

By 3.30 p.m. Ney received Soult's order of 2 p.m. which told him to drive Wellington away from Quatre Bras and then to wheel from there to his right to fall on the Prussian right wing on the battlefield of Ligny. Prompted by this order, Ney decided to attack on a front which stretched from the fields east of the Bois de Bossu to the Etang Materne. By then it was running towards 4 p.m. <sup>1</sup>

At that time, Ney had his division Bachelu on the high ground east of Piraumont and immediately north of the farm of Lairalle. Further to the left, near the farm of Gémioncourt, Foy kept his battalions, covered by skirmishers, on both sides of the Brussels-road.

It was there that Bachelu formed his division in columns of battalions, preceded by the 2<sup>nd</sup> léger which was dissolved as skirmishers. As they started their assault, covered by a bombardment, they worked their way through the high corn, the streams and their double hedges in the grassy low grounds of west of Piraumont and the Etang materne which separated them from the allied position. <sup>2</sup> As they had done so, they climbed the slopes of the plateau which were fully covered with high corn. <sup>3</sup>

From his position in the very centre of his position, Wellington saw the French approaching and he ordered to meet them with the most of his 5th division. For that reason, all battalions (except for the 92<sup>nd</sup>, the 95<sup>th</sup> and those of Best, in all about 4400 men) were ordered to take in their light troops and to advance in line from their positions along the Namur-road. <sup>4</sup> Meanwhile, the 27<sup>th</sup> battalion of chasseurs fell back in front of them. <sup>5</sup>

Sergeant Anton (42<sup>nd</sup> regiment) says about the situation: "Our pieces were loaded, and perhaps never did a regiment in the field seem so short taken. We were all ready in line-"Forward" was the word of command, and forward we hastened, though we saw no enemy in front. The stalks of the rye, like the reeds that grow on the margin of some swamp, opposed our advance; the tops were up to our bonnets, and we strode and groped our way through as fast as we could. By the time we reached a field of clover on the other side we were very much straggled; however, we united in line as fast as time and our speedy advance would permit. The Belgic skirmishers retired through our ranks, and in an instant we were on their victorious pursuers." <sup>6</sup>

As the British units met the French about 450 metres in front of the Namur-road, they formed line and opened a devastating fire, which completely surprised the French. <sup>7</sup> As the French started to hesitate after the British volleys, Picton launched a bayonet-attack, accompanied by a powerful cheer. This proved too much for the French: even before confronting the charge, the columns got into disorder and faced about. As the French streamed back into the low ground several men got entangled in the hedges. <sup>8</sup>

Only on the left, the 108<sup>th</sup> regiment of the line, delayed by a strong and impenetrable hedge in front, was able to maintain up some order. <sup>9</sup> The hedge in front of the 108<sup>th</sup> had been much higher and thicker as those further east and its commander, colonel Higonet, had ordered his sappers and grenadiers to open a gap of about a platoon width. They did so, and the first battalion of the regiment slipped through, to form to the immediate left of the 72<sup>nd</sup> of the line.

As they had done so, however, the British had charged and now pushed the French back through the hedge in confusion. Somehow, Higonet's battalion in front of the hedge had maintained its order and was now pulled back through the hedge behind the other two battalions, which formed front in line to the right where the 72<sup>nd</sup> passed, back to the French position. It was from here that they were able to push back the British from the hedge by a volley and a subsequent bayonet charge.<sup>10</sup>

So it was up to the first hedge on the bottom of the slope that the British pursued the French and forced them through the gaps in as much as they didn't get entangled themselves.<sup>11</sup> It was not only the state of the ground, however, which prevented them from advancing any further, even though they were already a fair distance away from their former positions.

As he witnessed the failure of Bachelu to his right, general Foy led his 100<sup>th</sup> regiment of the line on the high ground to the south-east of Gémioncourt for the 5<sup>th</sup> division to collect and this it did by giving off a fire.<sup>12</sup>

The 79<sup>th</sup> regiment, however, went beyond both hedges just west of the Etange Materne and started here a musketry-fire on the French on the other side of the low ground of the stream of the Etang materne. It was able to keep this up for about 15 minutes until their ammunition nearly ran out; then the battalion went back to a position which was about 50 yards in front of its former position and where it soon lay down because of the French gunfire.<sup>13</sup>

Neither of the other British battalions pulled back after their success to their former position; in fact they were all instructed to take up positions at some distance in front of the Namur-road. While the 79<sup>th</sup> was (probably in column) about 50 metres in front of it, the 32<sup>nd</sup> may have been in about the same situation.<sup>14</sup> To its right front were the 28<sup>th</sup> and the 1<sup>st</sup> regiment; these were both in columns on quarter distance and very close to each other.<sup>15</sup> Further to the right front were the 44<sup>th</sup> and 42<sup>nd</sup> regiment (in column or in line) – the 42<sup>nd</sup> was about 500 metres south of Quatre Bras and to the right front of, but close, to the 44<sup>th</sup> regiment. Both battalions acted as one regiment most of the day under the immediate command of Sir Denis Pack.<sup>16</sup> On the whole, Picton's line of battalions was now placed in echelon, right in front, after pivoting on the 79<sup>th</sup>. In this way, the front-length covered by the battalions extended for around 800 metres.<sup>17</sup> For the time being, the 92<sup>nd</sup> regiment was kept in its position on the Namur-road.

The situation to the far left of the British position didn't change much between 4 and 6 p.m. The 95<sup>th</sup> regiment and the Brunswickers were still in position in the Bois de Censes and on and around the Namur-road to the north and north-east of Piraumont, which was still held by units of Bachelu. Apart from the fact that there is no indication that the French advanced in force from Piraumont by the time the division of Bachelu advanced to Picton's division further to their left, there is no indication either that the Riflemen joined the British charge after this French attack.<sup>18</sup>

It was probably towards 5 p.m. or a bit later that the companies (nos.1 and 2 ) were driven away from houses of Thyle by a unit of French voltigeurs, which was supported by some gunfire coming from artillery which stood in front of Piraumont. As a result, both companies extended along a lane, from whence a galling fire was kept up for some time on both sides.<sup>19</sup>

As for Bachelu's division, it was hit that hard that it was obliged to collect in the fields between the farm of Lairalle and the hamlet of Piraumont.<sup>20</sup> At least in its staff, its casualties were considerable: amongst the wounded were general Campi, colonel Higonet (108<sup>th</sup> regiment of the line), colonel Maigrot (2<sup>nd</sup> regiment of light infantry), the chefs de bataillon Peltret (61<sup>st</sup> regiment of the line) and Thibault (72<sup>nd</sup> regiment of the line). The *chefs de bataillon* Dujardin (72<sup>nd</sup> regiment of the line) and Delhoux (61<sup>st</sup> regiment of the line) had been killed.

The moment the Brunswickers and the 5<sup>th</sup> British division had left their positions (to the right and to the front, on the other side of the Namur road respectively), major general Best led his brigade towards the Namur-road, under cover of a skirmishing line of the Lüneburg and Osterode battalion. Then it was towards 5 p.m. They took up a position (in line) immediately in rear of this road. The only unit which crossed the road in order to support the 42<sup>nd</sup> on the right of the division was the Verden-battalion. Major general Best had ordered it this way after the request of Sir Thomas Picton to send him a battalion as a support. The Verden battalion took a position near to the 42<sup>nd</sup> to support the skirmishing-line, but where is unknown.<sup>21</sup>

In this action, the 1<sup>st</sup> company advanced into the skirmishing-line en débandade; soon after the 2<sup>nd</sup> company also advanced and chased the French infantry back until behind a hedge; a fire-fight ensued, in which the 3<sup>rd</sup> company also got involved; but as the troops were not used to this way of fighting, a part of the 2<sup>nd</sup> company went too far ahead and was taken prisoner. This group consisted of lieutenant Von der Horst, ensign Plate, Kotzebue, some subaltern officers and 63 men. As they were instantly replaced, the battalion was able to maintain its position despite the strong French skirmishing-fire.

This fire annoyed the Hanoverians as it came from behind a hedge and some bushes, while they were in the open field. Lieutenant Hurtzig charged the French there and drove them out of two positions, but finally had to return to his battalion in order not to be cut off.<sup>22</sup>

The movement was supported by the battery of captain Von Rettberg, which took up a position south of the road, further to its left and probably between the 42<sup>nd</sup> (to its left) and the battalion Verden (to its right). By doing so, Rettberg left his ammunition waggons, as well as all the men he didn't really need on the Namur road in order to avoid unnecessary casualties; in addition, he gave his guns ample distances.<sup>23</sup>

The 2<sup>nd</sup> battalion of Orange Nassau still had its position north-east of Quatre Bras, but it could have been at this moment that it moved forward as well in the wake of Best's battalions. The battalion then took up a position near them, close to Quatre Bras.<sup>24</sup>

As he moved the battalions of Picton's division forward to meet Bachelu's columns of attack, Wellington requested the duke of Brunswick to bring his troops to the front over the Brussels-road as a support to Picton's right.

As a result, the Duke led most of his battalions in closed columns over this road forward to a position about halfway La Bergerie and the rivulet which streams north of Gémioncourt across the highroad, about 500 metres south of Quatre Bras. Here, he halted the Leib-battalion and the 1<sup>st</sup> battalion of the line on both sides of the high-road, the Leib battalion in a closed column to the left and the other battalion to the right, while he led both remaining companies of the advance-guard battalion into the field towards the Bois de Bossu; to their right was a line of skirmishers which linked up to the other two companies of the advance-guard battalion which were in the wood. In rear of this line of infantry, on a height, the hussars and the uhlans stood in line (to the left and right respectively) .

The 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> battalions of the line had halted immediately north of Quatre Bras in order to form a reserve on and very close to the Brussels road; for this they had both taken up a position *en crémaillère* (a line in right angles). In case of a French offensive, it was their task was, to receive the other Brunswick units and to hold the crossroads as long as they could. <sup>25</sup>

Meanwhile, as the French cavalry of Piré had pulled back and had collected under a strong French musketry fire, a party of the section captain Gey's horse battery was sent forward to collect the guns of Stevenart. The reason was that major De la Sarraz had ordered captain Osten to instruct Gey to do so. Gey collected some volunteers of his section; some hussars and Scottish soldiers joined in as well. They succeeded in retrieving two 6-pounders; two other guns of the foot-battery were still in French hands (one which had been left behind near the Bois de Bossu, and the other one in front of Quatre Bras), but were found back later; also the howitzer of Bijleveld's horse battery returned in Netherlands hands. <sup>26</sup>

However, by the time Bachelu's battalions were driven back by Picton, Jamin led his 100th regiment of the line in a position to the immediate right rear of the farm of Gémioncourt to cover his comrades of the 5<sup>th</sup> division which fell back. At the same time, he had instructed his 4th regiment of light infantry to maintain its position on both sides of the Brussels road, just north of Gémioncourt. <sup>27</sup>

It were the battalions and their skirmishers of this regiment in the frontline between Gémioncourt and the Bois de Bossu to which most of the Brunswickers now advanced. Very close to the west-side of the Brussels-road, south-west of Gémioncourt and immediately south of the road which leads from this farm to the one of Grand-Pierrepont, the French also had a battery which bombarded the Brunswick line shortly after it had taken up position. <sup>28</sup> Those who were hit in particular were the husars; major Cramm was wounded. The Brunswick units also suffered from the French musketry-fire, as a result of which they recoiled slowly. <sup>29</sup>

Though the duke of Brunswick through his countenance inspired his troops in this situation, he saw how they needed urgent support as they had been under this murderous fire for some time. To make matters even worse, two French infantry columns (in rear of each other), probably from Jérôme Bonaparte's division, approached from along the Bois de Bossu, of whiche one was protected by some cavalry and artillery. At the same time, French units of cavalry – those of Piré – (again) advanced over the Brussels road.

As the duke now saw that his skirmishers on his right wing fell back for the French ones, he decided to get the hussars to the other side of the Brussels road and there to fall back towards

Quatre Bras; here they had to be in readiness to act according to circumstances.<sup>30</sup>

In order to cover the retreat of the hussars, the duke led his 200 uhlans against the French infantry. However, the charge failed completely as the French received the Brunswickers with a well-aimed volley and the horsemen faced about; they only got together again in rear of Quatre Bras. Now, the duke ordered the hussars to charge and his infantry to go back as well.

The 1<sup>st</sup> battalion of the line did so along the Brussels-road, while the Leib-battalion did so by taking to its left through the fields, east of La Bergerie, in order to reach the Namur-road. Major Von Pröstler did his utmost to maintain order but he failed due to the presence of a numerous French infantry, the strong French artillery-fire, the lack of experience of his men and the approaching French cavalry. Eventually, they panicked and fled back towards Quatre Bras and Picton's position.<sup>31</sup>

As the Duke of Brunswick was trying to restore the wavering Leib-battalion by presenting himself in front of it, he got mortally wounded.<sup>32</sup> After his fall, Wellington appointed colonel Von Olfermann as commander of the Brunswick corps.<sup>33</sup> The retreat of the Brunswick units caused their fellow hussars to charge the French cavalry of Piré, which was now approaching. In their approach, the 6<sup>th</sup> lancers were leading, in front of the 1st chasseurs à cheval.<sup>34</sup> As the Brunswick hussars advanced their order was quickly disturbed by a straggling fire from French infantry, to which their right flank became exposed and in this way they failed in producing the slightest check upon the French cavalry. The result was that they were soon in full flight, closely pursued by their opponents.<sup>35</sup>

The 42<sup>nd</sup> and 44<sup>th</sup> regiment, both in line (<sup>36</sup>) and not far off from the Brussels-road, had seen the French cavalry pass by. The majority of both regiments initially had the impression they were Anglo-Netherlands-German cavalry, but their veterans recognized them as French and gave an oblique volley; after that the most rearward squadrons of lancers wheeled to their right in order to charge both units in their rear.<sup>37</sup> Sergeant Anton (42<sup>nd</sup> regiment) writes: "We saw their approach at a distance, as they issued from a wood, and took them for Brunswickers coming to cut up the flying infantry; and as cavalry on all occasions have the advantage of retreating foot, on a fair field, we were halted in order to let them take their way; they were approaching our right flank, from which our skirmishers were extended, and we were far from being in a formation to repel an attack; if intended, or to afford regular support to our friends if requiring our aid. I think we stood with too much confidence, gazing towards them as if they had been our friends, anticipating the gallant charge they would make on the flying foe, and we were making no preparative movement to receive them as enemies, further than the reloading of the muskets, until a German orderly dragoon galloped up, exclaiming, "Franchee! Franchee!" and, wheeling about, galloped off."<sup>38</sup>

The 42<sup>nd</sup> regiment was about to form a rallying square, but at the moment both flank companies were about to take their positions, the lancers reached the regiment in its rear and overtook both

companies; both were dragged along and some confusion was the result. Several men were cut off but both companies succeeded to complete the square thereby closing in the most forward lancers; immediately they were bayoneted. The remaining lancers were driven away.<sup>39</sup> The 42<sup>nd</sup> had to pay dearly, however. Colonel Macara was killed by a thrust of a lance through his chin (<sup>40</sup>); colonel Dick got in command. As soon as he got seriously wounded, brevet-major Davidson succeeded him. After Davidson also got wounded, brevet-major Campbell finally took over the command of the battalion which he did for the remainder of the campaign.<sup>41</sup> That day, the battalion lost more than 280 men.<sup>42</sup>

The 44<sup>th</sup> regiment also was in line the moment the lancers hit it from behind. Here too, the same mistake was made as to the identity of the approaching cavalry.<sup>43</sup> The moment the majority of the men realized they were French, the lancers were already very close. Colonel Hamilton saw that forming square made no more sense and therefore decided to receive them in line. He had his rear rank turn and fire a volley as soon as the French were very near. The effect was devastating: a lot of lancers fell and they were in the utmost confusion. Only in the centre of the Scottish line there had been a short direct contact with the lancers; here they had attempted to take the colours, but they didn't succeed although they showed much bravery.

During this action ensign Christie was seriously wounded as he got a lance in his face; the moment the lancer tried to take the colour, Christie instinctively fell to the ground on top of the colour. The result was that the lancer only got away with a small part which had torn off in the action. Immediately after, however, he was dragged from his horse by members of the 44th and stabbed.<sup>44</sup>

The French lancers fled along the flanks of the 44<sup>th</sup> regiment thereby receiving the fire of the left flank company and the front companies.<sup>45</sup> The 6<sup>th</sup> regiment of lancers suffered heavy casualties: chef d'escadron and lieutenant Chasseigne were killed, while captain de la Bellière, Guillaume and Malot and lieutenant d'Espiennes were wounded; in all the regiment lost 60 subalterns and men. Colonel Galbois had got wounded as well but kept leading his regiment.<sup>46</sup>

The battalion of Verden (Best's brigade) had hardly taken up its position near the 42<sup>nd</sup> regiment, as a part of it was also under attack of the French cavalry; it suffered losses, but the French were also fired at at close range by the skirmishers of the battalions of Osterode and Lüneburg from behind the Namur-road and fled.<sup>47</sup> The most part of Piré's division, however, continued its charge along the Brussels road towards Quatre Bras. Here they met the 92<sup>nd</sup> regiment and it was this battalion which, again, repulsed Piré with its fire at close range.<sup>48</sup>

Meanwhile, in the southern half of the Bois de Bossu, colonel Van Saxon Weimar waited in vain for the return of major Ampt, bringing him further instructions from high command what to do. Eventually, he decided to evacuate his sector in the wood altogether. By then it may have been towards 4.30 p.m.<sup>49</sup>

His line of retreat fell west, to the fields in rear of the wood, south-east of Hautain-le-Val and basically only involved the 1<sup>st</sup> battalion Nassau, the 9<sup>th</sup> and 10<sup>th</sup> companies of the 3<sup>rd</sup> battalion Nassau and the section of captain Winssinger, which covered the retreat with its fire.<sup>50</sup>

As Saxon Weimar fell back, the French skirmishers entered the wood from the south and south-east and in stead of pursuing the enemy, they advanced north, where they bumped onto the low ground of the small stream crossing the wood from the east. Beyond it were hardly any enemy forces, except for the two companies of Brunswick carabineers which had just got there.<sup>51</sup> As the French skirmishers left their supports just outside the perimeter of the wood, other battalions of Jérôme's Bonaparte's division gradually crept along this perimeter further north as a support for their comrades of Foy's division further to their right.<sup>52</sup>

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1. Account of an anonymous officer of the 32<sup>nd</sup> regiment. In: Swiney, G.C. - Historical records of the 32<sup>nd</sup> etc. p.116

Cf. Houssaye, H. - 1815.Waterloo p.201

Aerts, W. - Etudes etc. p.453

Von Müffling confirms the attack took place around 4 p.m. In: Geschichte des Feldzugs etc. p.10

2. Notes of general Foy. In: Girod de l'Ain - Vie militaire etc. p.271

Report of Reille to Ney, dated 17<sup>th</sup> June 1815. In: SHD, C15/22

General Bachelu in his letter dated 12<sup>th</sup> of February 1829 to the duc d'Elchingen. Cf. papers E.Stoffel. In: private collection.

As Clayton suggests, it might be that the one regiment of light infantry of the division, the 2<sup>nd</sup>, was used as skirmishers. This would end up in six columns of battalions (and not seven as Clayton describes), totalling about 2500 men. In: Waterloo p.206

Captain Ross-Lewin erroneously claims there was one heavy column. In: With the thirty second etc. p.257

According to Von Müffling there were three columns with small intervals. In: The memoirs of baron Von Müffling etc. p.238

In his earlier version of the events the attack was carried out en echelon, left in front. In: CvW - Geschichte des Feldzugs etc. p.10-11

3. Sergeant Anton (42<sup>nd</sup> regiment). In: Retrospect of a military life p.191

Private D.Vallence (79<sup>th</sup> regiment).In: The Waterloo Journal Vol.21 nr.2

Captain Macdonald. In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.500-501

Colonel Trefcon - Carnet de campagne p.181

4. Lieutenant Forbes (79<sup>th</sup> regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.314

Captain Macdonald (1<sup>st</sup> regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.707 p.3-6

Reille in his report of the 17<sup>th</sup> of June writes "elle [the division Bachelu] ne put résister à la charge d'une ligne d'infanterie anglaise et écossaise.." In: SHD, C15 nr.22

This is corroborated by the chief of staff of the division, colonel Trefcon. In: Carnet de campagne p.181-182

<sup>5</sup> Sergeant Anton (42<sup>nd</sup> regiment). In: Retrospect of a military life p.191

Lieutenant colonel Grunebosch also mentions the presence of the Scottish units in rear of his battalion. In: NL-ZuRAZ, Van Löben Sels, 0302, inv.nr.265

6. In: Retrospect of a military life p.191-192

7. Colonel Trefcon. In: *Carnet de campagne* p.182  
General Bachelu in his letter dated 12th of February 1829 to the duc d'Elchingen. Cf. papers E.Stoffel. In: private collection.

Major Calvert. In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.256-258  
Sergeant Anton (42<sup>nd</sup> regiment). In: *Retrospect of a military life* p.192  
Account of an anonymous officer of the 32<sup>nd</sup> regiment. In: Swiney, G.C. - *Historical records of the 32<sup>nd</sup> etc.* p.116  
Ensign Mudie (1<sup>st</sup> regiment) In: *Diary of ensign C.Mudie, 3rd Bn.The Royal Scots. Describing the battle of Waterloo and occupation of Paris, 1815.* In: *The Thistle.* April, July and October 1931 p.184  
The distance in front of the road is taken from the account of lieutenant Malcolm (42<sup>nd</sup> regiment). In: BWRA, nr.220  
This is corroborated by Bachelu himself describing the confrontation taking place “mi-côte”, halfway the slope.

<sup>8</sup> Foy In: *Girod de l'Ain. Vie etc.* p.271  
Report of Reille to Ney, 17<sup>th</sup> June 1815. In: SHD, C15.22  
Reille. *Notice historique etc.* In: *Documents inédits etc.*p.59  
Colonel Trefcon - *Carnet de campagne* p.182  
Major Calvert (32<sup>nd</sup> regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.256-258  
Lieutenant Forbes (79<sup>th</sup> regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.703 p.1-2  
Captain Crow (32<sup>nd</sup> regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.320-321

<sup>9</sup> Reille. In his report dated 17<sup>th</sup> of June. In: SHS, C15 / 22

<sup>10</sup> H.de Mauduit. Somehow, he had a report of a member of this regiment, but it is not clear who. In: *Les derniers jours Vol.II* p.148-150

<sup>11</sup> Captain Ross-Lewin (32<sup>nd</sup> regiment). In: *With the thirty second etc.* p.257-258  
Major Calvert (32<sup>nd</sup> regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.284-286  
Captain Crowe (32<sup>nd</sup> regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.320-321  
Houssaye says the British pursued as far as Piraumont, but this is incorrect. In: *1815.Waterloo* p.203

12. Captain Ross-Lewin (32<sup>nd</sup> regiment). In: *Ross-Lewin, H. With the thirty second etc.* p.257-258  
The 32<sup>nd</sup> regiment suffered considerably from the French fire at the hedge.  
Report of Reille to Ney, 17<sup>th</sup> June 1815. In: SHD, nr.C15/22 and Reille in his *Notice historique etc.* In: *Documents inédits* p.59  
Notes of Foy. In: *Girod de l'Ain. Vie etc.* p.271-272

<sup>13</sup> Major Calvert (32<sup>nd</sup> regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.256-259  
Captain Jameson. In: J.Macveigh - The historical records of the 79<sup>th</sup> Highlanders p.38-39  
Jameson, R. - Historical record of the seventy-ninth regiment etc. p.51-52  
According to another source the 79<sup>th</sup> regiment had to fall back as it nearly was cut off by French forces; as the battalion faced difficulties in getting through one of the hedges it would have suffered from French musketry fire quite considerably. Cf. Private D.Vallence (79<sup>th</sup> regiment). In: The Waterloo Journal Vol.21 nr.2 p.15  
Sergeant Dewar (79<sup>th</sup> regiment) mentions the advance for about 500 yards, but he doesn't mention the presence of French columns, only of French skirmishers who fell back slowly. Cf. his letter to his brother dated 5<sup>th</sup> of August 1815. In: NWMS, M1960.2

<sup>14</sup> Captain Ross-Lewin (32<sup>nd</sup> regiment) states the battalions fell back to a position on the other side of the slope. In: With the 32<sup>nd</sup> etc. p.257  
Major Calvert isn't specific about the position. In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.256-258  
Captain Crowe asserts his light company was about 450 metres in front of the battalion after it had charged. In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.320-321  
Another officer claims the 32<sup>nd</sup> charged the French again after their pursuit of the battalion. Cf. Account of an anonymous officer of the 32<sup>nd</sup> regiment. In: Swiney, G.C. - Historical records of the 32<sup>nd</sup> etc. p.116

<sup>15</sup> Captain Macdonald (1<sup>st</sup> regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.707 p.3-6  
The 1<sup>st</sup> regiment would have been brought back with difficulty. Cf. Operations of the 5<sup>th</sup> or etc. p.174

<sup>16</sup> Lieutenant colonel O'Malley (44<sup>th</sup> regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.322-324  
Sergeant Anton (42<sup>nd</sup> regiment). In: Retrospect of a military life p.193

It was probably around this period of time that the 44<sup>th</sup> was detached in quarter distance column at double quick to a rising ground to successfully relieve a battery from French cavalry which was hovering around; after that a Hanoverian battalion (probably Verden) came up and the 44<sup>th</sup> rejoined its brigade. Cf. Captain Burney (44<sup>th</sup> regiment). In: Carter, Th. – Historical record of the 44<sup>th</sup> etc. p.100

<sup>17</sup> Sergeant Anton (42<sup>nd</sup> regiment). In: Retrospect of a military life p.193  
Sergeant McEween (42<sup>nd</sup> regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.706 p.455-456

<sup>18</sup> Lieutenant Kincaid mentions the attack of Bachelu on the division, but doesn't enter into any detail about any share of the Riflemen, nor about any French action against his colleagues. Nor do other witnesses of the battalion do so. In fact, Kincaid mentions a lull in the fighting in his front for about an hour, until the units of Kielmansegge arrived (see below). In: Adventures etc. p.319-320

<sup>19</sup> Costello, private Edward. In: The adventures of a soldier etc. p.286

20. Notes of Foy. In: Girod de l'Ain. Vie militaire etc. p.271-272

Colonel Trefcon. Carnets de campagne p.183

Reille. In his report dated 17th of June. In: SHD nr.C15/22

<sup>21</sup> Lieutenant Von Berckefeldt (Münden battalion) incorrectly speaks of the 79<sup>th</sup> and 95<sup>th</sup> battalions, which were supported by the Verden battalion. In: [www.1815.ltd.uk](http://www.1815.ltd.uk) Original in: Geschichte des königlich Hannoverschen Landwehr Bataillons Münden

<sup>22</sup> Reports of major general Best. In: VPH-LBA, nr.7 and 8.

Notizen etc. In: VPH-LBA, nr.4

Ensign Oppermann (Münden battalion). In a letter dated 23<sup>rd</sup> June 1815 to his parents. In: Kannicht, J. Und alles wegen Napoleon p.203

Lieutenant Von der Horst himself. In: Hannoversches Magazin, 95<sup>e</sup> Stück. 1816 p.1507-1511  
He clearly states, unlike Best himself, that it was the 2<sup>nd</sup> company which he was a member of and that it succeeded the 1<sup>st</sup> into the action.

Von der Horst was led to the rear to a farm, from where he was led towards Charleroi on the 17<sup>th</sup> and the 18<sup>th</sup> to Beaumont.

<sup>23</sup> Captain Von Rettberg. In: VPH, nr.16 and 34.706 p.377-379 (plan).

Captain Von Cleeves. In: VPH, nr.15

Notizen etc. In: VPH, nr.4

<sup>24</sup> Cf. Captain Eberhard, C.F. Nassauische Erinnerungen an Waterloo. In: Der Uhrturm. Heft 27, July 1940 p.552

<sup>25</sup> Colonel Von Herzberg (of the general staff of the Brunswick corps). In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.23-55

Wachholtz, F.von - Geschichte des herzoglich etc. p.26-27 / plan.

1<sup>st</sup> lieutenant Kühler (Leib-battalion). Cf. his report dated 20<sup>th</sup> December 1827. In: NSA, VI Hs.18 nr.7.2

Corporal Külbel of the Leib-battalion gives a different impression of the advance: he claims his battalion first stood about 20-30 metres in front of Quatre Bras, immediately to the left of the Brussels road to cover some British guns, which stood on this road. Here, the battalion stood from about 4 p.m. until about 5 p.m. when it was relieved by a British battalion.

After that, the Leib-battalion moved to its left to the position sketched, at about 500 metres in front of the crossroads and to the south-east of the Bergerie. It did so in line, but this formation was soon changed into square by the duke of Brunswick himself. In this position (south east of the Bergerie) the battalion was placed in a closed column, of which the first platoon, led by ensign Klevert, was thrown out as skirmishers.

In: Die letzten Augenblicke etc. p.4-5

So far, it has been impossible to track down the identity of the British battery and battalion, as at that stage of the action there were neither of these units there.

<sup>26</sup> Lieutenant Henckens. In: Mémoires etc. p.228

Captain Osten. In: NL-ZuRAZ, Van Löben Sels, 0302 inv.nr.262

Lieutenant Van Wassenaar van St.Pancras (battery Gey). In: NL-ZuRAZ, Van Löben Sels, 0302 inv.nr.262

2nd lieutenant Koopman. In: NL-ZuRAZ, Van Löben Sels, 0302 inv.nr.262

Von Müffling. In: Geschichte des Feldzugs etc. p.12

A record about captain Gey mentions the participation of 2<sup>nd</sup> lieutenant Clement, sergeant Wanders of the train and some gunners of the first company of horse artillery. In: Kanselarij der Nederlandse Orden, The Hague.

Other documents relating to captain Gey also mention the participation of some hussars and some Scottish soldiers. In: NA, nr.2.21.071

The fact that two 6-pounders and a howitzer had been retaken is confirmed by both the same sources.

2<sup>nd</sup> lieutenant Koopman claims the gun of Bijleveld was returned by Gey by 6 p.m. In: NL-ZuRAZ, Van Löben Sels, 0302 inv.nr.262

Dellevoet is incorrect in his claim that the recovered guns came from Gey's unit of horse artillery. In: The Dutch-Belgian cavalry etc.p.113

<sup>27</sup> Cf. General Foy. In: Girod de l'Ain. Vie etc. p.272

Report of Reille, dated 17<sup>th</sup> of June. In: SHAT, nr.C15/22

<sup>28</sup> Wachholtz, F.von - Geschichte des herzoglich etc. Plan.

29. Wachholtz, F.von - Geschichte des herzoglich etc. p.27

Colonel Von Herzberg. In: BL, Ad.ms.34.706 p.23-55

30. Wachholtz, Von. In: Geschichte des herzoglich etc. p.28-29

Two Brunswick accounts speak in this phase of artillery-support of which they do not mention the name but it cannot have been another battery as the one of Lloyd (from the description of its position and fate), but from members of this unit it becomes clear that these guns came into action *after* the charge of the cuirassiers.

Cf. Von Wachholtz In: Geschichte des herzoglichen etc. p.28

Colonel Von Herzberg (of the general staff of the Brunswick corps). In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.23-55

Aerts takes over this support and identifies the guns as Hannoverian ones, without assigning them to a specific battery however. In: Etudes etc. p.445

Siborne does the same but doesn't designate them to any battery whatsoever either. In: History of the war etc. Vol.I p.114-115

31. Colonel Von Herzberg (of the general staff of the Brunswick corps). In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.23-55

Wachholtz, F.von - Geschichte des herzoglich etc. p.28-30

Lieutenant Henckens (6<sup>th</sup> regiment of chasseurs à cheval) confirms the fact that the Brunswick cavalry attacked the French infantry first. In: Mémoires p.229

Corporal Külbel of the Leib-battalion denies his battalion fell back in disorder, and at the same time erroneously claims it stood near la Bergerie for about 2 hours (from after 5 p.m. till about 7.30 p.m.), when it fell back upon units of Picton which, in the meantime, had taken up positions further forward as they stood in the beginning, after their success in repelling Bachelu. In: Die letzten Augenblicke etc. p.5

<sup>32</sup> Cf. separate note.

33. Wellington did so as the Duke of Brunswick had ever told him that Von Olfermann was next to him in seniority. In fact, colonel Von Herzberg was senior officer, but Wellington followed the Duke's wish. After the fall of Von Olfermann, Von Herzberg was given the command of the Brunswick corps. Cf. Wellington's letter dated 20<sup>th</sup> June 1815 to Von Herzberg. In: WD p.490-491

<sup>34</sup> Mauduit, H.de - Les derniers jours etc. Vol.II p.150

<sup>35</sup> Siborne, W. - History of the war etc. Vol.I p.117

Sergeant Langenstrassen, of the 4<sup>th</sup> company of Brunswick hussars, however, claims in a letter dated 2<sup>nd</sup> of August 1815 that his regiment maintained its position that day. Though it was charged by some French cuirassiers, they did not dare venture from close to the large coppice. In: [www.1815.ltd.uk](http://www.1815.ltd.uk) Original in: NSA, nr.249 AN 190

36. Major O'Malley (44<sup>th</sup> regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.70 p.322-324

Sergeant McEween (42<sup>nd</sup> regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.70 p.455-456

Lieutenant colonel O'Malley (44<sup>th</sup> regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.322-324

<sup>37</sup> Major O'Malley (44<sup>th</sup> regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.322-324

Sergeant McEween (42<sup>nd</sup> regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.455-456

Lieutenant colonel O'Malley (44<sup>th</sup> regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.322-324

38. In: Retrospect of a military life p.192

Cf. Sergeant McEween and major O'Malley (44<sup>th</sup> regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.455-456 and 34.706 p.322-324

39. Sir W.Gomm. In diary. In: Letters and journals p.355.

Lieutenant McEween (42<sup>nd</sup> regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.455-456

Captain Campbell (42<sup>nd</sup> regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.451-454

Lieutenant Malcom mentions the presence of “an immense number of the enemy’s lancers” but in case only two squadrons of them were engaged these could not have exceeded 250 horsemen; this against a combined force of 1200 men of the 42<sup>nd</sup>-44<sup>th</sup> cannot be regarded as immense. Malcolm confirms the 42<sup>nd</sup> wasn’t in square the moment the lancers approached from the rear, but it would have succeeded in forming one of wings; at the same time he admits the French were repulsed not without sustaining some loss. In: BWRA, nr.220

40. Sergeant Anton (42<sup>nd</sup> regiment). In: Retrospect of a military life p.192

Private J.Gunn (42<sup>nd</sup> regiment). In: JSAHR, Vol.49 p.115

According to Dalton, the four men carrying Macara off the field would have been surrounded by the French cavalry and sabred. In: The Waterloo roll call p.158

41. Sergeant Anton (42<sup>nd</sup> regiment). In: Retrospect of a military life p.193

42. Cf. Siborne, W. - History of the war etc. Vol.I p.455

The battalion counted 616 men.

43. Lieutenant Riddock (44<sup>th</sup> regiment) mentions his impression that they were Belgian cavalry. In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.293-297

Major O'Malley (44<sup>th</sup> regiment) says they were seen as Brunswick cavalry. In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.322-324

44. Major O'Malley (44<sup>th</sup> regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.322-324

Lieutenant Riddock (44<sup>th</sup> regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.293-297

45. The 44<sup>th</sup> wasn’t broken as Houssaye claims it was. In:1815. Waterloo p.203

46. Mauduit, H.de - Les derniers jours etc. Vol.II p.152

<sup>47</sup> Reports of major general Best. In: VPH, nrs.7 and 8

Notizen etc. In: VPH, nr.4

Mauduit, H.de - Les derniers jours etc. Vol.II p.151

In contradiction, Houssaye believes “a Hanoverian battalion” [Verden] was then dispersed. In: 1815.Waterloo p.204

This is confirmed by the “Notizen vom General Commando, MSS, as mentioned by Beamish. This document claims the battalion was cut down or captured after the French cavalry had charged the 42<sup>nd</sup>. In: History etc. Vol.II p.330

<sup>48</sup> Lieutenant colonel Gomm. In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.179-184

Captain Ross-Lewin (32<sup>nd</sup> regiment). In: With the 32nd etc. p.258  
Lieutenant Hope (92<sup>nd</sup> regiment). In: Letters from Portugal etc. p.227  
Lieutenant Winchester (92<sup>nd</sup> regiment). In: BL, Add.ms.34.706 p.242-247

At this moment, Siborne depicts a scene in which the head of the French cavalry column dashed into the group of buildings of Quatre Bras, some even penetrating to the north of them and into the yard of the farm of this hamlet, but I have found no documents to support this version of the events. In: History of the war etc. pVol.I p.123

49. Prince Bernhard van Saxon Weimar in:

Diary. In: THW, Grossherzogliches Hausarchiv, A.XXIV 30, p.192

Letter dated 29<sup>th</sup> August 1841 to captain Van Löben Sels. In: In: NL-ZuRAZ, Van Löben Sels, 0302 inv.nr.265

His letter dated 19<sup>th</sup> June 1815 to his father. In: Bas, F.de - La campagne de 1815 Vol.III. p.566

J.P.Leonhard (1<sup>st</sup> battalion Nassau) states his battalion took up a position north of Hautain-le-Val and that his manoeuvres ended by 4.30 p.m. Account in private collection.

Captain Büsgen (1<sup>st</sup> battalion Nassau) confirms his battalion formed in battle order about 300 to 400 yards west of the wood towards 5 p.m. At dusk, it reunited with the regiment further along the Nivelles road. In: HSD, Abt.1049, nr.1

Major Van Opstal confirms the section of captain Winssinger pulled back towards Nivelles. In: NL-ZuRAZ, Van Löben Sels, 0302 inv.nr.262

J.P.Leonhard (1<sup>st</sup> battalion Nassau) claims his battalion stopped manoeuvring at 4.30 p.m. In: private collection.

Captain Büsgen (1<sup>st</sup> battalion Nassau) confirms an hour of towards 5 p.m. He adds that his battalion took up a position *en bataille* at about 300 to 400 paces in rear of the wood. Later, those companies which acted as skirmishers rejoined it. In: VPH-LBA, nr.75

Ensign Macready (30<sup>th</sup> regiment) claims his battalion met Nassau troops before he actually reached the wood. In: Brett James, A. The hundred days p.62

Von Müffling confirms that by 4 p.m. the French had taken the southern part of the wood. In: CvW - Geschichte des Feldzugs etc. p.11

Colonel Van Zuylen van Nijvelt situates the evacuation of the southern part of the wood shortly after the charge of Van Merlen, i.e. around 4.30 p.m. In: Historisch verhaal etc. In: Bas, F.de - La campagne de 1815 Vol.III. p.314

<sup>50</sup> Cf. Captain Frensdorf (commander of the 3<sup>rd</sup> battalion Nassau). Cf. his account dated 10<sup>th</sup> of August 1815. In private collection

Before, the majority of the 3<sup>rd</sup> battalion Nassau, the 1<sup>st</sup> battalion Orange Nassau and the 8<sup>th</sup> of

national militia had gone back north, through the wood. The company of Nassau voluntary chasseurs was probably engaged in the wood until dusk. Cf. Captain Bergman, commander of the detachment of Nassau volunteers. In: Nassau Heimatblätter, 1915 nr.1+2 p.19

<sup>51</sup> Captain Bourdon de Vatry, aide de camp of general Jérôme Bonaparte confirms that the division attacked the Nassau and Brunswick troops in the wood. In: Grouchy, G.de - Mémoires du maréchal de Grouchy. Vol.IV p.101

<sup>52</sup> See below.

Cf. Reille. Notice historique etc. In: Documents inédits etc.p.59