

## **The French right wing.**

Some time that morning, general Exelmans wrote his report for Grouchy. It reads:

*Monsieur le Maréchal,*

*J'ai l'honneur d'informer Votre Excellence que dans l'affaire qui a eu lieu hier sous nos yeux, la brigade du Gal.Vincent a eu deux officiers de blessés, avec une vingtaine de dragons, et sept de tués. Cette brigade a parfaitement fait son devoir, conduite par le brave Gal.Vincent, qui joint à une grande expérience la fermeté et le sang-froid les plus rares. J'ai l'honneur de prier Votre Excellence de demander pour le Gal.Vincent la grade [here the rank is left out] dans la Légion d'honneur.*

*Le colonel Briqueville (du 20e) s'est très bien conduit, ainsi que le chef d'escadron Guibourg (du 15e) qui commandait le 1er escadron avec la plus grande vigueur; comme cet officier est très ancien, je demande pour lui le grade de major.*

*Les militaires ci-après désignés sont ceux qui se sont particulièrement distingués dans la petite affaire d'hier;*

*du 20e dragons:*

*Mrs.les capitaines Marguiannes et Rancorette;le Lt.Ibry; l'adjudant Barrie; le sous-lt.Warin;les Maux des logis Marcey, blessé, et Rey; et le grenadier Piné, qui a ramené 27 prisonniers.*

*Dans mon Etat-major, le Colonel Ferroussat s'est conduit au mieux; cet officier est digne de commander un régiment. Le chef d'escadron Sencier, mon aide de camp, s'est conduit également avec une bravoure extraordinaire.*

*Le Capitaine Fanchon, attaché à mon Etat-major, ancien officier de grenadiers, ne le cède en rien aux plus intrépides; je demande pour lui le grade de chef de bataillon.*

*Je demande la croix de la Légion pour Mr.Dibon, mon aide-de-camp, et pour Mr.Sénarmont lieutenant du 1er de chasseurs, qui se sont conduits au mieux; ce dernier est assez dangeureusement blessé; il est attaché à mon Etat-major.*

*Le Lt.Gal.Ct. (signé)*

*Exelmans <sup>1</sup>*

Grouchy spent the night at Campinaire and it was here, as the commander of the reserve cavalry, that he wrote his report for Soult:

*Campinaire, le 16 Juin 1815 à 5 heures du matin*

*Monsieur le maréchal,*

*Les quatre corps de cavalerie sont placés de la manière suivante:*

*Le 1er a une de ses divisions à l'ambusart [sic], et la seconde sur la route de Gilly à Fleurus en avant de l'embranchement de Capinaire [sic]. Le 2e corps a une de ses divisions à l'ambusart [sic] et l'autre en arrière du défilé de Ronchamp.*

*Le 4e corps a raillé [sic] sa seconde division et est au village de St.Francois et censes*

*environnantes.*

*Le 3e corps doit se trouver entre Charleroi et le point où nous avons chargé les carrés de l'infanterie prussienne. Le général Kellerman ne m'a point envoyé de Charleroi, son emplacement; mais il est de ce côté-ci.*

*Je n'ai point encore le rapport des pertes qu'on fait les 1er et 2e corps dans la journée d'aujourd'hui. Je l'ai demandé et le remettrai d'en qu'il me sera parvenu. Ci-joint copie de celui que j'adressai hier à l'Empereur.*

*Le total des prisonniers faits par la cavalerie dans la journée d'hier est de huit à neuf cents hommes.*

*Agréez, Monsieur le maréchal, l'assurance de ma haute considération.*

*Le maréchal commandant la cavalerie  
Comte de Grouchy*

*P.S. Le premier hussards faisant [sic] parti du 1er corps en a été détaché par Vos Ordres, et je désire que vous lui fessiez [sic] rallier la division Sault, d'en qu'il sera possible.<sup>2</sup>*

Grouchy received Sault's letter of 8 a.m. around 9 a.m. In reading Grouchy's report of 5 a.m. one can assume that he had already taken his precautions for the concentration of his troops.

Immediately, Grouchy issued march orders for the cavalry of Pajol, Exelmans and Milhaud. It remains unclear in what way Grouchy communicated to Vandamme and Gérard and vice versa.

The letter which was carried from Napoleon by the aide de camp Labédoyère was delivered to Grouchy shortly after or perhaps even before 9 a.m.

In this connection, there are two reports which would have been written by Grouchy for the emperor around the same time. They are:

*Au bivouac près Fleurus, le 16 juin 1815, 5 heures du matin*

*Sire,*

*En faisant la tournée de mes avant-postes, je viens d'apercevoir de fortes colonnes ennemies se dirigeant vers Bry, Saint Amand et autres villages environnants; elles paraissent venir par la route de Namur.*

*Le général Girard, dont la division d'infanterie, placée sur ma gauche, occupe un plateau plus élevé que ceux où se trouvent les troupes que je commande, vient me de confirmer l'arrivée incessante, depuis le point du jour, de corps Prussiens.*

*Je ne perds donc pas un instant à transmettre à Votre Majesté ces renseignements importants et positifs. Je réunis en ce moment mes troupes pour effectuer le mouvement que vous avez ordonné vers Sombreffe.*

*Je suis etc..*

*Le maréchal Grouchy<sup>3</sup>*

And another report reads:

*Le 16 Juin 1815, 6 heures du matin*

*Sire,*

*Je viens d'être informé par le général Girard que l'ennemi continue à se porter en force par Sombreffe sur les hauteurs qui environnent le moulin de Brie [sic]. Je m'empresse de transmettre à Votre Majesté ce nouvel avis conformatif de celui que je lui ai fait parvenir il y a une heure.*

*Le maréchal Grouchy*<sup>4</sup>

As printed copies were made available for the archives in Paris no originals of these reports are available, and therefore a complete verification has not been possible. Apart from that, they were actually not written the moment they claim to have been written, as they simply could not have been written then. First of all, there is the original report from 5 a.m. which Grouchy wrote as commander of the reserve cavalry and he would never have written such reports, certainly not at the same time but also not one to Soult and the other to Napoleon. The reason for the difference is that he wrote the one of 5 a.m. for Soult as commander of the reserve cavalry, while he wrote the others for Napoleon as commander of the right wing.

What he writes also doesn't match the situation between 5 and 6 a.m. First of all, there were no Prussian movements coming from the Namur road through Sombreffe by that time (Pirch I started to arrive towards 10 a.m.) and secondly, and what is even more important, is that at that moment Grouchy had no instructions to collect his troops and march towards Sombreffe. Therefore, the hours given are incorrect. Both reports probably date from between 10 and 11 a.m.; the second one would then have been written just before the moment Grouchy and Napoleon would actually meet in Fleurus.<sup>5</sup>

According to Napoleons orders the right wing had to move to Sombreffe without halting. At 8 a.m. Napoleon wrote to Grouchy: " Rendez-vous avec cette aile droite à Sombreffe. Faites partir en conséquence, de suite, les corps des généraux Pajol, Milhaud, Exelmans et Vandamme, et, sans vous arrêter, continuez votre mouvement sur Sombreffe ".

Grouchy, however, was forced to halt his movements due to the Prussian presence in the position Saint Amand – Ligny - Sombreffe and the absence of the 4<sup>th</sup> corps.

Grouchy put the right wing in motion, except for the 3<sup>rd</sup> and the 4<sup>th</sup> corps. Both these corps got their orders directly from the imperial headquarters. Also the reserve (the 6<sup>th</sup> corps and the Imperial guard) got its orders from the emperor. The units in the right wing had the following sequence: Pajol and Domon, Exelmans, Vandamme, Milhaud, Imperial guard and the 6<sup>th</sup> corps.

It was at 8 a.m. that Grouchy was ordered by Soult to move Pajol (with Domon) and Exelmans to Sombreffe. The distance between the bivouac of both corps and the ground north of Fleurus is about 4 kilometres. In case Grouchy got his orders at 9 a.m. then Pajol and Exelmans could have had their orders about 15 minutes later.<sup>6</sup> During their march both corps used the road leading from Charleroi to Point du Jour.

Vandamme had his headquarters in the farm of Fontenelle. That morning, his adjudant, colonel Trezel, sent out the following order to general Berthézène:

*au quartier général à la ferme de Fontenelle sous Farcine [sic] le 16 Juin 1815*

*Monsieur le général,*

*Son Excellence le général en chef comte Vandamme ordonne que chaque division d'infanterie du corps d'armée fournisse un détachement de cinquante hommes commandé par un lieutenant pour la garde des parcs et équipages du corps d'armée.*

*Veillez donner vos ordres pour que ce détachement se rende de suite au quartier général de Son Excellence où il sera à la disposition de Monsieur le colonel Voulandteu [?] qui en est le commandant.*

*Agréez, mon général, l'assurance de mon respect,*

*L'adjoint commandant sous chef de l'état major 9e division du 3e corps de l'armée du nord,*

*Trezel* <sup>7</sup>

Similar orders were issued to Lefol and Habert. It was around 9 a.m. that Vandamme received the orders to proceed to Sombreffe. One hour later the corps moved from its positions. <sup>8</sup> The 3<sup>rd</sup> corps followed both cavalry-corps and marched through Fleurus the moment Napoleon arrived here (11 a.m.). <sup>9</sup>

While Napoleon installed himself at the mill of Naveau and the palace was installed in the Chateau de la Paix at Fleurus, the 3<sup>rd</sup> corps marched through Fleurus to take up positions at the other side of the village, to the west of the road. The division Berthézène took up a position there in columns per division so as to observe “les débouchés de Saint Amand et de Mellet”. <sup>10</sup> The division kept its position until it was relieved there by the one of Girard, of Reille's corps. Then the division moved towards a position in front of Saint Amand, where it drove off some Prussian skirmishers.

The former position occupied by the 11<sup>th</sup> division can be located through the account of the surgeon d'Héralde, who was attached to the 12th regiment of light infantry (division of Girard). In his account (<sup>11</sup>) d'Héralde mentions the position his division took up near a mill. In the middle of the 19<sup>th</sup> century there were two mills on the road which leads from Fleurus to Mellet. One, in ruins, and the other, called Moulin de Barlaimont at 2400 metres east of Mellet and at 1600 metres west of Fleurus respectively. Between both these mills there was about 1400 metres distance. <sup>12</sup> It was in this position that general Girard learned through an imperial messenger about the situation on the French right wing. <sup>13</sup>

Pajol and Exelmans took up positions east of the road which leads from Fleurus to Gembloux. <sup>14</sup> Exelmans had a position directly to the right of the road and Pajol was on his right flank, occupying the farms of Faijt and La Converterie, and a farm halfway between them. <sup>15</sup> At this time of day, the heat was extreme. <sup>16</sup> The 4<sup>th</sup> cavalry-corps, of Milhaud, probably followed Vandamme. That morning it stood at St.Francois, a hamlet about two kilometres north east of Châtelet. Up to 2 p.m. it kept a position on this side of Fleurus, together with the Imperial guard,

but where exactly is unknown.

During the night of the 15th of June, the major part of the 4th corps of Gérard was at or south of the Sambre; one division, Hulot, was near Châtelet on the north bank of this river. Around 9.30 a.m. that morning Gérard got the order to move his corps to Sombreffe, while leaving Fleurus to his left.<sup>17</sup> Half an hour later the first units left their positions.<sup>18</sup> The column of the corps, coming from Châtelet, climbed the slopes of the valley of the Sambre through Châtelineau and over the road which connects this village to the Bois de Trichehève. From there it continued its march to the right of Fleurus through Wainage and Lambusart towards the windmill of Baulet. Here it halted for some time.

The distance between the bridge of Châtelet and this mill is 9 kilometres. The vanguard of the corps arrived at the Baulet windmill around 1 p.m.<sup>19</sup> General Gérard, escorted by his chief of staff, his aide de camps and a platoon of the 6<sup>th</sup> regiment hussars (Maurin), had gone ahead of his corps towards Sombreffe. During this reconnaissance, while approaching the Prussian outposts (<sup>20</sup>) three Prussian squadrons of the 6<sup>th</sup> regiment of uhlans approached them.<sup>21</sup>

The French group fled into a field with high corn and several ditches, and these circumstances made it hard for them to get out again. Gérard lost his horse as it stumbled over a ditch and threw him off. Now, the group made a firm stand and immediately after, the uhlans were on them. Gérard's aide de camp Lafontaine came to his aid, killed two Prussian lancers, but was himself killed by a pistol-shot; general Saint Rémy got seven lance-wounds and the aide de camp Dupéron wasn't successful either in rescuing Gérard. Gérard would have been taken prisoner, had not a squadron of the 12<sup>th</sup> regiment chasseurs à cheval, called up by colonel Rumigny, one of Gérard's aide de camps, intervened and rescued their comrades.<sup>22</sup> Shortly after these events, Gérard met Napoleon near the mill of Fleurus; it was around 12.30 p.m. They talked, amongst others, about the desertion of Bourmont.<sup>23</sup> Napoleon would have said: " Je vous l'avais bien dit, général, qui est bleu est bleu, qui est blanc est toujours blanc ! " <sup>24</sup>

The imperial guard had its positions along and on the road, between Charleroi and Gilly. Its general headquarters were located in Charleroi and it was from here that early that morning count Friant released the following *ordre du jour* for the generals commanding the grenadiers:

*Charleroi, le 16 Juin 1815*

*Le lieutenant général colonel de l'arme a vu avec étonnement et avec beaucoup de mécontentement que des grenadiers se permettent de conduire des chevaux de bat ou de selle.*

*Il ne peut attribuer cet oubli des devoirs et de la .... de leur part qu'à la négligence de MM.les officiers qui n'exigent pas que les hommes soient ...à leur rang et qui tolèrent un trop grand nombre de femmes à la suite des compagnies. Il ordonne donc à MM.les maréchaux de camp de faire disparaître de la colonne toutes celles qui excéderaient le nombre fixé, par les règlements et qui n'auraient pas l'autorisation de suivre l'armée.*

*Toutes celles qui après avoir reçu l'ordre de s'éloigner se montreraient à la suite des régiments seront arrêtées et remises à la gendarmerie.*

*Tout grenadier qui sera trouvé conduisant un cheval de bat ou autre sera conduit chez le lieutenant-général colonel de l'arme qui prendra à son égard les dispositions qu'il jugera convenables.*

*Les corvées de vivre le feront à l'avenir avec plus d'ordre. Les hommes iront toujours avec leurs armes et il y aura un officier par régiment à leur tête, les fourriers commandant leurs compag-*

*nies. On remettra chaque jour au lt. général colonel de l'arme l'état nommatif des hommes qui auront manqué aux appels.*

*MM. les Maréchaux de camp enverront dans le jour au chef de l'état major leurs situations de 15me suivant le modèle ci-joint: on n'y fera figurer que les hommes présent à chaque corps au moment de leur départ de Paris à l'exception du détachement du 1er régiment laissé pour le service de l'Empereur qui doit rejoindre incessamment. Tous les autres hommes seront rayés et portés en mutation: passé à la compagnie de depot. L'état nommatif de ces hommes avec leur position au départ de Paris sera envoyé à M. Villeumeureux quartier maître par MM. les officiers [...]*

*Indépendamment des situations de 15me qui doivent être remises les 14 et 29 de chaque mois, il sera adressé journellement comme par le passé... rapport journalier [sic] où on mentionnera la perte et le gain de chaque jour et les événements survenus dans les 24 heures.*

*Le lieutenant général colonel de l'arme,  
Comte Friant<sup>25</sup>*

The imperial guard received the order to move to Fleurus at 8 a.m.<sup>26</sup> It left its positions around 9 a.m.<sup>27</sup> Towards 1 p.m. it arrived in the plains in front of Fleurus, between the farm of Martinroux and Fleurus. Taking into account an average speed of about 2.5 km/hour, it would have taken the troops about 3.5 hours to get there. Here the guard halted here for about one hour.<sup>28</sup> About the formation, De Mauduit writes: " Toute l'infanterie de la Vieille Garde alla se former en colonnes serrées par divisions de cinquante files, chaque compagnie formant, seule, division, en raison de la force de son effectif, et prit ainsi position à droite de la chaussée et comme toujours, la gauche en tête. Les quatre régiments de la Jeune Garde se formèrent également en colonne serrée, mais sur la gauche de la chaussée et à notre hauteur. Là nous mimes nos armes en faisceaux pour laisser le temps à tous les corps de s'établir à leur place de bataille. " <sup>29</sup> In general, the infantry of the guard was on both sides of the road.<sup>30</sup>

The first French troops, those of Pajol and Exelmans, emerged from Fleurus around 11 a.m.<sup>31</sup> They had orders to advance towards Sombreffe, but they saw their way blocked by a part of the Prussian army. Now, both commanders decided to wait for orders and meanwhile their men took up temporary positions north of Fleurus.

At 11 a.m. Napoleon arrived and by then the infantry of Vandamme was marching through the village as well. The moment the emperor observed the Prussian positions, the 1st Prussian corps was at Saint Amand and Ligny and behind these villages, to Brye. Shortly after, the 2nd Prussian corps was beginning to arrive from Namur, and commenced taking up positions west of Sombreffe. Meanwhile, Vandamme deployed north of Fleurus and west of the road to Point du Jour. Here, both cavalry-corps it took up a temporary position, waiting for more definitive orders to be issued depending on Napoleon's intentions.<sup>32</sup>

The more the French developed their positions, the more the Prussian cavalry of Von Röder retreated from its position near the Tombe de Ligny.

As described above, the corps of Gérard arrived near the windmill of Baulet at around 1 p.m.<sup>33</sup>

The 4th corps had its temporary position here and halted here for quite some time; the moment the 3rd corps got its final position in front of Saint Amand, the 4th corps changed its position too.

Having fully worked out his battle-plan, Napoleon carried out a change of front towards 2 p.m.

with Fleurus as turning-point, to move his right wing forward.<sup>34</sup> As a result, the 3<sup>rd</sup> corps took up positions in front of Saint Amand (<sup>35</sup>).

The division of Girard was taken out from the left wing and pulled from its position west of Fleurus to the left, *en potence*, of the 3<sup>rd</sup> corps opposite Sain Amand le Hameau.<sup>36</sup>

The corps of Gérard advanced from its position east of Fleurus and turned to the left, so that it took up a position in front of this village. From here two divisions advanced over the Gembloux-road in column of divisions on whole distance towards a position east of Ligny; the other remaining division, of Hulot, as well as the cavalry division of Maurin advanced further towards a position facing Sombreffe and Tongrenelle.<sup>37</sup> The 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> cavalry corps got positions *en potence* facing Boignée and Balâtre.

It was until about 2 p.m. that the corps of Milhaud and the Imperial Guard had kept their positions on the other side of Fleurus; now they got the orders to take up the second line.

The Imperial Guard had halted in front of Fleurus on both sides of the road. After 2 p.m. the troops resumed their march in one column through Fleurus so as to keep the road open for artillery. Emerging from Fleurus the guard took up new positions again.<sup>38</sup> In this way, the French right wing took up a front of nine kilometres.

Early that morning, Lobau received orders to move his corps halfway between Charleroi and Fleurus and halt there until further notice. At what time the corps left its bivouacs at and around Mont-sur-Marchienne is unknown. In its new position it halted for several hours. In conformity with the orders he had, Lobau had left one bataillon at Charleroi as a garrison; it was the 3<sup>rd</sup> battalion of the 11<sup>th</sup> regiment of the line (division Simmer).<sup>39</sup>

Lobau's report most probably reached Napoleon around 3 p.m. At that time the corps was still halfway between Charleroi and Fleurus, waiting for further orders. It was at 3.30 p.m. that Napoleon sent out the order to Lobau to move his corps to Fleurus. The moment, therefore, the battle of Ligny started the corps was between Charleroi and Gilly.

In absence of the corps of Lobau, Napoleon had a total force at Ligny of about 65.000 men and 212 guns.<sup>40</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Copy in SHD, nr.C15 Original in private collection (baron Du Casse)  
Cf. Grouchy. Relation succincte 3<sup>e</sup> série p.16

2. Original in SHD, nr.C15, nr.5

3. Copy in SHD. C15, nr.5

The same file contains a very similar version, but dated at 6 a.m. It reads:

*Le 16 juin 1815, 6 heures du matin*

*Sire,*

*Je viens d'être informé, et le général Girard me confirme, que l'ennemi débouche en force par Sombreffe sur les hauteurs de St. Amand, paraissant venir par la route de Namur. Je m'empresse de donner cet avis à Votre Majesté; elle peut le regarder comme positif.*

*Je réunis les troupes afin d'effectuer le mouvement que Votre Majesté vient d'ordonner sur Sombreffe.*

*Je suis avec respect, etc.*

*Grouchy*

Also in:

Lachouque, H. - Le secret de Waterloo p.121

Piérart, Z.J. - Le drame de Waterloo p.147-148

4. Copy in SHD..C15, nr.5 Also in:

Piérart, Z.J. - Le drame de Waterloo p.148

Aerts, W. - Etudes etc. p.350

<sup>5</sup> Pollio also sees the impossibility of these reports at the hours mentioned, but doesn't clarify the issue. In: Waterloo p.178

Grouchy himself states somewhere that both reports reached the emperor at 10.30 or 11 a.m.

In: Relation succincte 2<sup>me</sup> série p.14

6. Menuau says it was 9.30 for Exelmans' dragoons. In: Historique du 14<sup>me</sup> régiment de dragons p.291

7. Original in SHD. C15, nr.5

8. At least the 11<sup>th</sup> division, the one of Berthézène. Cf.his report of the 17<sup>th</sup> of June, SHD. C15, nr.5

He mentions a position of Farciennes from where his troops left.

Ph.Gerbet (officer of the 37<sup>th</sup> regiment line, division Lefol) adds that the troops left at 10 a.m. though they were ready to march by daybreak. In: Souvenirs etc. p.10

9. Lieutenant Putigny (33<sup>rd</sup> regiment, division Berthézène) In: Le grognard Putigny baron d'Empire p.169

10. Berthézène's report of the 17<sup>th</sup> of June. In: SHD. C15, nr.5

The fact that the corps took up positions to the left of the road leading to Gembloux is confirmed by Ph.Gerbet (37<sup>th</sup> regiment line, division Lefol). In: Gerbet, Ph. Souvenirs p.10

Lieutenant Putigny (33<sup>rd</sup> regiment, division Berthézène) mentions a position in front of Fleurus. See: Le grognard Putigny baron d'Empire p.169

11. Delloye, S. - Les mémoires du chirurgien Dominique d'Héralde." In: Bulletin de la Société belge d'Etudes Napoleoniennes p.19-36

12. Vandermaelen (map). Both mills have been demolished. According to d'Héralde the Prussians were visible, but out of musket-reach. The distance between Girard and St.Amand la Haye was almost three kilometres. In: Les mémoires du chirurgien Dominique d'Héralde." In: Bulletin de la Société belge d'Etudes Napoleoniennes p.19-36

13. Les mémoires du chirurgien Dominique d'Héralde." In: Bulletin de la Société Belge d'Etudes Napoleoniennes p.19-36

14. Siborne gives a wrong impression of the advance of the French right wing. In his version the French advanced in two columns, one on the road and one to the right of it. Pajol and Exelmans took up positions in two lines on a short distance from Fleurus; Pajol and Exelmans to the right, Vandamme to the left and the corps of Gérard in the centre. The guard and Milhaud were in second line.

However, the 3rd corps followed the cavalry and the 4th corps took another route, fully separate of the other troops. There was no deployment in front of Fleurus either. In: History of the war etc. Vol.I p.177

According to Menuau, Exelmans initially marched in rear of Pajol but gradually shifted to a position to the right and left of the road of Fleurus. In: Historique du 14me régiment de dragons p.291

15. This intermediate farm is now called the "ferme de Quirini". In former times it was called the "ferme de Keumiée".

Colonel Von Reiche mentions the march around noon of a French cavalry-corps moving from Fleurus towards Wanfercée and which then turned to the left, towards Tongrenelle. These troops were those of Exelmans. In: Memoiren etc. p.189

16. Mauduit, H.de. - Les derniers jours de la grande armée Vol.II p.40

17. Gérard, E.M. - Lettre de M.le maréchal comte Gérard à M.le Pascallet p.2  
 Réfutations du livre Gourgaud etc. In: Mémoires du maréchal de Grouchy Vol.V p.262  
 Captain Francois (30<sup>th</sup> regiment line) claims the division of Pécheux left Chatelet at 4 a.m., but this must be an error. In: Journal du capitaine Francois etc. p.879
18. Hulot - Documents militaires etc. p.21  
 Kaisin, J. - Annales historiques etc. p.386
19. Gérard, E.M. - Quelques documents sur la bataille de Waterloo p.48  
 Réfutations du livre Gourgaud etc. In: Mémoires du maréchal de Grouchy Vol.V p.262  
 Marshal Grouchy says at 1 p.m the troops took up their positions in the frontline. In: Réfutations du livre Gourgaud etc. In: Mémoires du maréchal de Grouchy Vol.V p.148  
 Houssaye, H. - 1815.Waterloo p.161  
 Charras - Histoire de la campagne de 1815 Vol.I p.146.  
 According to captain Francois (30<sup>th</sup> regiment line, division Pécheux) the troops arrived at Fleurus at noon. Additionally he says the divisions took different routes, but doesn't give any details. In: Journal du capitaine etc. p.879  
 According to captain Forget, of the general staff of the corps, it arrived on the battlefield by 2 p.m. In: Chuquet, A. - Lettres de 1815 p.308
20. According to Houssaye, Gérard was then looking for Napoleon. In: 1815. Waterloo p.161
21. Cf. report of colonel De Grouchy of the 12<sup>th</sup> regiment chasseurs à cheval. This colonel was a son of the marshal Grouchy. His regiment formed part of the division of Domon (Vandamme's corps). In: SHD
- The 6<sup>th</sup> regiment uhlands was a part of the cavalry of Von Röder, of the 1<sup>st</sup> Prussian corps.  
 According to De Bloqueville general Gérard took a group of Prussian cavalry for the staff of Napoleon. Yet, it is hard to imagine that a man like Gérard would make that kind of mistake. In:
22. Gérard, E.M. - Lettre de M.le maréchal comte Gérard à M.le Pascallet p.2-3  
 Report of colonel A.de Grouchy, 17<sup>th</sup> June In: SHD  
 Colonel Rumigny (aide de camp of Gérard). In: Souvenirs etc. p.99-100
23. Houssaye, H. - 1815. Waterloo p.161  
 Napoleon was already informed about the desertion as Gérard had written to Soult earlier.  
 According to colonel Rumigny Gérard met the emperor before he went out to reconnoitre the position, but this is an error. In: Souvenirs etc. p.99  
 Maes thinks the meeting was between 2 and 3 p.m., but this is too late. In: Le premier corps etc. In: 8me cahier documentaire ABN, 1993 p.16
24. Gérard, E.M. - Lettre de M.le maréchal comte Gérard à M.le Pascallet p.4  
 Account of De Bloqueville (SHD).

Also see the account of baron Gourgaud (archive LMB, nr.AS 2448) and the account of baron Petiet. Petiet would have been an eye-witness of the meeting. The words he cites are different, but have basically the same meaning. In: Petiet, A, Souvenirs militaires etc. p.195

The account of colonel de Rumigny, aide de camp of Gérard, confirms the fact that Napoleon wasn't surprised to hear about the desertion of Bourmont. Cf. Souvenirs du général comte de Rumigny p.99

<sup>25</sup> This version is the one issued to general Poret de Morvan. In: SHD, C15 nr.5

26. Mauduit, H.de. - Les derniers jours de la grande armée. Vol.II p.38

This conforms to the idea that the order would have been sent out between 7 and 8 a.m. that morning from Charleroi.

27. Mauduit, H.de - Les derniers jours de la grande armée Vol.II p.38

Generals Petits account etc. In: The English Historical Review. Vol.XVIII. 1903 p.323

Fraint, J.F. Vie militaire etc. p.383

<sup>28</sup> Mauduit, H.de Les derniers jours etc. Vol.II p.40

According to Petit the guard arrived in front of Fleurus at 2 p.m. In: In: The English historical review 18 (1903), p.323

Cf. J.F.Friant - Vie militaire etc. p.383

<sup>29</sup> Mauduit, H.de - Les derniers jours de la grande armée Vol.II p.40

According to Petit, the guard was first "en colonne sur bataillons déployé" en then in "régiment déployé." In: The English historical review 18 (1903), p.323

De Mauduit adds that it was custom in the Old Guard to march "la gauche en tête", i.e. the chasseurs preceding the grenadiers and the last regiments in front: 4<sup>th</sup>, 3<sup>rd</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup>, 1<sup>st</sup> chasseurs and then the 4<sup>th</sup>, 3<sup>rd</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup> and 1<sup>st</sup> grenadiers.

For an action, both types of infantry usually joined, the 4<sup>th</sup> of each first and the 1<sup>st</sup> last. In a march-column of both divisions (for instance *en route* or on a battlefield), the 4<sup>th</sup> chasseurs would be in front, then the 3<sup>rd</sup> and then the 2<sup>nd</sup>. The same as for the grenadiers. The reserve would move in the following sequence: sappers and miners, and then the 1st chasseurs and 1st grenadiers. In: Les derniers jours etc. Vol.I p.448-449

<sup>30</sup> According to J.F.Friant the chasseurs were in the first line and the grenadiers to the left. His description is far from clear however. In: Vie militaire etc p.383

<sup>31</sup> Von Zieten. Cf. his report of the 8<sup>th</sup> July 1815. In: Reiche, L.von Memoiren etc. p.417

Tagebuch des Königlich Preussischen I.Armeekorps. In: Pflugk Harttung, J.von Die Schlacht bei Ligny p.23

Cf. Hafner, D. "Hans Carl Ernst Graf von Zieten, Königlich Preussischer Generalfeldmarschall. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte Preussens in den Jahren 1792-1815 p.259

Colonel Biot, aide de camp of general Pajol, states how Pajol's cavalry arrived in front of the enemy around 1 p.m. In: Campagnes et garnisons etc. p.239

32. Cf. the initial observation role of the 11<sup>th</sup> division.

Captain Von Bismarck, of the 1<sup>st</sup> battalion of the 29<sup>th</sup> regiment, in position in the outer gardens of Saint Amand la Haye, saw the French debouching from Fleurus around noon in two masses he estimates at 4000 men and 10.000 men. Cf. His diary coming from the former Kriegsarchiv. In: Wellmann, R. - Geschichte etc. p.627

33. With this position it was, conform Grouchy's orders, "à portée du 3e corps" and able to "concourir à l'attaque de Sombreffe". Cf. the order to Grouchy of that morning.

34. Cf. the French report written on the 20<sup>th</sup> of June at Laon. In: Bas, F.de - La campagne de 1815 Vol.III p.455

Also see: Grouchy, G.de - Mémoires du maréchal de Grouchy. Vol.IV p.9

Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de France etc. p.

Gourgaud - La campagne de 1815 p.47

Gerbet, Ph. - Souvenirs etc. p.10

Francois, captain - Journal du capitaine Francois etc. p.

Reiche, L.von - Memoiren etc. p.183

Die Geschichte des 28.Regiments. In: Special ABN, nr.65 p.20

35. Report of general Berthézène of the 17<sup>th</sup> of June. In: SHD. C15, nr.5

Cf. Houssaye, H. - 1815.Waterloo p.163

Mauduit, H.de - Les derniers jours de la grande armée Vol.II p.49

Gerbet, Ph. - Souvenirs etc. p.10

36. Cf. the French report written on the 20<sup>th</sup> of June at Laon. In: Bas, F.de - La campagne de 1815 Vol.III p.455

Also in: Berthézène, P. Souvenirs militaires etc. p.363

De Mauduit's statements about this division are contradictory. On the one hand he states it was taken from Wangenies by 2 p.m. to a position to the left of Vandamme, while on the other he asserts that the division spent the night at Heppignies, was ordered in the early morning towards Wangenies and that it was ordered from there by 3.30 p.m. to Saint Amand le Hameau to attack it. In: Les derniers jours et. Vol.II p.50, 56, 63,70-71

37. Mauduit, H.de - Les derniers jours de la grande armée Vol.II p.50

Hulot, E. - Documents militaires etc. p.21

Houssaye, H. - 1815.Waterloo p.163

Reiche, L.von - Memoiren etc. p.189

Tagebuch des Königlich Preussischen I.Armeekorps. In: Pflugk Harttung, J.von - Die

Schlacht bei Ligny p.23 In this document it is claimed that the 4<sup>th</sup> corps moved this way the moment the 3<sup>rd</sup> French corps attacked St.Amand. In: Haffner, D. Hans Carl Ernst etc. p.259  
According to Berthézène the 4<sup>th</sup> corps had hardly left to take up a position behind the 3<sup>rd</sup> corps when it got the instruction to take up a position facing Ligny. In: Souvenirs militaires etc. p.363  
Lieutenant Von Gerlach confirms the initial development of the French forces to their left and later to their right, over the road to Point du Jour as well, opposite Ligny. Cf.Lieutenant Von Gerlach (attached to the general headquarters). Cf.his diary. In: Aus den Jahren Preussischer Not etc. p.147

38. Mauduit, H.de - Les derniers jours de la grande armée Vol.II p.47-48

General Petit. In: The English historical review 18 (1903), p.323

Colonel Duuring (1<sup>st</sup> regiment of chasseurs). In: L'infanterie de la garde à Waterloo p.115

<sup>39</sup> Corporal Delroeux (3<sup>rd</sup> battalion, 11<sup>th</sup> regiment of the line). In: Fleischman, Th. - L'épopée impériale p.521

40. This total force comprises:

3<sup>rd</sup> corps: 17379 men and 46 guns. 4<sup>th</sup> corps: 15249 men and 38 guns. Division Girard: 3890 men and 8 guns. Pajol's corps (excluding the 1<sup>st</sup> regiment of hussars): 2359 men and 12 guns. Exelmans' corps: 3000 men and 12 guns. Milhaud's corps: 3516 men and 12 guns. Imperial guard: 20826 men and 104 guns. Total (including some losses on the 15<sup>th</sup> of June): about 66.000 men and 232 guns. In: SHD. C15, nrs.35 and 36