

The 2nd corps.

On the night of the 14th of June the 2nd French corps had its headquarters at Solre sur Sambre; the corps itself was spread out over an area with a length of six kilometres, between Solre sur Sambre and Leers and Fosteau. ¹ The division of Bachelu was in the outposts guarding the exits of Thuin, Rangnée and Strée; the division of Piré had to establish itself at Fontaine Walmont.

Reille was to leave with his corps at 3 a.m. and to arrive at the Sambre before 9 a.m. As for the crossing of the river the order of march of the 14th of June is not clear. On the one hand it states "...surtout le pont de Marchienne, par lequel il [Reille] sera probablement dans le cas de déboucher.." and: " M.le comte d'Erlon mettra en marche le 1er corps à trois heures du matin et le dirigera aussi sur Charleroi, en suivant le mouvement du 2e corps.."

In his first order of the 15th June to Reille, Napoleon doesn't mention Charleroi specifically, but he does in his second order as: "Si vous êtes encore à Marchienne lorsque le présent ordre vous parviendra, et que le mouvement par Charleroi ne put avoir lieu, vous l'opérez toujours par Marchienne". So, Reille had the option to cross the river at Marchienne-au-Pont if he felt the crossing at Charleroi wasn't possible.

The route Reille took ran through Solre-sur-Sambre, Leers-Fosteau, Biercée, Maladrie, Thuin, Le Chêne, Aulne, Montigny-le-Tilleul, Marchienne-au-Pont. It is the road on the right bank of the Sambre and which follows the heights here. Its total length was 27.5 kilometres. The corps left at 3 a.m. ² It took the road which runs along Hantes, Fontaine-Walmont, Leers and Fosteau and crossed the border between Fosteau and Biercée. ³

The actions at Lobbes and Maladrie.

In and in front of Lobbes (which lies for the most part north of the Sambre) stood a detachment led by captain Gillhausen. It consisted of three companies of the 2nd battalion 1st regiment Westphalian Landwehr (brigade Steinmetz) and a picket of the 6th regiment uhlan (on the flank); one company secured the bridge. ⁴

It was by 4.a.m. that the detachment came under attack of the division of Bachelu, the advance guard of Reille. ⁵ Though the Prussians had a strong position, the French drove them into Lobbes. However, the French didn't push through and turned eastward to the main road leading to Thuin.

While this action took place near Lobbes, Bachelu's main force advanced through Maladrie towards Thuin. ⁶ At Maladrie was another outpost and that was one which came from the garrison at Thuin, the 1st, 2nd and 3rd companies of the 3rd battalion of the 2nd regiment Westphalian Landwehr led by major Von Monsterberg (about 600 men). ⁷

A French column consisting of units of the divisions of Bachelu and Piré attacked Maladrie. ⁸ Initially, the French cavalry drove away a Prussian cavalry-sentry (probably the one from Strée) which had advanced. [⁹] and then the French artillery bombarded the Prussian position at Maladrie. By now, it was about 5 a.m. ¹⁰ After about an hour the Prussian evacuated their positions and went back to the woods north of the Sambre. ¹¹



The ferme de la Salle, at Strée.

The action at Thuin.

Thuin lies on a height on the south bank of the Sambre and is situated in the bend which this river forms with the stream of Biesmelle. On this narrow and eminent height was the upper part of Thuin and which counted in 1815 about 150 houses; this part of Thuin had been walled. The lower part of Thuin, situated between the upper part and the Sambre-river counted about 80 houses and was connected to the higher town by a road which wended its way upwards.¹²

In this situation, with heights of almost 100 metres, the only place to approach Thuin was from the east. With 179 metres the height of Maladrie, southwest of Thuin, was higher as Thuin itself (163 metres). With 196 metres, the height of Les Waibes, north of Thuin, and on the opposite bank of the Sambre, was higher as well, while the field of the Chapelle Saint Roch, west of Thuin, and on the other bank of the Biesmelle, were 168 metres high.¹³



The village of Thuin

At Thuin were the three first companies of the 3rd battalion of the 2nd regiment Westphalian regiment Landwehr (brigade Von Pirch II), led by major Von Monsterberg.¹⁴ Von Monsterberg had the instruction not to leave his post too early.¹⁵

Initially only French cavalry appeared, but soon after they were joined by infantry and artillery.¹⁶ After some initial skirmishing on the plateau of Maladrie, the Prussians were driven back into the valley of the Biesmelle, and soon after the French brought up a battery against Thuin. By that time, it was about 6 a.m.¹⁷ Gunfire damaged the church. By now, the French descended the slopes of the Biesmelle and reached the bridges of the Piraille and of the Couture; a detachment ran to reach the bridge over the Sambre. The assault on the upper part of Thuin now took place through the narrow tracks, gardens and terraces on the western slope of Notre Dame (the main entrance) and over the southern slope which gave access to the *poternes* / entrances of Arlequin, Maillard and Soeurs Grises.

The Prussians had blocked the entrances as much as possible and gave strong resistance in the narrow streets of the upper part of town.¹⁸ After about one hour of fighting the Prussians fell back to the eastern part of Thuin, where they got away through the exits of Bourreau and Chant des Oiseaux to Aulne. By now, it was 7.00 a.m. Here, on the field of Trieux, they were forced some time later to fight themselves out with their bayonets to a position east of Thuin as they were almost cut off by French cavalry which had advanced through Rangies and Biesme.¹⁹⁻²⁰

After the defence of Thuin the Prussians were no longer able to cross the Sambre; how this was possible is not clear. Now, the detachment got away over the road which led to Montigny-le-Tilleul. Meanwhile, other units of Reille took the posts at Hourbes and at the abbey of Aulne by driving off the outposts of the 3rd battalion 1st regiment Westphalian Landwehr. Aulne would have been attacked by 8 a.m.²¹ Of both actions, no details are known but it may be possible that they were actually evacuated before the French took them.



The ruins of the abbey of Aulne.

Even after the loss of Thuin, at 7.00 a.m., Von Gillhausen stayed for another half hour securing the far heights and withdrawing his various outposts; he still held the bridge at Lobbes with one company. Then, he withdrew to the wood of Sart-de-Lobbes and the moment he learned about the fall of the Prussian post at Hourbes, he continued his withdrawal (by orders of Von Steinmetz) further north towards a point between Anderlues (left) and Fontaine l'Evêque (right).²²

Captain Von Gillhausen alarmed the 1st brigade (Von Steinmetz); after that Von Steinmetz collected his battalions near Fontaine l'Eveque in order to cross the Piéton and to march to Gosselies.

While the troops of major Von Monsterberg were pursued over this road and were driven out of Montigny-le-Tilleul by French musketry fire, the French infantry of the 2nd regiment of light infantry took the post of captain Grolman of the 3rd battalion 1st regiment Westphalian Landwehr (about 700 men) and which was posted near the abbey. It was then around 8.30 a.m.

It was at Montigny-le-Tilleul that the troops of Von Monsterberg united with two squadrons of the 1st regiment West-Prussian dragoons nr.2, led by lieutenant colonel Von Woisky.²³

Von Woisky, in position at Jamioulx, having heard the guns and rattle of musketry at Thuin and having learned that the post of cavalry at Nalinnes had been attacked, informed Pirch II. The moment he got news from Thuin he went towards Montignies-le-Tilleul with his two squadrons.²⁴

Initially, the retreat took place in a relatively good order, but it was behind Montigny-le-Tilleul near the Chapelle of Saint Martin that the Prussians were taken in by the French vanguard. Von Woisky initially had a bit of success in driving back the French, but the moment they returned with reinforcements, the dragoons gave it another try but failed, being inferior in numbers, armour and experience.²⁵ The French were not only very numerous in cavalry, but also had two howitzers of a horse battery. It was now about 9 a.m.²⁶

The Prussians had to pay dearly for their attempt to resist the French. By now, Reille ordered the 1st regiment chasseurs à cheval led by colonel Simonneau to charge; the Prussian infantry which had formed square was cut down and also the Prussian cavalry suffered serious losses. Lieutenant colonel Von Woisky himself got wounded on his head but kept leading on his men. Of the 600 men of Prussian infantry and 250 horsemen, 200 men were taken prisoner and about a 100 killed or wounded.²⁷

Those who escaped found support at the entrance of Marchienne-au-Pont. Here was a part of the 2nd battalion of the 1st West-Prussian regiment infantry no.6, which had left Montigny-le-Tilleul before; the remainder of this battalion was at Marchienne-au-Pont itself.²⁸

Initially, a line of skirmishers of the 2nd battalion, led by lieutenant Von Hülfen, successfully defended the entrances of Marchienne-au-Pont, until the French deployed the two howitzers near the windmill of St.Martin, which was probably near the chapel of the same name, about 1.5 kilometres south of the entrance of Marchienne-au-Pont.²⁹ From here they started to bombard the village. Now, also because of a lack of artillery, and once the detachments expelled from Thuin had joined the battalion, captain Von Krentzki, on orders of Pirch II, abandoned the right bank of the Sambre and fell back to the bridge, using any cover he could find.

Von Krentzki now quickly barricaded the bridge and chose a favourable position on the left bank of the river. In this position lieutenant Von Hülfen was able to push back three successive attacks of the French, but soon the French superiority and his own lack of artillery forced him to evacuate Marchienne-au-Pont.³⁰

By 10 a.m. they went further back through Damprémy to Gilly, after having learned that the 1st brigade had gone back as far as level to Marchienne-au-Pont and that Charleroi had almost fallen into the enemies hands.³¹ By now, Reille received the order from Soult from Jamioulx which gave him the possibility to cross the Sambre at Marchienne-au-Pont instead of Charleroi.

The passage at Marchienne-au-Pont.

The division of Bachelu arrived in front of Marchienne-au-Pont around 10 a.m.³² In 1815, most of Marchienne-au-Pont was on the south bank of the Sambre; on the north bank some buildings lined the road which led north. The west part of the village was formed by a large monastery and a chateau, while the entrance to the south was preceded from that direction by another large monastery, the one of Miséricorde.³³

At Marchienne-au-Pont was the 2nd battalion of the 1st West-Prussian regiment infantry nr. 6 (800 men) with two guns.³⁴ The narrow bridge had been barricaded; on both sides of the river, the streets were just as narrow.³⁵ Bachelu had been ordered to take the bridge and the village. After a strong fire-fight the French attacked the garrison with the bayonet. The Prussians fell back, thereby slowing down the French advance and without suffering too much loss.³⁶

Before he entered the opposite bank of the river, Reille concentrated his army-corps further.³⁷ As a result it may have been towards 12.30 / 1 p.m. that the main part of Reille's corps started to cross the river.³⁸

The Prussians at Marchienne-au-Pont retreated to Gilly through Damprémy (³⁹). Here, these forces were received by the 1st battalion 2nd regiment Westphalian Landwehr) from Gilly, with four guns of foot battery nr.3.⁴⁰ Placed at the churchyard of Damprémy, these guns covered the retreat of the infantry to Fleurus; the half battery then reached Gilly.⁴¹

By 2.15 p.m. Napoleon sent general Reille from Belle Vue the order to speed up his march and to go to Gosselies in order to drive away the enemy there. The cavalry of the guard was also supposed to go to there.⁴² By the time Reille got the order, he may have had two divisions north of the Sambre.⁴³

The march towards Gosselies.

About the stretch from Marchienne-au-Pont to Jumet Reille himself says: "j'ai dirigé la cavalerie en laissant à gauche le Bois de Monceaux et je l'ai traversé avec la colonne d'infanterie." ⁴⁴ And: "..le comte le [the corps] fit déboucher et marcha sur Jumet au travers du Bois de Monceau, tandis qu'il faisait tourner ce bois par sa division de cavalerie". ⁴⁵

The Bois du Monceau was situated north-east and north-west of Marchienne-au-Pont; the 2nd corps passed in between these two parts, initially over the road which leads from Marchienne-au-Pont to Roux, and then to turn right over the Piéton and through the forest, along and through the hamlets of Baymont and Goysart and from there through the whole of Jumet towards the road to Brussels. Piré's cavalry covered the march further left, by turning the wood on its left. ⁴⁶

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1. In this area between Solre-sur-Sambre and Leers-Fosteau were several buildings, and which exist still today, like the farm of Les Engorgeoirs, the farm Dansonspène, the farm Le Sart Allard and the chateau of Fosteau.

2. Report of Reille of the 15th June, 9 p.m. written at Gosselies. In: SHD, C15, nr.22

3. Reille claims his corps crossed the border at 3 a.m. but this was slightly later as it left at 3 a.m. In: Notice historique etc. In: Documents inédits etc. p.55

According to colonel Trefcon (chief of staff of the division of Bachelu) it was dawn, so around 3.45 a.m. In: Carnet de campagne du colonel Trefcon. p.78

Another source gives 4 a.m. Cf. Die geschichte des 28.Regiments noemt 4.00 uur. In: ABN, nr.65 p.12

⁴ Beleuchtung etc. In: MWB, 1846 p.39

5. Captain Von Gillhausen and major Gerwien believe it was at 3.30 a.m. but this is a bit too early. Cf. Gillhausen in: MWB, Vol.30 p.36, Vol.31, p.180 and BL. Add.ms. 34.708.99

Also see: Report 1st army-corps. In: KA, VI.E.7.I.3 In: GSA,VPH-HA,VI nr.VII.nr.3A.p.1

Report about the 2nd brigade. In: KA,, VI.E.7.I.64 in: GSA,VPH-HA,VI. nr.VII.3c.p.28

Von Pflugk Harttung In: GSA. VPH-HA.VI., nr.II.12.p.17, and nr.II.4.p.44

Captain Gey (battery horse artillery of the same name of the army of the Netherlands and located at Saint Symphorien) says he learned that the French attack started at 4 a.m. but whether he had heard this himself by the gunfire or that he had learned this later during the day through others, remains unclear. Cf. letter of captain Gey to his brother, dated 15th of June 1815. In: NA, nr.462A, 2.21.071 coll.123 nr.188

6. Report of captain Von Gillhausen (2nd battalion 1st regiment of Westphalian Landwehrrifantry). In: KA, VI.E.7.II.35 In: GSA,VPH-HA,VI nr.VII,nr.3B p.7

7. Report about the 2nd brigade. In: KA, VI.E.7.I.64 in: GSA,VPH-HA,VI. nr.VII.3c.p.28

Cf. Pflugk Harttung, J.von In: GSA,VPH-HA VI, nr.II.4.p.44

Some state it was the 2nd battalion 2nd regiment Westphalian Landwehr. Cf. Piérart, Z.J. Le drame de Waterloo. p.63

Ollech, Von - Geschichte des Feldzuges von 1815. p.96

Also the 3rd battalion of the 28th regiment is mentioned. In: Special ABN, nr.65 p.12

See the report of Von Zieten dated 8th July 1815. In: Reiche, Von Memoiren etc. p.415

8. The fact that Bachelu was in front can be taken from Reille's report from 9 p.m. In this division, the 2nd regiment of light infantry was in front all the time. In: SHD, C15, nr.22

Sometimes this regiment is erroneously assigned to the division of Jérôme Bonaparte. Cf. SHD, file C15.35 (strengths of the corps Reille, 1st and 24th June 1815).

According to Von Pflugk Harttung, the Prussians evacuated Maladrie after a bombardment of four French guns which opened fire at 4 a.m. Cf. GSA, VPH-HA.VI., nr.II.12.p.17 and GSA, VPH-HA VI, nr.II.4.p.44

For this statement he uses the report of captain Von Gillhausen. Cf. report of captain Von Gillhausen (2nd battalion 1st regiment of Westphalian Landwehrinfantry). In: KA, VI.E.7.II.35 In: GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.VII,nr.3B p.7

⁹ Report of captain Von Gillhausen. In: KA, VI.E.7.II.35 In: GSA, VPH-HA VI, nr.II.4.p.44

¹⁰ According to Von Gillhausen the French bombardment on Maladrie started about one hour after the first exchange of musketry between the French and his outposts (he says 4.30, but taking into account his error of about 30 minutes, this may have been around 5.00).

Report of captain Von Gillhausen (2nd battalion 1st regiment of Westphalian Landwehrinfantry). In: KA, VI.E.7.II.35 In: GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.VII,nr.3B p.7

Major Gerwien believes it was then 4.30. Cf. BL. Add.Ms.34.708.99

11. Account of an adjutant of Von Steinmetz. In: Beleuchtung etc. In: MWB, 1846 p.180

According to Von Gillhausen, the Prussian units resisted for about 1.5 hours, but this includes probably the fighting at Thuin. Cf. Report of captain Von Gillhausen (2nd battalion 1st regiment of Westphalian Landwehrinfantry). In: KA, VI.E.7.II.35 In: GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.VII,nr.3B p.7

¹² For an impression, see: Le Loup - Les délices du Pays de Liège etc. p.350

¹³ T'Sas, F. - La prise de Thuin par les Français le 15 Juin 1815. In: Bulletin of the SBEN, no.62 1968 p.10-12

¹⁴ Pflugk Harttung, J.von In: GSA, VPH-HA VI, nr.II.4.p.44

¹⁵ Major Von Monsterberg. In: KA, VI.E.7.I.78 In: GSA, VPH-HA VI, nr.II.4.p.45 and nr.VII.3C.p.19

¹⁶ Cf. report of lieutenant Von Schlurich (on behalf of colonel Von Woisky), of the 1st regiment of West-Prussian dragoons, dated 15th June 1815, to Pirch II. In: KA, VI.E.15.II.23 In: GSA, VPH-HA VI, nr.II.4.p.44

The report of colonel Von Woisky himself, to Pirch II dated 15th of June as well. In: KA, VI.E.15.II.25 In: GSA, VPH-HA VI, nr.II.4.p.44

Major Von Monsterberg himself says he was attacked by 2 battalions, 4 to 5 squadrons and 2 guns. Cf. his report in the KA. nr.VI.E.7.I.78 in: GSA, VPH-HA, VI nr.VII.3C.p.19

¹⁷ Zieten in his report dated 8th July 1816 claims it was 4 a.m. In: Reiche, Von Memoiren etc. p.415

¹⁸ It was during these actions that major Von Monsterberg was taken prisoner for a short while, but was liberated by his aide de camp, lieutenant Delius and 30 soldiers. In this action, Delius himself was taken prisoner and got wounded. A family called Troye took care of him in their house. Cf. Conreur, M. - De Thuin à Waterloo p.31-32

¹⁹ The fact that the action at Thuin took more than an hour is confirmed by major Von Monsterberg himself. Cf. his report in KA nr.VI.E.7.I.78 in: GSA, VPH-HA,VI nr.VII.3C.p.19

20. Detailed research has been carried out on the action at Thuin

Cf. Conreur, M. - De Thuin à Waterloo. 1990. Conreur used mainly three sources. First of all, the account of Marie Louise Troye, born Drion. She had assembled the eye-witness accounts of her family-members who lived in her house in 1815.

In this house major Monsterberg and his aide de camp, lieutenant Delius, would have had their billet.

The second source Conreur used were the notes written down by Dr.Rombeau, entitled "Notes sur le passage des armées francaises en Thudinie les quatorze et quinze Juin 1815" , plus a questionnaire of captain Royet dated 1897, with the answers of Dr.Rombeau, then archivist at Thuin.

The third source was a letter of the priest Grandigneau. He was a priest at Thuin in the period 1803-1837. In a letter to his superior, the cardinal of Tournai, he reports about the events of June 1815. All these papers are now in the Royal archives at Mons.

²¹ Beleuchtung etc. In: MWB, 1846 p.39

At Aulnes there was a stone bridge over the Sambre. Cf. Le Loup - Les délices du Pays de Liège etc.p.342

²² Report of captain Von Gillhausen (2nd battalion 1st regiment of Westphalian Landwehrrifantry). In: KA, VI.E.7.II.35 In: GSA,VPH-HA,VI nr.VII,nr.3B p.8

23. Report of major Von Monsterberg. Cf. his report. In: KA,VI.E.7.I.78 in: GSA, VPH-HA,VI nr.VII.3C.p.19

Von Monsterberg adds that the 10th company of his battalion, from Ham-sur-Heure, as well as both detachments at Marbais and Nalinnes had not arrived at Montigny-le-Tilleul, but that they had been allowed by lieutenant colonel Von Woisky to take another way back.

Cf. GSA. VPH-HA.VI., nr.II.12.p.18

²⁴ Pflugk Harttung, J.von In: GSA, VPH-HA VI,nr.II.4.p.46

²⁵ Report of Von Zieten. In: KA, VI.E.15 in GSA, VPH-HA,VI nr.VII.3 E.p.2
Pflugk Harttung, J.von In: GSA. VPH-HA.VI., nr.II.12.p.18

²⁶ Report of colonel Von Stach (commander of the 1st West-Prussian regiment of infantry nr.6), dated 18th June 1815. In: Steinmetz, major Von Beleuchtung etc. MWB, p.43

27. Report of Reille, dated 9 p.m. from Gosselies. In: SHD, C15, nr.22

Report of colonel Von Stack, 1st West-Prussian regiment of infantry nr.6. In: KA, VI.E.7.II.63. In: GSA,VPH-HA,VI nr.VII.3C.p.3

Reiche, L.von Memoiren etc. p.157 and 162

Report about the 2nd brigade. In: KA, VI.E.7.I.64 in: GSA,VPH-HA,VI. nr.VII.3c.p.29

Chef d'escadron Lemonnier-Delafosse, chief of staff of the division of Foy, confirms Prussian squares were charged by French light cavalry near a windmill which stood to the right of the road [the one of Saint Martin, see below]. In: Souvenirs militaires p.204

Gourgaud mentions 300 prisoners on the whole route towards Marchienne. In: Campagne de dix-huit cent quinze. p.36

The chief of staff of the 2nd corps, maréchal de camp Pamphyle-Lacroix, also gives 300 prisoners. Cf. his report of the 4th of July 1815. In: Coppens, B. & Courcelle, P. Hougoumont p.79

And yet, colonel Von Monsterberg succeeded in collecting 20-30 dragoons with whom he drove the French back a bit and in doing so he would have liberated more than 150 prisoners. Cf. his report in KA.VI.E.7.I.78 in: GSA, VPH-HA,VI nr.VII.3C.p.19

Cf. GSA. VPH-HA.VI., nr.II.12.p.18 and nr.II.4.p.49

Von Monsterberg clearly blames the destruction of his battalion on the behaviour of the dragoons: they would have panicked and led the French cavalry into his battalion.

Von Damitz blames the losses to the fact that the Prussians lingered too long at Thuin and that they fell back over a relatively flat area. In: Geschichte des Feldzuges von 1815. p.78-79

Conreur situates this action of Von Woisky against the French cavalry immediately east of Thuin.

²⁸ This battalion had already been collected in the night of the 14th at Mont-sur-Marchienne, where it took up a position to cover the two alarm-guns. The moment the gunfire from Thuin was heard by captain Von Kronsky, he reported this back to Pirch II who ordered him to go to Marchienne-au-Pont. Cf. Von Pflugk Harttung. In: GSA,VPH-HA, VI, nr.II.5.p.6

²⁹ The fact that there was a fight near a mill of this name is also confirmed by Scheltema and Prunieu. Prunieu was mayor of Charleroi from 1814 until 1824.

Cf. Scheltema, J. De laatste veldtocht van Napoleon Bonaparte p.70

Prunieu, T.J. In: La bataille de Waterloo vue de Charleroi. In: Bulletin SBEN, 1952 nr.6 p.27

Masset (probably from a local tradition) confirms that French guns were placed at a site called Spiniat, near a shaft called Sainte Barbe of the mine Saint Martin. This shaft was west

of the road of Montigny le Tilleul and at about 500 metres from the centre of Marchienne-au-Pont. Inhabitants of Marchienne-au-Pont would have sought refuge in the Bois de Hameau and the Bois de Bayemont (north-east of the village). In: Histoire de Marchienne-au-Pont p.130-131

Cf. Maes, P. - Le premier corps etc. In: 8me cahier documentaire, ABN, 1993 p.7-8

30. Report of colonel Von Stack (commander 1st West-Prussian regiment no.6), dated 18th June 1815. In: Steinmetz, major von Beleuchtung etc. p.43

Report of colonel Von Stack, 1st West-Prussian regiment of infantry nr.6. In: KA, VI.E.7.II.63, in: GSA,VPH-HA,VI nr.VII.3C.p.3

Report of captain Von Krentzki himself. In: KA, VI.E.7.I.72, in: GSA,VPH-HA,VI nr.VII.3C.p.14

Diary of the 1st corps. KA, II.M.207 In: GSA,VPH-HA,VI nr.VII.3.p.13

Cf. Conrady, E.von - Geschichte des Königlich etc. p.240

Conreur, M. - De Thuin à Waterloo. p.14

Conreur mainly draws from the work of P.A.Masset, entitled “Histoire de Marchienne-au-Pont”

Maes cites a witness, Ph. Batriaux, but he gives no source.

He also informs us that the wounded were taken care of in the church at Marchienne-au-Pont, a place where most of the population had fled to. Cf. Maes, P. - Le premier corps etc. In: 8me cahier documentaire ABN, 1993 p.7-8

Cf. Scheltema, J. De laatste veldtocht van Napoleon Bonaparte p.70

Prunieu, T.J. In: La bataille de Waterloo vue de Charleroi. In: Bulletin of the SBEN, 1952 nr.6 p.27

³¹ Pflugk Harttung, J.von In: GSA, VPH-HA VI,nr.II.5.p.6-7

Report of captain Von Krentzki himself. In: KA, VI.E.7.I.72, in: GSA,VPH-HA,VI nr.VII.3C.p.14

32. Trefcon, T.J. - Carnet de campagne du colonel Trefcon. p.179

Cf. Wellmann, R. Geschichte des Infanterie-Regiments etc. p.67

According to a local citizen the French arrived at Marchienne-au-Pont at 7 a.m. Cf. Opérations militaires etc. Extrait d’une lettre d’un fonctionnaire public de Charleroi p.21

According to Conreur the French took the bridge between 11 a.m. and noon. In: De Thuin à Waterloo p.14

³³ Le Loup - Les délices du Pays de Liège etc. p.335-336

34. Das Tagebuch des Königlich etc. In: GSA,VPH-HA,VI,nr.VII.3a.p.12

³⁵ The bridge at Marchienne-au-Pont was a stone one, eight metres wide and thirty metres long. Cf. Lecomte - Considérations sur la bataille de Waterloo

However, according to a plan in the papers of Charras the bridge would have measured 4.35 in width. By whom the sketch has been drawn is unknown. In: SHD, nr.I K 416

36. Trefcon, T.J. Carnet de campagne du colonel Trefcon p.179
2nd lieutenant Herbillon (108th regiment of the line – division Bachelu) confirms the action at Marchienne-au-Pont and the share of his regiment there. In: Quelques pages d'un vieux cahier
According to ensign Larreguy de Civrieux (93rd regiment of the line – division Foy) the inhabitants received the French with enthusiasm. In: Souvenirs d'un cadet 1812-1823 p.163

37. Reille's account. In: Documents inédits etc. p.55

38. Navez believes it was noon. In: La campagne de 1815. Vol. I p.94
According to Moreau the action at Marchienne-au-Pont took two hours. Cf. Moreau, M. A
Jumet en Juin 1815. In: Bulletin SBEN, no.14 1955 p.21

³⁹ Report of colonel Von Stach, 1st West-Prussian regiment no.6 In: Beleuchtung etc. MWB, (1846) p.43

40. Report of captain Von Eberstein (2nd battalion of the 2nd regiment of Westphalian Landwehr infantry). In: KA, VI.E.7.I.77 in GSA,VPH-HA,VI nr.VII.nr.3C.p.12
Cf. Briefe eines Preussischen Offiziers über den Feldzug etc. In: MWB, 1822 p.461

41. Aerts, W. - Etudes relatives à la campagne de 1815 p.294

42. Gourgaud. Manuscript account. In: AN, Fonds Gourgaud, 314 AP30
Gourgaud was the messenger of this order.

43. Gourgaud reports he met Reille when he turned a large village at the Brussels road; this was Bonnaire and Les Hayes. Reille then was on his way to Jumet. In: Manuscript account.
In: AN, Fonds Gourgaud, 314 AP30

44. His report dated 9 p.m. In: SHD, C15, nr.22

45. Reille. Notice historique etc. In: Documents inédits p.55

46. Gourgaud writes: "Il se porta rapidement par la traverse pour couper vers Gosselies la route de Bruxelles". He also adds a sketch of the march. In: La campagne de 1815 p.39
Winand Aerts marks the route through Chapelle Saint Fiacre, Cense le Chenoy, the road which goes in a northern direction and which lies about 400 metres west of the Piéton; this road then continues through Les Hayettes, Wilbouroux, Tienne de Prise and along the Bois du Sart. There the road bends sharply to the right, along the Cense de Miaucourt, the hamlet of La Motte (to the left), over the Piéton and along the Moulin l'Estortoir (to the right) to the

northern part of Gosselies. In: Etudes relatives à la campagne de 1815 p.274

However, both these routes as given by Gourgaud and Aerts are far too eccentric; this is not "se porter rapidement par la traverse" or "..et marcha sur Jumet au travers .." as Reille describes it.

Delpierre describes the route as passing over the Piéton at the bridge à Ruau, near the mill of Damprémy, and then through the Bois de Monceau / Jumet towards Jumet, having the Chapelle Notre Dame au Bois to the left and to end up at the chaussée de Bruxelles at the site called La Brulote or at the crossing called Puissant. In: Jumet: journées de Juin 1815 p.45-46