

The French retreat.

In the parallel combination of Wellington's first advance and the breakthrough of the Prussian forces of Zieten's corps, the remains of by far the most of the French army started converging towards the Brussels, as the main exit from the battlefield to the south. In this way, this road started to act as a funnel into which the fugitive French army was sucked into.

It was at that moment, in this very crisis, that French high command took a few measures to save what could be saved. First of all, the division of Girard, stationed at Fleurus, was summoned to take up a position at Quatre Bras as a cover for what was now the inevitable retreat of the army. Soult wrote:

*18 juin, en avant de Caillou*

*Ordre au maréchal de camp Remond de prendre le commandement de la division Girard et de se porter aux Quatre Bras pour y prendre position.*

*Soult*<sup>1</sup>

Further, a *commissaire des guerres* was sent by Daure to Charleroi to conduct the *grand parc* and all the convois back over the Sambre.<sup>2</sup> At the same time, general Radet was ordered to collect arms and to distribute them to dismounted horsemen and others. To do so, Radet went back towards imperial headquarters where the passage allowed him to do this more easily. Assisted by his aide de camps and gendarmes, he was able to do so with numerous soldiers and to place them near the road. Not longer after though, Prussian forces started emerging from Plancenoit.<sup>3</sup>

Some time before, it might have been about 6.30 p.m., general Monthion had sent maréchal de camp Lebel (at that moment commander of central headquarters at Le Caillou) and Radet through chef d'escadron Gérard the order to clear the *chaussée* from anything which blocked it. Some 30 minutes later, the same order was reiterated by Soult through colonel Raoul.<sup>4</sup>

As the French élite battalions from the imperial guard fled back from the allied position in confusion upon their reserves on the intermediate ridge and as the first allied units were in pursuit, the 2<sup>nd</sup> corps and the cavalry on the French left wing were dragged along to the rear.<sup>5</sup>

The units of the 2<sup>nd</sup> French corps were able to pull back in reasonable good order towards the Brussels road, where they fell back further south across the adjoining fields to the west of it. It was near Genappe that they got intermixed with units of other bodies of the French army.<sup>6</sup> It was only Piré's division, accompanied by some cuirassiers, which was able to pull out along the Nivelles road. From there, it reached – through the Bois de Neuve Cour and Malplaquet – Quatre Bras.<sup>7</sup>

By the time the remains of the imperial guard streamed back to the rear, Lefebvre Desnouettes had the remains of his division take up a position near the three squares of the Old Guard, north-west of La Belle Alliance. By the time the enemy got too close, they also moved back along the *chaussée* without getting involved into any confrontation.<sup>8</sup>

Of Guyot's division, at least the *grenadiers à cheval* moved steady to the rear in closed column and as they bumped onto the 12<sup>th</sup> regiment of British light dragoons, these did not charge them due to their numerical inferiority and the determined way the French horsemen moved.<sup>9</sup>

As has been shown, the remains of the 1<sup>st</sup> corps also instinctively moved back towards the Brussels road, while the garrison at La Haye Sainte evacuated the farm as the allied forces drew too near. Ney, on foot, bruised and fatigued, now also left the battlefield, accompanied by

colonel Guillemin (commander of the 1<sup>st</sup> battalion 3<sup>rd</sup> regiment of grenadiers) and general Poret de Morvan (commander of the 3<sup>rd</sup> regiment of grenadiers).<sup>10</sup> It was only towards 11 p.m. , probably in the vicinity of Genappe, that Ney was offered a horse by major Schmidt of the (blue) lancers of the guard.<sup>11</sup>

While some gun crews of the grand battery managed to drag their guns back as far as the hamlet of Maison du Roi or to the Brussels road only, others simply had left their guns where they stood and submerged in the flow of fugitives streaming south.<sup>12</sup>

By then, the battalions of the Imperial Guard which had stood in reserve had also moved back. It had been since the middle of the afternoon already that the 1<sup>st</sup> battalion 1<sup>st</sup> chasseurs, based at Le Caillou, was placed on and at both sides of the high road so as to prevent fugitives coming back after the failure of the first grand offensive of retiring any further. In this, its commander, colonel Duuring, was aided by the *gendarmerie d'élite*.

Some hours later, in the early evening, several guns and caissons were also led to its rear with the information that they had spent their ammunition, and this while several caissons were not empty. This prompted Duuring to park these guns and caissons on both sides of the road. At the same time - as a precaution - he decided to put the horses to the treasury.

It was towards 8 p.m., the moment the Prussians started to be a threat for the imperial headquarters, that Duuring, in cooperation with the duke of Bassano (head of the imperial cabinet) decided to conduct the treasury and the other carriages of central headquarters further to the rear. The moment it dawned to Duuring that the full army was retreating he placed his battalion in column and only allowed other members of the guard to enter it; all other who attempted to do so were prohibited for fear of breaking the ranks. Not long after, Napoleon passed and he instructed Duuring "de serrer en masse" and to follow him.<sup>13</sup>

Of the French army, it were the two battalions of the 1<sup>st</sup> regiment of grenadiers which left the battlefield last. In their position immediately north of the Decoster house they were faced with the huge flow of fugitives seeking safety. After the defeat of the four battalions of the guard some time before, Napoleon had ridden back in a gallop towards the heights of la Belle Alliance where he had taken up a position within the square of the 1<sup>st</sup> battalion which stood west of the road. Here he was most probably escorted by his service squadrons and members of his staff such as Soult, Drouot and Gourgaud.<sup>14</sup> Now, he ordered general Petit, commander of the regiment, to beat the *grénadière* in an attempt to assemble the scattered remains of his guard.

Though the attempt attracted many fugitives, though not all of the guard, Napoleon now ordered to Petit to pull his regiment back. Petit did so, leading his 1<sup>st</sup> battalion through the fields adjoining the road and the 2<sup>nd</sup> battalion over the road itself. Both battalions made frequent halts to organize their ranks and to receive fugitives. The enemy closely followed but did not attack both élite battalions.<sup>15</sup> After having given his instructions to Petit, Napoleon had left the square and preceded it on horseback in its retreat.<sup>16</sup> Not long after, he met colonel Duuring with his battalion near Le Caillou where he instructed him to follow him with his unit. He would have added: "*Je compte sur vous*". This was for Duuring the moment to move his battalion through the fields east of the road south towards Genappe.<sup>17,18</sup>

The advance of the Wellington's army.

The whole of Wellington's army advanced, except for those units which had suffered too much. Eventually, about 40.000 men may have joined in in the general advance [<sup>19</sup>]; a majority of the infantry did so in a four-rank deep line.<sup>20</sup> Most of the infantry and cavalry, as soon they reached the low ground in front of them, halted for a brief period of time to form their broken ranks before penetrating further into the French position.<sup>21</sup> In the flow of the Prussian forces of the

1<sup>st</sup> corps working their way towards the French centre, units of the left wing of Wellington's army now moved up in the same direction in the general advance of the army.

At the same time, while the 3<sup>rd</sup> division (Alten's) kept stationary in its battle positions due to its extreme casualties, from Wellington's centre most other units from there converged to the French centre as well. Small parts of the army were kept back on the battlefield in and around the farms or around the ridge of Mont saint Jean, or further back to the rear where they had gone earlier in the day. <sup>22</sup>

The advance of Blücher's army.

As has been indicated, it was of the 1<sup>st</sup> Prussian corps the brigade of Von Steinmetz, preceded by part of the reserve-cavalry of Von Röder, which headed in a diagonal way across the battlefield towards the fields between the Brussels road and the village of Plancenoit.

As has been shown, another part of Von Röder's cavalry actually passed along immediately in rear of Wellington's frontline, extending deep into his centre.

It was therefore not long after the advance of Wellington's army that the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> Kurmark Landwehr cavalry regiments, as well as the two squadrons of the 6<sup>th</sup> uhlans, passed through the intervals of the left wing of Wellington's army, while the 1<sup>st</sup> regiment of Westprussian dragoons, operating further to the west and arriving too late to become actually engaged as well, passed through these same intervals in the centre of that army. <sup>23</sup>

To Zieten's left, as the forces of Lobau and the imperial guard fell back, those of Bülow made considerable progress: the brigades of Von Hacke and Von Losthin from their positions north of Plancenoit and those of Von Hiller and of the 2<sup>nd</sup> corps from Plancenoit. These last were those of the brigade of Von Tippelskirch, followed by the reserve-cavalry of the 2<sup>nd</sup> corps. <sup>24</sup>

Of Von Tippelskirch's brigade it was a line of skirmishers which advanced to the left of Plancenoit towards the road, and which consisted from right to left of the skirmishers of the 1<sup>st</sup> regiment of Pommeranian infantry nr.2 led by captain Von Goszicki, the skirmishers of the 2<sup>nd</sup> battalion of the same regiment led by captain Von Winterfeldt and the detachment of Jäger, led by lieutenant Rehbein. They reached the Brussels-road near Maison du Roi and it was here that Von Goszicki advanced over the road, while the other skirmishers did so to the left of it. Soon, Von Goszicki met some French cavalry on the other side of Le Cailou but they were soon driven off by the skirmishers of 12<sup>th</sup> company, led by subaltern Flögel. Soon after, units of the Imperial Guard were been driven away too by the fuseliers, led by Von Goszicki. <sup>25</sup>

It was at Wellington's extreme left flank that his forces got in direct contact with their Prussian allies, but now as the remains of the French army were drawn to the Brussels road, this was also in a parallel way the point where both Wellington's and Blücher's armies converged. Obviously, this led to the meeting of units of both armies there. <sup>26</sup>

In the darkness and sheer scale and tumult of the situation, the converging advance of both armies also led to actual erroneous clashes between them. For instance, the allied armies suffered from each others gunfire. As Wellington noticed that his forces suffered from gunfire of both the 1<sup>st</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> corps he sent baron Von Omphal, adjudant of general Chassé, through Constant Rebecque to Zieten to tell him to stop firing in his direction. He did the same towards Bülow through count De Sales, commissary of the Sardinian king. <sup>27</sup>

In their turn, it was in their advance beyond Plancenoit towards the Brussels road that two battalions of colonel Von Hiller's brigade got under gunfire of a unit of Wellington's army. As a result, Von Hiller had the battalions go back to the same village while he sent captain Von Reichenbach to the battery involved to cease fire. <sup>28</sup> On the road between La Belle Alliance and Rossomme the 18<sup>th</sup> British regiment of hussars was charged by a Prussian regiment of cavalry

and further west, there was also the brief encounter between the light dragoons of Vandeleur's brigade and the 1<sup>st</sup> Hanoverian regiment of hussars of Vivian's brigade.<sup>29</sup>

The Anglo-Netherlands-German positions.

As his army had penetrated into the former French position and judging his army was "tired to death" (<sup>30</sup>), Wellington ordered his troops to halt and to take up bivouacs; then he returned to his headquarters at Waterloo. While on his way back, by chance, he met marshal Blücher and his staff as these were heading from up his right through the fields.<sup>31</sup> This was on the Brussels-road just south of La Belle Alliance, almost opposite the farm of Trimotia and shortly before 10 p.m.<sup>32</sup> Of the Prussian staff, those who were present at the meeting were at least Von Gneisenau, general Bülow, major Von Lützow and prince Thurn und Taxis.<sup>33</sup>

Both commanders shook hands without dismounting [<sup>34</sup>] and had a conversation of about 10 minutes.<sup>35</sup> Apart from the exchange of congratulations, they made the agreement that the Prussians would pursue the enemy further.<sup>36</sup>

Wellington then continued his return to Waterloo in which he was seriously hindered by the presence of numerous guns and waggons and of course the countless dead and wounded.<sup>37</sup> The members of the group remained silent all the way [<sup>38</sup>] and reached the Bodenghien inn at Waterloo after 11 p.m.<sup>39</sup> In Wellington's arrangement with the Prussians, the majority of his army eventually centred in positions along the Brussels road, reaching south as far as the line which extends from the farm of Passavent on the left to the farm of Hilaincourt on the right.<sup>40</sup>

The Prussian positions.

Of the 1<sup>st</sup> corps, the brigade of major general Von Steinmetz took a bivouac immediately north of Maison du Roi, to the east of the Brussels road.<sup>41</sup> It was also at Maison du Roi that lieutenant general Von Zieten established his headquarters.<sup>42</sup> Of Bülow's corps, it was the 15<sup>th</sup> brigade which also took up positions near Maison du Roi [<sup>43</sup>], while the 16<sup>th</sup> brigade did so at Plancenoit. Here, Von Hiller instructed his staff to collect the forces, to extinguish the fires which were raging in the village and to remove the wounded from the ruins. Additionally, ammunition and supplies were distributed.<sup>44</sup> The reserve cavalry of the 4<sup>th</sup> corps penetrated as far as the Brussels road, but it halted there due to the darkness and the obstruction of the road.<sup>45</sup>

The pursuit.

As the remains of the French army were heading south, it was from his headquarters at Maison du Roi that Von Zieten gave orders to Von Röder to pursue them.<sup>46</sup> In his division, Von Röder had the Brandenburg dragoons and the Brandenburg uhlans precede all his other units (including the 1<sup>st</sup> regiment of Silesian hussars of the brigade of Von Steinmetz).<sup>47</sup>

Of the 2<sup>nd</sup> corps, it were in all probability the brigade of Von Tippelskirch, followed by the cavalry of Von Wahlen Jürgass (the regiment Königin Dragoons, the 2<sup>nd</sup> regiment Silesian uhlans, the 5<sup>th</sup> regiment of Kurmark Landwehr cavalry) which pursued the French along the road.<sup>48</sup> Of the 4<sup>th</sup> corps, it were detachments of the 18<sup>th</sup> regiment of infantry led by captain Von Bieberstein and captain Lessmann which were led forward in the pursuit.<sup>49</sup> It had been south of Plancenoit that both the 3<sup>rd</sup> battalion of the 15<sup>th</sup> regiment (Von Hiller) and the 3<sup>rd</sup> battalion of the 1<sup>st</sup> regiment of Silesian Landwehr led by major Von Keller had been operating. At the northern edge of the Bois de Chantelet they witnessed the fall of this village and then they left this position to proceed further west towards the chaussée, near Maison du Roi. By that time, the 3<sup>rd</sup> battalion of the 15<sup>th</sup> regiment was back to its normal strength after the return of its

skirmishers which until then, had been involved in the fighting in the south side of Plancenoit. From here, the fuseliers were led forward by Gneisenau himself.<sup>50</sup> It might have been these men who took the *landau* of Napoleon which was at this stage still on the heights of Rossomme. The *landau* was the one in the rear of a group of nine imperial carriages heading south into safety. Of these - for obvious reasons - both the *cabinet imperiale* and the *trésor imperiale* were in front.<sup>51</sup>

From his position between the hamlet of Les Flamandes and the farm of Passe Avant, major Von Falckenhausen and his men had also witnessed the French collapse and it was then that Von Falckenhausen decided to join the pursuit. In doing so, his horsemen threw themselves on the French fugitives and took several hundreds of them prisoner.<sup>52</sup>

During the retreat of Wellington's army and the advance of the French army on the 17<sup>th</sup> of June, the winding and narrow road leading through the village Genappe had formed a serious obstruction, delaying the movement of military formations. And of course there was the Dyle which streamed across which aggravated the problem.<sup>53</sup>

On this night of the 18<sup>th</sup> of June the situation was simply disastrous. The village was not only cramped with numerous vehicles, ammunition-waggons of all kinds and guns coming to and from the battlefield, but now also huge numbers of fugitives attempted to make their way through, which completed the confusion.<sup>54</sup> To make matter worse, no precautions (like officers capable of directing the remnants of the army around the village through Ways and Thy) had been taken in case of a retreat.

It was not long before 11 p.m. that Napoleon reached Genappe.<sup>55</sup> Witnessing the confusion, he made an attempt to open the road, to restore order and to form some kind of rearguard. The confusion was such though that he failed.<sup>56</sup> Napoleon, taking no risk of getting entangled in the confusion, managed to turn the village and then continued his way further south over the Charleroi-road.<sup>57</sup> In his rear, he was covered by battalions of the Old Guard pulling back from the battlefield as well. Both battalions of the 1<sup>st</sup> grenadiers initially fell back as two bodies, but it was near Glabais that its commander, general Petit, combined them in one on the main road and from there on continued his way in column per sections.

The total confusion at the entrance of Genappe prompted Petit to make a detour along the east-side of the village, something which colonel Duuring and general Christiani and their battalions had done some time before.<sup>58</sup> Guyot did the same with the few hundred men of his division he had been able to take back.<sup>59</sup>

Being on the heels of the French fugitives, the first Prussian units reached the heights in front of Genappe between 11 p.m. and midnight.<sup>60</sup> Initially, several hundred of French, entrenched behind the debris at the northern entrance of the village, made an attempt to resist, but this was soon put to an end by the gunfire of horse battery nr.2 which bombarded them from its dominating position.<sup>61</sup>

As the French masses wrangled themselves through and around Genappe, the Brandenburger uhlans and dragoons now started to penetrate in the village and threw themselves upon them.<sup>62</sup>

They were followed by the 3<sup>rd</sup> battalion of the 15<sup>th</sup> regiment of infantry (brigade Von Hiller).

As the 3<sup>rd</sup> squadron of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Brandenburg uhlans was busy in clearing the main road into the village, the fuseliers of the 15<sup>th</sup> regiment, led by major Von Keller, bumped into the *berline* of Napoleon at the north entrance of the village.<sup>63</sup>

Its driver, Jean Horn, hoping to turn the village, now attempted to wheel it into a side road leading west into the fields, but failed. As a result the carriage stranded at about 30 paces from the main road. It was just then that the Prussian infantry killed two of the six horses plus the postilion, and disabled Horn by cutting him down with their sabres.<sup>64</sup>

During its advance towards Genappe, the 3<sup>rd</sup> battalion of the 15<sup>th</sup> regiment had a small group in front, consisting of major Von Keller himself, a hornblower, two subalterns and 20 men. These were followed by a small advance guard, formed by a platoon under captain Von Humbracht. This group - in its turn - was followed by the battalion. Initially, the detachment led by major Von Keller penetrated into the village, but stranded here due to a lack of support. By the time however that the group led by captain Von Humbracht arrived and started to turn the French by pulling round the village, the Prussian infantry drove away the French infantry, which, in vain, had tried to set the village in flames.<sup>65</sup> Further, the 3<sup>rd</sup> battalion of the 15<sup>th</sup> regiment was supported by the skirmishers of the 1<sup>st</sup> Pommeranians (2<sup>nd</sup> regiment) under captain Von Goszicki and the Silesian Landwehr under captain Ehrhardt.<sup>66</sup>

It was during the pursuit that numerous French were taken prisoner, and at Genappe the numerous wounded who had got there during the battle obviously shared the same fate.<sup>67</sup> Others, even though wounded, were less lucky and were simply killed by the vengeful Prussians.<sup>68</sup>

For the Prussians, Genappe was a stage for the main part of the pursuing forces to halt. By then it was between 11 p.m. and midnight. Those units which continued the pursuit beyond Genappe were the 1<sup>st</sup> regiment of Silesian hussars, the Brandenburger dragoons and uhlans, the 3<sup>rd</sup> battalion / 15<sup>th</sup> regiment of infantry and the skirmishers of the 1<sup>st</sup> Pommeranian infantry regiment nr.2.<sup>69</sup> After the Prussian vanguard had penetrated into Genappe and had taken over control, Blücher and his staff entered it. By then it was in the very early hours of the 19<sup>th</sup> of June.<sup>70</sup> It was here in the inn of "*Au Roi d'Espagne*" that he established his headquarters.<sup>71 - 72</sup>

It did not long until a French general was brought in, severely wounded. It was general Duhesme, commander of the Young Guard.<sup>73</sup> He had got wounded at his head at Plancenoit by a howitzer.<sup>74</sup> His adjutant (and nephew) captain Marquiaud and some soldiers carried him to the rear where the group was taken prisoner on the Brussels road and brought to the Prussian high command, then at Genappe.<sup>75</sup> It was here that the personal surgeon of Blücher, Bieske, took care of Duhesme.<sup>76</sup> The wound proved mortal though and Dushesme died at 2 a.m. on the 20<sup>th</sup> of June. He was buried the same day at 8 p.m. at the old cemetery of Ways.<sup>77-78</sup>



The tomb of Duhesme at Ways.

Though the French had precipitately fled towards Genappe, it was north of this village that they were still acting in more or less larger units in some kind of cohesion. Genappe, with its massive congestion of men and material, now however splintered the remains of the French army to such a degree that any attempt to restore formations was bound to fail. Beyond Genappe, they all

moved over and through the fields along the *chaussée* further south.<sup>79</sup>

The seven remaining carriages of Napoleon's headquarters had somehow managed to get back through Genappe, but it was not far beyond the village and north of Quatre Bras that the *voiture de la chambre* (nr.357) fell in Prussian hands.<sup>80</sup>

Though the number of units in pursuit beyond Genappe had seriously been diminished [<sup>81</sup>], it was under the personal leadership of Gneisenau himself and under a full moon that they rounded up the French. These, in their turn, attempted several times to establish bivouacs here and there, but were driven away shortly after. In numerous cases, the sound of a gun, drums or trumpets was enough to frighten the French and get them on the run again.<sup>82</sup>



The Dyle at Genappe.

At Quatre Bras, while a smaller part of the French fugitives headed for Namur [<sup>83</sup>], by far the most of them went further south towards Frasnes and beyond, to Jumet. It was also at this crossroads that the remains of Piré's cavalry division rejoined the remains of the *armée du Nord*. They had pulled out from the battlefield along the Nivelles-road and had turned left near the Bois de Neuve Cour. From there they took a track taking them along the hamlet of Trou du Bois, Promelles and Hautain-le-Val to Quatre Bras.<sup>84</sup>

It was also near Quatre Bras that general Lobau attempted to form some kind of rearguard with a few hundred horsemen, but this was to no avail.<sup>85</sup>

Napoleon himself reached Quatre Bras by 1 a.m.<sup>86</sup> At that moment he was accompanied by Soult, Drouot, several other staff officers, the guide Decoster and an escort of *chasseurs à cheval* of the imperial guard and of the *gendarmerie d'élite*.<sup>87</sup> It was near the crossroads that he dismounted for a brief halt, despite the fact that the fields here were still covered with the debris and the dead and wounded of the action at Quatre Bras.<sup>88</sup> It might have been that Napoleon had expected the division of Girard to be at the crossroads, as it had been ordered some five hours ago, but this had been too late for the division to get there in time.<sup>89</sup> In fact, having discussed the situation, *maréchal de Remond* at Fleurus – having consulted the staff of the division – had decided around midnight to go to Charleroi instead. The division then departed towards daybreak and reached Charleroi towards 6 a.m.<sup>90</sup>

It was at Quatre Bras that Napoleon sent his aide de camp captain Dumonceau to Grouchy to him in writing about the loss of the battle at Mont Saint Jean. At the same time, he instructed

him to withdraw across the Sambre.<sup>91</sup> It was also from Quatre Bras that Napoleon sent colonel Baudus to Fleurus, where the majority of the imperial equipment was stationed, with instructions to let them pass the river Sambre at Charleroi. He was also told to instruct the division of Girard to do the same. As Baudus reached Fleurus, however, the division had already left and then Baudus proceeded to Charleroi where he found it involved in crossing the river.<sup>92</sup> Not long after his halt at Quatre Bras, the emperor continued his retreat; by then it may have been around 1.30 a.m.<sup>93</sup> Some two hours later he reached Gosselies. Here, he made a brief halt to have a light meal at the house of Dumont, the same where Ney had spent the night three days before.<sup>94</sup> After that he continued his way towards Charleroi.

Initially, Von Röder himself had halted near Quatre Bras to wait for the remainder of his brigade, but there it was Gneisenau who took the Brandenburger dragoons and uhlans further south.<sup>95</sup> However, it was not long after - at daybreak - that Gneisenau decided to halt his pursuit.<sup>96</sup> By then, French forces had been driven from in total nine bivouacs.<sup>97</sup> The Brandenburg dragoons (after having suffered some losses due to French musketry fire between Genappe and Frasnes) halted their pursuit by daybreak just south of Frasnes, while sending out 50 men led by lieutenant Düsterloh as far as Gosselies.<sup>98</sup>

The Brandenburg uhlans halted near Gosselies between 4 and 5 a.m., while the 1<sup>st</sup> regiment of Silesian hussars halted at Quatre Bras where they were attached to the cavalry of Von Röder. It was from there too that the regiment sent out some patrols, one of which took five French ammunition carts and five guns of their own guns as far as in the vicinity of Saint Amand.<sup>99</sup>

The skirmishers of the 1<sup>st</sup> Pommeranian regiment of infantry eventually halted at Pont-à-Migneloux (4 kilometres south of Frasnes), while the fuseliers of the 15<sup>th</sup> regiment penetrated at least as far as Mellet.<sup>100-101</sup>

It was in an inn at Frasnes that Gneisenau, accompanied by count Von Gröben (chief of staff of the reserve-cavalry of the 1st corps) and major Von Lützow (of the general staff), had a short rest.<sup>102</sup> Beyond Gosselies, most of the French forces which had joined the chaussée at Jumet on the 15<sup>th</sup> of June (those of the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> corps) now re-entered the secondary road to Jumet and eventually reached the Sambre at Marchienne-au-Pont. Others, particularly those of the imperial guard, the 6<sup>th</sup> corps and the cavalry, headed back to the Sambre via Charleroi.<sup>103</sup>

Ney also reached the Sambre at Marchienne-au-Pont. After having spoken here with general Lacroix (chief of staff of the 2<sup>nd</sup> corps), he crossed the river and headed from there for Beaumont.<sup>104</sup>

As he reached Charleroi, count Lobau made an attempt to create some order and having done so he decided to head back to Gosselies to do the same. Here, however, he was taken prisoner by a small patrol of Prussian uhlans. They took him to central headquarters at Genappe, where he had a brief meeting with Gneisenau and Blücher and from where he was conveyed to Brussels the same day.<sup>105</sup>

## Charleroi

Since the crossing by the *Armée du nord* of the Sambre on the 15<sup>th</sup> of June, Charleroi was its operational base and concentration point for its supplies. For that reason, the city was crowded with convois (loaded with supplies like bread, wine, brandy, rice and flour), caissons, bridging material and all sorts of baggages.

What added to the congestion were the numerous fugitives and wounded who had been dropping in on foot and on all sorts of vehicles from both the battlefields of Ligny and Quatre Bras. In three days some 200 waggons with wounded were delivered in numerous public building and private houses in the city.<sup>106</sup> Additionally, Prussian guns taken at Ligny were parked on the central square of the city.<sup>107</sup>

It may have been between 1 and 2 a.m. that the *commissaire des guerres*, who had been sent from the battlefield of Waterloo, arrived at Charleroi. Witnessing the situation, he immediately sought the local commander but for some unknown he had been unable to improve it. Meanwhile, the first wounded and fugitives from Waterloo had started coming in as well, spreading alarming news. This in itself was enough to complete the confusion.<sup>108</sup>

What added to the confusion was the sinuous and steep trajectory of the central street passing from the upper city to the lower one. In this way, the central vein connecting both parts, the bridge over the river Sambre, got fully obstructed.<sup>109</sup>

Cuirassiers, descending from the higher part of the city, in their momentum crashed one of the wooden parapets of the bridge which caused some horsemen to fall in the river. In the confusion, the sentry-box and several vehicles were tumbled over.

But that was not all. Immediately after the cuirassiers, the convois came down towards the bridge in a momentum as well, thereby crashing into obstructions there. The effect was that many supplies now ended upon the street; even some men were crushed. As the convois had grounded to a halt unprotected, they – plus those scattered on the street – now became an easy prey for plunderers searching for food and other supplies.<sup>110</sup> As the bridge had got by now almost fully unpassable, men started to look for fords to wade through the river instead.<sup>111</sup>

It had been at the northern entrance of Charleroi, near the *cabaret Belle Vue*, that six carriages of the imperial headquarters stranded.<sup>112</sup> One of them was the private treasury of the emperor (nr.410). It contained one million francs in gold and 200.000 francs in hard silver cash and was escorted by a paymaster, an officer of the *gendarmérie d'élite*, two subalterns and four *gendarmes*. The paymaster in charge, reluctant to pass through the tumultuous situation in the city, decided to remove the money and to distribute the bags containing 20.000 francs each amongst the men escorting the carriage. The idea was that they would carry them over the river into safety at a specified rendez-vous. However, the moment the paymaster had started writing down who was to carry which bags, some musketry fire was heard from a distance. This caused the group to panic, to start fighting amongst each other and to plunder the treasury completely.<sup>113</sup>

One of the other carriages which got stuck near Belle Vue (in this case between artillery-trains) was the *cabinet impérial*, led by the duke De Bassano. The moment he heard distant musketry fire, he gave orders to his assistants to tear up the most important documents and throw them away. This was accordingly complied with.<sup>114</sup>

It was probably towards 5 a.m. that Napoleon reached Charleroi, but how he got through remains unknown.<sup>115</sup>

It was towards 9 a.m. that the last remnants of the French army had passed the river Sambre, leaving behind the dead, wounded and stragglers in the city, as well as a massive array of supplies, material etc.<sup>116</sup>

## **Observations.**

By the time the four imperial battalions were hurrying back to the French position, towards 8 p.m, it was on the far French right that the division Durutte did the same in front of the forces of Zieten's corps. Both events triggered an almost immediate *terreur panique* amongst the French forces opposite the 1<sup>st</sup> Prussian corps and Wellington's army, which resulted in a general retreat towards the Brussels road.<sup>117</sup> From 8.30 p.m. onwards, the French forces evacuating Plancenoit increased the numbers of fugitives here even more.<sup>118</sup>

All in all, the general French retreat from the battlefield was only possible because of the resistance of the majority of the infantry units of the imperial guard, as well as by some cavalry,

around La Belle Alliance and by forces to the west of Plancenoit. This was basically the dam as it was thrown up in despair by Napoleon across the battlefield from Gomont towards Plancenoit. The significance of this second point should be stressed, because if the French front would have broken there earlier, the main part of the whole French army would have been cut off from its line of retreat.<sup>119</sup>

In their retreat, the French left a large part of their guns on the battlefield, while another part was dragged back to the rear, of which the majority fell in enemy's hands around Genappe.<sup>120</sup> It was here that Napoleon for a moment made an attempt to organise some kind of resistance, but it was just here that all order was lost.

From that moment onwards, he attempted to organise the retreat of the remains of the Armée du Nord as well as he could, but it was to very little avail. His attempt to organise some kind of cover at Quatre Bras failed, while the safeguarding of the *grand parc* to the south side of the Sambre shared an equal fate. In the understanding that all hope had gone on Belgian soil, it was for this reason that it was at Quatre Bras that Napoleon ordered Grouchy to fall back behind the Sambre river, which he did virtually unscathed by the 20<sup>th</sup> of June.<sup>121</sup>

About 30 minutes after the initial pursuit of Adam's brigade - which was soon joined to its right by Vivian's brigade and the 2<sup>nd</sup> regiment of light dragoons - it was that the remainder of the army advanced.<sup>122</sup> The advance confirmed the French retreat off the field and as such completed Wellington's victory, as by far the majority of the allied units did not get into any contact with the enemy as this was running off the field.<sup>123</sup>

Sometime after that, Wellington says he stopped the pursuit "only on account of the fatigue of our troops", but he also adds "and because I found myself on the same road with marshal Blücher, who assured me of his intention to follow the enemy throughout the night." This gives the impression that the Duke decided to halt his army without any consultation of the Prussian staff, but that this decision was firmly established as soon as the Duke had the promise of the Prussian staff to pursue the French army.<sup>124</sup>

In Wellington's arrangement with the Prussians, the majority of his army eventually centred in positions along the Brussels road, reaching south as far as the line which extends from the farm of Passavent on the left to the farm of Hilaincourt on the right.

For the majority of the Prussians who were in pursuit, Genappe was the main stage. Those who continued until daybreak were three regiments of cavalry and one battalion and a detachment of infantry; they reached up to Frasnes and beyond, to Gosselies. The majority of the Prussian forces engaged in the battle had their bivouacs at or in the immediate vicinity of the battlefield.

The pursuit of the French army was effective, but it could have been even more so if both armies had been able to involve more cavalry on both sides of the Brussels road. Yet, Wellington basically had no more fresh cavalry available as the brigades of Vivian and Vandeleur to work on the right side of it. To the left, Von Röder flooded the battlefield, but he was on his own and wasn't able to outflank the French due to the state of the field, the chaos and the distance. In that context, it would have been more efficient if the reserve cavalry of Bülow had been employed here as well.<sup>125</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> In: Register of staff. In: BN, nr.4366

Also in: Grouchy, A.F.E. de - Mémoires du maréchal De Grouchy Vol.IV p.77

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Mauduit, H. de – Les derniers jours etc. Vol.II p.484

<sup>3</sup> Combier, A. - Mémoires du général Radet d'après ses papiers personnels et les archives d'état p.342

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Baron Bellina's report to Davout, dated 23<sup>rd</sup> June 1815. In: SHAT, C15, nr.5

5. The fact that the Imperial Guard was in disorder is confirmed by captain Prax (3<sup>rd</sup> regiment of chasseurs). In: D'Avout, A. , "L'infanterie de la garde à Waterloo." In: Carnet de la Sabretache (1905), p.33-54, 107-128

The official French bulletin of the battle. In: Bas, F.de La campagne de 1815 Vol.III p.554

Captain Taylor (10th regiment of hussars). In: BL, Add.ms. 34.703 p.80-90

Captain Eeles (3rd battalion of the 95th regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.77-82

6. Lieutenant general Reille. In: Documents inédits p.62

Colonel Trefcon. In: Carnet de campagne etc. p.192

2<sup>nd</sup> lieutenant Herbillon (108<sup>th</sup> regiment, division Bachelu). In: Quelques pages d'un vieux cahier p.11-12

General Foy. In: Vie militaire p.282-283

Chef d'escadron Lemonnier Delafosse. In: Souvenirs militaires p.389-390

Chef de bataillon Puvis (93<sup>rd</sup> regiment, division Foy). In: Souvenirs p.118

Captain Robinaux (2<sup>nd</sup> regiment, division Jérôme Bonaparte) confirms his regiment – covered by some lancers - went back in good order. In: Journal de route p.210

Ensign Larreguy de Civrieux (93<sup>rd</sup> regiment, division Foy) uses terms as "sauve qui peut" and "à la trahison", which would have been uttered, but here he speaks more in a general sense about the army. In: Souvenirs etc. p.170

According to major Hepburn (2<sup>nd</sup> battalion 3<sup>rd</sup> Foot Guards), who was in command in the orchard of Gomont, the French retired from the fields in the south-east corner of the complex in no order, and almost without firing a shot. In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.311-316

<sup>7</sup> Oré, D.C. - 1er régiment de chasseurs 1651-1903 p.223

Houssaye, H. – 1815.Waterloo p.430

8. Chef d'escadron De Stuers (lancers of the guard), as cited by Houssaye. In: 1815. Waterloo p.431

9. Cf. General Guyot. In: Carnets de campagne p.296, 393, 397

By that time, Guyot himself was absent as he had got wounded some time before.

Captain Barton (12th regiment of light dragoons). In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.184-191

Chef d'escadron De Stuers (lancers of the imperial guard). In: Houssaye, H. – 1815.Waterloo p.431

<sup>10</sup> Colonel Guillemin. In: D'Avout, A. , "L'infanterie de la garde à Waterloo." In: Carnet de la Sabretache (1905), p.33-54, 107-128

11. Cf. Ney's letter to Fouché, dated 26<sup>th</sup> June 1815.

Cf. chef d'escadron Lemonnier Delafosse (aide de camp of general Foy). He situates this on the battlefield. In: Souvenirs militaires p.226

12. The following eye-witnesses confirm the presence of a large number of abandoned enemy guns near La Belle Alliance:

Major general Maitland (WL, nr.703.101)

Lieutenant Powell (1st Foot Guards). WL, nr.705.60 / 60 guns

Lieutenant Maule (battery Rogers). WL, nr.704.33)

VPH over Best: 32 verlaten vuurmonden

Major Hunter Blair (brigade major brigade Adam). WL,nr.34.705.75

Sir H.Vivian. In: BL,r.707.73).

Lieutenant colonel Colborne (52<sup>nd</sup> regiment). In: 708.119

Those who speak about the presence of abandoned French guns at Maison du Roi are:

Constant Rebecque. In: NA, 2.21.008.01 nr.25

Captain Reed (71<sup>st</sup> regiment). WL, nr.703.77 / 77 stukken

Corporal Aldridge (2nd battalion 95th regiment). In; BL, Add.ms.34.704.27

Major Seeger (2nd regiment light dragoons). In: BL, LD.VPH, nr.53),

Colonel Von Vincke. In: VPH, nr.26

Report of Bülow. In: Bas, F. de & T'Serclaes de Wommerson. La campagne de 1815 Vol.III nr, 31.3D1

Captain Luard (18th regiment hussars) mentions the capture of 30 guns in his letter dated 19<sup>th</sup> of June 1815. In: [www.11815.ltd.uk](http://www.11815.ltd.uk) Original in: Queen's Royal Lancers Archive, Prince William of Gloucester Barracks, Grantham.

13. Colonel Duuring. In: D'Avout, A. - L'infanterie de la garde à Waterloo p.115-119

Fleury de Chaboulon. In: Mémoires Vol.II p.132

14. General Christiani (2nd regiment of grenadiers). In: D'Avout, A. - L'infanterie de la garde à Waterloo p.115-119

General Petit. In: D'Avout, A. - "L'infanterie de la garde à Waterloo." In: Carnet de la Sabretache (1905), p.33-54, 107-128

Gourgaud, C. - La campagne de 1815 p.90

Mémoires pour servir etc. p.163

Saint Denis. Souvenirs du mameluck Ali p.112

15. General Petit. In: D'Avout, A. - "L'infanterie de la garde à Waterloo." In: Carnet de la Sabretache (1905), p.33-54, 107-128

16. Napoleon would have hesitated to leave the square, as a result of which Soult would have convinced hi mto do so by stating "Ah Sire, les ennemis sont déjà assez heureux!". Cf. Gourgaud, C. - La campagne de 1815 p.91

17. Cf. Colonel Duuring. In: D'Avout, A. - L'infanterie de la garde à Waterloo p.115-119  
It is in this connection that count Flahaut adds that the emperor during the retreat never rode

in a gallop but in a foot's pace. In a letter to the *Moniteur*, dated 1857. In: *The first Napoleon* p.321

18. Napoleon's secretary, Fleury de Chaboulon, describes the contradictory rumours of the fate of the emperor circulating during the collapse of the army. To make sure about the fate of Napoleon for himself, he decided to turn back, followed by first riding-master Chauvin, towards the battlefield on a horse of one of the carriages of central headquarters. While underway he met the page Gudin who told him Napoleon had left the field. Despite this news, Fleury de Chaboulon continued his route in which he met two cuirassiers who suspected him of deserting, but just then he was saved by an officer of the imperial guard who also told him that Napoleon was no more on the battlefield. He then went back as well. In: *Mémoires Vol.II* p.132

Colonel Forbin Janson, one of Napoleon's aides de camp, had been with Napoleon all day but fell back on him as he retreated, being involved in attempts to assemble the imperial guard. Cf. his letter to Sir R.Wilson, December 1817. Cf. Sir R.Wilson, *Correspondence*. In: BL, Department of manuscripts, nr.30.147 p.15-18

19. Cf. Houssaye, H. - 1815.Waterloo p.413

20. Cf. the different eye-witness accounts. Also see Wellington's memorandum of 1836. In: *WSD, Vol.X* p.513

21. Wellington's memorandum of 1836. In: *WSD, Vol.X* p.513

<sup>22</sup> For the exact details of the advance of all units involved, see the extensive note.

<sup>23</sup> Reports of the different regiments published by J.von Pflugk Harttung in: *Das 1<sup>e</sup> preussische Korps bei Belle Alliance* p.210-213

Major Von Gröben was near the 2nd regiment of Kurmark Landwehr cavalry during the advance. His account in: Pflugk Harttung, J.von Belle Alliance. *Die Schilderung der Ereignisse vom 16.-18.Juni 1815 durch einen mitbeteiligten Generalstabsoffizier* p.14

24. Cf. Report of general Bülow. In: Bas, F.de & T'Serclaes de Wommerson - *La campagne de 1815 aux Pays Bas. Vol.III* p.518-540

After the fall of Plancenoit, the Prussian foot-battery nr.2 (Von Hiller) was able to advance to a position north of the village from where it could cover the fields between it and the Brussels-road with its fire. In doing so, it also hit a battalion of the imperial guard which had evacuated the village just before. As it formed square for British cavalry (probably Vivian's), it continued its fire until it was asked by a British adjutant to quit doing so, which it did. Cf. account of 2<sup>nd</sup> lieutenant Von Stern-Swiazdowski. In: Förster, F. Chr. , *Geschichte der Befreiungskriege 1813, 1814, 1815. Vol.III* p.1009-1010

<sup>25</sup> Mach, A.von - *Geschichte des Königlich Preussischen etc.*p.340-341

According to Von Pflugk Harttung, Von Goszicki attached himself to major Von Keller. In: *GSA, VPH-HA VI nr.V.4F.2* p.38

26. Captain Campbell (42nd regiment). In: BL, *Add.ms.34.706* p.451-454

General Hanoverian report regarding the brigade of Best. In: NHA, Hann.41.XXI, nr.156 p.27-49

Captain Rogers (battery Rogers). In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.227-234

Captain Tomkinson (16<sup>th</sup> regiment of light dragoons). In: The diary of a cavalry officer etc. p.311

Lieutenant colonel H.Halkett. In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.402-403

Major Drewes (battalion Osnabrück). In: NHA, Hann.41.XXI, nr.151 p.70-72

According to lieutenant colonel Colborne skirmishers of the 52<sup>nd</sup> and Prussian forces mixed at the junction of the Brussels road and the road leading from Wavre to Nivelles. In: BL, Add.ms.34.708 p.40-49

Major Von Rettberg (3rd battalion 2nd regiment Nassau) speaks of his connection to skirmishers of the Prussian 18<sup>th</sup> regiment of infantry (brigade Von Losthin, 4<sup>th</sup> corps). In: VPH, nr.77

27. Cf. Attestation of general Zieten, dated 9<sup>th</sup> October 1815, which reads:

*“Der königlich Niederländische Hauptmann und Adjutant Van Omphal überbrachte mir in der Schlacht bei Belle Alliance den 18te Juny d.J. ein Botschaft von Sr.Excellenz dem Herrn.Herzog von Wellington.*

*Die Verachtung aller Gefahr , bei Ausrichtung des dem Herrn.Hauptmann v.Omphal ertheilten Auftrages, die rühmliche Anschicht [?] welche er dabei bewies, lassen es mich zu einem besondern Vergnügen rechnen, seinen persönliche Bekanntschaft in diesem glorreichen Tage gerne [...] zu haben. Diese Zeugnis habe Ich sehr gern hiermit öffentlich bekunden wollen. Im Hauptquartier Schloss Navarre den 9.Oktober 1815. V.Zieten”*

In: NL-ZuRAZ Van Löben Sels, 0302 nr.259

Cf. Constant Rebecque in his journal. In: NA, 2.21.008.01 nr.25

Constant Rebecque, though, speaks of a mission towards general Bülow.

Von Omphal himself in his account. In: NIMH, nr.104/7

28. Hiller, colonel von - Denkwürdigkeiten etc. p.252-253

29. Sir H.Vivian. In: Reply to major Gawler etc. In: USJ, 1833,II p.319

Sir H.Vivian (WL, nr.706 p.312-314)

30. Wellington's letter of the 19th of June to Lady Frances Webster In: WSD, Vol.X p.531

Cf. his report to lord Bathurst, dated 19<sup>th</sup> June 1815. In: Bas, F.de & T'Serclaes de Wommerson – La campagne de 1815 Vol.III p.478

31. Jackson, Sir B. Notes and reminiscences of a staff officer p.57-58

Journal Constant Rebecque. In: NA, 2.21.008.01 nr.25

Lieutenant Gawler (52nd regiment). In: BL, Add.mss.34.706 p.389-399

Sir Hussay Vivian contradicts this claim. He thinks that when the Duke gave him the order to bivouac, he had the impression that he had already spoken with Blücher. BL, Add.mss.34.707 p.50-57

<sup>32</sup> Cf. extensive note.

33. Cf. official Prussian report, the account of prince Thurn und Taxis and the journal of De Constant Rebecque.

34. Cf. Wellington to Lord Stanhope.

Wellington's letter of 8th June 1816 to William Mudford. In: WSD, Vol.X p.509

Gronow, R.H. - The reminiscences and recollections of captain Gronow. London.1900. p.199-200

35. Journal of De Constant Rebecque. In: NA, 2.21.008.01 nr.25

36. Cf. Journal of De Constant Rebecque. In: NA, 2.21.008.01 nr.25

Lieutenant colonel Freemantle (aide de camp of Wellington). In: BL, Add.mss.34.707 p.462-464

Sir H.Vivian. In: BL, Add.mss.34.706 p.312-314

37. Cf. Sir Basil Jackson In: Jackson, Sir B. Notes and reminiscences of a staff officer. p.58-60

A.Dallas (assistant of the commissariat) saw Wellington coming in quietly into Waterloo. In: Incidents in the life etc. p.134

Cotton believes the road was so much blocked near La Haye Sainte that he had to leave the road here. Cf. Cotton, E. – Une voix de Waterloo p.157

38. Jackson, Sir B. - Notes and reminiscences of a staff officer. p.58-60

39. Constant Rebecque. Diary. In: NA, 2.21.008.01 nr.25

Wellington also claims it was between 11 p.m. and midnight. Cf. letter dated 8th June 1816 to Mudford. In: WSD, Vol.X, p.509

Lord Stanhope cites Wellington having said it was 11 p.m. Cf. Stanhope, Ph.H. - Notes of conversations etc. p.84

In another account, though, the duke states it was after 10 p.m. Cf. his letter of 8 June 1816 to William Mudford. In: WSD, Vol.X p.508-509

Sir Basil Jackson believes it was after 10 p.m. and that it took 30 to 45 minutes to get there. Cf. Jackson, Sir B. Notes and reminiscences of a staff officer p.60

Prince Pozzo di Borgo also thinks it was 10 p.m. Cf. his letter to the countess of Archiac dated 22<sup>nd</sup> September 1837. In: LMB.

Sir George Scovell is even earlier with 9 p.m. Cf. his account in the Scovell Papers, PRO, nr.WO 37/12/84

Sir H.Smith (brigade major of Lambert's brigade ) would have talked to Alava and he would have told him it was 9 or 10 p.m.

Cf. Smith, Sir H. - The autobiography of Sir H.Smith etc. p.291

Wellington's cook, James Thornton, asserts that Wellington arrived at the headquarters around 00.30 a.m. and that he had a meal not long after in his bedroom.

Early that morning (around 4 a.m) , Thornton, at Brussels, had got the instruction to go to Waterloo and await the Duke there. Having collected some provisions in Brussels, he sent two men with them to Waterloo and followed them later; he arrived at Waterloo at 11 a.m. Cf. Thornton, J. Your most obedient servant p.95-98

The distance between Trimotia and the centre of Waterloo is about 6 kilometres and in connection to the bad state of the road etc. it took the group, though on horseback, at least one hour to cover it.

<sup>40</sup> Both farms are about 5 kilometres south of the ridge of Mont Saint Jean.

41. Cf. sketch of the position of the brigade. In former KA< VI.E.59. In: GSA, NL, VPH box 14 Report of general Von Zieten. In: Bas, F.de & T'Serclaes de Wommerson. La campagne de 1815 aux Pays Bas. Vol.III. nr. 31.3.B

Cf. Harkort, F. - Die Zeiten des ersten Westphalischen etc. p.60

The diary of the 1st corps, however, states that only the vanguard of Von Steinmetz was near Maison du Roi; the remainder of the brigade was in the vicinity of La Belle Alliance. Cf. Diary of the 1st corps. In: Pflugk Harttung, J.von Das I.Korps Zieten bei La Belle Alliance und Wavre p.201

As the 2<sup>nd</sup> battalion of the 1<sup>st</sup> regiment Westphalian Landwehr had become separated from the other battalions, this battalion only rejoined the regiment on the 19th of June. Cf. Pflugk Harttung, J.von - Das 1<sup>e</sup> preussische Korps bei Belle Alliance p.168

According to the regimental history of the 28<sup>th</sup> regiment (brigade Pirch II). the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> brigade also had their bivouacs near Maison du Roi. Cf. Die Geschichte des 28. Regiments In: Special ABN, nr.65 p.28

The 1<sup>st</sup> regiment of Silesian Landwehr cavalry (brigade Von Sydow, 4<sup>th</sup> corps), as coming from the Dyle, reached the field in the evening after the enemy was already retreating. It attached itself to the 1<sup>st</sup> corps. Cf. GSA, VPh HA Vi nr.V.4C p.26

<sup>42</sup> Cf. Diary of the 1<sup>st</sup> corps. In: Pflugk Harttung, J.von Das I.Korps Zieten bei La Belle Alliance und Wavre p.201

<sup>43</sup> Cf. Hofschröder, P. - 1815 The Waterloo campaign. The German victory p.150

Captain Von Conrady (3<sup>rd</sup> battalion 4<sup>th</sup> regiment of Silesian Landwehr cavalry) claims though that his battalion advanced as far as Genappe. In: Aus stürmischer Zeit p.418

44. Von Hiller, colonel - Denkwürdigkeiten etc. p.252.

Cf. Dörk, G.M. - Das Königlich Preussische etc p.132

<sup>45</sup> Cf. Report of general Bülow. In: Bas, F.de & T'Serclaes de Wommerson. La campagne de 1815 Vol.III nr.31.3.D1

<sup>46</sup> Pflugk Harttung, J von - Das 1<sup>e</sup> preussische Korps bei Belle Alliance p.215

47. Cf. report of Von Röder mentioning these regiments and the others to follow in the rear. In: Cf. Hofschröder, P. - 1815 The Waterloo campaign. The German victory p.151

Wechmar, H.von - Braune Husaren etc. p.62

Reports of the different regiments published by J.von Pflugk Harttung. In: Das 1<sup>e</sup> preussische Korps bei Belle Alliance p.210-213

Report of general Von Zieten. In: Bas, F.de & T'Serclaes de Wommerson. La campagne de

1815 aux Pays Bas. Vol.III, nr.31.3.B

It was on the southern side of Maison du Roi that Zieten ordered his reserve cavalry to pursue the enemy further. Cf. Diary of the 1<sup>st</sup> corps. In: Pflugk Harttung, J.von - Das I.Korps Zieten bei La Belle Alliance und Wavre p.201

48. Report of general Pirch I. In: Bas, F.de & T'Serclaes de Wommerson. La campagne de 1815 aux Pays Bas. Vol.III, nr.31.3.C

Pirch I speaks about the march of the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> battalion of the 1<sup>st</sup> Pommeranian regiment nr.2 and the 3<sup>rd</sup> battalion of the 25<sup>th</sup> regiment (both Von Tippelskirch) with the last battalion in front. Cf. Dziengel, J.D.von - Geschichte des königlichen zweiten etc. p.390

Stawitzky claims a participation of the fuselier battalion / 25th regiment (Tippelskirch), preceded for about 180 metre by the fuseliers of the 15<sup>th</sup> regiment (Von Hiller, 4<sup>th</sup> corps) and by the skirmishers of the fusilier battalion / 25<sup>th</sup> regiment led by lieutenant Klaatsch, those of the 1<sup>st</sup> Pommeranian regiment nr.2 led by captain Von Goszicki and those of the 5<sup>th</sup> regiment of Westphalian infantry (Tippelskirch). North of Genappe they were preceded by uhlans, with whom the infantry drove away some French cavalry and members of the Imperial Guard which had halted to make a stand. In: Geschichte des Königlich Preussischen 25ten Infanterie-Regiments p.95-98

<sup>49</sup> Woyna, Geschichte des 18.Regiments p.170,173

50. Report of general Bülow. In: Bas, F.de & T'Serclaes de Wommerson. La campagne de 1815 aux Pays Bas. Vol.III, nr.II.31.3D

Dörk, G.M. - Das königlich preussische etc. p.134

Colonel Von Hiller. In: Denkwürdigkeiten etc. p.253

Major Von Keller. In: Narrative of the particular circumstances etc. In: A description of the costly and curious etc. p.12

<sup>51</sup> Cf. Delloye, S. – Le sort des équipages etc. p.13-14, 23

The *landau* was registered under number 301.

Napoleon himself confirms the fact that more than one carriage was taken at Waterloo. In: Mémoires pour servir etc. p.168

It is also captain Gardiner who confirms in his diary that two carriages were taken. In: RAI, nr. MD 1178

52. Report of general Bülow. In: Bas, F.de & T'Serclaes de Wommerson. La campagne de 1815 aux Pays Bas. Vol.III, nr.II.31.3D

<sup>53</sup> According to Houssaye, the centrale bridge was 2.50 metres wide. His source for this claim is unknown. In: 1815. Waterloo p.432

Another publication states the bridge measured 210 cm wide. Cf. Aerts, W. & L.Wilmet. Waterloo etc. p.57

According to Gore, the Dyle was here about 180 metres wide and 30 to 45 cm deep. In: An historical account of the battle of Waterloo etc. p.73

54. Report of baron Bellina (member on the staff of Napoleon) to Davout, dated 23<sup>rd</sup> June 1815. In: SHAT, nr.C15, 5

Levavasseur, O. Souvenirs militaires etc. p.305

55. Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de France etc. p.164

Gourgaud - Campagne de dix huit cent quinze etc. p.90

Decoster claimed that Napoleon left Genappe around 11.30 p.m. Decoster spoke to professor Benzenberg in the summer of 1815. Cf. Benzenberg's letter to Gneisenau, dated 30th August 1815. In: Delbrück, H. Das Leben etc. Vol.IV p.614

56. Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de France etc. p.164

Gourgaud - Campagne de dix huit cent quinze etc. p.90

Report of baron Bellina (member on the staff of Napoleon) to Davout, dated 23<sup>rd</sup> June 1815. In: SHAT, nr.C15, 5

Captain Coignet. In: Les cahiers du capitaine Coignet p.405

Lobau writes about his men in 1817 to Craan: "nous avons attaqué en hommes qui ne doutaient de rien et dans la retraite, on n'était pas propre à résister au moindre choc." In Waresquiel, E.de – Lettres d'un lion p.175

57. Report of baron Bellina (member on the staff of Napoleon) to Davout, dated 23<sup>rd</sup> June 1815. In: SHAT, nr.C15, 5

Gilson, J. - Genappe à travers les âges p.131

According to Gilson, Napoleon used a small road along the Dyle (now the ruelle Duaphine) towards Ways where he crossed it. His source might be a local tradition.

Delloye, S. Napoleon dans sa dernière campagne. Spéciaal nummer van het bulletin van de SBEN. 1996. p.50

Neither Napoleon himself, nor Gourgaud is specific on how the emperor reached the other side of Genappe.

Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de France etc. p.164

Gourgaud, C. Campagne de dix huit cent quinze etc. p.90

Decoster claims he led the group *through* Genappe, which took about one and a half hour due to the chaotic situation. Decoster would not have been aware of a crossing at Ways. Decoster spoke to professor Benzenberg in the summer of 1815. Cf. Benzenberg's letter to Gneisenau, dated 30th August 1815. In: Delbrück, H. Das Leben etc. Vol.IV p.614

58. Colonel Duiring, general Petit and general Christiani. In: Moore-Smith, G.C. "General Petit's account of the Waterloo campaign." In: The English historical review 18 (1903), p.321-326

In: d'Avout, A. - L'infanterie de la garde à Waterloo In: Carnet de la Sabretache. 1905. p.33-54 en 107-128.391

H.de Mauduit. In: Les derniers jours de la grande armée Vol.II p.470, 479

He believes the 1st regiment turned the village by 11.45 p.m.

<sup>59</sup> Cf. his letter to Pelet, dated 27<sup>th</sup> April 1835. In: Carnets de la campagne (1792-1815) p.397

60. Two sources state it was 11 p.m.

Major Von Keller. In: Narrative of the particular circumstances etc. In: A description of the costly and curious etc. p.11

Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de France etc. p.167

61. Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de France etc. p.164  
Gneisenau in his report dated 20th June 1815. In: Bas, F.de & T'Serclaes de Wommerson. La campagne de 1815 aux Pays Bas. Vol.III, nr.31.3A  
Report of captain Von Borowsky (VI.E.7.I.171) Cited by Von Pflugk Harttung. In: das 1<sup>e</sup> preussische Korps bei Belle Alliance p.217

<sup>62</sup> Of the regiment of Brandenburg uhlans, the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> squadron followed the chaussée itself, while the remaining 3<sup>rd</sup> squadron advanced west of it (the 1<sup>st</sup> squadron covered the horse battery nr.2). Cf. Report of the regiment written by captain Von Wildowski. In: Former KAS, VI.E.7.II.172 In: GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.VII.3 E.p.54  
Pflugk Harttung in: Das 1<sup>e</sup> preussische Korps bei Belle Alliance p.211  
Goltz, G.F.G. – Geschichte des königlich Preussischen dritten Ulanen-Regiments p.168

<sup>63</sup> Cf.account of lieutenant Golz of the Brandenburger uhlans. In: Guterzky-Cornitz, Geschichte des I.Brandenburgischen etc. p.301 In: Cf. Hofschröer, P. 1815 The Waterloo campaign. The German victory p.152  
The *berline* (a four-wheeled closed traveling carriage) was registered under number 389. Napoleon describes it as a chaise de poste. In: Mémoires pour servir etc. p.168

<sup>64</sup> Cf. Major Von Keller's and Jean Horn's accounts in: A description of the costly and curious military carriage etc. p.12, 19  
Dörk, G.M. – Das königlich etc. p.134, 139-141  
Damitz, K. von – Geschichte des Feldzugs etc. p.317  
Ollech, Von – Geschichte des Feldzugs etc. p.253

The mameluck Saint Denis erroneously claims that Horn cut the reins of the horses and that he was severely wounded in the arm by a cannonball shortly after. In reality, Horn suffered ten sabre-cuts, of which three on one arm. After the battle, Horn had been found for dead and carried to Brussels two days later where his arm was eventually amputated. Cf. his own account. Cf. Souvenirs du mameluck Ali p.  
Also see the extensive note on the spoils taken at Waterloo.

Stawitzky has yet another version of the events in the sense that the *berline* was in the field, fronting towards the chaussée and having the four front horses on the road, but of which one in the second row had twisted and fallen, thereby preventing the whole to move. The driver, witnessing the enemy approach, then untied the horses and fled. All in all, it meant that the Prussians found and took the *berline* without its horses. In: Stawitzky, L. – Geschichte des Königlich Preussischen 25ten Infanterie-Regiments p.99

<sup>65</sup> Dörk, G.M. Das königlich etc. p.139-141 In this, Dörk cites from an account of a member of the 3rd battalion of the 15th regiment and this may very well be major Von Keller himself, but this is not sure.  
This witness explicitly mentions the absence of Napoleon himself the moment the *berline* was taken and this is also the most logical situation to be expected in this situation. It would be simply foolish for the emperor to mount a carriage in the total confusion and congestion he was. Cf. for the opposite claim:

A description of the costly and curious military carriage etc. p.10

Major Von Keller's account in: A description of the costly and curious military carriage etc. p.12

Gneisenau's report of the 20th of June 1815. In: Bas, F.de & T'Serclaes de Wommerson. La campagne de 1815 aux Pays Bas. Vol.III, nr.31.3A

Blücher's letter dated 20th of June to his wife. In: In: Bas, F.de & T'Serclaes de Wommerson. La campagne de 1815 aux Pays Bas. Vol.III, nr.32

Gneisenau's letter dated 20th of June 1815 to his wife. In: Ein Leben in Briefen p.321  
Aets, W. & L.Wilmet – Waterloo etc. p.60

<sup>66</sup> Cf. Mach, A.von Geschichte des Königlich Preussischen etc.p.342

<sup>67</sup> Of the 25th regiment of line infantry (division of Marcognet, 1st corps) 425 men were taken prisoner at Genappe. Cf. Chamberlain, P. From Waterloo to Dartmoor etc. The Waterloo Journal Vol.23 nr.1 p.26

68. The local tradition supports this claim. Cf. Houssaye, H. - 1815.Waterloo p.

General Pirch I mentions the killing, but not of the wounded. Cf. his report. In: Bas, F.de & T'Serclaes de Wommerson. La campagne de 1815 aux Pays Bas. Vol.III, nr.31.3C

Cf. Fleury de Chaboulon, M. - Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire etc. Vol.II p.133

69. Cf. report of Von Röder. In:Hofschröer, P. 1815 The Waterloo campaign. The German victory p.151

Wechmar, H.von - Braune Husaren etc. p.62

Reports of the different regiments published by J.von Pflugk Harttung. In: Das 1<sup>e</sup> preussische Korps bei Belle Alliance p.210-213

Report of general Von Zieten. In: Bas, F.de & T'Serclaes de Wommerson. La campagne de 1815 aux Pays Bas. Vol.III, nr.31.3.B

Report of captain Von Borowsky (V.I.E.7.I.171) Cited by Von Pflugk Harttung. In: Das 1<sup>e</sup> preussische Korps bei Belle Alliance p.217

Report of general Pirch I. In: Bas, F.de & T'Serclaes de Wommerson. La campagne de 1815 aux Pays Bas. Vol.III, nr.31.3.C

Dziengel, J.D.von - Geschichte des königlichen zweiten etc. p.390

Dziengel, on the other hand, says the 2nd regiment of uhlans (Von Thümen's brigade) passed through Genappe by daybreak and that it halted by 7 a.m. Cf. Dziengel, J.D.von - Geschichte des königlichen zweiten etc. p.390

Detachments of the 18th regiment of infantry (Von Losthin's brigade) led by captain Von Bieberstein and captain Lessmann advanced as far as Genappe and beyond, but were then recalled to their brigade. Cf. Woyna - Geschichte des 18.Regiments p.170,173

Captain Von Conrady (3<sup>rd</sup> battalion 4<sup>th</sup> regiment of Silesian Landwehr cavalry) confirms that the 3<sup>rd</sup> battalion of the 18<sup>th</sup> regiment (led by captain Bieberstein) was at the south-side of Genappe. In: Aus stürmischer Zeit p.418

Whether the detachment led by major Von Falckenhausen and the skirmishers of the 3<sup>rd</sup>

battalion 2<sup>nd</sup> regiment of Neumark landwehr infantry (Von Hacke) and those of the 2<sup>nd</sup> regiment Silesian Landwehr (Von Hiller) advanced beyond Genappe is unknown. Those of the 1<sup>st</sup> battalion 2<sup>nd</sup> Neumark Landwehr did. Cf. the report of the battalion. In: Hofschroeer, P. – 1815. The Waterloo campaign p.141

70. Von Knesebeck mentions in his report dated 21<sup>st</sup> of June 1815, written at Heidelberg, a time of 11 p.m. which is not possible. In: VPH, nr.125  
The same is the case with Von Müffling reporting on the 19<sup>th</sup> of June about the battle, as an annex to a letter of count Rechberg to fieldmarshal Wrede. Original in Bayerisches Kriegsarchiv München. In: Pflugk Harttung, J.von – Archivalische Beiträge etc. p.518  
Stawitzky mentions 11.30 p.m. In: Geschichte des Königlich Preussischen 25ten Infanterie-Regiments p.100

71. It was guarded by the 3<sup>rd</sup> battalion of the 25<sup>th</sup> regiment (brigade Von Tippelskirch). Cf. Ollech, Von - Geschichte des Feldzugs etc. p.254  
Stawitzky, L. – Geschichte des Königlich Preussischen 25ten Infanterie-Regiments p.100  
Prince Von Thurn und Taxis confirms Genappe as the place. In: Aus drei Feldzügen etc. p.340

<sup>72</sup> The representative of the Netherlands at Prussian headquarters, baron Van Panhuys, had written some time before from the battlefield to baron Nagell:

*“du champ de bataille près de Planchenoit, 18 Juin à 9 ½ heures du soir*

*La bataille commencée ce matin est décidée. Le duc de Wellington [...] a tenu dans l'attaque dirigé contre lui par l'armée Prussienne [?]. Bonaparte est défait et au lever du soleil il est à espérer qu'on ne trouvera résistances nulle part.*

*Je suis avec la plus parfait consideration etc.  
B.de Panhuys*

In: NA, nr.2.02.01 nr.6585

73. Captain Marquiaud (aide de camp of Duhesme). Cf. his letter dated 4<sup>th</sup> September 1827 to the Spectateur Militaire p.666-667

Also see: Nostitz, Von - Das Tagebuch etc. p.44

The claim that Duhesme was already there (in the basement) the moment the Prussians entered the building is incorrect.

Cf. Wagner, A. - Pläne der Schlachten etc. p.97

Damitz, K.von - Geschichte des Feldzugs etc. p.317

Mauduit, H.de - Les derniers jours de la grande armée Vol.II p.474

De Mauduit also erroneously claims Duhesme was brutally killed here by the Prussians.

74. General Pelet. In: d'Avout, A. - L'infanterie de la garde à Waterloo. In: Le Carnet de la Sabretache. 1905 p.33-54 en 107-128

Nostitz, Von - Das Tagebuch etc. p.44

Wagner, A. - Pläne der Schlachten etc. p.97

Damitz, K.von - Geschichte des Feldzugs etc. p.317

According to another publication , Duhesme got wounded near the mill named Tas (at the

Lasne, at the extreme south-east side of Plancenoit), but this building did not exist yet in 1815. Cf. Genappe en cartes postales anciennes nr.135

75. Captain Marquiaud (aide de camp of Duhesme). Cf. his letter dated 4th September 1827 to the Spectateur Militaire p.666-667

The fact that Duhesme was mortally wounded the moment he fell into Prussian hands is confirmed by Blücher in his report, dated 22nd of June 1815.

76. Nostitz, Von Das Tagebuch etc. p.44

Ollech, Von - Geschichte des Feldzugs etc. p.254

Damitz, K.von - Geschichte des Feldzugs etc. p.317

77. Cf. Captain Marquiaud (aide de camp of Duhesme). Cf. his letter dated 4<sup>th</sup> September 1827 to the Spectateur Militaire p.666-667

The funeral service was done by the priest De Vignerons (in 1815 he was 84 years old). Cf. Citation of him from the work of Lambert "Autour d'un vieux clocher" (p.105), by Van Noeyen. In: Le général Duhesme héros de Plancenoit. In: Bulletin of the SBEN, nr.10 (1954) p.23-32

It was on the 26<sup>th</sup> of November 1825 that the municipality of Ways gave the family of Duhesme permission to erect a monument to his memory. Cf. Genappe en cartes postales anciennes nr.135

This monument bears the following inscription:

" Ici repose Guillaume Philibert Comte Duhesme, lieutenant général des armées françaises, grand officier de la légion d'honneur, chevalier de l'ordre de St.Louis et de la Couronne de Fer. Né à Bourgneuf Dép.de Saone et Loire le 7 Juillet 1766 - atteint d'un coup mortel au champ d'honneur le 18 Juin 1815. Décédé à Genappe le 20 du même mois. " And on the backside:

" Sa veuve et ses enfants ont mis sous la protection de ce saint lieu et des braves de tous les pays la dépouille mortelle du guerrier intrépide qui fut aussi le modèle des époux et des pères. "

The old cemetery was dismantled in 1909, but the tomb of Duhesme was preserved.

Duhesme expired in a small room which was to the left of the central corridor which ran through the inn, and which was in the rear, overlooking the garden behind the building. Cf. plan and adjoining information from the family papers of Duhesme. In: exhibition in Roi d'Espagne in June 2015.

78. Legend has it that Duhesme was killed by a Brunswick hussar at the gate of the inn, the moment he offered him his sabre as a token of surrender. The hussar would then have said: " Le duc [of Brunswick] a été tué avant-hier, vous devez mordre la poussière aujourd'hui ! "

That this legend came up very soon after campaign proves the account of professor Benzenberg in the summer of 1815, as he tells the same story in his letter dated 30<sup>th</sup> August 1815 to Gneisenau. In: Delbrück, H. Das Leben etc. Vol.IV p.613

Cf. Piérart, Z.J. - Le drame de Waterloo p.404

Kelly, Chr. - A full and circumstantial account etc. p.54

Tarliens & Wauters. In: Géographie et histoire des communes Belges. Province de Brabant. Canton de Genappe p.8

79. General Pelet and Petit. In: D'Avout, A. - "L'infanterie de la garde à Waterloo." In: Carnet de la Sabretache (1905), p.33-54, 107-128

Lieutenant general Reille. In: Documents inédits p.62  
Colonel Trefcon. In: Carnet de campagne etc. p.192  
2nd lieutenant Herbillon (108th regiment, division Bachelu). In: Quelques pages d'un vieux cahier p.11-12  
General Foy. In: Vie militaire p.282-283  
Chef d'escadron Lemonnier Delafosse. In: Souvenirs militaires p.389-390  
Chef de bataillon Puvis (93<sup>rd</sup> regiment, division Foy). In: Souvenirs p.118  
Captain Robinaux (2<sup>nd</sup> regiment, division Jérôme Bonaparte) confirms his regiment – covered by some lancers - went back in good order. In: Journal de route p.210  
Ensign Larreguy de Civrieux (93<sup>rd</sup> regiment, division Foy) uses terms as "sauve qui peut" and "à la trahison", which would have been uttered, but here he speaks more in a general sense about the army. In: Souvenirs etc. p.170

<sup>80</sup> Delloye, S. - Le sort des équipages impériaux. In: Bulletin van de SBEN, nr.29 (1997) p.14  
His source for this statement remains unclear.  
Other carriages amongst this group (apart from the numbers 111, 165, 407 and 399) were the cabinet (nr.379) and the imperial treasury (nr.410).  
Delloye, S. - Le sort des équipages impériaux. In: Bulletin van de SBEN, nr.29 (1997) p.9, 12-14

<sup>81</sup> They were the Brandenburg uhlans and dragoons of Von Röder, the 1<sup>st</sup> regiment of Silesian hussars of the brigade of Von Steinmetz, the 3<sup>rd</sup> battalion of the 15<sup>th</sup> regiment of infantry (brigade Von Hiller)  
North of Genappe, this battalion was preceded by its skirmishers, but now the battalion advanced as a whole. Cf. Dörk, G.M. - Das königlich etc. p.139-141 In this, Dörk cites from an account of a member of the 3rd battalion of the 15th regiment and this may very well be major Von Keller himself, but this is not sure.  
Some platoons of skirmishers of the 1<sup>st</sup> Pommeranian regiment of infantry (brigade Von Tippelskirch) led by captain Von Gosziki and those of the the 2<sup>nd</sup> regiment Silesian Landwehrintanry (brigade Von Hiller) led by captain Ehrhardt also still participated in the pursuit.

<sup>82</sup> Cf. Gneisenau. In letters to his wife and to Hardenberg, dated 20<sup>th</sup> and 22<sup>nd</sup> June 1815. In: Delbrück, H. - Das Leben etc. Vol.IV p.527, 531  
Cf. his letter to his wife, dated 24<sup>th</sup> of June. In: Ein Leben in Briefen  
Cf. his report dated 20th June 1815. In: Bas, F.de & T'Serclaes de Wommerson – La campagne de 1815 Vol.III nr.31.3.A  
Lieutenant general Bülow. In: Bas, F.de & T'Serclaes de Wommerson. La campagne de 1815 Vol.III nr.31.3.D1  
Report of lieutenant general Von Pirch I. In: Bas, F.de & T'Serclaes de Wommerson. La campagne de 1815 Vol.III nr.31.3.C

<sup>83</sup> Cf. Report of marshal Grouchy about the presence of numerous fugitives at Temploux during the night of the 19th of June. In: Grouchy, G.de - Mémoires du maréchal de Grouchy. Vol.IV p.301

<sup>84</sup> Oré, D.C. - 1er régiment de chasseurs 1651-1903 p.223

Both lieutenant Henckens (6<sup>th</sup> regiment chasseurs à cheval) and colonel Baudus confirm the presence of at least a part of the division at Quatre Bras.

Cf. Henckens, lieutenant – Mémoires p.232

Colonel Baudus. Etudes sur Napoleon, Vol.I p.230

<sup>85</sup> Cf. Mémoires pour servir etc. p.168

86. Cf. Mémoires pour servir etc. p.168

Colonel Baudus' claim of his meeting with the emperor at 10 p.m. is way too early. Cf. Etudes sur Napoleon Vol.I p.230

Delloye speaks of a time between midnight and 1 a.m. In: Napoleon dans sa dernière campagne. Special number of the bulletin of the SBEN. 1996. p.50

De Mauduit believes the emperor got at Quatre Bras at midnight, one hour before his own unit got there. In: Les derniers jours Vol.II p.480

87. Captain De Brack (lancers of the guard). In: d'Avour. La cavalerie de la garde à Waterloo p.370

Decoster in his account of the events, as mentioned by Smithers. In: Observations made during a residence in Brussels etc. p.261

Sir Walter Scott spoke to Decoster early August in 1815 and he told him, as he did to Smithers as well, that he rode with Napoleon back as far as Charleroi. Cf. his letter to the duke of Buccleuch, dated August 1815. In: Grierson, H.J.C. (ed) The letters of Sir Walter Scott p.81

In the summer of 1817, Decoster told a man called Raffles that he was released at 4 a.m. 19<sup>th</sup> of June. In: Letters during a tour through some parts etc. p.326

88. Mémoires pour servir etc. p.168

Lieutenant Martin (45<sup>th</sup> regiment of the line, division of Marcognet). In: Souvenirs d'un ex-officier p.300

Manuscript of colonel Baudus. Cf. Houssaye, H. – 1815. Waterloo p.440

<sup>89</sup> Napoleon claims that the officers who were sent out to Girard reported back to him at Quatre Bras that the division was nowhere to be found. This is, however, in relation to the distance involved, impossible. In: Mémoires pour servir etc. p.168

<sup>90</sup> The surgeon d'Héralde (12<sup>th</sup> regiment of light infantry, division Girard). In: Delloye, S. – Les mémoires du chirurgien Dominique d'Héralde – In: Bulletin de la Société Belge d'Etudes Napoléoniennes. 1991 nr.14 p.27-29

91. Mémoires pour servir etc. p.168 They speak of more than one messenger, but there is no proof for the assertion.

The fact that the news was in writing can be taken from Soult's letter of the 19<sup>th</sup> of June to Grouchy, stating : "Je vous ai écrit hier soir de repasser la Sambre" , and also from his letter to Napoleon of the 22<sup>nd</sup> of June stating: "l'officier qui était porteur de cette lettre, est celui que j'envoyai des Quatre Bras etc." In: SHAT, C15, nr.5

The document itself somehow did not survive it to the present day and is also not registered in the register of staff of central headquarters.

The fact that captain Dumonceau was the messenger can be derived from the letter of general Guilleminot to general Le Sénécal, dated 23<sup>rd</sup> July 1836. In: AN, 400AP / 85.6

<sup>92</sup> Cf. Notes manuscrites of Baudus, as mentioned by Houssaye. In: 1815.Waterloo p.,442

Baudus, colonel. In: Etudes sur Napoleon p.231

Srgeon d'Héralde (12th regiment of light infantry, division Girard). In: Delloye, S. – Les mémoires du chirurgien Dominique d'Héralde – In: Bulletin de la Société Belge d'Etudes Napoléoniennes. 1991 nr.14 p.27

<sup>93</sup> He would not travelled long though: at Frasnes he would have made another brief halt in the farm of Dusart but why is unclear Cf. 1<sup>st</sup> lieutenant Brade. Memorie etc. In: NA, 2.13.13.09 nr.185

94. Fleischman claims it was then between 3 and 4.15 a.m. In: Histoire de la ferme du Caillou p.25

Delloye believes it was then 2 a.m. In: Charleroi. 1815 p.

Also in: Napoleon dans sa dernière campagne. In bulletin of the SBEN, 1996 p.57

Delloye mentions two people who witnessed the passage of the small group. First of all, a reverend called Grégoire. His account has been published in the annals of the Société Paléontologique et archéologique de l'arrondissement de Charleroi, and he indicated that Napoleon had trouble to get through Gosselies due to the numerous fugitives. Once beyond the chateau of Gosselies, he was able to accelerate his horse towards Jumet.

The second witness is Marie-Francoise Camille Dumont (born 1806), transmitted through her grandson baron A.Drion du Chapois and the historian Clément Lyon. She mentions the passage of a small group of generals by 2 a.m. They briefly halted at Dumont's house to take a light meal and then left again through a small street in rear of the house. One of them was Napoleon.

It has been asserted that Napoleon left the house through a door in the wall of the park in rear of the house. Cf. Noeyen, Van - Une halte de Napoleon apres Waterloo. La maison historique de la rue Saint Roch a Gosselies. In: Bulletin de la Société belge d'Etudes Napoleoniennes, nr.3 p.18-22

Delloye refutes this theory though by using cadastral maps of Gosselies dating back to 1851 and 1866-1901 to demonstrate that Napoleon actually entered the village through the rue St.Roch and left it through the rue Stranard and de rue Massau. In: Delloye, S. "La maison Dumont à Gosselies en 1815. Autopsie d'un témoignage." In: Bulletin de la Société belge d'Etudes Napoleoniennes (1992), nr.17 p.37-51

<sup>95</sup> Cf.Diary of the 1st corps. In: Pflugk Harttung, J.von - Das I.Korps Zieten bei La Belle Alliance und Wavre. P.201

Von Röder's report (VI.E.7.I.119) in: Hofschroer, P. - 1815 The Waterloo campaign. The German victory p.151 And in: Pflugk Harttung, J.von Das 1<sup>e</sup> preussische Korps bei Belle Alliance p.233

96. Gneisenau in his report dated 20th June 1815. In: Bas, F.de & T'Serclaes de Wommerson. La campagne de 1815 Vol.III nr.31.3.A

Gneisenau in a letter to his wife and to Boyen, dated 20th and 22nd of June 1815. In: Delbrück, H. - Das Leben etc. p.527,528

Gneisenau in a letter to the wife of Von Clausewitz, dated 24th June 1815. In: In: Delbrück, H. - Das Leben etc. p.527,528

Report of general Von Pirch I. In: Bas, F.de & T'Serclaes de Wommerson. La campagne de 1815 Vol.III nr.31.3.C

97. Gneisenau in his report, dated 20th June 1815. In: Bas, F.de & T'Serclaes de Wommerson. La campagne de 1815 Vol.III nr. 31.3A

Gneisenau to his wife in a letter, dated 20th of June 1815. In: Ein Leben in Briefen p.527

Report of general Bülow. In: Bas, F.de & T'Serclaes de Wommerson. La campagne de 1815 Vol.III nr.31.3.D1

The skirmishers of the 1st regiment of Pommeranian infantry nr.2 led by captain Von Goszikcki chased away French troops at Quatre Bras and Frasnes. Cf. Mach, A.von - Geschichte des Königlich Preussischen etc.p.343

<sup>98</sup> Kraatz-Koschlau, M.T. Geschichte des 1.Brandenburgischen Dragoner-Regiments nr.2 p.103

major general Von Röder. In: Former KGB, nr.VI.E.7.I.156 in GSA, VPH-HA, Vi nr.VII.3 E.p.81

The fact that the regiment was in pursuit until the morning of the 19th of June is confirmed by Von Zieten. In: Report of Von Zieten. In: Former KGB, VI.E.3.15 in GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.VII.3 E.p.2

Cf. Das Tagebuch des Königlich etc. p. In: Hafner, D. p.325

<sup>99</sup> Pflugk harttung, J.von Das 1<sup>e</sup> preussische Korps bei Belle Alliance. P.235

The fact that the regiment was in pursuit during the night is confirmed by Von Zieten. In: Report of Von Zieten. In: Former KGB, VI.E.3.15 in GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.VII.3 E.p.2

<sup>100</sup> Cf. Uber den Antheil des 2ten Armee-Korps an der Schlacht bei Belle Alliance. In: Militär Wochenblatt. 2.Jg. (1817) nr.68 p.326-327

Dörk, G.M. - Das königlich preussische etc. p.135

Mach, A.von - Geschichte des Königlich Preussischen etc.p.343

101. The fact that the Prussians reached that morning as far as Gosselies is confirmed by Bülow, Von Pirch I and major Von Keller.

Cf. their reports in: Bas, F.de & T'Serclaes de Wommerson. La campagne de 1815 Vol.III nrs.31.3.C and D1)

Major Von Keller (3<sup>rd</sup> battalion 15<sup>th</sup> regiment of infantry). Cf. Narrative of the particular circumstances etc. In: A description of the costly and curious military carriage etc. p.12

Lobau states there were no Prussians at Gosselies by 7 a.m., only some patrols. Cf. his letter dated 19<sup>th</sup> June 1815. In: Houssaye, H. – 1815.Waterloo p.446

According to Von Keller, the following officers distinguished themselves during the pursuit: captain Von Humbracht, lieutenants Von Oetlinger, Von Rosen, Von Dörk and Von Künzel. Cf. Narrative of the particular circumstances etc. In: A description of the costly and curious military carriage etc. p.13

102. Ollech, Von – Geschichte des Feldzuges von 1815 p.254

Major Von Gröben's account in: Pflugk Harttung, J.von - Belle Alliance. Die Schilderung der Ereignisse vom 16.-18.Juni 1815 durch einen mitbeteiligten Generalstabsoffizier p.15

According to prince Thurn und Taxis, Gneisenau halted at Frasnes at 5 a.m. Cf. his memoirs. In: Aus drei Feldzügen etc. p.321-322

103. Mémoires pour servir etc. p.169

Gourgaud, C. – La campagne de 1815 p.110 He also asserts parts passed through Châtelet but does not specify which ones these were.

For the imperial guard, see:

Colonel Duuring (1<sup>st</sup> battalion 1<sup>st</sup> chasseurs), general Pelet (2<sup>nd</sup> regiment of chasseurs) and Petit (1<sup>st</sup> battalion 1<sup>st</sup> regiment grenadiers), all confirming the slow passage through the congested city. In:

General Guyot (heavy cavalry of the guard). Cf. his letter to Pelet, dated 27<sup>th</sup> April 1835. In: Carnets de la campagne (1792-1815) p.397

Moore-Smith, G.C. "General Petit's account of the Waterloo campaign." In: The English historical review 18 (1903), p.321-326

D'Avout, A. "L'infanterie de la garde à Waterloo." In: Carnet de la Sabretache (1905), p.33-54, 107-128

De Mauduit states his battalion reached Charleroi by 6 a.m. , after having passed Gosselies by 4.30 .a.m. In: Les derniers jours etc. Vol.II p.484

Chef d'escadron Dupuy (7th regiment of hussars, division Jacquinet). In: Dupuy, V. - Souvenirs militaires de Victor Dupuy, chef d'escadron de hussard 1794-1816

Captain Robinaux (2nd regiment of the line, division Jérôme). In: Journal de route p.211

He speaks of a time of arrival at the Sambre of 6 a.m.

Chef d'escadron Lemonnier Delafosse (aide de camp of general Foy). He states that Foy and his staff slept a few hours at Marchienne au Pont. In: Mes souvenirs p.228

Several units of the 1st and 2<sup>nd</sup> corps though got back south of the Sambre through Charleroi. Piré's men had retreated along with the Imperial Guard and would have reached the river between 5 and 6 a.m. Piré himself had left his division for Paris and had left the command to general Hubert. Cf. Lieutenant Henckens (6<sup>th</sup> regiment of chasseurs à cheval). In: Mémoires p.232

General Schmitz adds in his report that part of his division (Donzelot's) also passed through Charleroi. In: Brouwet, E. - Mémoires et documents etc. In: Revue des études Napoléoniennes, 1932

General Noguès himself (division Marcognet, 1st corps) passed through Charleroi as well. In: Mémoires etc. p.276

Jérôme Bonaparte had got separated from his brother probably already on the battlefield and went back with one battalion and one squadron towards Marchienne-au-Pont. From there, he continued his retreat towards Avesnes. Cf. Jérôme's letter to his wife, dated 15<sup>th</sup> July 1815. In: Mémoires et correspondance du roi Jérôme Vol.VII p.24

Ensign Larreguy de Civrieux (93th regiment of line infantry, division Foy) confirms he passed through the congested Charleroi. In: Larreguy de Civrieux, S. - Souvenirs d'un cadet 1812-1823 p.172

As has been shown, the division of Girard retreated across Charleroi.

According to Gneisenau, some 40.000 men and 27 guns of the French army passed through the city of Charleroi. Cf. his report dated 20<sup>th</sup> June 1815. In: Bas, F.de & T'Serclaes de Wommerson. La campagne de 1815 Vol.III nr.31.3A

104. Ney in his letter to Fouché, dated 26th June 1815. In: LMB, nr.AS1301

The surgeon d'Héralde (12th regiment of light infantry, division Girard) speaks of his meeting with Ney north of Charleroi, but this is incorrect. Cf, his account. In: Delloye, S. – Les mémoires du chirurgien Dominique d'Héralde – In: Bulletin de la Société Belge d'Etudes Napoléoniennes. 1991 nr.14 p.19-36

105. Cf. Letter of Lobau, dated 19th of June and written from Brussels. As cited from the possession of baron Grandmaison, Lobau's grandson, by Houssaye. In: 1815.Waterloo p.442

In two other letters dated 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> June 1815, to his wife Lobau adds that he found at Gosselies some isolated stragglers, followed by enemy cavalry. As he tried to get away in his horse, it leapt over a ditch in which it fell over. Stunned and bruised by the fall, Lobau could do no other as to surrender. In: De Waresquiel, E. – Lettres d'un lion p.180-182

Late June, Lobau was sent to Britian where he was kept prisoner at Ashburton. Later in 1815 he returned to Belgium, from where he was allowed to return to France in December 1818. Cf. De Waresquiel, E. – Lettres d'un lion p.176, 179

Cf. Nostitz, Von - Das Tagebuch etc. p.44

Wellington to lord Bathurst, 19th of June 1815. In: WD, Vol.XII p.489

Reiche, L.von - Memoiren etc. p.229

Guretzky-Cornitz, Geschichte des 1.Brand.Uhlanenregiments p.301

As he was still in doubt about the fate of Lobau, marshal Grouchy enquired at Wellington himself on the 26<sup>th</sup> of June. Cf. his letter to Wellington. In: WSD, Vol.X p.596

<sup>106</sup> Cf. Piérard, A. – Le pays de Charleroi au point de vue etc. p.60

107. Mauduit, H. de – Les derniers jours etc. Vol.II p.484

Colonel Duuring (1st battalion 1st chasseurs). In: D'Avout, A. , "L'infanterie de la garde à Waterloo." In: Carnet de la Sabretache (1905), p.119

Surgeon d'Héralde (12th regiment of light infantry). In: Delloye, S. "Les mémoires du chirurgien Dominique d'Héralde." In: Bulletin de la Société belge d'Etudes Napoleoniennes (1991), nr.14 p.19-36

108. Mauduit, H. de – Les derniers jours etc. Vol.II p.484-487

Piérard, A. – Le pays de Charleroi au point de vue etc. p.58

Sollicitor F.J.Weggant. In: Logie, J. – À propos de la capture etc. p.11 He claims some 20.000 wounded French were eventually at Charleroi.

109. Notes of mayor Th.J.Prunieau. In: La bataille de Waterloo vue de Charleroi. In: Bulletin of the SBEN, nr.6 1952 p.29

Sergeant major Larreguy de Civrieux (93<sup>rd</sup> regiment of the line). In: Souvenirs etc. p.172

Adjutant Fleuret (55th regiment of the line). In: Description etc. p.152

According to Houssaye, this bridge was then some 38 metres long and 8 metres wide. In: 1815.Waterloo p.442

110. Houssaye, H. – 1815. Waterloo p.443  
Mauduit, H. de – Les derniers jours etc. Vol.II p.487-489  
Piérard, A. – Le pays de Charleroi au point de vue etc. p.58  
Lieutenant Martin (45th regiment of the line, division Marcognet). In: Souvenirs etc. p.302

<sup>111</sup> Notes of mayor Th.J.Prunieau. In: La bataille de Waterloo vue de Charleroi. In: Bulletin of the SBEN, nr.6 1952 p.29 and in: Logie, J. - À propos de la capture etc. p.12

<sup>112</sup> Delloye, S. Le sort des équipages impériaux. In: Bulletin van de SBEN, nr.29 (1997) p.17. Dörk cites from an anonymous member of the 3rd battalion of the 15th regiment who claims these carriages, one of which was the treasury, were taken somewhere between Genappe and Quatre Bras. He mentions some houses on the road, which he situates as the village Villers, but this is much more to the east. It may have been the hamlet called Le dernier patard, but the fact is that this version of the events cannot be matched to those at Charleroi. Other carriages taken there would be those of Napoleon's headquarters, of the marshals and other officials.

The money taken from the treasury had to be collected but the most of it got lost or scattered. Cf. Dörk, G.M. Das königlich etc. p.142-143 In this, Dörk cites from an account of a member of the 3rd battalion of the 15th regiment and this may very well be major Von Keller himself, but this is not sure.

113. Mauduit, H. de – Les derniers jours etc. Vol.II p.488  
De Mauduit erroneously claims the treasury contained a total value of 6 million francs, divided over 300 bags containing 20.000 francs each.  
Another publication states there were 60 bags, containing 1000 Napoléons each. Cf. La ferme du Caillou dans la bataille p.76  
Baron Peyrusse (trésorier général de la couronne in 1815). In: Mémorial et archives p.312  
Delloye, S. - Le sort des équipages etc. p.10, 17

114. Cf. Bassano to Caulaincourt, dated 25<sup>th</sup> June 1815. In: Ernouf, - Maret, Duc de Bassano p.657-658  
Fleury de Chaboulon, M. - Mémoires pour service à l'histoire de la vie privée, du retour et du règne de Napoleon en 1815 Vol.II p.134  
Sollicitor F.J.Weggant. In: Delloye, S. – 1815. Charleroi p.31

The situation of the fate of the different carriages composing the équipages impériales is extremely confusing.

Taking the conclusions of Delloye as a starting point, the situation would be thus:

-the *landau* (301) and the *dormeuse* (389) were taken by the Prussians near Rossomme and Genappe respectively.

-the *voiture de la chambre* was taken by the Prussians between Genappe and Quatre Bras

-the group preceding them, composed of the numbers 399 (with Marchand), 407, 111 and 165, would have reached France probably by diverging from the *chaussée* at Damprémy to Marchienne-au-Pont

-both the *cabinet* (379, with Fain, Maret and Fleury de Chaboulon) and the *trésor* (410) were abandoned by the French just north of Charleroi

-all the équipages parked at Fleurus (with captain Coignet) reached France safely through Charleroi

However, from the account of Marchand it becomes clear that his own carriage was overtaken by the Prussians near Genappe (he mentions Quatre Bras, but this is impossible as he speaks of a very strong congestion). This fact is corroborated by Saint Denis.

Fleury de Chaboulon also adds that Maret's own carriage fell in enemy's hands near Caillou, while five other waggons preceding the *cabinet* and the *trésor* were overtaken by the enemy at Quatre Bras.

Last but not least, captain Coignet himself states he was present at Waterloo. As Delloye is not very explicit with his sources for specific conclusions, the versions of these three witnesses are almost impossible to check against his statements.

Cf. Delloye, S. – Le sort des équipages

Saint-Denis, L.E., Souvenirs du mameluck Ali sur l'empereur p.112-113

Fleury de Chaboulon, M. - Mémoires pour service à l'histoire de la vie privée, du retour et du règne de Napoleon en 1815 Vol.II p.131-135

Marchand, L.J.N. - Mémoires de Marchand. Premier valet de chambre et exécuteur testamentaire de l'empereur p.164-166

Larchey, L. (ed.) - Les cahiers du capitaine Coignet (1799-1815) p.402

115. Journal des séjours de l'Empereur. In: Archives Nationales.IV.437, as cited by Houssaye. In: 1815.Waterloo p.442

Gourgand and Coignet mention a time between 4 and 5 a.m. In: La campagne de 1815 p.109

In: Larchey, L. (ed.) - Les cahiers du capitaine Coignet (1799-1815) p.406

Napoleon himself gives 6 a.m. Cf. Mémoires pour servir etc. p.169

Two other witnesses speak about 3 a.m. Cf. Prunieu. In: La bataille de Waterloo vue de Charleroi. In: Bulletin de la Société Belge d'Etudes Napoléoniennes, 1952 nr.6 p.29 and in: Logie, J. - À propos de la capture etc. p.12

Sollicitor F.J.Weggant. In: Documents et rapports de la Société Paléontologique et Archéologique de l'arrondissement judiciaire de Charleroi. T.XI-1181. In: Logie, J. – À propos de la capture etc. p.11

Yet another account gives 2 a.m. Cf. report of 1<sup>st</sup> lieutenant Van Uchelen (4<sup>th</sup> regiment of light dragoons, brigade De Ghigny), dated 20<sup>th</sup> June 1815. Cf. Logie, J. – A propos de la capture etc. p.11

<sup>116</sup> Report of 1<sup>st</sup> lieutenant Van Uchelen (4<sup>th</sup> regiment of light dragoons, brigade De Ghigny), dated 20<sup>th</sup> June 1815. Cf. Logie, J. – A propos de la capture etc. p.11

The solicitor F.J.Weggant gives 8 a.m. In: Logie, J. - À propos de la capture etc. p.11

<sup>117</sup> Cf. the official French bulletin. It also states that people would have cried "Sauve qui peut". In: Bas, F.de & T'Serclaes de Wommerson. La campagne de 1815 Vol.III p.554

Ney explicitly denies this last claim. Cf. his letter to Fouché. In: LMB, nr.AS1301

Drouot speaks of the panic amongst the adjacent forces after the defeat of the imperial guard in Wellington's front. Cf. his speech. In: The battle of Waterloo, Ligny and Quatre Bras etc. Vol. II p.113

Baron Bellina Kupieski also claims people would have even cried " Sauve qui peut, nous

sommes trahis.” Cf. his report to Davout, 23<sup>rd</sup> June 1815. In: SHAT, C15/6  
Von Müffling claims the French flight was caused by the Prussians, taking them in their rear, but this is incorrect. Cf. his report dated 19<sup>th</sup> of June 1815. In: GSA, VPH-VI-HA IV nr.1 p.76

<sup>118</sup> General Von Losthin speaks of a hurried flight towards 9 p.m. In: GSA, VPH-VI nr.V 4.A.1 p.36

<sup>119</sup> Lobau states in his letter to Craan, dated 20<sup>th</sup> January 1817 that at that time he acted in the idea of “defendre mon terrain pied à pied jusqu’à la retraite bien prononcée du gros de l’armée.” In: Waresquiel, E.de – Lettres d’un lion p.175

<sup>120</sup> 115 guns were led to the rear, of which 70 were taken by the enemy near Genappe. Eventually, only 45 were led back to France. Cf. the extensive note about the spoils of war. Cf. Gourgaud – La campagne p. 108

According to baron Bellina the loss was possible because of the fact that a lot of train-soldiers had fled. Cf. his report to Davout, dated 23<sup>rd</sup> June 1815. In: SHAT, nr.C15 nr.5  
It was foot battery nr.2 (Von Hiller’s brigade) which for instance came in touch with 5 guns of a French battery during the retreat, and which tried to pull off; as this failed, the crew left the guns and fled. Cf. GSA, VPH HA VI nr.V.4D p.15

<sup>121</sup> Napoleon makes the erroneous claim that he sent his brother Jérôme from Quatre Bras to Marchienne-au-Pont with the mission to collect the army between Avesnes and Maubeuge. In: Mémoires pour servir etc. p. 169  
Jérôme himself though doesn’t mention this mission in his letter to his wife, dated 15<sup>th</sup> July 1815. Cf. Houssaye, H. 1815. Waterloo p.442

Houssaye also points to the incorrect claim of Napoleon that he found the *parcs de réserve*, led by general Neigre, at Quatre Bras. This is not corroborated by any source and, above all, it is clear that at least part of them were at Charleroi.

Cf. Mémoires pour servir etc. p.168

Houssaye, H. 1815. Waterloo p.441

The rough scheme of Napoleon’s own retreat looks thus:

-battlefield to Genappe: 9.00 / 9.30 p.m. to 11 p.m. (2.5 to 3 km per hour)

-crossing of Genappe itself: 11 p.m. to midnight

-Genappe to Quatre Bras: midnight to 1 a.m. (4 km per hour)

-Quatre Bras to Gosselies: 1.30 a.m. to 3.30 am. (6 km per hour)

-halt at Gosselies: about 20 minutes, from 3.30 to 4 a.m.

-Gosselies to Charleroi: 4 to 5 a.m. (6 km per hour)

For the halt at Gosselies, cf. Delloye, S. Le sort des équipages impériaux. In: Bulletin SBEN nr.29 (1997) p.15

<sup>122</sup> According to lieutenant Gawler (52<sup>nd</sup> regiment) there was about 15 minutes between his own and the general advance. In: BL, Add.ms.34. 703 p.299-207, 34.704 p.88-97 and 190-198

<sup>123</sup> Cf. Von Müffling – The memoirs of baron Von Müffling p.250

<sup>124</sup> Wellington in his report to lord Bathurst, dated 19<sup>th</sup> June 1815. In: Bas, F.de & T'Serclaes de Wommerson – La campagne de 1815 Vol.III p.478

<sup>125</sup> Cf. Report of general Von Röder. In: GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.VII.3E.p.81  
Pflugk Harttung, J.von – Das 1e Preussische Korps etc. p.233