

The attack of the 1st French corps. The preceding bombardment.

The attack of the 1st corps was to be preceded by a bombardment of the grand battery. There is a lack of hard evidence about the length of this bombardment, but – as has been stated – it most probably started its fire somewhere after 1 p.m. The bombardment lasted until about 2.15 p.m., the moment the majority of the 1st corps and the French heavy cavalry almost reached the crest of the ridge of Mont Saint Jean.¹

The attack on the farm of La Haye Sainte.²

The actual attack of the majority of the 1st corps was preceded in its turn by one upon the farm of La Haye Sainte. Half of the 1st division which stood on the left, the brigade of Quiot, was supposed to attack the farm and therefore was formed in two columns (of two battalions each), as closed *colonnes de bataillons par division*.³

One of them was to advance upon the Brussels road and the other right to the east of it.⁴ They were the 54th and the 55th regiment of the line respectively. Both columns were covered by a swarm of skirmishers.⁵ After they had been formed, they climbed the slopes of the intermediate ridge and both approached the farm with great speed.⁶ As the 54th regiment directed its course upon the orchard of the farm, the 55th regiment made an assault upon the farm-building itself.⁷ By then it was around between 1.30 and 1.45 p.m.

At the moment of the French attack, the commander of the 2nd battalion of light infantry KGL, major Baring, had disposed of his men in the following way: three companies (about 200 men) were placed in the orchard of the farm, two companies (about 140 men) stood in the farm-building itself, while one company (about 70 men, led by captain Meyer) had its position in the garden immediately north of the farm.

At the moment of the attack major Baring himself was in the orchard of the farm. Here, he had his men await the French until they would be very near; the men were not supposed to reply to the enemy's skirmishing fire. The moment the French column threw itself upon the orchard it received a volley from the Hanoverians, but the French were also able to unleash a volley.

The French superiority proved far too strong and the Hanoverians, losing a great many men, were forced to fall back upon the farm.

The main reason to do so was the fact that the French column now moved further to its left, towards the west-side of the farm, thereby threatening to cut off the Hanoverians from the west-gate. Now, they evacuated the orchard and, while firing, moved slowly back to the west- and south side of the farm-building. The French were already swarming around the (open) west-gate but the Hanoverians managed to reach it and enter the farm.

The moment the French actually made an attempt to penetrate the farm here, they received a very heavy fire from the inside of the barn and their advance came to a halt.⁸ Major Baring had lost his horse; major Von Bösewiel had been killed in the orchard and the commander Hauptman had got wounded.

Meanwhile, the second column had directed its assault upon the east-side of the farm-building.

It was shortly before this moment that a section of the 2nd battalion of light infantry KGL which stood behind the abatis on the road, pulled back into the courtyard of the farm. Until then, the main gate of the farm had been kept open, but was now closed.

As soon as the French approached the farm, they received a heavy musketry fire from the men who were upon the small stables behind the wall and those behind its three apertures. As a result, some of the French entrenched themselves behind the abatis, from where they maintained a strong fire. Also, they were able to take possession of one the apertures (near the pond of the farm) and fired in upon the garrison from there. ⁹ at the same time, French skirmishers were pushing forward towards the British riflement in and around the sandpit. ¹⁰

It does not become clear whether it was major Baring who had asked for support, but as Baring was forced back towards the farm, the battalion Lüneburg (brigade Kielmansegge), led by lieutenant colonel Kléncke, descended the slope of the ridge of Mont Saint Jean towards the farm. ¹¹



The former orchard of the farm of La Haye Sainte, looking south.

With these reinforcements, Baring now drove the French back towards the orchard and even beyond it. However, while both battalions advanced, a body of cuirassiers - the brigade of Dubois - was formed in front of the former position of the division of Bachelu. ¹²

At the same time, the French who had stranded against the east-side of the farm itself, had started turning the garden in an attempt to cut off the farm's communication to the main position. They were able to do so thanks to the advance of the other brigade of the 1st division, the one of Bourgeois, further to their right and which cleared the sandpit and its immediate

vicinity of enemy troops. Baring now instructed captain Meyer to evacuate his ground and to retire his men into the complex.

Baring wanted to do the same with his other companies and had his men rally around him, but the sheer appearance of the closed ranks of the French cuirassiers made his own and Klencke's men panick and as a result they started a precipitate retreat towards the main position. Right after, they were overtaken by the cuirassiers, sabred and scattered. While some found shelter in the farm or were taken prisoner, others ventured to climb the ridge back to the main army, but while doing so they also received the fire of the French infantry which had dislodged the Hanoverians from around the garden and had taken up positions behind its hedges.¹³ The overall result was that only a small portion made it to the ridge unscathed. Lieutenant colonel Von Klencke had got killed and major Von Dachenhausen – his successor- was taken prisoner.¹⁴

Also the two companies (the 2nd and the 9th, led by captain Von Wynecken and Von Goeben) of the 1st battalion of light infantry KGL, who after the start of the battle had been posted as skirmishers to the right and north of the garden of La Haye Sainte shared the same fate and now fled back to the Ohain-road. With them was the commander of the battalion, colonel Von den Bussche.¹⁵

This was also the case with the Hanoverian jäger, led by major Von Spörken (Hanoverian jäger) had been in the fields west of the farm. As the French had taken the garden of the farm of La Haye Sainte, the 5th and 8th battalion of the line KGL (brigade Von Ompteda) were now launched from the main allied position to retake it.



The farm of La Haye Sainte, seen from the west.

Both battalions advanced to the hollow road in line, the 8th in front. This battalion had already started a successful bayonet action against the French infantry which was hovering in and around the garden, when they were suddenly charged on their right flank by the right wing of the same cuirassiers which had just scattered the allied units shortly before. The battalion suffered dearly from the cuirassiers. Its King's Colour also fell in enemy's hands.¹⁶ After ensign Moreau had got seriously wounded, the colour was taken over by sergeant Stuart but he got seriously wounded as well. Lieutenant colonel Schröder was mortally wounded and as a result major Von Petersdorff took over the command. It was Von Petersdorff who led the remains of the battalion back to the main position and there to their former position. Here, it formed a tiny square.¹⁷

The 5th battalion of the line KGL had hardly the time to form a proper square when it was that the cuirassiers they fell upon its right flank. At that moment it was still some 50 metres on the allied side of the Ohain-road. The cuirassiers were able to penetrate into the square, until the British dragoons of the Household brigade intervened (see below).¹⁸

As the 8th battalion of the line KGL had crossed the hollow road, the four remaining companies of the 1st battalion of light infantry KGL (the 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th) had followed it and took a position in this road. It also did so to take cover for the French gunfire.

From there, their right wing gave some fire on the cuirassiers as they had scattered the 8th battalion, before all four companies were called to their left to act against Bourgeois' column (see below).¹⁹

By now, the crew of Ross' battery - after having fired some case-shot and not having been able to limber up - sought shelter under their guns or in the hollow road.²⁰

Further to their left, the cuirassiers also continued their pursuit and now sabred down skirmishers of the brigade of Kielmansegge at the foot of the declivity. Most of them, however, reached their brigade in safety and it was there that the battalions of this brigade by now had formed two large squares. The one on the left was formed by those of Grubenhagen and Yorck and the one on the right by those of Verden and Bremen (led by colonel Von Langrehr).

These formidable squares had barely been completed in four files deep, when the cuirassiers were approaching from the area adjoining the farm of La Haye Sainte. As a result, the focus of their charge fell upon the south-east corners of both squares, thereby hitting the battalions of Verden and Grubenhagen more as the others. The front and left faces of the squares gave the French horsemen a volley at close range (30 to 40 paces). This fire proved to be very effective as the French columns split from their middle and fell back instead of going round the squares. The battalion Bremen was complimented for its bravery by the prince of Orange. In the action, the cuirassiers lost many horses.²¹

As the French horsemen had faced this setback, they assembled on the ridge in front of the allied squares, when the Household Brigade intervened (see below).²²

After the cuirassiers fell back shortly after along both sides of the farm, with the British dragoons in pursuit, Quiot's men evacuated the area around the farm at the same time. At that stage, some Hanoverians, led by captain Graeme, made a successful sally from the east gate of the farm by driving away the French beyond the abatis, behind which the group retook its former position.²³ It was also there for a short while that a detachment of Whinyates' battery was operating at that stage of the action.

The advance of the brigade of Bourgeois and of the divisions of Donzelot, Marcognet and Durutte.

While the action around La Haye Sainte continued, the other divisions of the 1st corps were formed for their attack upon Wellington's line. This took place in the low ground in front of the ridge of La Belle Alliance, so in front of the grand battery and other guns further to the right and to the rear of the intermediate ridge.²⁴

As the general order had phrased it, the attack was to be carried out en echelon, left in front, and to be directed upon the allied centre.²⁵ Not long after, the divisions of the corps, totalling about 13.500 men of infantry, were formed for the attack.²⁶

For the formation of the corps this instruction resulted in the fact that the division of Allix was in front, followed by those of Donzelot, Marcognet and Durutte. The divisions were formed in *colonnes de division par bataillon*: each battalion of the division was deployed into a line of three files deep, with each battalion placed in rear of the other, with an interval of about 4 metres.²⁷ The result was a formation consisting of four massive columns with a front varying between 130 and 150 men and a depth varying between 12 to 27 files, and each covered about 100 to 150 metres in front by a large swarm of skirmishers.²⁸

The other brigade of the 1st division, the one of Bourgeois, was formed in a massive column as sketched above. The same applied to the divisions of Donzelot and Marcognet.

Evidence on the formation of the division of Durutte is contradictory, but the most probable scenario is that Durutte left one regiment (the 85th of the line, led by colonel Masson), as well as his artillery, behind in the original position and that possibly the other regiment of the same brigade (Brue), the 95th regiment of the line, was detached to the right - covered by a strong cloud of skirmishers - to act against the enclosures south of the farm of Papelotte. The 85th and the artillery were to follow the advance and to position themselves upon the extreme extension of the intermediate ridge.

The remaining two regiments (probably the brigade of Pégot) were formed into one massive column which advanced in echelon to the one of Marcognet towards the Anglo-German-Netherlands main line.²⁹

In the formation as the divisions left their positions *en echelon* for the advance, the lateral intervals between the columns did not exceed more as about 200 to 235 metres.³⁰ As the columns in their starting positions were arranged slightly oblique in relation to the Brussels-road, they marched all straight ahead towards Wellington's position.³¹

It didn't fully work this way with Durutte's division. Being faced with an enemy to his immediate right, he would have proposed to form his division as en potence on the French frontline. This request wasn't met by high command. The result was that Durutte chose for a compromise, thereby splitting off half of division in the actual attack and using the other half as a reserve for the attack and for cover on his right flank. The result was a delay in the departure

of the main column, thereby creating a serious gap in the echelon in depth.³²

As Napoleon was about to leave his position near Rossomme he ordered the 6th corps to leave its positions immediately east of the great road and to follow in the wake of the 1st corps as a reserve. It was most probably somewhere around 1.30 p.m. that the corps marched in closed columns to the former position of the 1st corps and from there to the ridge which lies between those of La Belle Alliance and Mont Saint Jean, a total distance of about 2 kilometres. By the time it got there it was around 2.30 p.m. as it was shortly before the British dragoons approached this ridge.³³

Around the same time, the three 12-pounder batteries of the grand battery moved to the same ridge and established themselves there on its eastern extremity. Here, they were not only covered by Lobau's forces, but also by the cuirassiers of Milhaud and the light cavalry of Lefebvre Desnouettes.

As the majority of the 2nd corps was due to follow the 1st corps after it had successfully hit Wellington's line, both the divisions of Foy and Bachelu left their positions between 2 and 2.15 p.m. for their starting positions on the grounds immediately east of Gomont (at about 700 metres from the Ohain-road).

Just before, Foy had split off one of his brigades, the one of Gauthier (now led by colonel Tissot, as Gauthier had got wounded at Quatre Bras) towards Gomont.³⁴ At the same time, Bachelu moved his division for some distance to his left front to close up to Jamin's brigade.

In their new position, Foy deployed on the left and Bachelu, slightly in front, on the right. At the same time, at least Kellermann's corps advanced to a position which was in the low grounds immediately in rear of the divisions. Both divisions, as well as some artillery, had hardly established themselves there, however, or their advance was grounded to a halt due to the sudden collapse of the main attack further to their right. After they had witnessed the remains of Dubois and Quiot streaming back to the French position, they kept their positions after that, still exposed to the allied gunfire.³⁵

It was most probably around 1.30 p.m. that Napoleon advanced to the pinnacle of a height on or in the immediate vicinity of the Brussels road, a point some 1000 metres north of the knoll where he had been, near opposite the Decoster-house. From here, in the very heart of the French position, Napoleon could overlook the fields where the 1st corps was just about to start its advance towards Wellington's position.³⁶ Ney was with him.³⁷ General d'Erlon was on the heights to the immediate right of the grand battery, in the centre of his corps.³⁸

In the wake of Napoleon, the infantry of the imperial guard followed through the low ground along the road to a position which was slightly in rear of the former one of the division of Bachelu. A short time later, most probably after the 6th corps had advanced to its new position on the intermediate ridge, the guard crossed to the other side of the high road and took up a position on the heights to the immediate right of the Decoster-house. They did so in deployed regiments, the Young Guard in front, the chasseurs à pied in the middle and the grenadiers à pied in the rear. By then it might have been between 2.30 and 3 p.m.³⁹

After Napoleon had instructed Ney to give the sign for the attack, the large columns of the 1st

corps started their advance through the undulating fields between the heights of Mont Saint Jean and La Belle Alliance. Eager to go into action, carrying *arme au bras*, numerous soldiers exclaimed *Vive l'empereur!*⁴⁰ By then it was somewhere between 1.45 and 2 p.m.

The advance was not without difficulty. After - so it seems - a swift start, speed decreased due to the soil which was slippery due to the previous rain and that mud clung to the soldier's boots.

⁴¹ At the same time, orders as coming from the higher officers - who were advancing around the columns - could hardly be heard by those more towards the centre of the columns, while this situation in general was made more difficult because of the noise of the shouting and, above all, the French bombardment.⁴²

As the artillery on Wellington's left wing had received the instruction not to reply the enemy's gunfire but to restrict their fire against the advancing infantry [⁴³], now d'Erlon's columns started to suffer from enemy gunfire.⁴⁴ As files were thinned out by gunfire, the order of "*serrez les rangs!*" could be heard as a result.⁴⁵

In the repulse of the attack of the 1st corps, the allied guns involved were those of the batteries of Ross (6 guns), Rogers (6 guns), Bijleveld (7 guns) and Von Rettberg (6 guns). Though the columns were out of range when they were in the low grounds between both positions [⁴⁶], after their departure they soon came within the effective zone of round shot (up to 800 metres).⁴⁷

The enemy's position the French were about to attack consisted first of all of skirmishers which stood about 200 metres in front of the Ohain-road. Their reserves subsequently stood on and in this road. These light troops had the task "to cover and protect our batteries. To establish ourselves at all times as much in advance as might be compatible with prudence. To preserve intervals between our extended files for greater security from the fire of the enemy's batteries. To show obstinate resistance against infantry of the same description, but to attempt no formation or offer useless opposition to charges of cavalry, but to retire in time upon the squares in our rear, moving in a direct line without any reference to regiments or nations. When the charge was repulsed, to resume our ground."⁴⁸

Some 10 to 15 metres in rear of this road stood the first line of infantry, which in this case consisted of parts of the 1st battalion 95th regiment and the majority of the brigade of Van Bijlandt.⁴⁹ They all stood in a line two ranks deep.

The first line stood about 30 metre in front of the second which was composed of the remaining battalions of the brigades of Kempt, Pack and Van Bijlandt (except for the 44th regiment). All these units (except for the one battalion of Van Bijlandt, the 5th battalion of national militia) initially stood in column of battalions at quarter distance, but as soon as the enemy approached, they deployed into line. This manoeuvre normally took about two minutes. As long as they had not received the order stand up to unleash a volley of musketry fire or to advance, all infantry was lying down on the north slope of the ridge, out of view for the enemy.⁵⁰

All units of the second line being deployed into a two rank deep line covered a total front of almost 700 metres, from the Brussels road up to the point where the Ohain-road to Papelotte and Ohain bifurcates. From left to right stood the 92nd, 42nd, 1st (Pack), the 5th battalion of national militia (Van Bijlandt), the 28th, 79th and 32nd (Kempt). In their front, in frontage

ranging from the extreme left of the 42nd up to the left wing of the 28th stood the battalions of the Van Bijlandt over a front of about 350 metres.⁵¹

In the low ground further down, in the third line, stood the heavy cavalry of Ponsonby, at about 90 metres in rear of the Ohain-road in columns of squadrons at half distance.⁵²

In this position, the Ohain-road acted as a kind of defence line which not only encouraged a more determined defence but which could also, with its hedges and hollow parts, derange the enemy in its advance in case he would penetrate it.

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1. Times given about the start of the *actual attack* of the 1st corps vary.

Noon is given by:

General Noguès - Mémoires p.274

Captain Naylor (King's Dragoon Guards). Account in: King's Dragoon Guards Museum. CARDG 1985-1199

General Schmitz. Account of 25th June 1815 In: Brouwet, E. "Mémoires et documents sur la campagne de 1815." In: Revue des études Napoléoniennes. (1932) p.360-365

Ingilby, lieutenant (battery of Gardiner). In: BL, Add.Ms.34.703 p.266-271

Captain Naylor (King's Dragoon Guards). In: King's Dragoon Guards Museum, nr.CARDG 1985-1199

Major general Lambert. In: BL, Add.Ms. 34.704 p.63-65

Captain Leach (1st battalion 95th regiment).In: BL, Add.Ms. 34.707 p.388-391

General Best. In: VPH, nr.24

According to d'Erlon the bombardment started at noon. Cf. Drouet d'Érlon. Le maréchal Drouet, comte d'Erlon etc. p.97

Baron Gourgaud asserts he brought Ney the order to attack at noon. In: LMB, nr.AS 2448.

12.30 o'clock

Major Baring (2nd battalion of light infantry KGL). In: VPH, nr.30

Major Calvert (32nd regiment). In: BL, Add.Ms. 34.705 p.169-170

Canler, L. (28th regiment of the line) - Mémoires de Canler p.26

Colonel De Jongh (8th battalion of national militia). In: Nagelaten papieren

1 p.m.

Lieutenant Riddock (44th regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.122-126

Lieutenant Simmons (95th regiment) states the bombardment started at 1 p.m. In: A British rifleman etc. p.365

Lieutenant Kerr Ross (92nd regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.703 p.341-344 (it could also have been 12.30 o'clock).

Lieutenant Hope (92nd regiment) for the start of the bombardment. In: Letters etc. p.248 and BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.18-21

Captain Kennedy Clarke (Royals).In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.3-5 He is unsure whether it was 1 p.m. or just before.

1.30 p.m.

Captain Von Rettberg (Rettberg's battery) believes it was between 1 and 2 p.m. In: VPH, nr.66 and BL, Add.ms.704 p.229-235

Lieutenant Martin (45th regiment of the line, division Marcognet) claims the bombardment of the grand battery started between 11 a.m. and noon and that it last for two hours, when the attack of the 1st corps started. In: Souvenirs d'un ex-officier p.285

2 p.m.

Colonel Van Zuylen van Nijevelt. In: Historisch verhaal etc. In: NA, nr.2.13.14.01 nr.8
Lieutenant kolonel Grunebosch. In: NL-ZuRAZ, Van Löben Sels, 0302, inv.nr.265
Captain Macdonald (1st regiment, brigade Pack) believes the attack took place before 2 p.m.
In: BL, Add.ms.34.707 p.3-6
Lieutenant Clifton (Royals). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.73-76

2.30 p.m.

1st lieutenant Scheltens (7th battalion of the line). In: Souvenirs etc. p.200 His timing is bizarre: he states the French bombardment started at noon, while the attack would have started two and a half hours later, while the Prussians would have started their bombardment at 2 p.m. [!]

Lieutenant Winchester (92nd regiment, brigade Pack) mentions 2 or 3 p.m. In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.335-338

According to corporal Canler of the 28th regiment of the line (brigade Bourgeois), Ney gave the order of attack half an hour after the bombardment of the grand battery had started. In: Mémoires de Canler p.26

According to Charras, the bombardment was already quite intense before 1 p.m. In: Histoire de la campagne etc. Vol.I p.287

For the fact that the grand battery fired right up to the moment that the French columns were about to hit the allied line, see the accounts of members of the Union and Somerset brigade. De Lacy Evans adds that the French redoubled their gunfire at that moment. In: BL, Add.ms.34.707 p.124-126

2. The main structure of this chapter is based upon the accounts of major Baring, commander of the 2nd battalion of light infantry KGL, which formed the initial garrison of the farm.

In: Erzählung der Theilnahme des 2ten leichten Bataillons der Königlich Deutschen Legion an der Schlacht von Waterloo. In: Hannoversches Militärisches Journal (1831), p.69-90

The second account is in: VPH, nr.30

³ Both battalions of each regiment may have been in rear of each other, thereby creating more depth and a width of one division.

4. Cf. Baring. In: Erzählung der Theilnahme des 2ten leichten Bataillons der Königlich Deutschen Legion an der Schlacht von Waterloo. In: Hannoversches Militärisches Journal (1831), p.69-90

⁵ Cf. Account of adjutant Fleuret (55th regiment of line infantry). He was himself a member of the voltigeurs who were in advance of the regiment's column. From his account it can be derived that the main column of his regiment was right in front of the east-side of the farm. In: Description etc. p.149-151

⁶ Lindau, F. Ein Waterloo-Kämpfer, p.131

7. Lieutenant Graeme (2nd battalion of light infantry KGL). In: BL, Add.ms.34.707 p.497-508
Private Lindau (2nd battalion of light infantry KGL). In: Ein Waterloo-Kämpfer, p.131
Lieutenant general Alten in his report to the duke of Cambridge, dated 20th June 1815. In: VPH, nr.20

8. Lindau, F. Ein Waterloo-Kämpfer, p.131 Lindau was in the barn for about half an hour, and then went to a position near the main gate of the farm on the other side (most probably immediately south of it).

According to lieutenant Biedermann however, the garrison from the orchard (or a part of it) went back towards the main position and was charged by cuirassiers; then they fled in the squares of the division and continued the action there. Cf. Biedermann, E. lieutenant - Von Malta bis Waterloo p.183-184

⁹ Lieutenant Graeme (2nd battalion of light infantry KGL). In: BL, Add.ms.34.707 p.497-508

¹⁰ Cf. Account of adjudant Fleuret (55th regiment of line infantry). He was himself with these voltigeurs. In: Description etc. p.149-151

11. Cf. Hanoverian reports in: VPH, nr.19 and 21

Houssaye erroneously mentions a KGL-battalion instead. In: 1815. Waterloo p.349

In full strength, the battalion counted 550 men, but after the casualties suffered at Quatre Bras and the detaching of 50 sharpshooters to Gomont this was no longer the case.

12. Colonel Ordener (1st regiment of cuirassiers). For his regiment, he confirms its role in the charge alluded to. In: Lot, H. – Les deux généraux Ordener p.91

Also see the observations.

Houssaye claims it was the brigade Travers (Milhaud), but gives no actual proof for this. In: 1815. Waterloo p.349

Charras, in the same absence of any source, also mentions the brigade Dubois (Milhaud). In: Histoire de la campagne Vol.I p.298

Gourgau adds there were four squadrons of cuirassiers to the left of the chaussée, with whom he joined in for their charge. In: AN, Fonds Gourgau 314 AP30

The squadrons also were accompanied by two members of Ney's staff, the aide de camps Levasseur and Crabbé. In his description of the cavalry, Levasseur is not very clear about the composition and strength of the cavalry which charged along the west side of La Haye Sainte. Initially, he indicates that all colonels of the cavalry had to detach one squadron to compose a force to carry out the charge, while after that he only speaks of cuirassiers. In: Levasseur, O. – Souvenirs militaires p.298-300

The presence of cuirassiers to the left of the 1st corps is also confirmed by lieutenant Kincaid

(1st battalion, 95th regiment) and major Baring (2nd battalion light infantry KGL). In: Adventures etc. p.333
BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.48-62

13. Cf. Baring in his two accounts mentioned.

Biedermann, E. lieutenant - Von Malta bis Waterloo p.183 Biedermann originally came from the orchard.

Lieutenant general Alten in his report for the duke of Cambridge, dated 20th June 1815. In: VPH, nr.20

General Hanoverian report. In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.289-302

Hülsemann, B. – Geschichte des Königlich etc. p.82-83

Lüneburg journal. In: NHA, Hann.48A.I.nr.368

A general report about the Hanoverian participation in the battle and another about that of the brigade Kielmansegge state that the Lüneburg battalion advanced after the French had taken the garden north of the farm. However, from the accounts of major Baring it becomes clear that this cannot have been the case as Meyer reported back to him some time after the Lüneburgers and Baring had driven away the French from the south side of the farm-building. In: VPH, nrs.19 and 21

14. Other losses were the captains Holzermann, Von Goeben, Schaumann and ensign Von Robertson. Cf. Anonymus. Die Königlich Deutsche Legion und das Hannoversche Corps bei Waterloo p.21

¹⁵ Adjutant Buhse (1st battalion of light infantry KGL). In: BL. Add.ms.34.704 p.264-267

Captain Von Wynecken (1st battalion light infantry KGL). In: BL, Add.ms.34.707 p.224-225, 294-297

Lieutenant Leonhart (1st battalion of light infantry KGL). In: BL, Add.ms.34.707 p.226-227

Adjutant Heise (1st battalion of light infantry). In: BL, Add.ms.34.707 p.294-297

Ensign Macready (30th regiment). He was a member of the light company of the 30th regiment and was in that capacity in front of his battalion.

As the commander of the British skirmishers, major Vigoureux, saw that his men were too far extended the moment he saw the cuirassiers approaching, he decided to pull them back. As a result, some of them went back upon the 30th regiment, others upon the brigades of Kielmansegge and Von Kruse, while some others sought their safety in the farm of La Haye Sainte. Cf. Macready's diary. In: History of the 30th regiment p.340 Also in his letter dated Paris, 7th July 1815. In: NAM, nr.8203/10

16. Major Von Petersdorff (commander of the battalion involved) wrote on the 22nd of July 1815 to the duke of Cambridge that the colour was handed over to his adjutant by an adjutant of the Cumberland hussars, with the information that it would have been retaken from the enemy. How this adjutant would have got hold of it doesn't become clear. In:

Hann.Hauptstaatsarchiv Hann.38D nr.200

This information got a follow-up in the ribbon being placed on wreath, attached to the colour bearing the following text: “On the 18th of June 1815 in the battle near Waterloo in Flanders, where His Grace the Duke of Wellington gained complete and decisive victory over Napoleon Bonaparte, the King’s Colour of the 8th Line Battaillon King’s German Legion was shot in twain, taken and retaken from the enemy. Ensign Morau, the bearer of this colour on that day, was severely wounded. Paris, August 1st 1815.” In: Schwertfeger, B. - Geschichte der Königlich Deutschen Legion 1803-1816 Vol.II p.448

According to Von Beamish, the colour was found back several days after the battle by a Hanoverian horseman. In: History of the KGL Vol.II p.356

17. Report of the 8th battalion of the line KGL. In: VPH, nr.38

Captain Marburg (8th battalion of the line KGL). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.248-249

Ensign Domdorf (8th battalion of the line KGL). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.247

Captain Brinckmann (8th battalion of the line KGL). In: Franklin, J. – Waterloo.Hanoverian correspondence p.78-79

General report about the Hanoverian participation in the battle. In: VPH, nr.19

General Hanoverian report. In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.289-302

Lieutenant Bertram (8th battalion of the line KGL). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.250-253

In his report dated the 19th of June for Wellington, Alten is not that explicit about the setback as suffered by the battalion by merely stating that, for a moment, “the French cavalry got amongst the 1st light and particularly the 8th, until the advance of our cavalry sent them back.”

In: WSD, Vol.X p.534

In his report of the day after, he claims a large French infantry column was pushed back by the 1st and the 2nd light battalions, the 8th line battalion of Von Ompteda’s brigade and the Lüneburg battalion of Kielmansegge’s brigade and that shortly later the French rolled up the infantry which was “*en débandade*.” Reporting this way, Alten simplifies matters. In: VPH, nr.20

Ompteda, L.Fr. von - Ein hannoversch-englischer Offizier vor hundert Jahren etc. p.282 He states the battalion now lost 7 officers and 100 men.

Lieutenant Bertram (8th battalion of the line KGL) also states that his battalion was able at this stage to push back the cuirassiers and that his battalion was scattered after 5 p.m., which is incorrect. In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.250-253

The journal of the 8th battalion of the line KGL erroneously situates the action at 10 a.m. In: VPH, nr.38

¹⁸ Ensign Walther (5th battalion line infantry KGL). In: Franklin, J. – Waterloo. Hanoverian correspondence p.77

Lieutenant colonel Von Linsingen (5th battalion of line infantry). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.237-240

General Hanoverian report. In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.289-302

Ensign Wheatley claims his battalion pushed back the cuirassiers before the British cavalry intervened. Cf. his diary. In: Hibbert, Chr. (ed) , The Wheatley diary etc. p.65

Though the aide de camp of Von Ompteda, captain Von Brandis seriously mixes things up in his account. In his idea, both KGL battalions were charged by the cuirassiers with the said results *after* these French horsemen had pursued the British dragoons after their charge. In: Dehnel, H. - Erinnerungen deutscher Offiziere in Britischen Diensten aus den Kriegsjahren 1805 bis 1816 p.288-289

¹⁹ Lieutenant Leonhart (1st battalion of light infantry KGL). In: BL, Add.ms.34.707 p.239-240

²⁰ Cf. Captain Ross. In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.201-204, 34.707 p.255-259

Ross, by the way, denies the presence of men of the KGL battalion at that period of time. Gunner John Edwards in a letter to his brother dated 14th July 1815. In: Laws, M.E.S. (ed) A Waterloo letter

²¹ Cf. Report of lieutenant colonel Von Scriba. In: VPH, nr.41 and in: Das leichte Bataillon etc. p.90

Lieutenant general Alten in his report for Wellington, dated 19th June 1815. In: WSD, Vol.X p.534

Lieutenant general Alten in his report for the duke of Cambridge, dated 20th June 1815. In: VPH, nr.20

Report of lieutenant colonel Von Müller. In: VPH, nr.40

General report about the Hanoverian participation in the battle and another about that of the brigade Kielmansegge. In: VPH, nrs.19 and 21

Lieutenant Bülow of the battalion Bremen, in a letter dated 26 August 1815. In: Kannicht, J. - Und alles wegen Napoleon p.206

Lieutenant colonel Von Scriba. In: Das leichte Bataillon etc. p.89 (sketch)

Lieutenant Von Tschirschnitz (Bremen battalion). In: Franklin, J. – Waterloo. Hanoverian correspondence p.122

Major Von Schkopp (commander of the Verden battalion), however, denies that his battalion fired at a distance of 30-40 paces. He distinctly believes it did so at 120-180 paces, as he felt dissatisfied about this. In: Franklin, J. – Waterloo. Hanoverian correspondence p.128

The report about the brigade Kielmansegge claims that in the confrontation a French colonel, adjudant plus several officers were taken prisoner. As there is no indication that colonel Ordener of the 1st regiment of cuirassiers was taken prisoner, it could then only have been colonel Habert of the 4th regiment of cuirassiers. In: VPH, nr.21

Siborne claims the cuirassiers received fire from the guns of Lloyd and Ross, but members of these batteries do not support this claim. In: History of the war in Belgium etc. Vol.II p.22

22. Lieutenant general Alten in his report for Wellington, dated 19th June 1815. In: WSD, Vol.X p.534

Lieutenant general Alten in his report for the duke of Cambridge, dated 20th June 1815. In: VPH, nr.20

Lieutenant colonel Von Müller (Bremen battalion). In: VPH, nr.40

Lieutenant Von Tschirschnitz (Bremen battalion). In: Franklin, J. – Waterloo. Hanoverian correspondence p.122

Major Müller (Bremen battalion). In: VPH, nr.40

Ensign Wheatley (5th battalion of the line KGL). In: The Wheatley diary p.65

Major Von Schkopp (commander of the Verden battalion). In: Franklin, J. – Waterloo. Hanoverian correspondence p.128

General report about the brigade of Kielmansegge. In: VPH, nr.21

²³ Lindau, F. Ein Waterloo-Kämpfer p.132

Lieutenant Graeme (2nd battalion of light infantry KGL). In: BL, Add.ms.34.707 p.497-508

²⁴ Canler, L. (28th regiment of the line) - Mémoires de Canler p.26

25. General Durutte. In: Sentinelle de l'armée p.78

Charras. Histoire de la campagne etc. Vol.I p.288

26. The columns were formed in front of the artillery. This means that at least the grand battery halted its fire the moment the infantry passed through it. Cf. Canler, L. Mémoires de Canler p.26

Cf. Houssaye, H. – 1815.Waterloo p.347

27. Lieutenant Martin (45th regiment of the line, division Marcognet) mentions the formation *en colonne par bataillons et en masse*. Cf. his letter dated 1th August 1815. In: Carnet de la sabretache Vol.III 1895 pp.493

In his memoirs, Martin refers to the formation *par bataillons déployés, se suivant à 4 pas de distance*. In: Souvenirs d'un ex-officier p.285

Corporal Canler (28th regiment of the line) states that his brigade was formed *en colonne serrée par bataillon*. In: Mémoires de Canler p.26

Captain Duthilt (aide de camp of Bourgeois) refers to the formation as *en colonne d'attaque par bataillon*. In: Les mémoires etc. p.302

Durutte states all divisions were formed *en colonnes par bataillon*. In: Sentinelle de l'armée p.78

Adjudant Gastinieu (13th regiment of light infantry, division Donzelot) says his division was formed "tous les bataillons déployés, rangés à 5 pas les uns des autres." Cf. his memoirs in: Coppens, B & P.Courcelle – La Haye Sainte p.75

Chef de bataillon Rullière (95th regiment of line infantry, division Durutte) states that each division of the corps formed one column: the 1st battalion was deployed and the seven others

were placed *serrés en masse sur le premier seulement à 5 pas de distance d'un guide à l'autre*. In: Largeaud, J.M. Napoleon et Waterloo: la défaite glorieuse de 1815 à nos jours p.375

General Schmitz speaks of his division (the 2nd) being *en colonnes par bataillon*. In: Brouwet, E. "Mémoires et documents sur la campagne de 1815." In: Revue des études Napoleoniennes. (1932) p.360-365

The exception is general Noguès claiming his brigade (division Marcognet) was formed in *bataillons échelonnés*. He also denies he had skirmishers in front. In: Mémoires etc. p.274

²⁸ The size of each column has been calculated upon the following data:

-a soldier occupying a space of 60 cm wide and 80 cm deep.

-an interval of about 4 metres between the battalions

-all companies of voltigeurs having been deployed as skirmishers in front of the column

For the divisions this results in the following figures:

Bourgeois: 280 skirmishers in front – column: 1600 men strong, 78 to 80 metres wide (130 files) x 22 metres deep.

Donzelot: 780 skirmishers in front – column: 4000 men strong, 88 to 90 metres wide (148 files) x 55 metres deep.

Marcognet: 650 skirmishers in front – column: 3250 men strong, 81 metres wide (135 files) x 50 metres deep.

Lieutenant Winchester(92nd regiment) indeed describes Marcognet's column as of 3000 to 4000 strong and adds that its front was about as wide as the front length of the 92nd. In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.259, 335-338

Durutte: 333 skirmishers in front – column: 2000 men strong, 83 metres wide (138 files) x 22 metres deep.

Both Charras and Houssaye give the columns too many files in their front, i.e. 150 to 200 men. In: Histoire de la campagne de 1815 Vol.II p.288

1815.Waterloo p.347

Aerts uses smaller sizes for files and therefore ends up with smaller fronts and depths. In: Etudes etc. Livre V (manuscript) p.42

De Mauduit assigns Durutte's column a front of 150 men and a depth of 18 files. In: Les derniers jours etc. Vol.II p.307

Captain Childers (11th regiment of light dragoons) refers to a column of about 1500 men strong which was passed by the two regiments of his brigade [the one of Durutte]. In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.1651-66

Lieutenant Kincaid (1st battalion, 95th regiment) confirms that the column which was heading for his unit [the one of Bourgeois] was a dense mass of 10 to 12 files deep. In: BL, Add.ms.34.707 39-41

Lieutenant Shelton (28th regiment) adds about this same column that it consisted of 4 battalions. In: BL, Add.ms.34.707 p.131-135

Bernard gives the columns absurd sizes particularly in depths varying between 265 and 625 metres. His front-widths are set on 120 metres. In: *Le duc de Wellington et la Belgique* p.216

Koontz points to the fact that the divisions marched in inverted order, not from the senior (1st) to the least senior (4th), but from left to right, not from right to left as would be expected. As the attack was ordered to commence with the left, it might be conceived that the divisions advanced left in front. In this way it could be expected that the 2nd brigades (the least senior) to be at the front of the divisional columns, with the 1st following. With each brigade, the junior (highest number) regiment would lead, followed by the senior regiment (the lowest number), and within regiments it would be likely that the senior battalion would be the outermost one. For the divisional columns this would in that case mean the following order of battalions from front to rear:

Bourgeois: 1st / 105th, 2nd / 105th, 2nd / 28th, 1st / 28th.

Donzelot: 1st / 51st, 2nd / 51st, 1st / 19th, 2nd / 19th, 1st / 17th, 2nd / 17th, 3rd / 13th, 2nd / 13th, 1st / 13th

Marcognet: 1st / 45th, 2nd / 45th, 1st / 25th, 2nd / 25th, 1st / 46th, 2nd / 46th, 2nd / 21st, 1st / 21st.

Durutte: 1st / 29th, 2nd / 29th, 2nd / 18th, 1st / 18th.

There is no hard evidence for the theory, but it might have been possible that the columns were arranged in this way. Cf. Koontz, J.E. - Notes on d'Erlon's first attack at Waterloo. Part II p.36-37

The fact that the columns were covered by skirmishers is confirmed by:

Captain Duthilt (aide de camp of Bourgeois). In: *Les mémoires etc.* p.302

1st lieutenant Scheltens (7th battalion of the line). In: *Souvenirs etc.* p.200

Private Lindau (2nd battalion of light infantry KGL). In: *Ein Waterloo-Kämpfer* p.131

Lieutenant Graeme (2nd battalion of light infantry KGL). In: *BL, Add.ms.34.707* p.497-508

Captain Leach (1st battalion, 95th regiment). In: *Rough sketches* p.387 He confirms this for "the several large columns of infantry" he saw approaching.

Lieutenant Kincaid (1st battalion 95th regiment). In: *The adventures etc.* p.33-334

Captain Gardiner (battery of the same name) speaks of a French advance "covered by innumerable light troops." In: *NLS, MS 3615*

Captain Van Bronkhorst (7th battalion of national militia). In: *Letter dated 9th July 1815.* In: *Ons Leger, 1982 Jg.67 nr.6* p.32-38

Lieutenant Hay (12th regiment of light dragoons). In: *Reminiscences under Wellington* p.177 (he speaks of squares in stead of columns)

Captain Kennedy Clarke (Royals). In: *BL, Add.ms..34.707* p.91-94

He states there were so many skirmishers between the two columns in front of him that they almost seemed to form a third body in between them; at the same time he recognizes the smoke and confusion were considerable.

Though not a participant himself, colonel Bugeaud described in 1824 the division of Marcognet as being in one column *à distance entière, dont la fraction était un bataillon déployé*. Cf. his letter to lieutenant colonel d'Esclaibes, dated 11th December 1824.

Some years, in 1833, he described all the divisions of the 1st corps as having been in *colonnes serrées*. Cf. his letter dated 12th October 1833 to Soult.

In: Coppens, B. & Courcelles, P. – Le chemin d'Ohain p.21-22

Lieutenant colonel Miller (Inniskillings) claims he saw no skirmishers in front of the column of Marcognet. In: BL, Add.ms.34.707 p.79-81

Coppens and Courcelle claim that the column of Durutte consisted of six battalions and that its front contained 150 men and that the depth of the column was 18 files. One of the battalions of Pégot would have been extended as skirmishers in front and a few companies as skirmishers on the right flank. In: La Papelette. Waterloo 1815 p.11

Navez mentions a reserve of two battalions and a columns of 18 files deep. In: La campagne de 1815 Vol.I p.270

29. Captain Chapuis. In: Notice sur le 85^e de ligne pendant la campagne de 1815 p.45

General Brue. In: Notice sur le 85^e de ligne pendant la campagne de 1815 p.53

Mauduit, H.de - Les derniers de la grande armée Vol. p.306

Durutte himself says nothing of a measure of leaving one regiment behind. In: La sentinelle de l'armée p.78

From the accounts, however, of two chefs de bataillon, Rullière and Bosse, seem to hint to the fact that their regiment (the 95th) was incorporated into a larger column.

Cf. Chef de bataillon Rullière (95th regiment). In: Largeaud, J.M. - Napoleon et Waterloo p.376

Chef de bataillon Bosse (95th regiment). In: Doise, J. Remarques etc. p.19-25

In connection to the forces attacking Papelette, different strengths are mentioned by historians.

While Charras refers to several companies, Siborne goes so far as to claim a full brigade. In: Charras. La campagne de 1815 Vol.I p.294

Siborne, W. History of the war in France etc. VolII p.3

30. Taking an initial total front-width in the French position and of the columns involved (about 1300 and 360 metres respectively), there was no more front-width left as about 940 metres, which would result in intervals of about 235 metres, which is comparable to about 400 paces. Cf. Charras. In: Histoire de la campagne etc. p.288

Chef de bataillon Rullière (95th regiment of line infantry, division Durutte) mentions one of between 400 and 500 paces. In: Largeaud, J.M. Napoleon et Waterloo: la défaite glorieuse de 1815 à nos jours p.375

Charras copies his account but mentions 400 paces. In: Histoire de la campagne etc. Vol.I p.288

Houssaye is quite incorrect in stating it was 400 metres for each interval. In: 1815.Waterloo p.347

Adkin is much more closer to the truth by giving 200 metres. In: The Waterloo companion p.412

The fact that the columns advanced *en echelon* is confirmed by Scheltens and Vivian.

In: Souvenirs Souvenirs p.201

In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.99-107a

³¹ Lieutenant Riddock (44th regiment) speaks of an advance of the French while obliquing to their right. In: BL, Add.ms.34.707 p.95-97

Captain Tomkinson (16th regiment of light dragoons) confirms that the French advanced diagonally to the allied position, but believes at the same time that they had their right considerably advanced (it was in fact their left). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.131-132

³² Cf. Account of Durutte. In: Mouvemens [sic] de la 4^e division du 1er corps d'armée p.78

Durutte even states that he complied with orders the moment he saw the other divisions moving forward.

³³ The advance of the 6th corps to the position referred to is confirmed by accounts from both French and British participants.

Sergeant-major Marq (107th regiment, brigade Tromelin) states that the 6th corps advanced at 3 p.m. (which is incorrect) to a position in the middle of the battlefield, where it took up regimental squares. As British dragoons fell upon them the same moment they were also involved in an action against cuirassiers. In: Description etc. p.48

From this description, these dragoons cannot be other dragoons as those of either Somerset or Ponsonby.

Janin, *sous-chef d'état-major* of Lobau's corps, claims the corps advanced "pour soutenir l'attaque du centre" and that it took up a position "sur la crête du ravin que sépare les deux armées." [this is the intermediate ridge]. Some time later, after a reconnaissance carried out by general Durrieu and later by Lobau and Janin himself, "la destination du 6^e corps se trouva changée par cet incident; il ne s'agissait plus de continuer l'attaque contre les Anglais, mais bien de repousser celle des Prussiens." In: Campagne de Waterloo p.35

Durutte confirms that Lobau placed himself in rear of his own division the moment the 1st corps was facing defeat, and clearly situates this some time before the Prussians emerged on his right. In: Mouvements etc. p.78

Colonel Combes-Brassard writes that the corps "marcha pour soutenir l'attaque de la droite" and that at 3.30 p.m. (it was one hour earlier) it "achevait de se déployer en réserve sur toute la droite de l'armée." This means that it took up a position with wide intervals the moment d'Erlon was involved in his actual attack (the italics are mine). In: Souvenirs et correspondance

etc. p.19-20

Chef de bataillon Rullière (95th regiment) confirms the presence of the 6th corps in rear of his own during the attack of the 1st corps. In: Largeaud, J.M. - Napoleon et Waterloo etc. p.376

Though general Tromelin correctly takes a position to the *west* of the Brussels road as a starting point for the movements of the 6th corps, he states that it moved from there at 3 p.m. at 200 metres south of La Belle Alliance, in rear of Milhaud and leaving Plancenoit to its right, to a position – as he describes it - on a height between the streams of Smohain and the Lasne which was at a little more as one kilometre from the north-east side of Plancenoit. This is a position between the small woods near Fichermont and the farm of Hanotelet, at about 1500 metres from the centre of Plancenoit. This would suggest that the corps moved straight from its position in the centre of the army to the extreme right flank, which is in contradiction to the other testimonies.

In: Lachouque, H. – Sous la République etc. p.227

De Mauduit confirms that the 6th corps followed the 1st corps to “la crête du ravin qui sépare les deux armées“ [the intermediate ridge] and that it moved from there to a position opposite the Prussians to its far right. In: Les derniers jours etc. Vol.II p.380

From the British side, the presence of French infantry immediately in rear of the advanced guns is confirmed by:

Major Evans. In: BL, Add.ms.34.707 p.119-123

Major Clarke (Scots Greys) who mentions the presence of a (third) line of French infantry beyond the cavalry upon which the dragoons could not make any impression due to their broken and crippled state. Cf. his letter to sir J.S.Denham, dated 11th July 1815. In: NWMS, no reference.

Captain Kennedy Clark (Royals) writes about the fire of fresh troops stationed on the opposite height. In: BL, Add.ms.34.707 p.91-94, 165-167 and 34.708 p.1-4

Lieutenant Ingilby (battery Gardiner) confirms the presence of French squares or columns north of LA Belle Alliance. In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.266-271 plan nr.2

There might be a relation here with Shaw Kennedy speaking of the advance of the grand battery to the intermediate ridge, which in fact were the guns of Lobau. In: Notes etc. p.86-87

³⁴ Cf. the actions for Gomont.

³⁵ Cf. Reille. He states: “Les divisions Foy et Bachelu se déployèrent sur le plateau entre le bois [Gomont] et la route [Brussels road]. Bientôt après, une division d’infanterie du 1er corps fut mise en désordre par une charge de cavalerie anglaise, qui fut ensuite repoussée par la nôtre.” In: Documents inédits p.61

Colonel Trefcon. In: Carnet de campagne du colonel Trefcon 1793-1815 p.188

General Foy. In: Girod de l’Ain, M. - Vie militaire du général Foy p.280-281

Chef d’escadron Létang (7th dragoons). In: Note sur la charge de la division l’Héritier. In: SHAT, Mémoires et reconnaissances nr.719

Captain Kühlmann describes some pieces of heavy calibre having established themselves at about 700 metres distance. In: VPH, nr.62

Chef d'escadron Lemonnier Delafosse (adc of general Foy). He mentions allied gunfire which hit not only his division, but also the carabiniers which were immediately in rear of his division. At the same time, a lot of cannonballs stranded in the muddy soil. In: Souvenirs militaires p.216-217

Ensign Larreguy de Civrieux (93rd regiment, brigade Gauthier). He confirms his unit suffered from enemy gunfire which ricocheted and then hit his regiment. Later, it advanced a couple of hundred metres; soon after the division had taken up its new position, his unit was committed at Gomont. In: Souvenirs d'un cadet p.168-169

Lieutenant Pratt (30th regiment). He says he saw a French column between 2 and 3 p.m. advancing from the Brussels road, near the orchard of La Haye Sainte, towards Gomont. After the column had taken two thirds of its trajectory it came under the well directed fire of Cleaves and the French fell back; they would have done the same attempt several times. Though this last element is most probably incorrect, the column referred to cannot be another as the one of Bachelu. In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.88-94

There could be a connection here with a column present opposite the west-side of La Haye Sainte during the day, as claimed by lieutenant Graeme (2nd battalion of light infantry KGL). In: BL, Add.ms.34.707 p.497-508

Houssaye is totally wrong in his analysis that Reille did not comply with the order of 11 a.m. by believing that Napoleon abandoned the idea, or that Reille either neglected it or that he was too much occupied with his action at Gomont. In: 1815.Waterloo p.336

³⁶ It is a height at a level of 140 metres. For this position of Napoleon, cf.

Craan. An historical account of the battle of Waterloo p.25 / plan (Craan claims he stood there at 3 p.m and this is correct).

Decoster claims he took up this very position, but his timing is incorrect (5 p.m.). In: Smithers, H. – Observations made etc. p.259

Foy. In: Girod de l'Ain. Vie militaire etc. p.279-280

Barral, G. Itinéraire etc. p.41 (plan)

According to Barral, Napoleon took up another position west of the Brussels road, before the one he had nearly opposite the Decoster house, but further data are lacking.

Delloye, S. Napoleon dans sa dernière campagne. Special issue of the Bulletin of the SBEN. 1996. p.49

Gourgau claims the position was “sur une éminence près la ferme de La Belle Alliance.” He clearly mentions the fact that Napoleon got further forward after launching the attack on Gomont and before the attack of the 1st corps. In: La campagne de 1815 p.77

According to Napoleon himself it would have been a position near La Belle Alliance. In: Mémoires pour servir etc. p.147

Lieutenant Kincaid (1st battalion, 95th regiment). He saw, from his position in rear of the

sandpit, Napoleon and his staff taking up a position in front of him, next to the great road. In: *Adventures etc.* p.333

37. Cf. Drouot in his speech for the *Chambre des pairs*, 24th June 1815. In: *Additional particulars etc.* Vol.II p.112

Cf. general De Salle. In: *Souvenirs et correspondance etc.* p.53

³⁸ Cf. general De Salle. In: *Souvenirs et correspondance etc.* p.53

³⁹ General Petit (1st regiment grenadiers). In: Moore-Smith, G.C. - General Petit's account of the Waterloo campaign. In: *The English historical review* 18 (1903), p.324

Captain De Stuers (1st battalion 2nd regiment of chasseurs) . He claims he was about 120 metres away from the emperor. Cf. his account. In: Pawly, R. & Courcelle, P.– *Mémoires etc.* p.34

De Mauduit situates the change of position at 3 p.m. Here, he mentions the 3rd and 4th regiment of grenadiers coming into a position along the high ground where the 1st corps had stood, while the 1st and the 2nd grenadiers stood further south. He mentions a position between La Belle Alliance and Rossomme, but for this last one he actually means the Decoster house. The battalions of sappers and miners would have been near the road, but where is not indicated. In: *Les derniers jours* Vol.II p.290, 292, 386-387

General Pelet (2nd regiment of chasseurs).In: d'Avout. *L'infanterie de la garde à Waterloo* p.37

General Christiani (2nd regiment grenadiers).In: d'Avout. *L'infanterie de la garde à Waterloo* p.112

Captain Prax (3rd regiment of chasseurs). In: *L'infanterie de la garde à Waterloo* p.120

Captain Duthilt . In: *Les mémoires etc.* p.302

Chef de bataillon Rullière (95th regiment) confirms the presence of the imperial guard to the left of the 6th corps during the attack of the 1st corps. In: Largeaud, J.M. - *Napoleon et Waterloo etc.* p.376

The French bulletin confirms that the imperial guard took up the former position of the 1st corps by 3 p.m. In: Bas, F.de – *La campagne de 1815* Vol.III p.552

Lachouque situates the advance of the imperial guard at 2 p.m. In: *The anatomy of glory* p.483

40. Lieutenant Martin (45th regiment of the line). In: *Souvenirs d'un ex-officier* p.286

Captain Duthilt . In: *Les mémoires etc.* p.302

Corporal Canler (28th regiment of the line). In: *Mémoires de Canler* p.26

Lieutenant Ingilby (battery Gardiner). In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.266-271 and in his diary. In: RAI, nr.MD 797

Lieutenant Hope (92nd regiment) for the start of the bombardment. In: *Letters etc.* p.248 and BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.18-21

⁴¹ Cf. Lieutenant Martin (45th regiment of the line). In: Souvenirs d'un ex-officier p.285
Captain Duthilt. In: Les mémoires etc. p.302

On the contrary, major Evans mentions the suddenness with which the French, after rushing forward, stood on the allied frontline. In: NLS, Adv.46.9.19

Kempt also speaks of the rapid advance of the columns. He even goes so far as to claim that the enemy concealed his attack to the last moment. This might have to do with the fact that the columns were partly formed out of sight of the enemy. Cf. his report dated 19th of June 1815. In: WSD, Vol.X p.536

Private Lindau (2nd light battalion KGL), in the orchard of La Haye Sainte, mentions the very high speed of the columns of Allix in their approach of the farm-complex. In: Ein Waterloo-Kämpfer p.131

42. Captain Duthilt He even states there was a slight confusion within the column of the brigade of Bourgeois. In: Les mémoires etc. p.302

Cf. Chef de bataillon Rullière (95th regiment of line infantry, division Durutte). In: Largeaud, J.M. - Napoleon et Waterloo: la défaite glorieuse de 1815 à nos jours p.375

⁴³ Cf. The account of assistant surgeon James (1st Life Guards). In: Vansittart, J. (ed) - Surgeon John Hoddy James's journal. p.34

⁴⁴ Lieutenant colonel Gomm. In: Letters and journals p.358

And in: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.440-442

Captain Rogers (battery Rogers). In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.227-234

Lieutenant Koopman (battery Bijleveld). In: NL-ZuRAZ, Van Löben Sels, 0302, inv.nr.262

He states his battery opened fire upon the enemy at a range of 800 paces (about 500 metre).

45. Lieutenant Martin (45th regiment, division Marcognet) in his letter dated 1st August to his mother. In: Carnets de la Sabretache. Vol.3 1895 pp.493 and in: Souvenirs etc. p.286

Corporal Canler. In: Mémoires de Canler p.26-27

Captain Von Rettberg (battery Von Rettberg). In: VPH, nr.6

Sir Willam Gomm. In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.440-443

Captain Rogers (battery Rogers). In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.227-234

Lieutenant Leslie (79th regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.159-161

He mentions the good behaviour and effective fire of a Brunswick battery in front of him. Obviously, the battery Bijleveld is meant.

⁴⁶ Lieutenant colonel Gomm. In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.200-206, 440-442

⁴⁷ Cf. Haythornthwaite, Ph. - Napoleon's military machine p.32

⁴⁸ Lieutenant Pratt (30th regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.88-94

⁴⁹ Lieutenant colonel Grunebosch (27th battalion chasseurs) mentions a distance of 60 paces (12 metres). In: NL-ZuRAZ, Van Löben Sels, 0302, inv.nr.259

⁵⁰ Cf. Colonel Van Zuylen van Nijvelt. In: Historisch verhaal etc. In: NA, nr.2.13.14.01 nr.8
Lieutenant Winchester (92nd regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34
Lieutenant Pronk (8th battalion of national militia). Cf. his diary. In: The family-prospectus
“Pronkstukken”

⁵¹ In his sketches of the position, captain Gore (adc of Kempt) assigns both the brigade of Van Bijlandt and Kempt a front which is way too extended, i.e. from the Brussels road up to the point where the Ohain-road to Papelotte and Ohain bifurcates.
It measures approximately 590 metres for Van Bijlandt and for Kempt about 375 metres (in columns) and 535 metres (in line). In: BL, Add.ms.34.707 p.426-431

⁵² Major Evans states that his cavalry stood about 50 metres in rear of the Ohain-road the moment it charged. In: BL, Add.ms.34.707 p.391-393