

The charge of the French cuirassiers. ¹

After having witnessed the lack of success of Foy in the centre and still under pressure to take the crossroads and move from there towards the emperor, Ney became desperate to force it and he now decided to commit his cuirassiers to accomplish this task.

It was towards 6.30 p.m. [²] that Ney said to Kellermann: "Mon cher général, il s'agit du salut de la France, il faut un effort extraordinaire; prenez votre cavalerie, jetez vous au milieu de l'armée Anglaise, écrasez-la, passez-lui sur le ventre etc." ³ Kellermann pointed out to Ney that his brigade would be far inferior to the enemies strength and that the remainder of his corps was further to the rear. Ney clearly disagreed and exclaimed: "N'importe! Chargez avec ce que vous avez, écrasez l'armée anglaise, passez lui sur le corps, le salut de la France est dans vos mains; partez donc, je vous fais suivre par toute la cavalerie ici présente." ⁴

The units Kellerman committed for the charge were the 8th and 11th regiments of cuirassiers, forming the brigade of Guiton, almost 800 men strong. ⁵ Kellermann joined this brigade, which stood near Le Balcan. From here he led it slowly over the road up to the farm of Gémioncourt. ⁶ Here he had the brigade form in columns of squadrons, each squadron on a double distance of its front (that is, a double column per squadron). ⁷ Kellermann, together with general Guiton and colonel Garavaque, then took up position in front of the first squadron of the 8th regiment of cuirassiers and gave the order to charge, which soon spread through the whole column. Kellerman was in a hurry to start the charge, so that the men didn't have the chance to fully realize the situation they were about to face. ⁸ The cuirassiers probably advanced on the Brussels-road and to its immediate left. The 8th regiment, led by Kellermann himself, was most probably in front of the 11th regiment. ⁹

Opposite Guiton, major general Colin Halkett, with an aide de camp, galloped forward, cleared La Bergerie and from there he could see French cavalry, forming by detachments, move forward under the appearance of going to water their horses.

Halkett, aware of the imminent charge, immediately rode back to his brigade and he hardly arrived there when a French heavy bombardment started on the road. Accordingly, he sent word to colonel Morice of the 69th regiment and major general Pack to be ready to receive them. Morice confirmed this order a short time after.

While in the act of forming square the prince of Orange came up to the regiment and asked what they were about. The reply was the directions they had received from Colin Halkett, on which he said there was no chance of the cavalry appearing, and he ordered them to form column and to deploy into line, which was complied with. ¹⁰ To cover the manoeuvre, colonel Morice had sent forward no.8 company to form a skirmish line. Behind this screen were no.4 and 5 companies, the square having been formed on the centre of the battalion. Colonel Morice now ordered the three right-flank companies to wheel and form line to the right of no.5 company and as this was taking place, the sudden news came that enemy cavalry was approaching upon which the battalion attempted to form square again. ¹¹

It was at this very moment that the cuirassiers ran through the battalion (see below). As the leading grenadier-company of the 33rd regiment reached a prominent height between the Brussels road and the Bois de Bossu, it saw the cuirassiers in the distance. ¹² The 30th regiment was able to form square, though. ¹³ The 73rd regiment also formed square, while having its left a bit thrown back in order to be able to give an effective fire. ¹⁴ The Brunswickers held their position further to the right, possibly also in square(s) now. It was against this position that the cuirassiers charged.

In advancing, general Kellerman saw a regiment further to his front right and which was for some reason moving from square into line. It was the 69th regiment of Alten's division.

Meanwhile, the cuirassiers of the 11th regiment continued their advance and hit the square of the

30th regiment. The light company had just joined the square on its left hand side in time and now the square was surrounded by the horsemen, but the square was able to drive them away with its well-aimed volleys, fired from a short distance.¹⁵

It is not entirely clear whether the 73rd regiment was actually charged by the cuirassiers, probably not.¹⁶ As the 11th regiment of cuirassiers dealt with the 30th to the left of the road, it was the 8th regiment which continued its advance to its target, the 69th regiment. Right at that moment the regiment was in an open column; it attempted to form a square upon its centre. The grenadier-company and the companies nrs.1, 2 and 3 were just about to complete the square as the cuirassiers approached. Captain Lindsay, commander of the 1st company, halted his company plus the grenadier-company and the company nr.2, wheeled them and tried to let them fire. This attempt, however, proved wrong, as it were exactly those companies, to the right hand side of the regiment, which were accordingly run over and cut down by the French horsemen.¹⁷

The regiment was spread and suffered high casualties. Some, mainly from the left hand side of the regiment, managed to reach the square of the 42nd / 44th [18], while some officers – pursued by twenty cuirassiers – fled towards the Namur-road. That day, in all, the regiment lost 152 men: 5 officers and 147 privates.¹⁹ Even though the battalion had fallen apart, a small body of men formed a scrum around the battalion's two colours. Ensign Ainslie was bearing the Regimental colour, while ensign Keith did so with the King's colour. As the French came near, Ainslie, as well as his colour sergeant, instinctively threw themselves to the ground thereby protecting the colour with their bodies. As it was hidden from their view, the French were immediately distracted to the King's colour not far off. Yet, despite the courage of captain Lindsay, lieutenant Pigot and volunteer Clarke the King's Colour fell in French hands.²⁰

Though there is no direct source available about the situation of the battalion after this blow, but most probably the remains of the battalion were taken back north of the Bois de Bossu (see below).

Right after the charge upon the 69th regiment, the cuirassiers headed for the 42nd regiment.

After the charge of Piré sometime before, at least this battalion stood in an irregular mass due to the rapid succession of commanders; the plan was to form each company on the right of its sergeant, but now the cuirassiers approached. The battalion formed line on the left of the grenadiers, until the 42nd regiment was ordered to form square, which it did under the eye of Sir Denis Pack himself. The cuirassiers then dashed on two sides of it but were repulsed in the direction of the Bois de Bossu.²¹ The 44th regiment would also have been charged at, but this units fired most effectively thereby driving off the French successfully.²²

After the 33rd regiment had advanced through the fields west of the Brussels road, it took up a position about 300 metres east of the Bois de Bossu, on a height. In its right front were some Brunswick units (infantry and cavalry) and in its front was a line of French light French infantry. Very soon after its arrival, French units of infantry moved in its right front towards the Brunswickers. The 33rd regiment gave a volley and marched up to the French in the direction of the Bois de Bossu. The result was that the enemy pulled back precipitately. By now, the 33rd regiment had come into a position about 250 metres from the wood and under the heavy fire of some French guns. At the same time, Guiton's cuirassiers approached further to the east. The battalion suffered heavy casualties from the French gunfire and the attempt to form square was very much impaired. To make matters even worse, rumour spread that the cavalry was in the rear of the battalion and it got into disorder for fear of being cut off. As a result, the battalion fled towards the wood, but here it was more or less restored by Sir Colin Halkett who had taken its colours and had advanced to the front of it. Here, the battalion would have given a volley to the French cavalry. Shortly after the cuirassiers had gone and the 33rd regiment was still in the edge of the wood, it was relieved shortly after by the Foot Guards (see below). Then it pulled out to the north, to a position north of the wood.²³ While lieutenant Hope Pattison mentions that they were faced with French light infantry in their front, it is ensign Thain who claims they were

actually charged by the cuirassiers and that they were successful in driving them away with their fire.²⁴ All in all, the role of the battalion was not satisfactory.²⁵

The exact share of the Brunswickers here isn't very clear, though there are strong indications that the 2nd and 3rd battalions of the line, just in rear of Quatre Bras, contributed to the defeat of the cuirassiers by their musketry-fire.²⁶⁻²⁷

Having dashed on the 69th, the 42nd /44th and the 30th regiments, the cuirassiers tried to push through their effort straight on the crossroads of Quatre Bras. It was here that they were now faced with successful musketry fire of the Lüneburg battalion (brigade Best) which had taken up the position of the 92nd regiment and which unleashed its volley until the French were at about 30 paces distance. The duke of Wellington and Sir Thomas Picton witnessed the success and expressed their satisfaction to the battalion.²⁸

By then, the cuirassiers already had lost about 200 men and by now general Kellermann, major general Guiton, colonel Garavaque and numerous others had lost their horse. Exhausted and scattered, the cuirassiers now tried to regroup, but right at that moment another Anglo-Netherlands-German artillery unit arrived on the spot: it was captain Kühlmann's unit. It was around 7 p.m.

Kühlmann had gone ahead of his division, the 1st, on the Nivelles-road and arrived at the crossroads just as the cuirassiers approached. He immediately unlimbered two guns (the section of lieutenant Speckmann) on the Brussels-road in front of the farm of Quatre Bras.

Meanwhile, the four other guns of Kühlmann's battery came in position in the rear of the Namur-road and to the left of the same farm of Quatre Bras.²⁹ Also, Sandham's battery would have been committed into some action, but further details are missing.³⁰ The commanders of the different units of Guiton's brigade had them no longer in control and the retreat of the French heavy cavalry soon changed in a rout.³¹ Kellermann himself, having lost his horse, somehow would have saved himself.³²

In their flight the cuirassiers would have run over units of Foy and only halted near Frasnès.³³ During their flight the drivers of the ambulances, which were in the rear, were carried along. In their panic they cut the reins of their horses and fled, along with other non-combatants of the baggages and artillery-reserves. The result was that the ambulances got completely disorganised.³⁴ In total the brigade of Guiton lost 250 men; Kellermann himself also had got wounded.³⁵

It was after 7 p.m., just at the very end of the charge of the cuirassiers, that the last Brunswick units arrived at Quatre Bras.³⁶ They were the 1st and 3rd battalion of light infantry, plus the complete artillery of the corps, in total about 1800 men.³⁷ Both battalions supported the Brunswick line-battalions which were at Quatre Bras, while both batteries took up positions in rear of the Namur-road, on a short distance to the left of Quatre Bras.³⁸ Here, they had a small share in driving off the cuirassiers from the cross-roads.³⁹

At the same time, the section of Bijleveld's battery, led by 2nd lieutenant Koopman, still in position between the Namur and the Brussels road (facing west) and having nothing to do there, linked up with the Brunswick artillery and joined it to Quatre Bras. There, however, Koopman met captain Bijleveld who instructed him to join him in rear of the farm of Quatre Bras.⁴⁰

Right at the time of the charge of Guiton, Lloyd's battery was united west of Quatre Bras and as soon as the cuirassiers fell back, the battery advanced over the Brussels road to a position about 600 metres south of the crossroads, and 400 metres east of the Bois de Bossu. The situation was that the Brunswickers, near the edge of the wood, were seriously suffering from French guns which were firing at them from close range and which had their positions very near the skirt of the wood, a bit further south. Colonel Kelly ordered captain Lloyd to take up position. The battery did so under heavy fire and before it unlimbered some three or four horses of each gun and waggon were killed, some wheels disabled and gunners killed. However, Lloyd succeeded in silencing the French guns and even obliged a mass of French infantry which was moving out

from the wood to return there very soon after. Being without any support (except for a few Brunswick uhlans), however, captain Lloyd ordered to limber up and return to Quatre Bras.⁴¹

It was by 7 p.m. as well that lieutenant Von Wussow, from Prussian headquarters, dropped in at the crossroads. He was sent around 6 p.m. by Gneisenau to Wellington to inform him about the situation of the Prussian army at Ligny and to enquire about Wellington's situation.⁴²

After Von Wussow had reported to Von Müffling first, he then told Wellington: "Zur Zeit meines Abreitens vom Schlachtfelde waren sämmtliche Dörfer der von uns besetzten Stellung hinter dem Lignebach, von Sombreffe über Ligny, St. Amand la Haye und Wagnelée, trotz der unausgesetzten Angriffe der Franzosen und des wechselnden Verlierens und Wiedergewinnens, von uns behauptet worden. Indessen stelle es sich je länger je mehr heraus, dass die Verluste sehr wüchsten, und da die Aussicht auf eine Unterstützung durch das Korps Bülow's gänzlich geschwunden sei, so werde es höchstens möglich sein, das Schlachtfeld bis zum Eintritt der Nacht zu behaupten: ein grösserer Erfolg stehe nicht zu erwarten."⁴³

Von Wussow also would have expressed the following request on behalf of the Prussian staff: "Vielleicht könne die kräftige Offensive der Engländer den Kaiser Napoleon verhindern, seine Streitkräfte nachhaltig gegen die Preussische Armee zu verwenden."⁴⁴

After that, Wellington would have asked Von Wussow to inform Gneisenau "dass es ihm bis jetzt zwar sehr schwer geworden sei, dem heftigen Angriff der überlegenen Franzosen Widerstand zu leisten, dass er aber mit der jetzt eingetroffene Verstärkung – er glaube circa 20.000 Mann zur Stelle zu haben – doch eine kräftige Offensive zu Gunsten der Preussischen Armee versuchen werde."⁴⁵

The reinforcements Wellington referred to were no less as the men of Cooke's division who started reaching Quatre Bras by 7 p.m.⁴⁶ The batteries of Kühlmann and Sandham had preceded the division.⁴⁷ The division halted for a short time at Hautain-le-Val to have the stragglers catch up. On the way to Quatre Bras, the men were instructed to prepare 10 rounds, to check their flintlocks and to fix bayonets.⁴⁸ At the same time, as they approached the field of action, they encountered numerous wounded.⁴⁹ One of them was major Jessop, member of the staff of De Lancey, who claimed help was urgently needed.⁵⁰

As the division reached the western edge of the Bois de Bossu, the prince of Orange was there to receive them.⁵¹ He sent both light companies of the 1st brigade, led by Lord Saltoun, into the wood.⁵² At that time, French skirmishers had already penetrated as far as the Namur road.⁵³

The 2nd battalion followed both companies, with two companies at a time.⁵⁴ Further to the rear of the 2nd battalion, the 3rd battalion of the 1st regiment of Foot Guards followed, but this battalion took a direction more through the extreme east part of the wood and along its edge here.⁵⁵ While Maitland's brigade advanced through the wood, Byng's brigade was kept as a reserve in a position immediately north of it, along the Nivelles-road.⁵⁶

It were just the two light companies of this brigade which advanced to turn the wood near Quatre Bras while bringing forward their left shoulders and then to advance through the fields between the wood and the Brussels road.⁵⁷

The Foot Guards succeeded in driving back the French back to the low ground of the rivulet which runs through the wood without too much trouble. Here they attempted to make a stand. Yet, they couldn't resist the British and in an hour the wood was in their hands.⁵⁸ This was at a high price however. They had suffered high casualties by the fact that units had got scattered in the thickness of the (under) wood and that men by mistake shot at each other. Moreover, the French artillery fire took its toll, either by direct fire or by men getting killed or wounded by heads of the trees falling down as a result of it.⁵⁹

As a result, the Foot Guards were forced to fall back to restore order to the low ground of the rivulet. Very soon after, however, the battalion was ordered to extend to the left of the wood and

form a line; at the same time, the 3rd battalion of the 1st regiment of Foot Guards joined in to do the same.⁶⁰

As the men emerged from the wood, they did not form a regular line towards the Brussels road, but more of a mass as all order had been lost in passing through the wood. Also some other (foreign) units coming from the wood which had been engaged before joined in.⁶¹ At least Brunswickers did so, coming from the edge of the wood to take up a position on the left flank of the line; they may have been both the 2nd battalion of the line and the Leib-battalion, or one of them. The light companies of the 2nd brigade of Byng formed up to the right rear of them.⁶²

Further to their rear in the field were the 30th regiment and the 73rd regiment of the brigade of major general Halkett. The 33rd regiment was then still in the edge of the wood.⁶³ Soon after the arrival of the Foot Guards, however, the 33rd regiment pulled to the rear through the wood to a position on the Namur-road immediately north of it.⁶⁴ The 92nd regiment which was then at the edge of the wood went to the rear as soon as the Foot Guards arrived. It pulled back through the wood to a position immediately north of Quatre Bras.⁶⁵ As soon as the line had been formed it advanced over a short distance, but was soon faced with a strong fire of French infantry and stranded. Additionally, French cavalry (probably of Piré) was hovering around to take its chance to charge in the right moment.

And soon after it did on the Anglo-Netherlands-German left flank, thereby trying to roll up the line from there. It worked for the 2nd and 3rd battalion of 1st Foot Guards as they got into a temporary confusion and retired back into the edge of the wood, where they took up a position in and in rear of the hollow road which lines it. This left the Brunswickers – still manoeuvring to the left of the line- facing the cavalry, but they succeeded in forming square in time and repelled the French successfully.⁶⁶

Meanwhile, Byng's brigade – covered by its light companies- had advanced in line through the Bois de Bossu from its position north of it. After it had emerged, it advanced while bringing its left shoulders forward in order to drive back the French infantry, but as these were already in full retreat, the Guards were ordered to return to their former position.⁶⁷ The light companies however, continued their advance along the road and the farm of Gémioncourt and probably took a course a bit further to their right. In this situation, while being in pursuit, they also formed square as French cavalry was constantly menacing them, but without actually charging. Meanwhile, it was bombarded by French gunfire, but not with too much of a loss as the officers were able to have their men avoid the fire as much as possible.⁶⁸

The Foot Guards of the 1st regiment, now in position along the wood, held back the French horsemen with a destructive fire.⁶⁹ At the same time, the 30th regiment was charged, though slightly, by the cavalry of Piré.⁷⁰

All the French cavalry actions to the west of the Brussels road were intended to cover the slow retreat of the French infantry on the French left wing and in the centre.⁷¹ Units of Foy's divisions were used in the centre as well to cover the French retreat.⁷² The cavalry probably was from Piré, which was drawn there from the centre and right wing - where it had been menacing Picton's battalions for some time - around 8 p.m.⁷³ In the centre, at least the 30th regiment was ordered to retake the farm of Gémioncourt.⁷⁴

Eventually, the farm fell to two companies of this regiment, led by major Chambers. Initially they were able to run into the courtyard of the farm but there they got under a hail of musketry fire. Having recoiled, the men turned the buildings, reached the orchard and then made an attempt to penetrate into the buildings from there, which they did by battering open the door and aiming the muskets through the windows. Shortly after, the French evacuated the farm. Howard got the instruction to hold the farm at all costs, even though the battle was drawing to an end.⁷⁵

The situation of the 73rd regiment at this moment is not entirely clear, but it can be assumed that it was still around its former position. By now, the 33rd regiment and the 69th regiment advanced through the Bois de Bossu or east of it to follow the general advance and so they finally joined

the remaining battalions of their brigade.⁷⁶

The French retreat was also covered by the French artillery. It was against this artillery that three guns of the battery of Von K uhlmann advanced over the Brussels road, while duelling with the French until it got dark.⁷⁷

Of the 5th British division, right after the charge of the cuirassiers, both the 42nd and 44th regiment were very much exposed and had spent most of their ammunition. For that reason they were taken back in rear of the farm of Quatre Bras, where they lay down.⁷⁸ The other battalions of the division, however, were kept more or less stationary in their positions in front of the Namur road, until the close of the battle, though data for the 28th regiment are lacking.⁷⁹

On the extreme left flank, the units of Kielmansegge and the 1st battalion of the 95th regiment had gained Piraumont and its surroundings and from that time on they were able to keep their positions until it grew dark and bivouacs were established. Later that evening, the Riflemen left their positions here and pulled further to the centre to the other battalions of the 5th division.⁸⁰

By now it was almost 9 p.m. and although the rattle of musketry of the skirmishing still could be heard here and there, the battle was running to an end.⁸¹ By then Wellington had his front-line stretching out from the southern edge of the Bois de Bossu, along the farm of G emioncourt as far as the hamlet of Piraumont; the line was covered with outposts in front.⁸²

Ney had pulled back his troops on the heights in front of Frasnes.⁸³ By the time the battle came to an end, around 9 p.m., the 1st corps (three divisions of infantry plus a regiment of cavalry) was arriving on the field of action and they relieved those of the 2nd corps in the first line.⁸⁴ Though the French outposts were near the Anglo-Netherlands-German ones, the night passed quietly, until sometime before daybreak, when a skirmishing fire started.⁸⁵

¹ For some reason, probably to enlarge their own role, a lot of eye-witnesses of the Anglo-Netherlands-German army depict the French cavalry as cuirassiers (as being the most feared type of cavalry of the French army). In supposing this to be right, it would have meant that these cuirassiers would have charged just about everywhere and at any time, while in most of these cases units of Piré are meant. Though this depiction is somehow very persistent, in fact **one** charge of French cuirassiers took place and that was the one referred to here.

Cf. Kellermann in his report of 10 p.m. that night. In: SHD. C15, nr.5
Kellermann. Observations sur la bataille de Waterloo etc. In: SHD, Mémoires et reconnaissances, no.719
Reille. In: Notice historique etc. In: Documents inédits etc. p.59
Ney in his report to Soult dated 16th June, 10 p.m. In: SHD. C15, nr.5 - He explicitly mentions one charge.

By far the most of those who mention cuirassiers (but which were in fact chasseurs à cheval and / or lancers) are members of Picton's or De Perponcher's divisions. Cf.
Lieutenant Forbes (79th regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.1-2
Lieutenant Winchester (92nd regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.242-247 and 34.707 p.7-10
Lieutenant Kerr Ross (92nd regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.252-256
Sir W.Gomm. In: BL, Add.ms.706 p.200-206 and 34.706 p.1790184 and in Letters and journals p.353
Lieutenant Blake (1st regiment). In a letter dated 10th July 1815. In: NLS, MS104488.i
Captain Ross Lewin (32nd regiment). With the 32nd etc. p.257-258
Private Vallence (79th regiment). In: The Waterloo Journal Vol.21 nr.2 p.15
Ensign Mudie (1st regiment). In his diary. In: Diary of ensign C.Mudie, 3rd Bn.The Royal Scots. Describing the battle of Waterloo and occupation of Paris, 1815. In: The Thistle. April, July and October 1931
Lieutenant Riddock (44th regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.293-297
Lieutenant Martin (44th regiment). In a letter to his father dated 29th June 1815. In: Essex Regiment Museum, Chelmsford.
Private Gunn (42nd regiment). In: JSAHR, Vol.49 p.115
Captain van Zuylen van Nijvelt. In: NA, nr.2.21.180 inv.37
Colonel van Zuylen van Nijvelt. In: Historisch verhaal etc. In: Bas, F.de La campagne de 1815 Vol.III p.318
Count Van Limburg Stirum. In: NL-ZuRAZ, Van Löben Sels, 0302, inv.nr.265
Scheltens. In: Souvenirs etc. p.198
Anonymous member of the section Gey. In: Bredasche Courant. 5th July 1840

In most cases it may have been a deliberate wrong description, as cuirassiers – one would expect – should have been quite distinctive by their armour; on the other hand, others may have seen the members of the 1st regiment of chasseurs à cheval as cuirassiers as these probably wore helmets instead of shakos. Cf. Haythornthwaite, Ph. - Uniforms at Waterloo p.146

Van Löben Sels sees the two types of cavalry (light and heavy cavalry, i.e. cuirassiers) as being written about in accounts, but doesn't enter into conclusions. In: Bijdragen etc. Vol.IV p.527 (footnote)

Several eye-witnesses, however, do describe the lancers as lancers indeed while others also do describe chasseurs à cheval. Lancers wore helmets too, by the way.

Cf. Lieutenant colonel Grunebosch (27th battalion of chasseurs). In: NL-ZuRAZ, Van Löben Sels, 0302, inv.nr.265

Brevet major Van Balveren (6th regiment of hussars). In: NL-ZuRAZ, Van Löben Sels, 0302, inv.nr.263

Captain Van Royen (6th regiment of hussars). In: NL-ZuRAZ, Van Löben Sels, 0302, inv.nr.263

Sergeant McEween (42nd regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.455-456

Basing his account on so many British eye-witness accounts, mentioning cuirassiers (while they were not), Siborne writes an account in which cuirassiers take a prominent role, for instance before 5 p.m. against the 42nd / 44th and even against Van Merlen – and this while the cuirassiers were not engaged before 6.30 p.m. In: History of the war etc. Vol.I p.126,130

Eventually, Dellevoet sees the same problem, but apparently has not been able to solve the contradictory accounts and concludes that the “controversy warrants a closer investigation.” In: The Dutch-Belgian cavalry etc. p.120

². Kellermann states it was between 6 and 7 p.m. In: Observations sur la bataille de Waterloo etc. In: SHD, Mémoires et reconnaissances, no.719

Lieutenant Henckens (6th regiment chasseurs à cheval) believes it was 7 p.m. In: Mémoires p.229

Erroneously, colonel Heymès says it was 3 p.m. In: Relation etc. In: Documents inédits etc.p.9

³. Kellermann. In: Observations sur la bataille de Waterloo etc. In: SHD, Mémoires et reconnaissances, no.719

⁴. Kellermann. In: Observations sur la bataille de Waterloo etc. In: SHD, Mémoires et reconnaissances, no.719

⁵. Kellermann. In: Observations sur la bataille de Waterloo etc. In: SHD, Mémoires et reconnaissances, no.719

Kellerman himself states he had then 600 men available. Why other units of his corps were not available remains unclear. The 11th regiment of cuirassiers didn't wear cuirasses.

⁶. According to captain Bourdon de Vatry the 8th regiment of cuirassiers, while underway to the front, would have cheered to prince Jérôme Bonaparte and on their way back would have shown the colour of the 69th regiment to him. In: Brett-James, A. - The hundred days p.64

⁷. Houssaye, H. - 1815.Waterloo p.213

Another source states they advanced in a line of squadrons. Cf. History of the 30th regiment p.315

⁸. Kellermann. Observations sur la bataille de Waterloo etc. In: SHD, Mémoires et reconnaissances, no.719

Kellermann also wrote to Ney that evening: " .. à l'instant, sans laisser aux troupes le temps de réfléchir, je me suis précipité [...] sur l'infanterie anglo-hanovrienne." In: SHD, C15 nr.5

⁹ Cf. Trumpeter Charonnet (8th regiment of cuirassiers).

Other than this, Charonnet makes claims which are impossible to reconcile with the context of the situation. First of all, he speaks of the complete failure of an initial charge of the full brigade against British dragoons, while he remains silent about the outcome of the second (apart from the description of the taking of the colour of the 69th). He also assigns the 69th a strength of 4000 men. In: d'Amonville, captain – Historique du 8^{me} cuirassiers p.241

¹⁰ Major general Colin Halkett. In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.276-279

Halkett doesn't mention the prince himself, but "an officer high in rank". Also in: BL, Add.ms.34.707 p.37-38

Captain Barlow (69th regiment) doesn't want to enter into detail about the identity of the person either. In his letter dated 7th of July 1815 to his father. In: NAM, nr.6507-1

Also see:

Private J.C.Black (1st regiment). Letter to his father dated 10th July 1815. In: NLS, nr.MS10488

W.F.Butler severely criticises the prince of Orange in this matter. In: A narrative of the historical etc. p.79

Yet, lieutenant Pigot (69th) blames the disaster which befell the battalion to captain Lindsay, ordering the grenadier and 1st and 2nd companies to face right about, in open column and to fire upon the cuirassiers instead of forming square. In: BL, Add.ms.34.708 p.146-147

¹¹ Cf. Robinson, M. – The battle of Quatre Bras 1815 p.312

¹² Ensign Macready (30th regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.708.72

Lieutenant Hope Pattison. In: Personal recollections p.5

¹³ Captain Harty (33rd regiment) In: BL, Add.ms.34.707 p.533-536

Siborne states as that the prince of Orange would have ordered the battalion to enter into line just before the cuirassier charged (as with the 69th regiment) but there are no documents supporting this. Version. In: History of the war etc. Vol.I p.141

¹⁴ Lieutenant Lloyd (73rd regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.708 p.172-174

¹⁵ Ensign Macready, E. In: United Service Magazine, 1845 Part I p.390

The History of the 30th regiment cites from the diary of Macready in which he mentions the presence of cuirassiers and lancers. The square would have been 6 ranks deep. In: History of the 30th regiment p.315, 317, 322

The presence of lancers is also claimed by captain Harty (33rd regiment). Harty was with the light troops which acted near and in connection with the 30th. In: BL, Add.ms.34.707 p.533-536

¹⁶ Members of the battalion do not mention a charge at all. Cf. Lieutenant colonel Harris and lieutenant Lloyd. In: BL, Add.ms.34.708 p.171-172 and 34.708 p.172-174

However, sergeant Morris claims the battalion was charged and brought into confusion after which it retired to the Bois de Bossu. Later, the cuirassiers charged the battalion again, after it had advanced again in order to drive away the French infantry in cooperation with the Brunswickers. Cf. Recollections p.68-70

Lieutenant colonel Harris, however, claims the battalion never entered the Bois de Bossu. In:

BL, Add.ms.34.708 p.171-172 and in: Macready, E. - On a part of etc. In: United Service Magazine, 1845 part I p.393

¹⁷ Lieutenant Pigot (69th regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.708 p.146-147

Butler - The journal of occurrences concerning the 69th regiment. In: History of the 30th regiment p.318

According to Kellermann the 69th regiment did fire at 30 paces distance, but this was in vain. In: Observations sur la bataille de Waterloo etc. In: SHD, Mémoires et reconnaissances, no.719

Captain Barlow (69th regiment) indicates the fire of other squares, but doesn't mention any volleys of his own regiment and gives the impression the surprise was that strong that it didn't have the chance to fire at all. In his letter dated 7th July 1815. In: NAM, nr.6507-1

¹⁸ Butler. The journal of occurrences concerning the 69th regiment. In: History of the 30th regiment p.318

Lieutenant Riddock (44th regiment) In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.293-297

¹⁹ Siborne, W. - History of the war etc. Vol.I p.455

Of its 589 men, this was almost 26% of its total strength.

²⁰ Captain Barlow (69th regiment) In his letter dated 7th July 1815. In: NAM, nr.6507.I

Cf. Robinson, M – The battle of Quatre Bras 1815 p.314-315

Although different names can be found of the one who actually took the colour, the versions of colonel Tancarville, chief of staff of Kellerman in 1815 and colonel Garavaque are probably the most authentic ones.

De Tancarville claims it was not the cuirassier Lami, but actually two cuirassiers of the 8th regiment, called Albisson and Henry: “du 16 Juin au major général. Envoi d'un drapeau anglais pris dans la charge faite par la brigade du général Guiton le 16 Juin à l'affaire de Frasnes par les cuirassiers Albisson et Henry du 8 régiment.” In: SHD, Succession Tancarville. In a letter to colonel Tancarville, dated 29th October 1818, colonel Garavaque – commander of the 8th regiment of cuirassiers - claims it was Henry only. In: SHD, File Garavaque nr.2760 GB/2 and SHD, C15/5

Yet, Kellermann himself speaks in his report of the 16th of June of the cuirassiers Vulgager (also found as Volgny or Valgayer) and Nourain (also found as Hourise).

Trumpeter Charonnet (8th regiment of cuirassiers) has yet another version of the event. He claims the cuirassier Henry dismounted to take the colour and then handed it over to brigadier Borgnès, in order to be able himself to mount his horse. However, as Borgnès rode to the rear to save the colour, Henry's horse followed him, leaving its rider on the field. Borgnès claimed the trophy, but it soon became clear, after the return of Henry to the regiment, that this proved incorrect. Later, Henry was awarded with money and a rank as *chevalier de la Légion d'honneur*. In: d'Amonville – Historique du 8e cuirassiers p.241

In a note, d'Amonville adds that a maréchal de logis called Massiet participated in taking the colour, as this is mentioned in his *état de service*.

Siborne claims the cuirassier Lami presented the colour to Ney. In: History of the war etc. Vol.I p.143

According to Surtees the volunteer Clarke did save the Regimental Colour. This corresponds to the version of Sir Colin Halkett, in which he makes a clear difference between the two colours. In: BL, Add.ms.34.707 p.37-38

Cf. Surtees, G. - British colours in the Waterloo campaign. In: JSAHR, Vol.43.1965. p.75
The return of the colour to Britain is a strange history. In 1909 a captain called Jeffcock of the Inniskillings in Aray le Rideau, France, saw in a museum two colours which were for sale: a Netherlands one and the one of the 69th regiment which was taken at Quatre Bras.

Though the silk in the heavy embroidery in the middle had gone and the colours had faded, the colour was in a reasonable good condition. The curator of the museum, Mr.M.L.X.de Rocard, was the son of general De Ricard, who was in his turn the grand-nephew of general Donzelot. Both colours had been donated to the museum by the curator.

From a letter from 23rd June 1909, written by the gate-keeper to captain Jeffcock, it becomes clear that general Donzelot had been the owner of four British colours and that he had given two of them to the Musée des Invalides; the other two he had kept in the family. Somehow he acquired the colour in question. Immediately, captain Jeffcock bought the Colour (for 600 francs) and had it restored. In 1909 it was in the hands of captain Jeffcock, Car Colston, Hall, Nottinghamshire. Eventually, the colour was returned to the regiment and is now on exhibit in the regimental museum at Cardiff Castle.

Cf. Leslie, major J.H. - The story of a British flag etc. p.1-8

Also see: Surtees, G. - British colours in the Waterloo campaign. In: JSAHR, Vol.43.1965. p.75

Glover, G. – Waterloo, myth and reality p.82

Sir Colin Halkett denies the capture of the colour, but admits it being missing. In: BL.Add.ms.34.706 p.276-279

²¹ Sergeant Anton (42nd regiment). In: Retrospect of a military life p.194

Lieutenant colonel Gomm. In: BL Add.ms.34.706 p.179-184

Sergeant McEween (42nd regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.455-456

McEween describes the horsemen as dragoons wearing cloaks and cuirasses.

²² Lieutenant Riddock (44th regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.293-297

Though Riddock doesn't describe them as cuirassiers, from the time he situates the charge (6 p.m.) it may have been the cuirassiers.

²³ Lieutenant Hope Pattison (33rd regiment). In: Personal recollections p.5-9

Ensign Thain (33rd regiment) in his diary. In: Duke of Wellington Regiment Archive.

Private Hemingway. In a letter dated 16th August 1815 to his father. In: Waley, D. A new account of Waterloo etc.

Sir Colin Halkett. In: BL, Add.ms.34.707 p.58-59

The rumour that the battalion would have been nearly cut off and intercepted by cavalry, came down to a surgeon of the 33rd as well, who had his post near Quatre Bras. Cf. Assistant surgeon Finlayson (33rd regiment). In: NLS. MS.9236

Ensign Howard (33rd regiment) doesn't enter into any detail about the battle of Quatre Bras in his letter dated 8th July 1815. In: Webb carter, B.W. - A Waterloo shako

Captain Harty (33rd regiment) was a member of the light company which formed part of the flank battalion, which consisted of the light companies of the brigade and which acted in the vicinity of and in connection with the 30th and it was with this battalion that it formed square. In: BL, Add.ms.34.707 p.58-59

²⁴ Cf. Lieutenant Hope Pattison (33rd regiment). In: Personal recollections p.5

Ensign Thain (33rd regiment) in his diary. In: Duke of Wellington Regiment Archive.

According to colonel Von Olfermann the 2nd line battalion drove off the cuirassiers several

times. Cf. his report dated 16th of June. In: VPH-LBA, nr.9
Houssaye even claims a Brunswick square would have been run down by the cuirassiers, but there is no proof for that. This also applies to his claim that an artillery-crew was sabred. In: 1815.Waterloo p.214

²⁵ Cf. Colin Halkett. In: BL, Add.ms.34.707 p.58-59

Its commander, lieutenant colonel W.K.Elphinstone wrote to his father on the 23rd of July 1815: “they behaved very well on the 16th, in my opinion they might have been steadier (but this is between ourselves); we suffered a good deal that day.” In: BL, MSS.EUR F.89.8

²⁶ Colonel Von Olfermann states the 2nd line battalion drove off the cuirassiers several times. Cf. his report dated 16th of June. In: VPH-LBA, nr.9

Ensign A.Kubel (1st company 3rd battalion of the line) states his battalion was in the third line in rear of Quatre Bras and were it not that artillery intervened, his whole battalion would have been killed to the last man. Cf. his letter dated 22nd June 1815. In: former www.1815.ltd.uk
Original in: NSA, nr.249 AN190

²⁷ While lieutenant Hope Pattison mentions that the Brunswickers were faced with French light infantry in their front, it is ensign Thain who claims they were actually charged by the cuirassiers and that they were succesful in driving them away with their fire.

Cf. Lieutenant Hope Pattison (33rd regiment). In: Personal recollections p.5

Ensign Thain (33rd regiment) in his diary. In: Duke of Wellington Regiment Archive.

²⁸ Notizen etc. In: VPH, nr.4

Major general Best. In: VPH, nr.8

Captain Kühlmann. In: VPH, nr.14

Alten in his report to the duke of Cambridge, dated 20th of June. In: VPH, nr.5

Captain Mercer (battery Mercer) on the 17th of June, confirms the presence of dead cuirassiers on and along the Brussels road and as far as just in front of the farm of Quatre Bras. In: Journal of the Waterloo campaign Vol.I p.263

Captain Jessop (QMG department) confirms this. In: Recollections of Waterloo, by a staff officer p.8

²⁹ Captain Von Kühlmann. He gives the impression as if the battery was on the field for about one hour until the cavalry charge took place; initially it would have fired on French artillery in front at 1200 paces. In: VPH, nr.14

Cf. Notes of captain Chr.Heise.MSS, as used by L.N.Beamish. In: History etc. Vol.II p.335

Surgeon Ellington (30th regiment) had his position about 150 metres from the crossroads, in rear of the Nivelles road; he saw the two guns on the road. In: BL, Add.ms.34.708 p.183-185

According to private Clay (2nd battalion 3rd Foot Guards) the artillery went around one of the buildings of Quatre Bras and immediately opened fire. Cf. his recollections. In: former www.1815.ltd.uk Original in: Regimental Headquarters Scots Guards.

Ensign Standen (3rd Foot Guards) claims he saw two Belgian guns on the Brussels road, but these were the ones of Von Kühlmann. In: BL, Add.ms.34.708 p.328-334

³⁰ Cf. Letter of a sergeant of the Royal Artillery drivers to his father, dated 22nd September 1815. In: Caledonian Mercury, 8th October 1815

He mentions an advance at a gallop and some action near a small village [the buildings of Quatre Bras].

The fact that we are dealing here with Sandham's troop can be taken from the fact that the sergeant was British, that the troop arrived just before the Foot Guards and that it had come from Enghien, where the 1st British division was located.

³¹ Kellermann. Observations sur la bataille de Waterloo etc. In: SHD, Mémoires et reconnaissances, no.719

³² Cf. Captain Bourdon de Vatry (aide de camp of prince Jérôme). In: Brett James, A. - The hundred days p.64

Colonel Heymès. In: Relation etc. In: Documents inédits etc.p.9

They both claim Kellermann got back while hanging, on both sides, to the bits of the horses of two cuirassiers. This is a common shared version, though Kellermann himself doesn't mention it at all and this is logical as this kind of clinging to a horse will not help one getting away; on the contrary, the horses will never accept this and will start prancing. Cf. Kellermann. Observations sur la bataille de Waterloo etc. In: SHAT, Mémoires et reconnaissances, no.719

Count Flahaut, in a letter dated 1861 to F.Lavalette. In: The first Napoleon etc. p.317

³³. Foy claims cuirassiers even fell back beyond Frasnes, panicking and plundering baggages. In: Vie militaire p.273

³⁴. Captain Duthilt (brigade Bourgeois, division Allix -1st corps) saw the baggage of his division also carried along on the Brussels road, while he himself was in a position east of the road, heading for the battlefield of Ligny. In: Les mémoires p.299

Some of the fugitives would even gone as far back as Marchienne-au-Pont and Charleroi. Cf. Foy - Vie militaire p.273

³⁵. Kellermann had bruised his knee and foot. In his report to Ney, dated 16th of June, 10 p.m. In: SHD, nr.C15, nr.5

Colonel Garavaque was wounded, as were 12 other officers of the 8th regiment of cuirassiers.

The 11th regiment had lost 4 officers (one killed and three wounded). Cf. Martinien, A. - Tableaux etc. p.530, 534

³⁶. In case these troops left Laeken at 11 a.m. they cannot possibly have been at Quatre Bras before 7 p.m. The total distance is about 37 kilometres. It is a mystery how and where these units were delayed.

In this group was surgeon Drude of the 1st light battalion of infantry. According to Drude the battalion marched through Waterloo at 4 p.m. and underway he met a lot of stragglers and wounded, some of whom he treated. That night, he treated a lot of Brunswickers too (mainly of the 2nd line battalion and the advance guard battalion) in the vicinity of Quatre Bras. Later that night, while looking for his unit, he fell in the hands of patrols of Piré. He thinks the Brunswickers were at Waterloo at 4 p.m. Then they would have covered 20 kilometres in 5 hour time; the remaining 17 kilometres to Quatre Bras would then have been covered in about three and a half hours time. In: GSA. Rep.92 Gneisenau, A.Ab.t.Paket 3

For 7 p.m. also see:

Charras - La campagne de 1815 Vol.I p.208

Houssaye believes it was between 6 and 7 p.m. In: 1815.Waterloo p.217

Siborne states it was 6.30 p.m. In: History of the war etc. Vol.I p.152

³⁷ Wachholtz, F.von - Geschichte des herzoglich etc. p.32

Colonel Von Herzberg. In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.23-55

Surgeon Schütte (battery Heinemann). In: VPH-LBA, nr.95 Schütte, however, is quite erroneous about the times in his account. In general he is about two hours too early.

Initially, Schütte was with his battery, but soon he was instructed by major Mahn to install himself in one of the houses of Quatre Bras. Schütte returned to his battery in the evening.

³⁸ Surgeon Schütte (battery Heinemann). In: VPH-LBA, nr.95

Wachholtz, F.von - Geschichte des herzoglich etc. p.32-33

Colonel Von Herzberg. In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.23-55

³⁹ Ensign Lindwurm (2nd battalion of the line). Cf. his letter dated 23rd June 1815. In: former www.1815.ltd.uk Original in: NSA, nr.249 AN 190

Private Bosse (2nd company 3rd battalion of the line) in his diary. In: NSA, 249 AN 191

⁴⁰ 2nd lieutenant Koopman. In: NL-ZuRAZ, Van Löben Sels, 0302 inv.nr.262

⁴¹ Captain Rudyard (Lloyd's battery). In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.473-478

Rudyard shows in his sketch two batteries, each of four guns, which is actually similar to one French battery. He also shows them too much **in** the skirt of the wood, a highly improbable position for guns. Additionally, these guns were a bit further south as he shows them in relation to the position of the 33rd and the 92nd which battalions had to do with these guns (see above). Also the French column of infantry could not have advanced from where he shows, being too far north in relation to the Anglo-Netherlands-German position. On top of that, the 400-500 yards he mentions for his battery puts it far more close to the Brussels road as he shows as well.

Lieutenant Wells (Lloyd's battery). In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.259-261

Both guns which were left on the field were recuperated and remounted during the night of the 16th or possibly on the early morning of the 17th of June. Cf. Sir A.Frazer. In his letters dated 17th and 18th of June 1815. In: Letters etc. p.540, 545

The two major Brunswick accounts about the battle of Quatre Bras (and which are very similar), those of Von Wachholtz and of colonel Von Herzberg, both state that this support of these guns took place much earlier, towards 5 p.m.

However, at that time and under those circumstances as described (about one hour after the advance of the Brunswick units into the frontline), there was simply no artillery available to accomplish this mission. The only one which could have done so was the one of captain Lloyd and from the British accounts mentioned above it can clearly be derived that Lloyd supported the Brunswickers right after the charge of Guiton. The Brunswick accounts for instance also mention the loss of two guns of the battery involved – another proof that we have to do with Lloyd.

Cf. Wachholtz, F.von - Geschichte des herzoglich etc. p.28

Clearly, colonel Von Herzberg copies most details from him. In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.23-55

⁴² Von Wussow himself confirms he left Bussy the moment most of the villages, apart from Saint Amand and part of Ligny, were in Prussian hands and that he returned to Bussy just before Ligny fell to the French.

This, in combination with the fact that he reached Quatre Bras the moment Wellington received more reinforcements (which was the 1st division of Cooke), makes he got at Quatre Bras around 7 p.m. (taking it took him about an hour to cover the distance between Bussy and Quatre Bras, including a detour).

Von Damitz claims Wellington received news from Blücher by 8.30 p.m. that Blücher “die Hoffnung aussprach die Schlacht halten zu können”. As this is basically the same message as has been described above, this message was the one carried by Von Wussow. In: Die Geschichte etc. p.214

Colonel Hervey, assistant quarter master general at Wellington’s staff in 1815, translates what was the same message in a more positive way, as: “Just before dark an officer came from the Prussians to inform the duke that they had retaken Ligny and Saint Amand, from which they had been driven in the morning, and that everything was going well.” In: A contemporary letter etc. p.432

Houssaye interprets this time as 8.30 p.m. In: 1815. Waterloo p.259

Bleibtreu believes Wussow reached Wellington by 6.45 p.m. In: England’s grosse Waterloo-Lüge p.121

⁴³ Account of Von Wussow himself. In: Ollech, Von - Geschichte etc. p.139-140

Von Wussow apparently was able to speak French, otherwise he wouldn’t have turned himself directly towards Wellington.

⁴⁴ Von Ollech cites this passage after having stated that Von Wussow didn’t know about the agreement between Gneisenau and Wellington for the last one, if possible, to come to the Prussian’s direct assistance, and for that reason Von Ollech claims these words express Von Wussow’s opinion. In: Geschichte etc. p.140

Though the account of Von Wussow, unfortunately, is not integrally available, this last request was not Von Wussow’s opinion. Cf. observations in the evaluation of the cooperation between Blücher and Wellington on the 15th and 16th of June.

⁴⁵ Account of lieutenant Von Wussow. In: Ollech, Von - Geschichte etc. p.140

⁴⁶ Account of lieutenant Von Wussow. In: Ollech, Von - Geschichte etc. p.139-140

As with other reinforcements, the times of arrival differ amongst eye-witnesses and historians. Captain Von Kühlmann (battery Kühlmann) states it was 4 p.m. that his division arrived. In: VPH, nr.14

Also see: MacKinnon - The origin and services of the Coldstream Guards Vol.II p.211

Others claim it was 5 p.m. Cf. Captain Powell (1st regiment Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.143-148

Lord Fitzroy Somerset. In: NAM, nr.6507-1

Ensign St.John (2nd battalion, 1st Foot Guards). Cf. letter dated 22nd June 1815. In: former www.1815.ltd.uk Original in the Regimental Headquarters Grenadier Guards nr. H07/005

Siborne believes it was around 6.30 p.m. In: History of the war etc. Vol.I p.152

Ensign Short (2nd battalion Coldstream Guards) believes it was at 7.30 p.m. In a letter dated 19th June 1815. In: NAM, nr.7702-5

Gomm believes it was 6 p.m. In: Letters and journals etc. p.354

For this same hour, see private S.Green (3rd battalion / 1st Foot Guards) in a letter to his brother, dated 12th July 1815. In: former www.1815.ltd.uk Original in: Regimental

Headquarters Grenadier Guards, nr.H07/004

The same hour is confirmed by ensign Wedgwood (3rd Foot Guards) in a letter dated 19th June 1815 to his mother. In: former www.1815.ltd.uk Original in: Regiment Headquarters Scots Guards.

^{47.} For the presence of the other divisional battery (Sandham's) at Quatre Bras, cf. lieutenant colonel May's letter dated 5th April 1816 to captain Whinyates. In: RAI, MD1438
Colonel Sir G.Wood in a letter to the master-general of the ordnance dated 24th June 1815. In: Duncan, F. History of the royal regiment of artillery Vol.II p.421
Letter of a sergeant of the Royal Artillery drivers to his father, dated 22nd September 1815. In: Caledonian Mercury, 8th October 1815.

^{48.} Captain Powell (1st Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.143-148

^{49.} Private Clay (2nd battalion 3rd Foot Guards). In his recollections etc. In: former www.1815.ltd.uk Original in Regimental Headquarters Scots Guards.

According to ensign Standen and Lord Saltoun most Netherlands troops they saw retreating were doing so over the Brussels road and not the Namur-road. In: BL, Add.ms.34.708 p.324-335

Ensign R.Batty (1st Foot Guards) tells there were also a lot of British wounded. Cf. letter dated 21st June 1815. In: private collection

^{50.} Captain Powell (1st Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.143-148

^{51.} Ensign Standen (3rd Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.705 p.19-22

^{52.} Captain Powell (1st Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.143-148

Ensign Standen (2nd battalion 3rd Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.708 p.328-334

Lord Saltoun (1st Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.431-434

^{53.} Ensign Standen (3rd Foot Guards). He states that many Netherlands left the wood, the moment he reached it. In: BL, Add.ms.34.708 p.324-335

Standen also cites Lord Saltoun saying that at that moment there were no more Netherlands troops in the wood, but only about 50 French.

According to ensign Batty (1st Foot Guards), however, numerous French skirmishers had started emerging from the Bois de Bossu. Cf. his letter dated 21st June 1815. In: private collection p.3-4

Another anonymous officer of the Foot Guards claims the French were already coming out from the wood. Cf. account in: The battle of Waterloo, or a faithful and interesting history etc. p.95

According to ensign Macready (30th regiment) the French had taken nearly the whole of the wood the moment the Foot Guards joined in. In: Brett James, A. p.62 and in BL, Add.ms.34.708 p.227-229

About the role of the Brunswickers *in* the wood practically no information is available. Though there would have been two companies of carabinieri of the Advance-guard battalion, no records about their role further in the action are available. Von Olfermann's report dated 16th of June is very confusing. He claims that the Leib-battalion and the 2nd light battalion were fighting in the wood and that they lost and retook it three times, but the 2nd light battalion

wasn't in the wood at all: it was near Piraumont - additionally, the Bois de Bossu wasn't lost and retaken three times. In: VPH-LBA, nr.9

⁵⁴ Captain Powell (1st Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.143-148

⁵⁵ Ensign Batty (1st Foot Guards). Letter dated 21st June 1815. In: private collection.

⁵⁶ Ensign Batty. Letter dated 21st June 1815. In: private collection

Ensign Short (Coldstream Guards) in his letter dated 19th of June 1815. In: NAM, nr.7702-5

Captain Mackinnon. In: Origin and services of the Coldstream Guards Vol.II p.211

Account of an anonymous officer in the Foot Guards. In: The battle of Waterloo, or a faithful and interesting history etc. p.95

Houssaye incorrectly says both brigades entered the wood. In: 1815.Waterloo p.217

⁵⁷ Private Clay (2nd battalion 3rd Foot Guards). In his recollections etc. In: former www.1815.ltd.uk Original in Regimental Headquarters Scots Guards.

Ensign Standen (3rd Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.708 p.324-334

Also in a letter to his mother, dated 27th June 1815. In: former www.1815.ltd.uk Original in Regimental Headquarters Scots Guards.

Captain Powell (1st Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.143-148

Captain Mackinnon. In: Origin and services of the Coldstream Guards Vol.II p.211

⁵⁸ Captain Powell (1st Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.143-148

Captain Saltoun (1st Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.431-434

Ensign Standen (2nd battalion / 3rd Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.708 p.324-334

Major van Gorkum. In: family archive, Gorkum.

The only officer witnessing serious resistance is ensign Batty (2nd battalion 1st Foot Guards), stating the French contested every bush. In: collection Hanington.

⁵⁹ Ensign Short (Coldstream Guards) in his letter dated 19th June 1815. In: NAM, nr.7702-5
He claims the division lost 30 officers and 500 men.

Captain Powell (1st Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.143-148

Ensign Standen (3rd Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.708 p.324-327

Ensign R.Batty (1st Foot Guards) Cf. his letter dated 21st June 1815. In: private collection p.4
He confirms the Foot Guards had a tremendous loss.

Captain Nixon (2nd battalion 1st Foot Guards) in a letter dated 19th June 1815 to his father. In: University of Nottingham. Drury Lowe collection Dr.C.30/6

Major Van Gorkum, of the staff of the general quartermaster of the army of the Netherlands, joined in with the advance of the Foot Guards; he claims that the French had taken a part of the wood but fell back without offering any serious resistance; no shot was fired by the British. In: Mijne staat en militaire herinneringen etc. In: Family archive van Gorkum.

⁶⁰ Captain Powell (1st Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704.39

Ensign R.Batty (1st Foot Guards) Cf. his letter dated 21st June 1815. In: private collection p.4

Here, Houssaye gives a complete false representation of the situation, depicting the Foot Guards as trying to take the farm of Grand Pierrepont and then being charged by Piré and being bombarded. In: 1815.Waterloo p.218

^{61.} Captain Powell (1st Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.250-253
Captain Nixon (2nd battalion 1st Foot Guards) in a letter dated 19th June 1815 to his father. In: University of Nottingham. Drury Lowe collection Dr.C.30/6

^{62.} Captain Powell (1st regiment of Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.143-148
Lord Saltoun. In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.431-434
Colonel Von Herzberg (of the Brunswick general staff). In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.23-55
Ensign Standen (3rd Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.708 p.324-327
According to captain Mackinnon there were detachments from the battalion companies of the 3rd guards led by lieutenant colonel Home to the right of the light companies of the 2nd brigade, led by lieutenant colonel Macdonnell. Lieutenant colonel Mackinnon went in support with 4 companies of the Coldstream Guards. In: Origin and services of the Coldstream Guards Vol.II p.211

^{63.} Captain Saltoun (1st regiment of Foot Guards) describes he left the Bois de Bossu and went in an eastern direction, initially; in this he refers to the low ground of the stream of Gémioncourt on his right and the 33rd about 135 metres to his left and about 70 metres in his rear, behind a hedge – this position was in the edge of the wood. In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.431-434
Ensign Standen (light company 2nd battalion, 3rd Foot Guards) claims Halkett was on the right of his men and to the left of the 1st Foot Guards. Cf. BL, Add.ms.34.708 p.269-271
Siborne says the brigade of Colin Halkett, after the charge of the cuirassiers, had gone back into the north-east part of the Bois de Bossu (and that it advanced later, with the units of Maitland), but there is no supporting evidence for this. In: History of the war etc. Vol.I p.147

^{64.} Lieutenant Hope Pattison (33rd regiment). In: Personal recollections p.9
Private Hemingway (33rd regiment). In a letter to his father dated 16th August 1815. In: Waley, D. - A new account of Waterloo etc.
Ensign Ch.Lake (3rd Foot Guards), in his journal. In: former www.1815.ltd.uk Original in Regimental Headquarters Scots Guards.
Hope Pattison claims his battalion met the Foot Guards when they entered the wood, but the version of captain Saltoun is preferred (see above).

^{65.} Sergeant Robertson (92nd regiment). In: The journal of sergeant D.Robertson p.149
Lieutenant Kerr Ross (92nd regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.252-256
Lieutenant Winchester (92nd regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.706 p.242-247
Lieutenant Hope (92nd regiment). In: Letters from Portugal etc. p.236

^{66.} Captain Powell (1st Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.143-148
Ensign Standen (3rd Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.708 p.324-327
Ensign St.John (2nd battalion, 1st Foot Guards). Cf. letter dated 22nd June 1815. In: former www.1815.ltd.uk Original in the Regimental Headquarters Grenadier Guards nr. H07/005
Letter of an officer of the Foot Guards, dated Binch 20th June 1815. In: Leeds Mercury, 5th August 1815.
Two Brunswick eye-witnesses do not mention a cavalry charge on both battalions, but merely mention their advance by the bayonet. Cf. Wachholtz, F.von Geschichte des herzoglich etc. p.32
Ensign Batty (1st Foot Guards) claims the 3rd battalion of the Foot Guards was in square and that it repulsed all attempts of the French cavalry. Cf. his account dated 21st of June 1815. In:

private collection.

Colonel Von Herzberg. In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.23-55

Siborne believes it was the Guard-battalion. In: History of the war etc. Vol.I p.156

⁶⁷ Lieutenant Short (2nd battalion/ Coldstream Guards). Letter dated 19th of June. In: NAM, nr.7702-5

⁶⁸ Private Clay (light company, 2nd battalion / 3rd Foot Guards). In his recollections etc. In: former www.1815.ltd.uk Original in Regimental Headquarters Scots Guards.
Ensign Standen (2nd battalion 3rd Foot Guards). Cf. his letter to his mother dated 27th June 1815. In: former www.1815.ltd.uk Original in: Regimental Headquarters Scots Guards.

⁶⁹ Captain Powell (1st regiment of Foot Guards). In: BL, Add.ms.34.704 p.250-253

⁷⁰ Ensign Macready, E. In his diary. Cited in: History of the 30th regiment p.322
Also in: United Service Magazine, 1845 Vol.I p.390

⁷¹ Ensign Macready expresses his admiration for the way French skirmishers and columns kept their distances and formation while retreating. Cf. his diary. In: History of the 30th regiment p.322

⁷² Lemonnier-Delafosse - Souvenirs militaires p.207

The one company of the 2nd battalion of the 1st léger led by chef de bataillon Jolyet and which had supported the 4th léger in the centre, moved back, in cooperation with two companies of the 3rd battalion, towards the farm of Gémioncourt from where they fell back later in the evening. The remainder of the 2nd battalion had been kept at the edge of the Bois de Bossu. Cf. Chef de bataillon Jolyet. In: Souvenirs et correspondance p.76

⁷³ However, lieutenant Henckens doesn't enter into any detail about any actions of his division after about 7 p.m. in his memoirs. Cf. Mémoires p.229

⁷⁴ Wellington would have considered to take the farm the same day or the next morning; Von Müffling would have convinced him to do it right away. In: The memoirs of baron Von Müffling etc. p.239

According to an anonymous informant of lieutenant Gawler the brigade of Colin Halkett advanced to the farm in columns at quarter distance. In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.389-399

⁷⁵ Ensign E.Macready. In his diary. In: History of the 30th regiment p.322-323 and in BL, Add.ms.34.708 p.227-229

And in: On a part of etc. In: United Service Magazine 1845 I p.391.

Macready was there and tells he saw about a hundred French wounded in the farm.

⁷⁶ Lieutenant Hope Pattison (33rd regiment). In: Personal recollections etc. p.9

Private Hemingway confirms his battalion had to cover a long distance before it halted: he mentions a mile and a half, but it was about 1500 metres.

Hope Pattison gives the impression that the whole brigade was reorganized north of the Bois de Bossu after the charge of the cuirassiers, preparatory to its advance, but the battalions involved have been at least the 33rd regiment and the 69th regiment. As the 30th regiment took Gémioncourt sometime later (having been so near to the Brussels road), it can be assumed

that this battalion did not fall back at all after the charge of the cuirassiers. The same probably applies to the 73rd as there is no mention of this.

⁷⁷ The section of two guns which had been at Quatre Bras plus a gun from the other four further left. Cf. Von Kühlmann. In: VPH-LBA, nr.14

Another source claims the whole battery advanced. Cf. Notizen etc. In: VPH-LBA, nr.4

⁷⁸ Sergeant Anton (42nd regiment). In: Retrospect of a military life p.196

Captain Campbell (42nd regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.451-454

Lieutenant Riddock(44th regiment) doesn't mention any retreat. In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.293-297

⁷⁹ Captain Macdonald (1st regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.707 p.3-6

Major Calvert (32nd regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.256-258

An anonymous officer of the 32nd regiment claims that at least his battalion was taken back to the Namur-road by 6.30 p.m., to be relieved by Pack's brigade, until the battalion was called up again at 9 pm. to assist the 28th regiment. Cf. account of an anonymous officer of the 32nd regiment. In: Swiney, G.C. - Historical records of the 32nd etc. p.116

Sir Wm.Gomm claims units of Alten's division relieved several regiments of the 5th division, whose ammunition was totally exhausted and which now fell back to the Namur-road. However, these units were those of Best (Verden and Lüneburg) and those didn't actually relieve them but had taken up positions to their right and right rear. In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.179-184 and 34.705 p.144-145

In: Letters and journals etc. p.354

In his accounts, Gomm mixes up the Hanoverian units of Best and Von Vincke, and here he mixes up Best with the one of Kielmansegge.

⁸⁰ Lieutenant Kincaid (1st /95th regiment). In: Adventures etc. p.321

Caldwell, G. & R.Cooper - Rifle green etc. p.41

Captain Leach (1st / 95th regiment). In: Rough sketches etc.p.377

The Lüneburg battalion spent the night at Piraumont. Cf. Lüneburg journal. In: former www.1815.ltd.uk Original in NHA, Hann.48A I, nr.368

Houssaye gives the impression that the complete brigade of Kempt gained Piraumont, but this is not correct. In: 1815. Waterloo p.217

⁸¹ Report of the prince of Orange, dated 17th June. In: WSD, p.497

Captain F.von Jeckeln (2nd battalion Orange-Nassau). In: former www.1815.ltd.uk Original in: HSD, nr.1041 nr.1

Major general Best. In: VPH, nr.8

Major Forbes (79th regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.314

The official Brunswick report. In: VPH, nr.1

Assistant surgeon D.Finlayson (33rd regiment) in his letter to Mr.Somerville, dated 25th June 1815. In: NLS, MS 9236 p.46

Lieutenant Von Berckefeldt (Münden battalion). In: Geschichte des königlich Hannoverschen Landwehr Bataillons p.219

Lieutenant McKenzie (42nd regiment) claims the battle ended by 10 p.m. In: BWRA, nr.414

⁸² For the Anglo-Netherlands-German extreme left wing this is confirmed by Lieutenant

Pensman Gairdner (95th regiment). In: NAM, nr.6902-5

Colonel Trefcon. In: Mémoires etc. p.184

Captain Von Scriba (battalion Bremen) confirms the French outposts were just on the other side of the low ground of the stream of Piraumont, on the north of the Bois Delhütte. In: VPH-LBA, nr.12

The French may have been in the farm of Lairalle that night.

The outposts in front of the Bois de Bossu were formed by the light companies of the 3rd regiment of Foot Guards. Cf. Ensign Standen. In: BL, Add.ms.34.708 p.324-327

Captain Nixon of the 2nd battalion / 1st regiment of Foot Guards, however, states that his battalion was forced at the end of the action to evacuate the wood for immense numbers of French light infantry. Cf. his letter dated 19th June to his father. In: University of Nottingham. Drury Lowe Collection. DR.C.C.30/6

The Münden battalion (brigade Best) established a line of picquets in order to cover the left flank of the army. Cf. Lieutenant Von Berckefeldt (Münden battalion). In: Geschichte des königlich Hannoverschen Landwehr Bataillons p.219

⁸³ Chef de batallion Puvis of the 93rd regiment of the line situates the bivouac of his regiment near a large village where also the ambulances were. This village was Frasnès. In: Souvenirs p.116

⁸⁴ Reille - Notice historique etc. In: Duc d'Elchingen. Documents inédits p.60

Ney in his letter to Fouché, 23rd June 1815. In: LMB, nr.AS1301

Drouet d'Érlon - Le maréchal Drouet, comte d'Erlon etc. p.96

The prince of Orange states it was 4 p.m. In his letter dated 17th June 1815. In: Bas, F.de - La campagne de 1815 Vol. III p.432

According to brigade-general Schmitz (division Donzelot) the battery of his division had a small share in the battle; if it had, it was firing to cover the French retreat. This is confirmed by gunner Veillard of the 10th company 6th regiment of artillery (division Donzelot).

In: Brouwet, E. - Mémoires et documents etc. In: Revue des études Napoléoniennes.1932

Un canonnier de Napoleon. Mémoires de Jean-Baptiste Veillard 1807-1815. In: Carnet de la Sabretache (1957), nr.46 p.370

⁸⁵. See chapter about 17th of June.