, nr.74

Major general Von Kruse. In: VPH, nr.73

Captain Frensdorff (private collection)

<sup>55</sup> Colonel Van Zuylen van Nijevelt. In: Bas, F.de – La campagne de 1815 Vol.III p.334

Major general Best. In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.278-282 and VPH, nr.22 and 24

Lieutenant Heise. In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.190-191

Rapport van Von Rettberg (VPH, nr.66)

Major general Von Vincke. In: VPH, nr.25 and 26

Captain Taylor (10<sup>th</sup> regiment of hussars). In a letter to mr.Brownrigg, dated 16<sup>th</sup> July 1815. In collection A.Lagden.

Lieutenant Winssinger. Cf. his letter, published in: Eenens, A. Dissertation etc. p.52

Shortly after, Winssinger was assigned a third gun, of the horse-battery of Bijleveld, led by sergeant Koppij.

Bernard van Saksen Weimar confirms the number of three guns which were led by lieutenant Winssinger. In: NL-ZuRAZ, Van Löben Sels, 0302 inv.nr.265

Contradictory to this is the fact that major Van Opstall mentions the presence of eight guns in the battery of Bijleveld (of which six to the right and two to the left). Cf. In: NL-ZuRAZ, Van Löben Sels, 0302 inv.nr.262